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Abstract
The thesis critically examines the advance o f United Nations peacekeeping as an instrument for 
managing various facets o f a post-colonial world order. The first part o f  the study explores the 
structural role o f UN peace operations in a world of sovereign states as well as the internal 
political struggle to shape the parameters and direction of the UN’s work. As far as the former is 
concerned, it is suggested that peace operations should be understood as very specific political 
activities that have been forged to provide for either a transition from one social system to 
another, or deployed to buttress a particular world social order. Concurrently, it is argued that the 
expansion o f peacekeeping must also be seen in the context o f  the internal ideological and 
political battle to determine the orientation o f the world body. While this has witnessed the 
organisation briefly challenged during the 1970s by Third World states determined to direct the 
UN’s gaze onto the regulation o f the private international economy, the matter has been settled 
(for now) in favour o f  the organisation directing its energies to advocating particular forms of 
liberal governance within Southern societies. Both dynamics—the wider structural role o f peace 
operations and the narrower internal struggle to determine the content o f the UN’s work— are 
necessary in order to understand the political connotations o f these practices and their 
predominance in the organisation’s activities today. After analysing the political specificity of 
UN peace practices, the study moves on to look at their utilisation in the African context— in 
Angola, Rwanda, and Somalia—paying particular attention to the wider political transformations 
underway in each context and the role o f the UN in pursuing such ends. The thesis concludes with 
a set o f observations about the place of the UN in managing world order in the Southern 
hemisphere.
2
Contents
Acknowledgements 4
Preface: United Nations Peace Operations in Perspective 5
1. United Nations Peace Operations and World Order: A critical reappraisal o f 18
purposes and practices, 1948-1987
2. Defining the Work o f the United Nations: From the challenge o f Third World 46
activism to the resurgent Western security agenda
3. Reorienting the United Nations in a Post Second World Context: The advance of 63
peace operations
4. United Nations Misadventures in Somalia: Militarised liberal internationalism in 91
the early 1990s
5. Post-Colonial Rwanda and United Nations Conveyance Operations: From 125
trusteeship to neo-liberal state transformation
6. Manufacturing Peace in Angola: The Lusaka Protocol and the standard o f UN 155
peace operations
7. United Nations Peace Operations and the Management of the World Political 189
Order in the Periphery
Appendices:
1. UN Security Council Vetoes January 1989-December 2005 221
2. UN Peacekeeping Operations January 1989-December 2005 223
Bibliography 225
3
Acknowledgements
Over the years in which the research and writing-up o f this study has taken place, I have had the 
support and encouragement o f friends, family and colleagues. I would like here to say a special 
thanks to Nick and Pamela for reading and commenting on innumerable rough drafts and for their 
unflinching belief in the cause, as well as to my family in general, Anis, Sigrid, Janna, Makram, 
Adam and Inas for their solidarity and for the many happy and welcome distractions that they 
have provided. In the UN in New York, the Division for Palestinian Rights provided the ideal 
setting to observer the various transformations in orientation that the world body has been 
undergoing since the collapse of the Second World and, through the example o f its continued 
existence and refusal to redefine the parameters o f  the legitimate rights o f Palestinians, especially 
refugees in the wider region, practically demonstrated how resistance from within the UN is still 
possible, even if  increasingly difficult. Following and working closely with the Permanent 
Observer Mission o f Palestine during this time showed from another angle— that o f the 
consultative organs and committees—how it is possible for the dedicated staff o f a small observer 
mission to continuously take on the chancelleries o f materially mighty UN member-states and 
occasionally emerge victorious. It is not o f course in New York that any o f these issues will be 
resolved— resistance in our current context is best organised in Nablus, Jenin and other towns in 
Occupied Palestine— but it is important to recognise for Palestine and elsewhere, that in the 
beleaguered and barricaded comers o f the UN system there are staff and diplomats who are 
holding their ground too. In the School o f Oriental and African Studies, the Department o f 
Politics and International Studies has proved a stimulating intellectual environment where I have 
benefited from working with John Game, Stephen Hopgood and Mark Laffey. Most o f  all, in the 
School, the intellectual encouragement that I have had from Tom Young has been greatly 
valued— not only in the context o f PhD supervision— but over the years for showing me the 
tangible and intangible virtues of an older much more independent and less machine-like 
academic order. I am grateful for this opportunity and experience, not least because o f the space it 
opened for much more critical reasoning. It goes without saying, however, that I alone am 
responsible for any omissions or mistakes contained herein. Finally, none o f what follows would 
have been possible without the faith and patience o f Stephanie, who has indulged, on occasion 
intolerably suffered, the trials and tribulations o f a SOAS PhD student. No mean feat it must be 
confessed. It is to Stephanie and the eagerly awaited first addition to our family that this thesis is 
dedicated.
4
Preface
United Nations Peace O perations in Perspective
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‘Peacekeeping operations symbolise the world community’s will to peace and represent 
the impartial, practical expression o f that will’ Javier Perez de Cuellar (Noble Peace Prize 
acceptance speech, 1988).
‘...Universal and lasting peace, seen as the greatest aim o f collective endeavour, tends to 
go hand-in-hand with a freezing o f the world’s political, economic and military map as it 
is at the time o f the constitution o f the organisation. Again, this involves a remarkably 
primitive notion o f the Cosmopolis, in that the idea of peace is opposed not only to that o f 
war but also, implicitly, to the notions o f social change, development and productive 
rivalry.’ DaniloZolo (Cosmopolis, 1994).
Introduction
Since the collapse o f  the Second World the United Nations (UN) has moved to the centre o f  the 
regulation and management o f conflict in Southern states and societies. This has seen the 
organisation take on new and varied tasks in the ordering and reordering o f numerous societies 
including: monitoring cease-fires, quartering and demobilisation; organising, overseeing and 
verifying democratic elections; establishing, advising and running international tribunals; and 
even assuming, albeit temporarily, executive authority over entire African and Asian states.1 
Remarkable as these ‘new’ roles may be, they are now routinely treated as a natural and normal 
set o f  activities for the UN to be preoccupied with. In today’s post-Cold War milieu, peace 
operations have been thoroughly internalised and naturalised.
The primary aim o f this study is to explain the context o f such a radical alteration in the scope 
and extent o f UN peace activities through a historical and conceptual re-evaluation o f the 
functions o f  these practices in world order management, and through an extended discussion o f 
several UN encounters with post-colonial states. It is suggested that it is practically meaningless 
to view these practices as anything other than deeply political regimes for overseeing social 
transitions in the periphery o f the world system. More specifically, it challenges the assertion that
1 For a brief description o f  some o f  these new activities see UN document: ST/ESA/246, 1996, ‘An 
Inventory o f  Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities’.
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such activities, from the 1940s to the 2000s, can be separated from the political project o f making 
and remaking post-colonial states and societies along certain liberal political economy lines.2
Remarkably little has been written on the wider ramifications o f the huge projects o f domestic 
constitution o f several Southern states that the UN has been entrusted with, and the consequences 
o f  these for how we understand the political and ideological specificity o f international bodies, 
such as the UN, charged with the management o f these practices. In fact, the sheer extent o f UN 
involvement in the domestic affairs o f Southern societies has not generated any sizable or 
coherent body o f academic work that has critiqued these practices in anything other than 
vocational, even anodyne, terms.3 To be more precise, the focus o f literature on United Nations 
peacekeeping and peacemaking activities has largely been on technical and practical issues: 
problems o f ‘command and control’ in the field; issues o f aid coordination; discussion o f ‘rapid 
reaction forces’ or ‘regional’ peacekeeping initiatives; techniques for third-party mediation; as 
well as general debate about the effectiveness and ‘lessons’ o f  various forms o f peace activities.4 
The broader surveys o f these activities tend to maintain a focus on the merits o f various 
approaches to peacemaking— for example the virtues o f power-political paradigms that see 
conflict within societies as best resolved when there is a ‘ripe-moment’ between mutually 
exclusive armed belligerents compared to those more liberally attuned approaches that see such 
conflicts as best addressed via governance programmes and civil society targeted projects.
2 For UN peace operations as liberal projects, see: Roland Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the 
‘mission civilisatrice” , Review o f  International Studies, vol.28, no.4 (2002), pp.637-656. In the context o f  
the historic role o f  US foreign policy in promoting liberal modernity in the post-1945 period, see: William 
Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). From the perspective o f  the remaking o f  Eastern Europe in the post-1989 milieu, 
see: Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian B id for World Dominance (London: Verso, 
1999), pp. 187-247. And, in the context o f  Africa’s relationship with Western modernity, see: Tom Young, 
‘A Project to be Realised: Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa’, Millennium: journal o f  
international studies, vol.24, no.3 (1995), pp.527-546; and Tom Young, ‘You Europeans, you are just like 
fish! Some Sceptical Reflections on Modernity and Democratisation in Africa’, Cadernos de Estudos 
Africanos, no.3, (Julho/Dezembro 2002), pp. 113-125.
3 There is, however, a disparate literature from a variety o f  academic disciplines that has critiqued the U N ’s 
post-Cold War activities. Among others: Francois Debrix, Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: the United 
Nations and the Mobilization o f  Ideology (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1999); 
Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster R elief Industry in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 
1997); Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001); Liisa H. Maliki, 
Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania 
(Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1995); Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects fo r  World Government 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
4 For example, the widely used: Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, (eds.) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
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Consequently, what is most striking when surveying the literature is the vocational content o f  the 
material, and the generally uncritical character o f the subject area.5 Apart from the exigencies o f 
governments, international organisations and institutes in requiring ‘policy-relevant’ material, this 
is perhaps also a result o f the conceptual categorisation o f the subject as ‘conflict resolution’ or 
‘humanitarian intervention’, where the wider contexts o f these undertakings are left unquestioned. 
Sociologically, what is unambiguous is that such material is nearly exclusively produced in a 
world in which there is an intimate relationship between ‘practitioners’, ‘professionals’ and 
‘academics.’6 As a result discussion and debate is largely, if  not exclusively, ‘problem-solving’ in 
nature in that it does not question the origins, development and framework that has underpinned 
the frontal advance o f peace operations in international politics, and in that it has naturalised the 
guiding presumptions o f such activities— namely ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’, and even ‘peace’. 
Ultimately, most mainstream literature takes as its starting point the self-declared purpose o f the 
United Nations as noted in the preamble o f its 1945 Charter as a sacred and consecrated given: 
‘We the peoples o f  the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge o f w ar.’
5 It is plain that much o f  the literature is designed for direct import into the practice o f  UN conflict 
resolution. This includes more conceptual material relating to the nature o f  conflict and conditions 
necessary for its resolution. In the early 1990s, for example, the work o f  Professor William Zartman 
(broadly part o f  power-political approaches to conflict resolution) on precipitating ‘hurting stalemates’ 
through ‘balancing’ the parties became influential in the UN and the first Clinton administration. One 
recent UN memoir by a prominent senior official, Sir Marrack Goulding, confirmed this when he wrote: 
‘When, in 1993, I became responsible for the UN’s efforts at peacemaking and, especially, preventative 
diplomacy, I found Zartman’s concept a useful tool for identifying which actual or potential conflict’s 
might be worth the U N ’s attention.’ Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 2002), p.22.
6 Much o f  the literature is produced by ‘ex-practitioners’. For a small sample: Goulding, Peacemonger; 
Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987); Margaret Anstee, Never 
learn to Type: A Woman at the United Nations (London: Wiley, 2003); Chester Crocker, High Noon in a 
Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Tough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Cameron 
Hume, Ending M ozambique’s War: the Role o f  Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: USIP 
Press, 1994). Although there are countless conflict resolution organisations, much o f  the literature with 
reach is produced by a handful o f  foundations based in the Anglo-American world and close to the UN 
establishment, including: International Peace Academy (IPA); US Institute o f  Peace (USIP); Ford 
Foundation; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; International Crisis Group (ICG); the Stimson 
Centre; Ralph Bunche Institute; and within the UN itself, publications from the UN University. Overall, 
there is a close relationship between these largely American think tanks, foundations and the UN itself— 
with many o f  its staff slipping seamlessly between them. In this, the milieu o f  conflict resolution shares a 
noticeable and perhaps unsurprising sociological similarity with International Relations, particularly in the 
US. In IR see Stanley Hoffman, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus, vo l.106, 
no.3 (1977), pp.41-60. It should perhaps also be noted that certain institutes and foundations have 
historically had a close working relationship with US national security institutions, particularly the CIA. 
This is documented as far as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are concerned and is also relevant to 
several international studies centres (e.g. MIT’s CENIS). See: Bruce Cumings, ‘Boundary Displacement: 
Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War’, Bulletin o f  Concerned Asian 
Scholars, vol.29, no.l (1997), pp.6-26; and Francis Stoner Saunders, Who P aid the Piper: the CIA and the 
Cultural C old War (London: Granta, 1999), pp. 135-145.
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The United Nations conflict-resolution milieu
Despite the uncritical nature of UN peacekeeping literature in the Anglo-American academic 
milieu, a veritable cottage industry has developed over a short period o f time to meet the needs o f  
the public and private bodies that have conducted or advanced these types o f activities in the 
South. Indeed, with the rapid expansion o f  UN peace operations from the early 1990s, 
commentators and new experts have sought en masse to formulate theories o f international 
conflict resolution and successful UN peacekeeping. Over the last couple o f decades these have 
generally progressed from ‘power-political’ (realist) ideas o f ‘balancing’ local forces and 
pursuing ‘hurting stalemates’ that can be translated into power-sharing agreements, to ‘human- 
centred’ (liberal) approaches that insist on the political and economic rights o f the individual 
above that o f the state, regime or faction and that posit the importance o f ‘good internal 
governance’ for domestic social harmony.7 What is immediately striking about such literature, 
apart from the increasing utilisation o f elementary international relations theory to explain deep- 
rooted social conflict in the South, is that all this material accepts that some form o f intervention 
and regulation o f peripheral societies is desirable and necessary. There are, o f course, 
fundamental differences o f opinion as to what the template o f intervention should be— from 
traditional third-party diplomacy and power-sharing agreements to international ‘peace 
enforcement’. But, in general, this is a narrow technical debate about the best medium o f 
intervention and not a debate that questions the political contingencies o f these activities per se. 
In fact, if  anything, the tendency in the literature is to stress the paucity of UN intervention, the 
‘indifference’ o f the UN Security Council, and the bureaucratic inertia o f UN managers towards 
social violence in the Southern hemisphere.8 The common critique o f the UN and its peace roles 
hence relates to its lack o f intervention at the borderlands of the world system, in places such as 
the Congo and Sudan.
7 For reviews o f  various theories o f  international conflict resolution, from power-political to human-centred 
approaches, see the following edited volumes produced in large part by practitioner-academics: Chester A. 
Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.) Managing Global Chaos: Sources o f  and  
Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1996); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier 
Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.) Herding Cats Multiparty: Mediation in a Complex World, (Washington, 
D.C.: USIP Press, 1999).
8 See Michael Barnett for the most lucid example o f  this type o f  argument in the academic literature, 
especially in the Rwandan context. Michael Barnett, ‘Peacekeeping, Indifference, and Genocide in 
Rwanda’ in Raymond Duvall, Hugh Gusterson, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, (eds.) Cultures o f  
Insecurity, (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 173-202; and Michael 
Barnett, Eyewitness to a genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2002).
9
O f course, what this mainstream critique reflects on a deeper conceptual level is the normative 
belief among Western practitioner-academics o f their responsibility, even duty, to help progress 
post-colonial societies towards liberal modernity. Indeed in our current context there is absolutely 
no question o f the legitimacy of intervening through the mechanism o f UN peace operations in 
the Southern hemisphere; it is simply taken for granted that some states and societies require 
various degrees o f regulation and liberal progression until such a time as they are suitably 
‘developed’. There are even a growing number o f British and American commentators who are 
openly advocating a return of classic colonialism and extolling the virtues o f American empire.9 
As one prominent advocate, Sebastian Mallaby, explains: ‘After more than two millennia o f 
empire, orderly societies now refuse to impose their own institutions on disorderly ones. This 
anti-imperialist restraint is becoming harder to sustain, however, as the disorder in poor countries 
grows more threatening.’10 To solve this problem, Mallaby advocates the creation of: ‘A new 
international body with...nation-building muscle and expertise...[that] could be deployed 
wherever its American-led board decided, thus replacing the ad hoc begging and arm-twisting of 
current peacekeeping efforts.’11
But beyond the parody o f the ‘new imperialist’ fringe o f the global governance literature some 
tentative endeavours have been made to contextualise UN practices in the South. Here there are a 
handful o f scholars within this community o f practitioners and commentators who have 
acknowledged that a Western ‘civilising mission’ pervades UN peace practices and its attendant 
commentary. Roland Paris, perhaps the most self-reflective commentator in the mainstream 
literature, has clearly shown for instance how these operations already form part o f  a w ider liberal 
project that are reminiscent o f colonial practices.12 While certainly not the first to point-up these 
types of ideological continuities— this has been explored more generally in the African context
9 Otherwise known as the ‘new imperialism literature’. See the work of: Sebastian Mallaby, Robert Cooper, 
and Max Boot. But perhaps most forthright has been the work o f  Niall Ferguson who has extensively 
argued that empire— specifically the British and potentially in the future an American— has been one o f  
history’s greatest modernising forces. For Ferguson this process, which he labels ‘Anglobalisation’, has on 
balance been a positive global development. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise o f  the British 
World (New York; Basic Books, 2003).
10 Sebastian Mallaby ‘The Reluctant Imperialist’, Foreign Affairs, vol.81, issue 2 (March-April 2002), p.2.
11 Ibid. p.6.
12 In his recent monograph, How W ar’s End, Paris seeks to resolve the debate between power-political and 
liberal approaches to peace operations by putting forward a theory o f  ‘Institutionalisation Before 
Liberalisation’, or IBL. The idea here being that a more long-term project o f  societal reconstruction would 
provide a more solid foundation for the liberal project. Roland Paris, How War's End (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). On the civilising mission o f  peace operations, see: Paris, ‘International 
peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’, pp.637-ff.
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and in relation to the good governance programmes o f the World Bank— Paris’s work has at least 
begun to question the inherent political predispositions and connotations o f UN peace operations 
in the 1990s.13 But the problem with the type o f work that Paris has produced— indeed with the 
great deal o f mainstream literature— is that it neglects the specific and unique role o f  the UN in a 
post-European empire era and how, in different times and in different places, the UN has forged a 
role for itself in administrating the affairs o f Southern societies. Perhaps most importantly, very 
little is revealed in this literature about what these types o f practices amount to in terms o f  the 
management o f  post-colonial affairs, and with relation to evolving forms o f world order.
For a more satisfactory discussion o f these questions it is necessary to make use o f a far more 
disparate and critical set o f commentators who have examined various dimensions o f 
international organisations and international intervention. In terms o f the growing utilisation o f 
Western force in the South, the most pertinent critique has been produced by David Chandler—  
who has examined the way in which recent international intervention in the Balkans and in Africa 
has served to erode what he labels the UN Charter System o f sovereign-equality and returned the 
international system to a previous ‘Westphalian’ era o f ‘might-is-right.’14 While this study agrees 
with the type o f  conclusion that Chandler puts forward with relation to the decline o f  certain 
features o f sovereign-equality in the South, the emphasis in what follows is to show the longer 
history o f  engagement that the UN has had with many post-colonial societies, the local and wider 
politics o f  such encounters, and the various structural transformations that the UN has often been 
charged with administrating to subject peoples.
But so far as Chandler’s arguments relating to the end o f ‘sovereign-equality’ are concerned, it 
may be inferred from what follows that while it has indeed been substantially modified over time 
to a much more empirical criteria forjudging and respecting sovereignty in the periphery, it is 
also clear that in the broader scheme o f events the idea o f sovereign-equality has always been an 
unstable and fluctuating international norm. For a start, the prominence o f this concept in the 
UN— in its resolutions, statements, and general policy positions— partly reflected the reaction o f
13 With relation to Africa: Young, ‘A Project to be Realised: Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa’. 
With relation to the World Bank: Graham Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance and Theories o f  
Political Action in Africa’ British Journal o f Politics and International Relations, vol.7, issue 2 (2005), 
pp.240-260; and David Williams and Tom Young, ‘Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory’ 
Political Studies, vol.42, no.l (1994), pp.84-100.
14 David Chandler: From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto, 
2002); ‘The People-Centered Approach to Peace Operations: The New UN Agenda’, International 
Peacekeeping, vol.8, no.l (2001), pp.1-19; ‘International Justice.’ New Left Review, no.6 (2000), pp.55-66.
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Third World states (in the ascendancy within the organisation at the time) to what they perceived 
as the increasing tendency o f the US (and European states) to directly and covertly intervene in 
the local politics o f these societies, in instances such as that which occurred in Iran, Guatemala, 
Cuba, Congo, Chile, Angola and elsewhere throughout the post-1945 period.'5 With relation to 
Chandler’s conclusions relating to a division o f labour between NATO and the UN, with the 
former carrying out the military tasks and the latter following-up with the conduct o f  civilian 
roles, it is broadly clear that this has indeed been the tendency in so far as it relates to important 
geo-strategic areas o f the world system— such as on the edges o f European capitalism in the 
Balkans, in the repositories o f vital raw materials such as Iraq, and in other areas o f historic geo­
political competition, such as Afghanistan. In other cases, at the periphery o f the world system, 
the division o f  labour that Chandler indicates is emerging would seem to be much less prevalent. 
Rather, it would appear that a far more generalised and basic system o f United Nations 
surveillance, regulation and administration is emerging in these borderland areas.
Much more generally there are a set o f scholars in the field o f international political economy—  
Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Craig Murphy— who have pioneered critical Gramscian 
approaches to international organisations.16 While this literature has little if anything to say about 
the nature o f UN peace operations, their general conceptualisation and accounts o f the role and 
place o f the United Nations in world order and as an instrument o f hegemony are instructive. This 
is especially the case with relation to understanding the institutionally contingent nature o f the 
UN’s various activities and the ideological battles within any given international organisation to 
shape its ‘programme o f work’ and general orientation.17 The recent work o f Peter Gowan on the 
US and international order has also provided this study with some o f its wider grounding—  
especially as it relates to the way Gowan has conceptualised and clarified some o f the formative
15 For a record o f  post-1945 US interventions in the Third World: William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military 
and CIA Interventions since World War II, (London: Zed Books, 2003).
16 Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method’ Millennium: 
journal o f  international studies, vol. 12, no.2 (1983), pp. 162-175; Stephan Gill (ed.) Gramsci, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Craig N. 
Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1994).
17 See Robert Cox’s writings on the nature o f  international organisations and hegemony. In particular the 
rarely cited article in the Canadian scholarly publication, International Journal: Robert W. Cox ‘The crisis 
o f  world order and the problem o f international organization in the 1980s’ International Journal, no.35 
(1980), pp.370-395. See also Robert W. Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: 
reflections on some recent literature’ International Organization, vol.33, no.2 (1979), pp.257-301.
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politics and functions of the UN.18 It is the broad outlook, if not the precise theory and 
conclusions, o f the above work that this study hopes to engage and develop.
United N ations peace operations as political operations
The general contention of the study is that in order to critically assess the UN’s peace activities it 
is necessary to place them in their historical context (1946-2004) and to analyse them according 
to, on the one hand, the wider relations o f political and economic power that brought them about, 
and on the other, the narrower organisational struggle to define the very substance and outlook o f 
the U N ’s work. Here in the wider context, the analysis seeks to demonstrate that peacekeeping 
has developed from an ad-hoc mechanism designed to help manage the transition to formal 
independence and a device used to institutionalise and police a certain set o f post-colonial 
relationships in the peripheiy, to an all-encompassing apparatus used to facilitate the 
reorganisation o f state-society relationships along narrow neo-liberal lines including, where 
necessary, facilitating the transfer o f power from one elite to another.19
To be sure there are broad continuities in the development of UN peacekeeping. Most obviously, 
the object and zone o f intervention has always been, and is always likely to be, at the very 
borderlands o f the international system. The guiding political grammar for understanding such 
interventions remains, with the occasional important exception, that o f a supreme umpire whether 
it be between that o f an old imperial power and one o f its ex-colonial subjects, or between that o f 
two elites within a particular post-colonial crisis; and finally the political, one might say historic, 
task o f  such peace operations has been to help smooth-out, in the broadest sense at least, crises 
that have led to the contestation o f the public-political sphere, the state system, which has 
ultimately formed an important precondition for a private world economy and therefore remained 
an elementary facet o f the post-1945 liberal peace settlement.20 At the very least, UN peace
18 Especially, Peter Gowan, ‘US:UN’ New Left Review , no.24 (2003), pp.5-28; Peter Gowan, ‘Watchdogs 
o f a Liberal Peace’ New Left Review, no.l 1 (2001), pp.79-93; and Peter Gowan, ‘The American Campaign 
For Global Sovereignty’, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.) Socialist Register, 2003, Fighting Identities: 
Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism, (London: Merlin Press, 2003), pp.2-27.
19 Since the 1980s, the UN has presided over several elections that have seen the transfer o f  power from one 
regime to another. A seminal case here was Nicaragua (ONUVEN) when the incumbent Sandinistas were 
voted out o f  power. In Angola with UNAVEM II, as we will examine in Chapter Six, there was an 
expectation among the international community generally, that a transition would occur from the MPLA to 
UNITA. For a variety o f reasons— including the utilisation by the MPLA o f  a Brazilian PR company and 
the increasing militancy o f  UNlTA’s public rhetoric— and to the surprise o f  a great many Western capitals 
this outcome did not occur.
20 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire o f  Civil Society (London: Verso, 1994).
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operations have been about helping to manage the institutionalisation and transmission o f various 
visions o f liberal modernity in the periphery o f the world system— whether it be the buffering o f 
nation-states, the policing of the international political economy or latterly, though not without 
antecedents, the intricate restructuring of state-society relations.
Equally however, the changes in peace operations have not been insignificant. To cite a few: the 
object o f intervention has generally transformed from managing interstate to ostensibly ‘internal’ 
conflict; and whereas such operations have in the first four decades o f their existence remained 
ad-hoc and mostly cautious, peace activities are now much more widely utilised sis a form o f 
‘global governance’. But more significant, there has been a transformation from the general 
objectives o f what can be considered ‘traditional’ peacekeeping—that is, helping to police the 
nominal separation o f the state-system from the private world-economy even if, in places, 
temporary eccentricities were permitted— to ‘second-generation’ operations that have a very 
specific and universal set o f prescriptions for how the post-colonial state, society, and economy 
should be organised and divided. This template now also includes specific political governance 
preferences— namely a measure o f formal pluralism— and is necessarily more intensive, intrusive 
and micro-managed than most ‘traditional’ peace operations.
O f course this has not been a seamless or necessarily unproblematic process. Nor is it an 
irreversible or irrevocable one. Indeed, such an evolution in peacekeeping, moulded and 
promoted as it has been by US seigniory, has taken place in the context o f seminal struggles to 
constitute and reconstitute the UN from its founding to the present day and this is where the 
narrower internal politics o f the organisation becomes pertinent: peace operations have 
themselves been a deeply political project in that they represent a particular minority vision o f 
what the UN should be preoccupied with and it has only been latterly, in light o f the rapid 
disintegration o f  organised Third World resistance at the UN during the 1980s, that they have 
gained uncontested ascendancy.21 In many respects, the First G ulf War (1991) reflected the final
21 Prior to this, o f  course, the Non-Aligned Caucus at the UN had made a concerted effort to redefine and 
extend UN oversight into public and private international economic relations (for example the New  
International Economic Order, Centre for Transnational Corporations, Charter on the Economic Rights and 
Duties o f  States). The aim here was to instigate some form o f  public regulation o f  the private economy. 
This was the nadir o f  Western influence in the UN and a time during which a growing belligerency was 
being directed at the organisation by several Western governments. These internal struggles will be 
discussed at some length in Chapter Two. For a general sense o f the embittered and indignant feeling in the 
US (and other Western states for that matter) at this apparent usurpation o f  the UN, see former US UN 
Ambassador Daniel Moynihan’s memoir o f  the period: Daniel Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (London: 
Seeker & Warburg, 1979).
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capitulation o f opposition Southern ‘caucuses’ at the United Nations (Non-Aligned and G-77) and 
the formal re-launch o f the organisation as a security body. Crucially, this development has 
necessarily required the reorganisation of the International Secretariat around peace activities and 
a greatly expanded role for international officials in the management o f political and socio­
economic conflict in the periphery of the international system. As to be expected, this has 
thrown-up numerous challenges relating to the limits and boundaries o f UN influence, and most 
significantly, the appropriate means for pursuing the lately restored and resurgent liberal political 
economy agenda o f  the organisation. But despite the formidable challenges the secretary-general 
and international technocrats have had to face in running and managing such large-scale political 
and socio-economic projects, from the Congo in 1960 to East Timor in 1999 the UN has 
developed a certain capacity, some advocates may say a ‘comparative advantage’, for 
administering such tasks. One has only to think o f  recent debates that have advocated the UN as 
the only body capable o f running a direct election in Iraq under such adverse conditions; and nor 
is this simply or solely related to issues o f international legitimacy or predictable patterns o f 
Anglo-American political pressure on the top-rungs o f the Secretariat for there are also very 
experienced and well-trained UN personnel that are perhaps the only professionals adept enough 
at the art o f international election staging able to manage this political demand at such short 
notice. It is the very execution o f these reformed peace roles in three seminal African contexts 
during the rapid expansion of these practices in the 1990s— especially their wider functions and 
their intercession in local politics— that form the subject o f the middle-three chapters o f the study.
What quickly becomes evident during this investigation of UN encounters in the African milieu is 
that UN peace operations are fairly intrusive mechanisms for regulating post-colonial affairs and 
that they often reflect, in their design and implementation, a  wider political agenda. In most cases, 
the structural design and actual implementation o f the operation are not only intended to usher in 
a new social order in these places, but they are also often calibrated to advance one local elite or 
force at the expense o f another. It is suggested here that on the broadest level this reflects the way 
in which the UN has come to act as a mediator o f  inter-capitalist competition in the periphery—  
or, more accurately, the way in which the UN has historically served to advance a US agenda in 
local political contexts, sometimes against that o f other G-8 interests. In any event, what emerges 
from these African encounters is the way in which the UN has become an important arbitrator o f 
the ‘native question’, a force that now regulates aspects o f political life in the Southern 
hemisphere.
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The structure and methodology of the thesis
The thesis unfolds largely in the order set out above. The first three chapters provide the general 
historical, political and institutional context in which to situate the current UN predilection 
towards peace operations. Chapter One sets the scene by discussing the historic role o f  the UN 
and its peacekeeping in fashioning a world social order o f nation-states and a private world 
economy out o f European empire blocks. Chapter Two then moves on to show how these early 
peacekeeping activities were set aside when the organisation moved out o f the orbit o f  total US 
tutelage in the late 1960s and towards alternative visions of UN work. In essence, the line o f 
reasoning in these opening two chapters is that peace operations are deeply political practices 
reflective, historically at least, o f a US vision o f world order. Indeed, Chapter Three goes on to 
show how, when the organisation moves back towards the orbit o f G-7 control in the late 1980s, 
its ‘programme of work’ and general outlook is reoriented again towards conducting an extreme 
set o f  peace practices in the periphery. The contention here is that the UN is calibrated to fit into a 
new specialised international division o f labour, which was as a whole designed to extend and 
deepen the liberal capitalist system after the collapse o f the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ worlds. The 
U N ’s role in this new division o f labour is to help manage and bolster the transmission o f the 
political facets o f this liberal capitalist order to the most peripheral parts o f the global system. The 
three chapters that follow the broad discussion o f the rise o f UN peace operations in international 
politics— on Somalia, Rwanda and Angola respectively— explore different facets o f this new UN 
role. The general focus with relation to these three African encounters is on the functions and the 
local politics o f these UN operations. It is also highlighted how, in many instances, the UN has 
played a far more protracted role in these societies’ post-colonial journeys than is commonly 
admitted by the mainstream literature. The study concludes with a set o f observations about these 
practices and about world order management in the periphery more generally.
The methodology of the thesis is relatively straightforward. The research for the UN-African 
encounters is based upon a comparative case-study approach to social inquiry— a technique that 
is particularly useful for investigating phenomenon in the social and political world in which 
there are few examples, and for which direct empirical material is difficult to attain. Beyond the 
general interest o f each example o f UN operations examined, the choice o f case studies relates to 
chronology, regional spacing and the varying forms o f action that the UN took in each set o f
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circumstances.22 But above all else, each instance o f a UN operation treated in this study is 
insightful because o f the various ways in which they shed light on the methods harnessed and 
abandoned by international officials during this experimental but broadly transformative period, 
and the way in which the UN in general is reoriented towards the political reconstruction o f many 
peripheral post-colonial states and societies. More generally, the research method and work 
undertaken for this thesis is mainly, but not exclusively, archival: official and unofficial United 
Nations documents (letters, draft and final Security Council resolutions, reports o f the secretary- 
general, verbatim records, and where relevant agency reports or Commissions o f Inquiry) are 
compared and contrasted with each other and other sources, such as the print-media, non­
governmental and governmental material, in order to provide a picture o f the wider and local 
politics o f UN peace operations as well as institutional UN reform. This has been supplemented, 
where possible, with confidential interviews and e-mail communications with relevant officials, 
and by general insights garnered as a participant-observer o f the Fifty-Fifth Session o f the 
General Assembly and the Security Council in New York in 2000.
22 Each instance examined in detail (Angola, Rwanda, and Somalia) represents three-different regions o f  
sub-Sahara Africa (East, Central and Southern), a different time-period, and a different manifestation o f  
UN peace operation.
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C h ap ter 1
United Nations Peace O perations and W orld O rder:
A critical reappraisal o f purposes and practices, 1948-1987
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‘The United Nations is the preeminent institution o f  multilateralism.’ Shashi Tharoor 
(‘Why America still needs the United Nations’, Foreign Affairs, 2003).
‘...B y the beginning o f 1945 Washington resolved to define the organisation in a manner 
which sacrificed little American freedom of action, and opened up new modalities for 
attaining its objectives. The United States determined to oppose its other allies’ creating 
blocs and spheres o f interest, but also to shape the future United Nations in a manner that 
acknowledged not just great power among the members o f the Security Council, but also 
the distinctive role o f the United States as the most powerful nation on earth.’ Gabriel 
Kolko (The Politics o f War, 1968).
The purposes and practices of UN peace operations
The enduring representation o f UN peace operations during the Cold War is invariably that o f 
lightly armed peacekeepers, or ‘blue helmets’, inhabiting precariously demilitarised zones 
between two adversarial states. The image is one o f an international brigade o f soldiers helping to 
sustain a cold peace by buffering two or more armed groups. Here one only has to think o f  a 
south pacific Fijian battalion policing Southern Lebanon for twenty years, or that o f a Swedish 
unit helping to keep the North apart from the South o f Cyprus since 1964.23 Similarly, the 
narrative that has undeniably dominated the issue o f peacekeeping has, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
revolved around the discourse o f bi-polar Cold War politics; a superpower stand-off in the 
Security Council disabled the possibility o f collective security as envisaged in the UN Charter, 
which in turn led to the practical and functional need to manage potential regional conflagrations 
in some other ad hoc way. As A. B. Fetherston writes: ‘It was this need to avert the potential 
escalation o f local conflicts into superpower confrontations, coupled with an inability to act, that 
led to the development o f peacekeeping.’24 Conceptually, therefore, peacekeeping during this 
period was generally looked at as a broadly functionalist response of certain UN officials and 
delegates and a few o f  its middle ranking member-states intended to circumnavigate the 
particularities, and deficiencies, o f a bi-polar security system. For such efforts, the UN earned the 
1988 Nobel Peace Prize. As Javier Perez de Cuellar noted in the UN’s acceptance speech:
23 United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review o f  United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: UNDPI, 
1996, Third Edition), pp.698-700, p.706.
24 A.B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory o f  United Nations Peacekeeping (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994),
p.12.
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‘The award o f the noble peace prize to United Nations peacekeeping operations gives 
recognition to an idea o f striking originality and pow er...the technique which has come 
to be called peacekeeping uses soldiers as the servants o f peace rather than as the 
instruments o f war. It introduces into the military sphere the principle o f non-violence. It 
provides an honourable alternative to conflict and a means o f reducing strife and tension, 
so that a solution can be sought through negotiation. Never before in history have 
military forces been employed internationally not to wage war, not to establish 
domination and not to serve the interests o f any power or group o f powers, but rather to 
prevent conflict between peoples.’ 25
Beyond the platitudes o f such remarks, however, the contours o f this speech outline succinctly the 
common mode o f envisaging such actions. Not simply functional any longer, peacekeeping has 
developed over time into a regular and relatively reliable part o f the international regulation o f 
war and peace— in short part o f an emerging world society. Javier Perez de Cuellar again: ‘In our 
striving for a world at peace with itself, and governed by the rule o f law, I believe that 
peacekeeping operations play a vital and significant role. In some ways they are analogous to the 
role o f the civil police in the development o f peaceful, law-abiding nation states.’26
In explaining the purpose o f these activities, and noticeable in the above citation, there is often a 
reliance on metaphors, especially by ex-practitioners turned commentators— peacekeepers are at 
one time international ‘firemen’, at another a global ‘police’ force, and still others, and rather 
remarkably considering ideologies o f nationalism, ‘repositories’ or temporary ‘custodians’ o f  
national sovereignty.27 The suggestive imagery o f such language is perhaps an attempt to posit 
the ethos o f peacekeeping as one that is essentially ‘civil’, part o f the fabric of cosmopolitan 
governance in the international system and yet beyond the particular political machinations or 
prejudices o f any one of its constitutive parts.28 One is to suppose that a UN ‘Blue helm et’ like a
25 1988 Noble Peace Prize acceptance speech by Javier Perez de Cuellar. Available at: 
<www.nobleprize.org/peace>.
26 Ibid.
27 A new discourse, primarily produced and reproduced by ex-UN officials and one that has become 
relatively pervasive among UN advocates, focuses on the way in which the UN has been utilised as a 
convenient ‘scapegoat’ for great power inaction. A formative advocate o f  such a line o f  reasoning is Sir 
Brian Urquhart. For example: Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p. 13 8.
28 Danilo Zolo vociferously attacks this kind o f  cosmopolitan philosophy, which ‘...has come for us to 
assume all the overbearing dominance o f  an idol’ and is ‘...liable, for instance, to lend justification to the 
theory o f  ‘humanitarian intervention’ by the great powers in the political, economic and social problems o f  
other states, even against the wishes o f  their governments or o f  majorities or minorities within those 
countries.’ Zolo, Cosmopolis, p.xiv.
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fireman, or a police officer, does not choose which international emergency to respond to: a fire is 
a fire.
And in one sense this is absolutely correct for classic peacekeeping operations, especially during 
the first few decades o f their development, which were surreptitiously designed to help keep the 
peace and preserve international order. Put a little less charitably, part o f their function was to 
maintain the status quo. The central problem however arises if  we seek to question or 
problematise the prevalent order, which was not natural, neutral or, during the early Cold War 
period, even universal. Here it should be recalled that the post-1945 liberal order, which consisted 
o f a ‘UN Charter System’ (that is, according to David Held a world o f formally equal nation­
states)29 and Bretton Woods Institutions (designed to promote and underpin a private world 
economy), was one that was in competition (up until the late 1950s at least) with a closed colonial 
world order led by Britain as well as with the centrally planned economies o f the Second World.30 
This 1945 order— its institutions and their outlook— were designed and developed to provide the 
material and ideological bedrock o f US post-world war power and purpose by providing for a 
political and economic division of the world that would supplant the formal colonial system.31
29 David Held, From the M odem  State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.85. 
For a distinct and, at the time, controversial account o f  the rise o f  a US designed order in the post-1945 
world, see Michael Cox, ‘Western Capitalism and the Cold War System’ in Martin Shaw (ed.) War, State, 
and Society (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), pp. 136-194. Here, Cox shows how in the immediate 
post-1945 period the Soviet ‘threat’ was in actuality part o f  a US constructed ‘Cold War System’ that’s 
major utility for US planners was that it served to discipline Western Europe, and public opinion within the 
US, behind an American-led world capitalist system. For Cox, the existence o f  the Soviet Union helped, 
not hindered, a US authored liberal order.
30 As Churchill wrote to Eden in early 1945: ‘If the Americans want to take Japanese Islands which they 
have conquered, let them do so with our blessing and any form o f  words that may be agreeable to them. But 
‘Hands o ff  the British Empire’ is our maxim.’ Churchill cited in: Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f  War: Allied  
Diplomacy and the World Crisis o f  1943-1945 (New York: Vintage, 1968), p.465. But it should be recalled 
that the UK was forced by the US to open up its preferential imperial trading-system to American 
companies as a pivotal condition for the $3.75 billion loan that the UK received from the Truman 
Administration and for the cancellation o f  $20 billion o f  the ‘lend-lease’ account. Dean Acheson, Present 
at Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p.324. Melvyn Leffler. A 
Preponderance o f  Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1992), p.63.
31 For a historical background o f  the US construction o f  post-1945 world institutions, see: Acheson, Present 
at Creation; Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: the Origins o f  the United Nations and the Search fo r  
Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1990); Cordon Hull, The Memoirs o f  
Cordell Hull: Volume //(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948); Kolko, The Politics O f War, Gabriel Kolko 
and Joyce Kolko, The Limits o f  Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, (New  
York: Harper & Row, 1972); Stephen Schlesinger, Act o f  Creation: the Founding o f  the United Nations 
(Oxford: Westview, 2003). In International Relations, see: Gowan, ‘US:UN’; Rosenberg, The Empire o f  
Civil Society; M. Cox, ‘Western Capitalism’; Robert W. Cox, ‘Social forces, states, and world orders: 
beyond international relations theory’, Millennium: journal o f  international studies, vol. 10, no.2 (1981), 
pp. 126-155; Bruce Cumings, ‘The Wicked Witch o f  the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch o f  the
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No matter how such plans went awry with the support o f colonialism here, or the sideling o f one 
or all o f the multilateral institutions at one time or another there, a world o f nation-states 
separated from a liberal world economy was essentially a world order promoted to prise open 
world markets and resources for American private and public power.32 US State Department 
officials like Under Secretary o f State William L. Clayton, no less than Treasury ones, were not 
coy: ‘We need markets— big markets— around the world in which to buy and sell.’33 And yet, as 
Claire Wilcox, assistant to the above Under-Secretary, noted in 1949: ‘Freedom o f international 
trade depends on the freedom o f domestic economic life...governed by competition between 
independent enterprises in free markets.’34 ‘Freedom o f domestic life’ and the promotion o f the 
nation-state as a vehicle to enforce such a freedom, the basic prerequisites o f American power as 
it was projected in the 1940s and since, was the cornerstone o f the nascent order.35 Certainly, 
from the British establishment’s standpoint this was, as the Labour party bitterly put it in 1946, 
‘Wall Street imperialism’.36
In these respects the United Nations was partly established, from the perspective o f the US at 
least, to help formalise and universalise the political division o f the world along the lines o f 
nation-states, and its consequent roles in peace activities confirmed this. Indeed, the United 
Nations was largely a product o f US planning and diplomacy. From 1939 the US State 
Department was secretly preparing for post-war international order in various bodies, such as the 
distinguished Advisory Committee o f Postwar Foreign Policy and, in the early 1940s, the 
influential Informal Political Agenda Group in the State Department under Leo Pavolsky.37 As is 
to be expected, many powerful figures from the US establishment were involved in these working 
groups— for example in the Advisory Committee, Isaiah Bowman (President o f John Hopkins 
University) and Norman Davies (President o f the Council on Foreign Relations) both o f whom
East’, in M.J. Hogan (ed.) The End o f  the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp.87-101.
32 An argument put forward by: Ellen Meiksins Woods, Empire o f  Capital (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 131- 
132.
33 William Clayton cited in: Kolko, The Limits o f  Power, p. 14.
34 Claire Wilcox cited in: Kolko, The Limits o f  Power, p. 17.
35 This type o f  reasoning follows Justin Rosenberg, who has argued that this 1945 American inspired 
international order: ‘...like domestic social power, will have two linked aspects: a public political aspect 
which concerns the management o f  the state-system, and a private political aspect which effects the 
extraction and relaying o f  surpluses. It means the rise o f  a new kind o f  empire: the empire o f  civil society.’ 
Rosenberg, The Empire o f  Civil Society, p. 131. See too: Woods. Empire o f  Capital, pp. 131 -132.
36 British Labour party member cited in: Kolko, The Limits o f  Power, p.65.
37 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, pp.5-29; Schlesinger, Act o f  Creation, pp.33-51.
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were well aware o f  the historical imperatives o f establishing new modalities o f imperial power to 
replace the system upon which British hegemony had been organised.38 Furthermore, it is widely 
accepted by historians that the plans for the UN that implicitly formed the basis o f discussion and 
agreement at Dumbarton Oaks and subsequently San Francisco were those o f the State 
Department and Leo Pavolsky.39 There were, o f course, exceptions: for example the issue o f 
‘Trusteeship’ was put in ‘cold storage’ during Dumbarton Oaks for fear o f alienating the British.40 
From the State Department’s perspective in the 1940s, one purpose o f a universal and general 
world body was to undercut moves for a world split along great power spheres o f influence— an 
outcome and policy that both Stalin and Churchill coveted for the UN. Here, the theory was, 
despite interdepartmental disagreements within the US, that a general organisation would help 
open empire blocks and allow for a formal US role in Europe much more than an organisation 
that placed a large emphasis on regional pacts and spheres o f influence.41 Still, there was much 
opposition to this: for one, the US War Department preferred straight geo-strategic policies, 
largely in order to requisition Pacific island bases outright, and to justify exclusive US dominion 
over the Americas.42 Such ideas, o f course, worried diplomats at the State Department who 
understood that outright annexations would provide a pretext for continued protectionism o f the 
British and Soviets ‘spheres’. In some respects, the resolution to these issues for the US was the 
Trusteeship system and Article 82 of the UN Charter, which allowed for territories to be labelled 
‘Strategic’ and thereby directly monitored by the relevant Security Council members and Article 
51 and Article 52 on regional arrangements.43 So despite different points o f view regarding the 
merits o f universalism versus regionalism that existed within the US establishment, between for 
example Cordon Hull and Sumner Welles, and the vacillation o f Franklin D. Roosevelt on this 
matter too, by the end o f the San Francisco Conference there had come to be some bi-partisan 
understanding regarding both the conceptual imperatives o f a universal system and the practical 
need to accommodate, temporarily at least, British exceptionalism and protect the prospect for 
unilateral US action in its own hemisphere.44 Or, as John J. McCloy the War Department’s 
representative at San Francisco relayed to his Secretary o f State Henry J. Stimson: ‘. . . I ’ve been 
taking the view that we ought to have our cake and eat it too; that we ought to be free to operate
38 For an in-depth treatment o f  Isaiah Bowman, see the recent account o f  his influence on US geo-political 
thinking by Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the prelude to Globalisation 
(Berkeley, CA: University o f  California Press, 2003).
39 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p.64, p.71; Schlesinger, Act o f  Creation , p.48.
40 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p.69.
41 Kolko, The Politics o f  War, p.457, pp.465-466; Gowan, ‘US:UN’, p.l 1.
42 Kolko, The Politics o f  War, pp.465-6.
43 Schlesinger, Act o f  Creation, pp. 175-193; Kolko, The Politics o f  War, p.474.
44 Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p.24; Kolko, The Politics o f  War, pp.468-70; Gowan, ‘U S:U N \ pp.20-1.
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under this regional arrangement in South America, at the same time intervene promptly in 
Europe; we oughtn’t to give away either asset.’45
While the UK, and France for that matter, did not necessarily envisage such a role for the 
organisation this is what came to pass through a variety o f processes and dynamics internal and 
external to the UN too extensive to detail here.46 The political corollary o f this was that UN peace 
operations were invariably deployed to manage the transition from one world order to another in 
particularly problematic places, or positioned to prohibit the potential withdrawal o f a state and 
its society from the liberal world system. In short, UN activities in the realm o f international 
security must be seen as part and parcel o f a very particular order—resembling not so much a 
universal and transcendental ‘peace interest’ so much as a political project designed to achieve 
peace settlements according to an exacting set o f criteria.
From this perspective, therefore, UN peacekeepers look less benevolent and more complicit as a 
regulating mechanism in a particular political and socio-economic international hierarchy. Indeed, 
such operations as undertaken by the UN functioned fundamentally to promote, preserve and 
extend the unique political and economic post-World War II settlement. More specifically the 
functions o f peace operations have historically fallen into two broad sets o f activities: here the 
distinction to be made is between those peace activities that were about providing for a transition 
from one social system (the closed colonial) to another (the internationalised state-system and 
private world economy), such as that which occurred in the rarely discussed Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia and West Irian) and the much more infamous 1961 Congo operation, and those peace 
activities that essentially sought to prohibit modifications in the political or economic principles 
o f  the state-system, such as the formative Suez episode. It is also evident that both types o f  peace 
operations— conveyance operations or policing ones— must be seen in the broader context o f the 
transformation from a world of empires to a world o f ‘modest’ nation-states, in which the 
economy is largely separated from the public and political domain.47 Indeed, as we will see in the
45 McCloy cited in: Kolko, The Politics o f  War, p.470.
46 For an overall discussion on the politics o f  forging the UN, see: Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks and 
Kolko, The Politics o f  War, pp.457-482.
47 By ‘conveyance operation’ it is meant a peace operation conducted by the UN that’s primary purpose is 
the transfer o f  a bounded community from one social and political system to another, such as from a colony 
to an independent nation-state. The ‘Modest Nation State’ is a reference to Michael Mann’s argument 
relating to the historical and sociological roots o f  the modem state and its spread across the globe. Mann 
argues that the ‘modest nation state’ is part o f  a social order universalised by the middle o f  the twentieth 
century that has come to exclude forms o f  economic power and moral regulation (even though Mann 
argues that the state is increasingly becoming active in the moral sphere). In this view the ‘modest nation
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next section this is clearly shown in the negotiations that led to the United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) deployed to defuse the Suez crisis in 1956, ostensibly for some the first bona fide 
peacekeeping operation.
On the other hand, and in some ways the hidden story of peace operations, is that o f UN 
observers and intermediaries deployed to help mediate the transition from one political and socio­
economic system to another. One can think o f a variety o f examples here, nominally all issues of 
decolonisation, such as that o f Indonesia and West Irian (1962-9), the Congo (1960) and South 
West Africa (1989). O f course, it could be argued that all peacekeeping was broadly related to 
decolonisation, from the division o f  the British Empire in India and its attendant consequences for 
Kashmir (UNMOGIP) for example, to Palestine and the imperial imposition o f a two-state 
‘solution’ and the resultant need to police ‘the parties’ (UNTSO). Yet, while there is good reason 
to argue this point in the broadest sense, it is analytically useful to differentiate those instances in 
which the UN was directly involved in providing for a transition from the colonial to the post- 
colonial from those in which the UN was deployed to stall the violent consequences o f the 
decolonisation process because it is the former that has come in various guises to dominate a new 
generation o f peace operations in the 1990s and 2000s. In other words, the operations o f the 
contemporary period mark a striking resemblance to those ‘transition’ ones noted above in that 
they are seeking to preside over a transformation from one form of political and socio-economic 
complex to another. Here, should it be useful to labour the application o f  metaphors to UN 
activities further, there is a pedigree o f operations under which the primary task has been to act as 
a ‘mid-wife’, or perhaps more pejoratively, ‘handmaiden’, to nascent international political and 
socio-economic orders. Before going on to look at the early genealogy o f such roles and 
functions, it is useful to review briefly the tasks most associated with peace operations during the 
Cold War— namely military peacekeeping deployed to keep various interstate combatants apart.
state’ has replaced the ‘multi-national empire model’ and the ‘fascist model’, both o f  which took on 
extensive control o f  ‘economic life’ and the regulation o f  morality. Michael Mann, ‘Has Globalisation 
Ended the Rise and Rise o f  the Nation-State?’ Review o f  International Political Economy, vol.4, no.3 
(1997), pp.476-496.
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The Suez Crisis, UNEF and the regulation of post-colonial states
Classic UN peacekeeping operations that seek to buffer two armed state actors are a rarity 
today.48 Some do remain, in Kashmir, Cyprus, Lebanon, pending comprehensive settlements 
involving reunification or final arbitration. While some of these operations were established to 
help soothe violent discord caused by the imperial partition o f Eastern lands— in Jammu and 
Kashmir, Jerusalem— peacekeeping as a form o f non-violent but armed intercession was also 
developed to manage relations between ex-colonial powers and their former colonies, as in the 
case with Egypt and UNEF.49 In this instance, the use o f international troops was not only 
developed as a temporary substitute and proxy for direct Western control o f the Suez Canal Zone 
and the Sinai, it was also utilised to help institutionalise certain restrictions, in principle and in 
practice, on the political economy o f this post-colonial state.
This is especially relevant to the way in which both UN sponsored negotiations with Egypt 
following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company but preceding Western invasion, and 
the deployment of UN troops after this punitive action began, precluded the potential possibility 
that Egypt should have unconditional sovereignty over the canal and its company. Indeed, 
although it was well understood by the UN and Eisenhower Administration that Egyptian 
sensibilities must be accounted for, it was taken as given that for the crisis to be resolved Suez 
would have to be tied into an agreement broadly similar to the imperial regime that had governed 
it in the past— the Constantinople Convention o f 1888. Remarkable in this post-colonial crisis 
therefore, was not only the audacity o f Anglo-French actions, but also the way in which the UN 
broadly enforced Western demands on Egypt.50
48 One UN interstate peacekeeping operation that has been recently deployed is UNMEE— setup in 
September 2000 to monitor a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea. See Appendix Two for details o f  
peace operations deployed in the post-1989 period.
49 The account o f  Suez described here is necessarily brief and limited to the involvement o f  the UN. It does 
not, for example, detail the crisis o f  Anglo-American relations that it precipitated nor the unilateral 
measures taken by the Eisenhower Administration (such as economic action) to discipline its allies. For 
general accounts o f  Suez see: Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle 
East (Vermont: Amana Books, 1988); Mohammed Heikal, Cutting the Loin’s Tale: Suez through Egyptian 
Eyes (New York: Arbor House, 1987); and Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, (eds.) Suez 1956: the Crisis 
and its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
50 The UN secretary-general was crucial in securing from Nasser the demands o f  the ‘ 18 states’ announced 
at the London Suez Conference (16-24 August 1956). As we will see these were encapsulated in UN 
S/RES/118 (1956).
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Most accounts o f  UN involvement in the crisis, however, have tended to focus on one element o f 
this episode, the functional innovations o f UNEF for managing interstate conflicts and its 
diplomatic rationale. Here, commentators have tended to contend that UNEF was largely the 
result o f international pressure— particularly US opposition to military action— to force a 
ceasefire between Israel and Egypt and thereby precipitate a British and French withdrawal. As 
Alan James put it: ‘The reality w as...that two major Western states were virtually being frog­
marched away from the scene of their crime by their leader’ and for this reason, according to 
former UN Under-Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart ‘...the main task before the UN was to 
find a way to save their faces and to allow them to withdraw with what dignity they could 
salvage, as soon as possible.’51 This general narrative is usually extended to detail the semantics 
o f  this path breaking form of multilateral diplomacy, such as: the source and standards o f troop 
contributors; logistics and equipment, including even the origins o f the applicable uniforms; and 
the principles under which such a deployment would occur.52 Here, for example, details o f the 
shuttle diplomacy that the secretary-general performed in order to negotiate the entry o f UNEF 
troops into Egypt. Overall, most are agreed, ‘UNEF was a great victory for common sense, 
innovation, hard work, and intelligent leadership’ and that Dag Hammarskjold’s suggestions had 
been ‘. ..a  conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, 
international military operation.’53
As previously indicated, far less has been written from Egypt’s perspective in what must have 
been a salutary and humbling lesson on the exigencies o f the international political economy.54 In 
fact, it is remarkable how little attention is given to the fact that it was Egypt that capitulated to 
more or less every Western demand before the invasion and as a result o f mediation by Dag 
Hammarskjold, and that by the time the British and French aerial attacks began, Egypt was in 
absolutely no position to reject a proposed UN force. So while no doubt there was an element o f 
embarrassment and awkwardness that the Western alliance, particularly among the British and
51 Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p.212 and Urquhart, 
A Life in Peace and War, p. 132.
52 See the accounts o f  UNEF by: Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War; James, Peacekeeping in International 
Politics; Fetherston, Towards a Theory o f  United Nations Peacekeeping', and Agostinho Zacarias, The 
United Nations and International Peacekeeping (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
53 Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p.33, p. 138.
54 Publicly, especially in the Arab world, President Nasser came out o f  the crisis a nationalist hero who had 
successfully fought-off European imperial, and Israeli, ambitions in the region. To a large extent, in the 
popular imagination this image remains today.
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French, suffered, it is equally valid to question the settled status-quo that UNEF legitimised and 
help institutionalise.55
Following Nasser’s nationalisation o f the Canal Company, negotiations with the interested parties 
had taken place in various forums, including two conferences in London.56 Western powers, 
including Britain, France, and the US, had objected to the nationalisation o f the canal on the basis 
that it was in contravention of the Constantinople Convention (1888) and despite the fact that 
Nasser had guaranteed free navigation o f the waterway. As Britain and France related it to the 
Security Council in September 1956, they were opposed to the:
‘...Situation created by the unilateral action o f the Egyptian Government in bringing to 
an end the system of international operation o f the Suez Canal, which was confirmed by 
and completed by the Suez Canal Convention o f 1888.’57
In fact the Constantinople Convention mentioned nothing relating to the private or public 
operation of the canal, or the running o f the Universal Suez Canal Company; rather its main 
provisions related to the ‘...free use o f the Canal, in time o f war as in times o f peace’, which 
should be accorded to every vessel ‘.. .o f  commerce or o f war, without distinction o f flag.’58 For 
Egypt the nationalisation o f the canal was as much about the redistribution o f dues eamt from 
passing vessels— most of which was traditionally dispersed among the mainly Western 
stockholders that made-up the Canal Company— as it was a symbolic assertion o f sovereignty. As 
Nasser stressed during his public announcement o f the nationalisation o f the Canal Company on 
26 July 1956:
‘The Suez Canal was dug by the efforts o f the sons o f Egypt - 120,000 Egyptians died in 
the process. The Suez Canal Company, sitting in Paris, is a usurping com pany...w hy 
shouldn’t we take it ourselves?’59
55 Because o f  the symbolism o f  the Suez crisis for the rise o f  US hegemony in the Near East and the decline 
o f  the British Empire most accounts naturally focus on this facet o f  the issue.
56 France, Britain and the US held talks in London between 29 July and 2 August 1956 and a further twenty 
states participated in a further ‘London Suez Conference’ on 16-24 August 1956.
57 S/3654, 23 September 1956.
58 Constantinople Convention o f  the Suez Canal, 1888: Article I.
59 Nasser’s speech reproduced in Donald C. Watt, Documents on the Suez Crisis (London: RIIA, 1957), 
p.48.
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At the outset, the US had put significant onus on the secretary-general to find a favourable 
outcome through a negotiated settlement.60 Through ‘Good Offices’, Dag Hammarskjold 
convened the relevant representatives and found agreement relatively rapidly— even if  this may 
have been a function o f an Egyptian attempt to disable growing British and French belligerency. 
In effect, the basis o f the settlement o f the crisis came to be Security Council Resolution 118 
(1956), which had been formed out o f the six principles that secretary-general Hammarskjold had 
negotiated with the foreign ministers o f Egypt, France and Britain.61 These included: the ‘free 
and open transit’ for all users o f the Canal ‘without discrimination’; that the sovereignty o f Egypt 
‘should be respected’; the operation o f the canal should be ‘insulated from the politics o f any 
country’; that Egypt and users were to agree on tolls and charges; as well as on a ‘fair proportion’ 
o f the dues to the development o f the Canal; and an agreement to refer all disputes for 
arbitration.62
It is telling that two provisions o f the resolution, three and six— ‘the operation o f  the Canal 
should be insulated from the politics o f any country’ and ‘disputes...between Suez Canal 
Company and Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration’— run completely against 
point two: that ‘the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected.’ One might ask how was it possible 
for Egyptian sovereignty to be respected when the Canal, located on Egyptian territory, was to be 
insulated from the politics o f any country? The ‘politics o f any country’ provision quite clearly 
refers to Egypt for it is unclear how the domestic politics o f other states would affect its everyday 
operation. And if ‘politics’ was to be excluded from the operation o f the canal, this must impinge 
by definition on the dominion o f the country. In a sense this provision went further in 
circumscribing Egyptian control o f the canal than even the Constantinople Convention, which at 
least allowed in Article X for the possibility o f the Sultan o f the Ottoman Empire taking over the 
operation o f the canal. Specifically, the Sultan: ‘...m ight find it necessary to take for securing by
60 Dag Hammarskjold had taken the initiative to mediate between the British, French and Egyptian 
governments with the support and encouragement o f  US Secretary o f  State John Foster Dulles. Brian 
Urquhart, Hammarskjold (London: The Bodley Head, 1972), p.73.
61 S/RES/118, October 13 1956. Mediation by Hammarskjold had taken place from October 9 to 12 and 
resulted in his recounting o f  the understandings arrived at with the various parties to the Security Council 
on 13 October 1956. These formed the basis o f  Security Council Resolution 118 (1956). ‘Yearbook o f  the 
United Nations 1955/56/57’, available at <http:domino.un.org/unispal>.
62 It is worth noting that Security Council Resolution 118 (1956) is remarkably similar to the ‘proposals’ 
arrived at by eighteen states (including among others the UK, US and France and excluding Egypt, USSR, 
and India) during the London Suez Conference (16-24 August 1956). Here all o f  the central points o f  
Security Council Resolution 118 are taken, more or less verbatim, from the London ‘proposals’: for 
example point 2 (c) o f  the ‘Proposals’, which sought the ‘Insulation o f  the operation o f  the Canal from the 
politics o f  any nation.’ See ‘The 18-Power Proposals o f  the First London Conference, 16-24 August 1956’, 
reproduced in: Watt, Documents on the Suez Crisis, p.53 and S/RES/118, October 13, 1956.
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their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance o f public order.’63 Equally, it could 
also be noted that it is unclear how the referral o f all disputes for arbitration was in any way 
compatible with the sovereignty o f the country. As Evan Luard put the issue in a rather innocuous 
way: ‘ ...Proposals would thus not have reversed nationalisation but would have submitted Egypt 
to a form o f international responsibility.’64
In these points, one can only assume that there were specified and internationally legitimated 
limits to the reach and authority o f post-colonial states and conclude that the Suez Canal Zone 
was too important a strategic location and profitable enterprise to be in the hands o f a popular 
nationalist and socialist Third World regime. To a large extent this was confirmed with the latter 
deployment o f  peacekeepers in the Canal Zone and in the Sinai, which served to internationalise 
the enforcement o f the above provisions and served to put the ability o f the Egyptian State to 
entirely govern this ‘international resource’ beyond its effective scope.
To be sure, these international interventions did not prohibit Nasser from nationalising foreign 
property, expanding state enterprises and experimenting with a centrally planned economy in the 
rest o f  the country. Far from it: the Suez invasions o f late 1956 actually provided the Egyptian 
government with the pretext to appropriate British, French, as well as Jewish, property.65 But it is 
clear that it was Nasser’s Arab Socialist demagoguery, and its potential ramifications for both the 
Suez Canal and the wider Middle East, that had so incised the Eden and Mollet governments into 
military action in the first place; their goal was nothing less than the overthrow o f Nasser.66
Such ambitions and action were much to the consternation o f the UN secretary-general and the 
Eisenhower Administration, who together had invested a great deal o f effort into resolving the 
crisis in a quiet manner, and in a way satisfactory to the Western Alliance.67 The British and 
French invasion o f the country— a plan coordinated with Israel— transformed the issue into a far 
larger one relating to European dominion over the Near East and competing Western visions for
63 Constantinople Convention o f  the Suez Canal, 1888: Article X.
64 Evan Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2: The Age o f  Decolonisation, 1955-1965 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p.29.
65 British, French and Jewish property seized in November 1956. British and UK banks in Egypt are 
nationalised in January 1957.
66As Nasser saw it: ‘Mollet will not be satisfied unless he has the Canal and my throat too’ cited in: 
Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p.219. See also: Erskine Childers ‘Judgement on Suez’ reproduced in Harry 
Browne, Flashpoints: Suez and Sinai (London: Longman, 1971), p.l 11.
67 It should be recalled that Hammarskjold had put a significant amount o f  pressure on the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, to make the concessions that led to the ‘six principles.’ Urquhart, 
Hammarskjold, p. 168.
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how international affairs should be regulated and enforced. Not inconsequential was the 
embryonic US security regime in the region embodied in the 1950 Tripartite Agreement and 
which later developed in 1957 into the Eisenhower Doctrine.68 In one way, as we will come on to 
see, the intercession o f UNEF was about enforcing this new order in which European gunship 
diplomacy was proscribed in favour o f formal sovereign equality and reliable rentier states.69
But even though UNEF was partly developed as a vehicle to extract Britain, France and Israel 
from Egyptian territory, it was also useful precisely because it enforced compliance, albeit 
informally and temporarily, o f the Egyptian state to the provisions negotiated by the secretary- 
general and formalised in Security Council Resolution 118 (1956). This is particularly noticeable 
in some o f  the debates that surrounded the potential deployment o f a force, and in the 
negotiations that Dag Hammarskjold undertook with Nasser to secure the terms o f entry and 
departure for the UN operation.
The idea o f using peacekeepers to resolve the crisis precipitated by the invasion was first 
proposed by Lester Pearson, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN and former 
candidate for the post o f secretary-general. It reflected the Canadian concern that deteriorating 
Anglo-American relations could seriously impinge on the country’s position, considering its 
Commonwealth history and its North American neighbour. At first, Pearson had envisaged that 
British and French troops might actually participate in this ‘...truly international peace and police 
force’ while a settlement was being worked out.70 That this was out o f the question became 
evident when the surreal potential o f  using Canadian forces—the Queen’s Own Rifles no less—  
was rejected by Egypt for their unfavourable connotations.71 No wonder for a while when the 
issue was under discussion in the General Assembly, Eden was able to assure Parliament that: 
‘.. .a  UN force should eventually be associated with the Anglo-French police action.’72
In the end, the degree o f Western connivance in the UN operation was toned-down both in terms 
o f the troops used and in the specific purposes mandated to the Emergency Force (even though
68 The 1950 Tripartite Agreement was a set o f  understandings between Britain, France and the US 
regarding the defence o f  sovereign borders and armistice lines in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine (5 
January 1957), sought to firmly establish US pre-eminence in the Middle East above possible external peer 
competitors and local revisionist forces.
69 A regional order ultimately guaranteed, as outlined in the Eisenhower Doctrine, by the use o f  covert and 
conventional US military force.
70 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p. 176.
71 Joseph P. Lash, Hammarskjold, (London: Cassell, 1962), p. 187.
72 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p. 176.
31
Dag Hammarskjold was insistent on using Canadian manpower in some form). The real 
innovation here seems to be that it formalised the use o f middle-ranking powers in such 
international actions. To some extent, this has functioned as symbolic reassurance o f  the non­
partisan nature o f the organisation’s security work— even if  it does not indicate the wider 
structural and political logic o f these interventions. Nonetheless, UNEF’s mandate was far more 
ambiguous and undefined than the UK and France had hoped: it did not provide for the direct 
security o f the Suez Canal much less for its re-establishment as a Western dominated private 
company. However it did provide for the intercession o f international troops under formal 
Egyptian assent first to help disengage the forces in Port Said and its environs, and second to 
provide a buffer between Egypt and Israel on the armistice line. Thus with Egyptian permission, 
international troops were stationed on its territory, transforming its freedom o f  action 
considerably.
This ‘internationalisation’ o f the Sinai Peninsula was further sealed by a guarantee secured by 
Dag Hammarskjold regarding the longevity o f the operation. Here it was widely felt that Nasser 
might withdraw the consent required for troops to be deployed and thereby scupper the 
operation.73 Through persistent efforts—namely, the secretary-general’s repeated threats that 
UNEF troops already deployed would be withdrawn immediately— Nasser assented to what was 
labelled the ‘Good Faith Agreements’. In effect, it tied Egypt into accepting troops in the country 
until the crisis had been settled as defined by the UN:
‘When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and
functioning o f UNEF, it [Egypt] will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance o f
General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956.’74
W hile a decade later Egypt felt able to request a withdrawal o f UNEF, up until then a great deal 
o f  anxiety among Arab states had been expressed about the indeterminate and open-ended nature
73 The concept o f  consent is a tricky formal facet o f UN peace operations (unless undertaken under Chapter 
VII o f  the UN Charter). From the beginning (i.e. from UNEF) the necessity o f  consent was self-evident 
because o f  the theoretical sovereign equality o f  all states in the ‘UN Charter System’. As consent was 
therefore imperative, in order not to undermine the system itself and the regime o f  intervention that it 
marked, different forms o f  international pressure were called for in order to ensure formal assent to UN  
deployment. This sometimes involved diplomatic pressure from one or more great power, or from the 
secretary-general himself, on local forces to consent to UN deployment.
74 ‘Good Faith Agreements’ reproduced in: The Blue Helmets, p.41. Brian Urquhart states that Dag 
Hammarskjold had threatened Nasser on three occasions with the immediate withdrawal o f  UNEF unless 
he assented to some form o f  understanding regarding the duration o f  the operation. Urquhart, 
Hammarskjold, p. 193.
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o f the operation. This was especially the case with UNEF’s positions in Sharm el Sheikh, which 
were being used to enforce the free passage o f Israeli ships through the Straits o f Tiran.75 And 
despite the public triumphalism o f the Nasser regime, private understandings relating to the 
functioning o f UNEF— especially in the Gaza Strip and Sinai— and the pure fact that the Force 
was operating solely on the Egyptian Side o f the Armistice Line, underscored the constrained 
nature o f this Arab state’s autonomy.76
In sum, it can be concluded that in lieu o f formal coercive intervention by Western European 
states to enforce the re-imposition o f its imperial system in the Suez— one that had seen the Canal 
occupied by Britain for a hundred years— a new type o f global regime that was fully compatible 
with the sovereign equality of newly independent states was tentatively developed that served to 
‘internationalise’ the region and indirectly circumscribe Egyptian autonomy o f this ‘international 
resource’. This was a significant development in a post-colonial world for it established a novel 
political formula for policing Southern states that that had fallen foul o f the international political 
economy, which did not necessarily rely on gunship diplomacy or impinge, at least formally, on 
the sovereignty o f these new states.77
O f course, not every classic interstate peacekeeping operation was analogous to the kind o f 
processes and logic o f the Suez one. Peacekeeping in Lebanon, the Golan Heights, Cyprus and 
Kashmir, were all operations designed to stall the violent consequences o f the dismantling o f 
formal empires and buttress these ‘new’ states. Ad-hoc, limited in scope and precariously 
positioned, these operations had no direct function in policing the international political economy 
other than reinforcing in the widest sense its political and public corollary, the ‘modest nation- 
state’. Nonetheless this is an important detail in itself because o f the formative importance o f a
75 Israel refused to allow UN troops to be deployed on its side o f  the Armistice line.
76 Hammarskjold had negotiated a secret 12-point memorandum o f understanding on UNEF’s activities 
with Nasser in April 1957, which included understandings regarding the continued stationing o f  UNEF in 
Sharm el Sheikh after the departure o f  the Israeli forces and thereby guaranteeing the free passage o f  Israeli 
ships, and an Egyptian commitment not to remilitarise the Gaza Strip. Nasser was naturally concerned to 
keep the agreement private. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp.219-220.
77 Without doubt, military action continued to be taken by the US and other powers to enforce or reinforce 
regional political and economic complexes. In the Far East, the US operation against North Korea, under 
UN auspices, was an early but extreme example o f  this: the US utilised the Security Council, its automatic 
majority in the General Assembly and the pliancy o f  the secretary-general, Trygve Lie, to authorise and 
legitimate an enforcement operation to restore South Korea to the Western capitalist system. But such 
actions could only be undertaken in extreme circumstances because the basis o f  the post-war system 
remained in principle, if  not in practice, the sovereign equality o f all states. UN peacekeeping with its 
doctrine o f  consent and the use o f  ‘disinterested’ forces was a useful innovation precisely because it was at 
once sensitive to these new modalities, able to preserve the structure and hierarchy o f  the post-1945 world 
order in a manner acceptable to many post-colonial states.
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universal sovereign state-system for upholding a private world economy. Put another way, every 
one o f these interstate operations was intimately part o f a new social order that materialised in the 
post-war period that saw the international sphere reorganised along, as Justin Rosenberg has put 
it: ‘ ...a  public political aspect which concerns the management o f the state-system, and a private 
political aspect which effects the extraction and relaying o f surpluses.’78 In short, interstate 
peacekeeping was an intrinsic part o f this new social order in the periphery— concerned 
primarily, although as we have seen in Suez and UNEF not exclusively, with the ‘political 
aspect’, the ‘management o f the state-system’.
But there are a series o f operations that the UN undertook in the early decades o f its existence that 
went further than simply buttress, institutionalise and protect the new political order and that were 
actually centrally concerned with the transition from the colonial, to the sovereign. To a large 
extent, it is these formative operations— in Jerusalem, West Irian, Leopoldville and Windhoek—  
rather than the classic ‘interstate’ ones detailed above that are the secret ancestors of today’s Post- 
Cold War ‘second-generation’ operations. Entrusted with the management of transfer from one 
order to another within certain societies, these operations have acted as an important vehicle for 
the transmission o f liberal modernity in the borderlands o f the world system.
E arly  UN conveyance operations and the case of W est Irian
In the first decades o f the UN’s existence, the organisation deployed several operations intended 
to help facilitate the transition from colonial rule to sovereign independence. Although during this 
period a far rarer occurrence than the ‘classic’ interstate peacekeeping operations discussed 
above, these activities are important because they were directly involved in the transfer o f 
bounded communities from one social order to another. In this detail they are important 
forerunners to ‘second-generation’ peace operations, which have been deployed repeatedly since 
the collapse o f the Second World in 1989 to preside over a specific restructuring o f the domestic 
‘space’ along neo-liberal political economy lines. For this reason there is merit in examining 
these formative UN operations as a category in their own right.
One little discussed example o f ‘transition’ operations was the UN Temporary Executive 
Authority (UNTEA) and Security Force (UNSF), which briefly administered the territory o f West 
Irian (otherwise known as West New Guinea or Irian Barat) between October 1962 and May
78 Rosenberg, The Empire o f  Civil Society, p. 131.
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1963.79 That this formative experience is infrequently addressed is surprising given that UNTEA 
was the first operation in which the UN had assumed executive authority in a territory, and the 
first occasion in which the UN had been allocated significant nation-building roles and 
functions.80 One o f the most noteworthy developments here was the key role that UN officials 
played in carrying through these tasks and the significant degree o f autonomy bestowed upon the 
UN Secretariat in the process. In this regard what becomes striking when examining the operation 
and conduct o f UNTEA is the nascent aptitude o f the UN Secretariat in carrying out intricate 
political functions within Southern societies on behalf o f its member-states.
Under the New York Agreements arrived at by the Indonesian and Dutch governments regarding 
West Irian, the tasks given to the UN Secretariat included among others: establishing a formal 
political institution under the UN Administrator’s dispensation (IX and XXIII); reforming 
colonial institutions o f law and order; guaranteeing private property (XXII); and preparing the 
unwitting indigenous population as the agreement put it ‘...psychologically for the impending 
change to Indonesian authority.’81 This wide ranging set o f activities was all the more remarkable 
given that these tasks and functions were carried out in the context o f a substantial proportion o f 
the population (by some accounts one-third) remaining outside the centralised control o f the 
Dutch authorities.82 Overall, as the authors o f the third edition of the United Nations produced 
‘Blue Helm ets’, note: ‘The transfer o f authority implied a need to adapt existing institutions from 
the Dutch pattern to an Indonesian pattern.’83
In contrast to interstate peacekeeping, what is particularly noticeable in this operation therefore 
are its large nation-building tasks and civilian dimensions. Here the UN is not so much concerned 
with policing the separation o f armed forces, the demarcation of armistice lines or enforcing 
compliance to an international regime, although UNSF had key responsibilities in most o f  these
79 For literature dealing with this event see: John Saltford, ‘United Nations involvement with the act o f  self- 
determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea), 1968 to 1969’, Indonesia, no.69 (April 2000), 
pp.71-92; Paul Van de Veur, ‘The United Nations in West New Guinea: a critique’, International 
Organization, vol. 18, no.l (Winter 1964), pp.53-73.
80 U Thant (acting secretary-general at the time) refers to the West Irian operation on only two pages o f  his 
400-page or so memoir. In these references he does not hint at any o f  the controversies surrounding the 
affair and merely cursorily recounts the set-up o f  the operation: U Thant, View From the UN (London: 
David & Charles, 1977), pp.48-49. Sir Brain Urquhart, in his sweeping account o f  his four decades at the 
UN, does not refer to West Irian once.
81 Cited in: Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2, p.342.
82 James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, p. 193. The population o f the territory was estimated at 
700,000.
83 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.645.
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regards; rather the UN is essentially involved in running and fashioning nascent territorial 
institutions designed to foster Indonesian rule. O f course, this is why UNTEA was primarily a 
civilian operation, made-up largely o f international officials turned administrators. As we will see 
in later chapters, this was an important innovation because it ultimately bequeathed a decisive 
political role to the UN Secretariat in reshaping African and Asian societies.84
For the moment however, it should be stressed that in the wider context these conveyance roles—  
providing for a transfer o f direct control from the colonial to the post-colonial and helping to 
create the institutional context under which such a transfer could take place— were not a neutral 
or value-free set o f activities. In the widest sense performing functions that helped institutionalise 
a world o f nation-states was a deeply political project if  only because it reproduced a form o f 
international social organisation that was inimitable to US post-world war II strategic planning. 
This can be partly illustrated in the wider context under which UNTEA was brought about, and in 
the narrower manner in which UN officials sought to inhibit the potential prospect o f the territory 
moving towards independence outside of the new Indonesian nation.
In the first place, UNTEA was designed as a mechanism to extricate the Dutch Empire out o f the 
Pacific and tie the territory, regardless o f the inclination o f the indigenous inhabitants, into 
centralised Indonesian rule. After a period o f escalating tension in the region that had seen 
insurgency and counter insurgency between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the Kennedy 
Administration moved decisively to the view that West Irian should be transferred to Indonesia.85 
Certainly US preoccupations at the time— tying Djakarta into the Western Alliance, ensuring 
access to raw materials in the Archipelago, and consolidating US maritime dominance o f the 
Pacific—produced a US policy that was firmly behind the Sukarno government.86 This was 
confirmed when the US prohibited Dutch military aircraft refuelling on American Air Force 
bases, and after the Kennedy Administration boycotted the inaugural ceremony o f  the New 
Guinean Council that the colonial authorities had instituted.87 This US pressure combined with 
more general diplomatic isolation and the increasing costs o f the territory on the metropolis itself
84 While these practices were innovative as far as UN practices were concerned they were not unlike the 
traditional roles and functions o f  colonial administrators.
85 James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, pp. 186-92. Robert F. Kennedy in particular was 
concerned about retaining the large Indonesian Archipelago within the Western capitalist system.
86 Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2, p.336. US policy in this regard reflected the wider 
logic o f  the Kennedy Doctrine, which had placed far more emphasis on Third World regimes as 
interlocutors o f  American hegemony.
87 Ibid. pp.337-38.
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left the Dutch government with little option but to negotiate, which it did under US mediation in 
1962.88
To a large extent, the real issue became one o f the modalities o f transfer to Indonesia as opposed 
to any serious discussion o f the possibility o f self-rule for West Irian.89 Here, the principal 
original point o f  difference had been that while the Netherlands held that the territory should 
move towards its own independence, ostensibly because o f a separate West New Guinean identity 
which the authorities were busy constructing, the Indonesians maintained that as part o f the Dutch 
East Indies, W est Irian should be decolonised across-the-board as was the norm elsewhere.90 The 
resort to unconditional negotiations meditated by the US and UN, however, reflected clearly the 
circumscribed negotiating position o f the Dutch, which was forced in the final settlement to 
rescind on its main demands except for some ceremonial details that conferred the appearance of 
a principled Dutch withdrawal. In particular, the Dutch agreed to transfer authority to Djakarta 
via the UN and accepted a relatively weak provision calling for an ‘Act o f Free Choice’ to take 
place on the territory before 1969 under Indonesian control but UN supervision. In terms o f the 
wider structure o f the operation, therefore, UNTEA was designed to serve as a mechanism for 
removing the Dutch from one of its last overseas strangleholds and ensuring the incorporation of 
West Irian into a friendly Indonesian state. As Alan James has written in relation to this episode: 
‘W hat...the principle o f self-determination entailed was the break-up of empires, not the 
dismemberment o f new, non-white states.’91
If there was any doubt about this on the ground, UNTEA officials ensured, from the domestic 
Papuan perspective at least, that any aspirations regarding self-rule outside the Indonesian orbit 
would be thwarted. Indeed, as has been the case in peace activities in other contexts, the structural 
objective o f the operation was also reinforced by the practical interpretation o f the UNTEA 
mandate by officials on the ground and in New York. For example, UN officials went to great 
efforts to prohibit anti-Indonesian demonstrations in the territory and to ‘ ...discourage dissent by 
Council m embers’ all the while the integration of Indonesian police and administrators in the 
territory was being expedited.92 Most remarkable, however, was the pragmatic position o f the
88 James, The Politics o f  Peacekeeping, pp. 185-192. U Thant recalls that he was encouraged by Robert F. 
Kennedy to mediate between the Indonesians and Dutch. Thant, View From the UN, p.48.
89 Saltford, ‘United Nations involvement with the act o f  self-determination in West Irian’, pp.71-72.
90 Indonesia also made the claim that the territory had been part o f  central Javanese control since the sixth 
century.
91 James, Peacekeeping in International Politics, p. 195.
92 Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2, p.342.
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UN vis-a-vis the ‘Act o f Free Choice’ that Indonesia was to initiate before 1969. On this issue the 
UN secretary-general had certain rights and responsibilities under Article XVII and XXI o f the 
New York Agreements that revolved around appointing a representative and retaining UN staff 
for the purpose o f advising and assisting the Indonesian government in carrying through the ‘Act 
o f Free Choice’.93 According to the Agreement, the ‘Act o f  Free Choice’ was to decide whether 
the territory would ‘remain with Indonesia’ or ‘sever their ties with Indonesia’ and would be 
carried out according to ‘international standards.’ Needless to say the precise interpretation o f 
these provisions was absolutely central to the outcome o f this ‘Act o f Free Choice.’
In this crucial matter, however, the Secretariat interpreted the provisions remarkably liberally 
with no relevant UN personnel visiting the territory until 1968 and a general acceptance o f the 
preferred Indonesian method o f ‘free choice’— admittedly with some pleas for credibility by the 
UN representative, Bolivian diplomat Ortiz Sanz, appointed to oversee the issue.94 Nonetheless, 
given the tight restrictions and control that the Indonesian state had applied to the territory after 
the withdrawal o f UNTEA in 1963, and the reports o f frantic military campaigns to subdue the 
natives in the interior after this transition, it would have been hard to avoid the conclusion and 
possibility that there was a strong antipathy towards the Javanese on the island. Indeed, the 
unpopularity o f the Indonesian regime in West New Guinea was evident to all. As one Jakarta 
based American diplomat conceded in 1968: ‘The Indonesians have tried everything from 
bombing them with B-26s, to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state o f semi­
rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt 
at repression.’95 And yet there was a general reluctance on the part o f UN officials to address this 
issue: the arrangements made by the Indonesians for the ‘free choice’ and carried out between 
July and August 1963 were by all accounts barely credible, with hastily convened representatives 
o f councils isolated and asked to assent to continued Indonesian rule or be branded as traitors.
It was argued here by UN officials and Indonesians that because o f the degree o f political 
development o f many o f the inhabitants, or lack thereof, and due to the inhospitable terrain o f the 
island, it was necessary to conduct an act o f free choice by the Indonesian system o f musjawarah,
93 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.646.
94 Ortiz Sanz proposed and pushed for minimally acceptable ‘standards’ for the conduct o f  the ‘free 
choice’. By and large these were rejected and he eventually concluded, along with the Indonesians, that an 
act ‘ ...in  accordance with international practice is indeed, impossible’. Cited in: Saltford, ‘United Nations 
involvement with the act o f  self-determination in West Irian’, p.79.
95 US diplomat cited in: Saltford, ‘United Nations involvement with the act o f  self-determination in West 
Irian’, p.74.
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which means by a process o f council consultation. In practice this translated, as John Saltford has 
noted, into Indonesian soldiers and officials selecting and then isolating assembly members 
several weeks before the ‘consultation’ and giving direct instructions as to what to say in their 
speeches and how to vote.96 Apart from the indignant responses o f a few West African states to 
the whole process in the General Assembly, the rest o f the international community led by the US 
was willing to play along with the Indonesian interpretation o f this formal obligation.97 UN 
officials, for their part, played a pivotal role in legitimising the process by sanctioning the 
Indonesian conduct o f the ‘act o f free choice’ and thereafter confirming that the Djakarta 
government had fulfilled its obligations vis-^-vis the New York Agreements and General 
Assembly Resolution 1752 (1962). In this regard, it is worth recalling the final report o f Ortiz 
Sanz to the General Assembly affirming that an Act o f Free Choice had been carried out, which 
was technically accurate but remarkably reticent. It noted that within: ‘...the limitations imposed 
by the geographical characteristics o f the territory and the general political situation in the area, 
an act o f free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in 
which the representatives o f the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia.’98 
For the UN, and the international community more generally, this report by Sanz was the end o f 
the matter; the UN had completed its final task as conferred to it by the New York Agreements 
and sanctioned by the General Assembly.
All in all, the UN’s association with the territory o f  West New Guinea was a rather extraordinary 
affair that pointed-up some o f the key structural and political roles o f the organisation in a post­
colonial world. Unlike so called ‘classic’ interstate peacekeeping, West Irian provided the first 
opportunity for the UN to become directly and fully involved in the business o f constructing 
nation-states, both in terms o f their internal state-society relations and in terms o f how this was to 
fit into wider regional non-colonial state-structures. But apart from the overarching political logic 
and wider structural role o f this episode o f colonial transition, remarkable as it was for world 
order management, what UNTEA also highlights is the nascent political role o f UN officials 
within these situations for forging the domestic conditions under which transfer is manufactured. 
This ‘domestic’ role had two intrinsic facets: UN officials as one time professional nation- 
builders caught-up in providing the institutional prerequisites for transfer and, at another, political 
instruments for fashioning a smooth and legitimated reallocation of power and authority via the
96 Ibid. pp.86-88.
97 Ghana and several Francophone West African states raised their objections to the Indonesian process in 
the General Assembly.
98 UN A/7723, Annex I, 6 November 1969.
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‘Act o f Free Choice’. This was perhaps inevitable given the formal civil roles assigned to the UN 
by its representative organs; but in effect it introduced into world affairs a specialised set o f 
international professionals who could be employed to take charge o f administrating territories and 
redesigning their public institutions. In this regard the management o f post-colonial affairs no 
longer necessarily relied exclusively on the manpower o f colonial powers.
UN mediators and officials: walking a straight-line?
While UNTEA was pioneering in the sense that it was the first operation to administer a territory 
and hence partake in nation-building functions, it was not the first instance o f UN peace activities 
that included considerable political roles for top-UN officials. Here, mediation in Palestine, and 
the controversial 1961 Congo operation (ONUC), were early UN activities that bestowed upon 
officials significant political functions and leew ay." In both cases UN officials were charged with 
managing and mediating between groups in a post-colonial domestic context and were therefore 
required to a greater or lesser extent to adjudicate between them. In principle and in practice such 
a role reflected new regimes for managing ostensibly endogenous post-colonial issues and 
suggested a new object o f authority in these societies. For instance, in lieu o f tarnished British 
imperial mediation in the Near East, a UN mission gradually evolved to negotiate and secure an 
armistice between the Arabs and the nascent Israeli state, and institutionalise changing visions of 
a two-state solution. Structurally, therefore, the mediating arm o f UNTSO replaced British rule 
from Government House in Jerusalem as the major advocate o f an essentially imperial division of 
historic Palestine.100 In this respect UN officials have played a role in replicating, wittingly or 
unwittingly, a particular vision o f world order. As we have already seen this is what effectively 
happened in West New Guinea, where a UN representative helped ensure the incorporation o f the 
territory into Indonesia. But perhaps one o f the more notorious sets o f actions by UN officials 
was during the Congo operation in 1961 (ONUC). Here UN officials had the ability to transform 
the domestic political landscape in favour o f one or other social force or political grouping, as 
was seen by Andrew Cordier’s controversial and prejudiced decision to close airports and close­
down national radio stations in the country after the unconstitutional dismissal o f  Patrice
99 Various dimensions o f the UN-Congo encounter are discussed in Chapter Seven.
100 Trygve Lie was a particularly ‘outspoken’ advocate for partition in Palestine. Evan Luard, A History o f  
the United Nations. Volume 1: The Years o f  Western Dominance, 1945-1955 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1983), pp.343-346.
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Lumumba as Prime Minister by the President Kasa Vubu.101 In this case, the top-UN official in 
Kinshasa undertook a political decision that was absolutely decisive in the fall o f the Lumumba 
government and in the eventual rise of the Mobuto regime.
While an admittedly extreme case o f UN action, what this episode demonstrated was that from 
the early years o f the organisation UN officials were given important political roles in mediating 
affairs within some post-colonial states and that as a consequence they held some capacity to 
shape the landscape o f these communities. Maybe not quite as decisive as the role o f top-colonial 
administrators during the latter stages of say British colonialism, UN representatives and 
mediators nonetheless introduced into the affairs o f decolonised states an added international 
political and diplomatic dynamic that, to a greater or lesser extent, changed the distribution o f 
domestic order and power. Even seemingly benign administrative roles such as those that 
UNTEA held in what was considered an inconsequential piece o f territory had immense political 
import; banning anti-Indonesian demonstrations, dissuading local leaders from voicing dissent, 
expediting the assimilation of Indonesian officials were crucial in smoothing the way for 
Indonesian rule in the land. All this o f course belies the typical account o f UN activity that takes 
as a given the impartial, neutral and disinterested role o f UN officials and operations.
This falsehood becomes more evident once it is appreciated that every epoch o f UN peace 
activities has generated a set o f UN officials that have authored these processes and, in the early 
years at least, retained close links to Western institutions from which they emerged. An early and 
formative case was that o f the African-American Ralph Bunche, between 1940-1971.102 A 
researcher in the Office o f Strategic Services (OSS under William Donovan was the direct 
forerunner o f the CIA) on African political development during the Second World War he later 
became an intrinsic part o f  the Department o f State’s negotiating team in Dumbarton Oaks and 
San Francisco, relating specifically to issues o f trusteeship and decolonisation.103 In this regard 
Bunche later came to be considered by the Truman Administration as the most effective 
spokesman and authority on issues o f decolonisation and was often dispatched to argue the case
101 For a good recent reconstruction o f  these set o f  events, partly based on UN documents, see: Ludo De 
Witte, The Assassination o f  Lumumba (London: Verso, 2001).
102 The best treatment o f  Ralph Bunche remains the one written by long-time former associate in the UN 
and now ‘Scholar in Residence’ in the Ford Foundation in New York, Sir Brian Urquhart: Ralph Bunche: 
an American odyssey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). Admittedly, a very sympathetic 
treatment o f  Bunche it nonetheless remains the most insightful and informative record o f  his activities in 
the UN.
103 Ibid. p. 102.
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for independence with the British and French in various fora, such as the first session o f  the 
General Assembly held in London in 1946.104 Having virtually written the articles on trusteeship 
in the UN Charter at San Francisco, he was later seconded to the UN, to the Trusteeship Council, 
which he was instrumental in establishing and securing colonial territories for.105 Later, as Deputy 
to the UN Mediator Count Bemadotte in Palestine, Bunche wrote most o f the various plans and 
proposals for partition, including the Bemadotte partition proposal.106 After the assassination o f 
Bemadotte by the Stem Gang in 1948, Bunche took on the role as Acting Mediator and was 
responsible for key UN decisions in the history o f the conflict. Recognising the utility o f Bunche, 
secretary-general Dag HammarskjSld appointed him ‘Under Secretary-General for Special 
Political Affairs’, in effect a position created to harness his talents in the event o f  any significant 
political activity undertaken by the UN.107 While two such positions had been created— one for 
an American and one for a Soviet— it was widely recognised that this was a matter o f  creating 
symbolic balance and that Bunche remained the primary trouble-shooter in this regard. From this 
platform, Bunche became an instrumental interlocutor in the Suez crisis, Lebanon and especially 
the Congo. Throughout this time Bunche remained a prominent member o f the East Coast 
political establishment (for a while president o f American Political Studies Association) and 
retained the confidence o f several US Administrations, including the Eisenhower Presidency 
during the McCarthy investigations o f American citizens at the UN.108
Regardless o f  how figures like Ralph Bunche are viewed, it is hard to deny that they were 
instrumental in the development of the UN and especially in its peace practices. In some respects 
they were historically as noteworthy as many o f the UN Secretaries-General, because o f their
104 Ibid. p. 130.
105 As noted the issue o f  trusteeship was put into ‘cold-storage’ during Dumbarton Oaks so Bunche 
achieved little progress on this issue. But in San Francisco, Bunche gained the credit for the Trusteeship 
Council chapter (XIII) in the Charter as well as having a huge impact on Chapter XI and XII. Brian 
Urquhart surmises the impact o f  these articles as: ‘ ...the three chapters on dependent peoples and 
trusteeship gave a momentum and a legitimacy to decolonisation which allowed the process to be 
completed within thirty years o f  the San Francisco Conference, putting an end to the long era o f  colonial 
empires, and radically changing the membership o f  the United Nations. Bunche was to continue to play a 
central role in the historic process.’ Ibid. pp. 119-122.
106 Ibid. p. 176.
107 Ibid. p.246.
108 Shortly after his election, Eisenhower offered Bunche the position o f  US Deputy Representative to the 
UN. Ibid. p.244. O f Bunche’s role in the UN, Eisenhower’s Chief o f  Staff had apparently said: ‘The 
President fully agrees with your view [Bunche] that you can best serve the nation in the United Nations.’ 
Urquhart makes a point o f  denying that Bunche held this ‘...conception o f  his role in the United Nations.’ 
Cited in: Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p.262. Bunche won many US awards for his service to the US and UN, 
such as the Theodore Roosevelt Medal for Distinguished Service by the Theodore Roosevelt Association. 
Ibid. p.255.
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deep institutional knowledge of the organisation, their political impact on places such as the 
Congo and Palestine, and in some cases their often-formative roles in shaping the Charter o f  the 
United Nations. But in Bunche’s case, it is also apparent that he remained part o f a small group o f 
American officials that dominated the top-echelons o f the Secretariat during its first few decades 
and who remained close throughout to the complex o f private and public East Coast institutions 
that remained at the heart o f US post-war power.109 These included controversial and influential 
figures such as Dag Hammarskjold’s Executive Assistant, Andrew Cordier, and the Assistant 
secretary-general for Administrative and Financial Services from 1945 to 1954, Byron Price. It 
has been noted by Shirley Hazzard, a former UN employee and prominent American critic o f the 
UN during the 1980s, that Price was: ‘...the secret agent o f the United States government within 
the United Nations leadership’ and that ‘...although his name scarcely appears in U.N. studies 
and memoirs o f the period, the significant power over the Secretariat was in his hands.’110 Indeed, 
it may be recalled that Byron Price was instrumental in the clandestine process o f the selection 
and vetting o f US candidates and dismissal o f US employees in the Secretariat that had been 
arranged with the State Department and officiated by Trygve Lie during the 1950s.
In sum what this brief discussion o f officials and mediators has sought to highlight is that it is 
practically meaningless to assume that the U N ’s activities within states in the early years, and 
perhaps more generally, can be thought o f in any way as independent, impartial, neutral and 
uniformly representative o f the ‘international community.’ Certainly behind these assumptions is 
a whole range o f political functions, and perhaps just as importantly, sociological complexes in 
which the UN was involved and an intrinsic part.
UN peace activities as political activities, the early  years
The above discussion o f UN peace activities has sought to contextualise the role o f  the U N ’s 
peace functions in the post-1945 world by showing their wider structural role in helping provide 
for a transition to a world o f nation-states. Two types o f such activities have been identified and 
examined briefly: those that were designed to cushion the inter-state consequences o f 
decolonisation and manage post-colonial relationships; and those directly part o f mediating the
109 This is a reference to institutions such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. As previously noted, 
these East Coast organisations, among others, have historically had a close relationship with US national 
security and foreign policy institutions. See: Cumings, ‘Boundaiy Displacement’, pp.9-ff; Hoffman, ‘An 
American Social Science’, pp.49-50, and Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, p.35, pp. 139-140, pp. 144-5.
110 ‘Reflections. Breaking Faith - 1’, Shirley Hazzard, New Yorker, vol.65, issue 32 (September 1989), p.66.
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transition between two world orders. In both categories, UN operations are better seen as political 
operations because of their central role in ‘policing’, or administrating the direct transfer to, a 
particular world system in the periphery. Undoubtedly, the activities o f the UN, as shown in the 
cases o f Suez and West New Guinea illustrate clearly the central role o f the organisation in 
promoting a specific understanding o f ‘peace’ in each context. In Suez, it was shown that apart 
from a method o f rebuilding the Western Alliance and disentangling Britain and France from the 
Near East, UNEF was also a successful way o f instituting an exacting political economy on an 
important geo-strategic resource and enforcing, in the case o f the Straits o f Tiran at least, free 
passage o f Israeli shipping. It also confirmed the utility of the secretary-general in negotiating 
agreements and understandings with nationalist Third-World leaders.
West Irian, on the other hand, pointed-up important ways in which the UN managed a transition 
from Dutch to Indonesian rule and, crucially in this case, the way in which the potential 
possibility o f an alternative future for the territory was precluded by both the structural nature o f 
the operation and the narrower and politicised interpretation o f the mandate by UN officials. 
Notable not only for the political task o f nation building, therefore, UNTEA introduces into the 
milieu o f ‘peace operations’ the international official with significant political sway over the 
direction o f certain activities within Southern societies. Admittedly not the first instance o f such 
politicised activities—the Congo was a far more contentious and problematic episode for the UN 
Secretariat— it nonetheless represented a milestone in the development o f UN security roles 
because it formally administered the territory and was directly complicit in significant nation- 
building tasks.
On the whole, it is evident that from their inception peace operations can only be considered 
impartial, neutral and value-free if  we accept that the post-1945 world order is a natural and 
universal one. However, if the post-World War II settlement is problematised and placed in the 
wider context o f a decline in the world o f Empires and the rise o f extra-European powers, it 
becomes palpable to consider the prospect that UN peace operations are very specific to a new 
kind o f social order and distribution o f power. This is certainly backed-up by even the most 
cursory awareness that a world o f nation-states promoted by the US was in direct competition 
with not only the Second World but with European Empires: in this view, peace operations during 
this period were about managing various aspects o f decolonisation and institutionalising new sets 
of post-colonial relationships in the periphery. The political essence o f these activities is 
underscored further if we scrutinise the activities o f UN officials charged with the management of
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these processes, particularly in those operations within societies because o f the wide-ranging 
tasks allocated and the sheer degree o f autonomy exercised. As will be examined in subsequent 
chapters, while a rarity in the early years o f the Cold War, this development is now a central 
feature o f  most if  not all o f the many multi-dimensional peace operations deployed since the 
occasion o f Namibia’s independence in 1990 and required a complete overhaul o f the internal 
organisation o f the UN Secretariat.
Yet it is difficult to comprehend the increased resort to UN peace operations within Southern 
states after 1990, and the related expansion o f UN influence that has necessarily accompanied 
such a rise, without looking at the transformation o f UN as a whole over the years. In this regard 
the UN has itself been a site o f institutional struggle, which has seen states and groups o f states 
attempt to define the very content and outlook o f the organisation’s workload. It is at this internal 
level that the contingent character o f the UN’s peace roles and their political genesis becomes 
fully apparent simply because an organisation that is preoccupied by its peace and security 
functions at the expense of managing and regulating the world economy reflects a narrow, and 
ultimately Western vision o f the UN’s role in world affairs.
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Chapter 2
Defining the Work of the United Nations:
From the challenge of Third World activism to the resurgent Western security agenda
46
‘International organisation can be thought o f as a historical process rather than a given set 
o f institutions.’ Robert W. Cox ( ‘The Crisis of World Order’, 1980).
‘Like all other institutions, the United Nations is changing, redefining its rules and its 
mission in the world. It has a limited but important role to play in a hungry and divided 
world that is already in the middle o f  a class war between the rich and poor nations -  and 
doesn’t quite know it.’ James Reston ( The New York Times, 23 May 1975).
Decolonisation and the ‘tyranny of the majority’
It is has often been noted at one time or another that the United Nations is ‘in crisis’ or ‘in flux’, 
its future indeterminable due to its relations with one or other major power, or a result o f some 
wayward activity in the periphery. In fact, every decade o f the UN’s existence has thrown-up 
some difficulty concerning its supposed functioning and programme o f work. These disputes are 
important to international life not least because they often represent various competing visions for 
how this sphere should be organised and arranged. And while today the specificity o f  the UN’s 
outlook is often taken as fixed and preset— that is, its orientation around peace operations, human 
rights and increasingly terrorism— this was clearly not the case during the Cold War when the 
organisation was at times racked by contests to shape and reshape its workload.
Although the early years o f the UN were marked by what can only be considered, in Evan 
Luard’s terms, as ‘Western Domination’, by the 1960s the organisation had taken on a much 
more proactive stance on a number o f issues.111 Largely a function of the admission o f new states 
to the world body, it was soon evident that as an organised group they might push the body into 
areas unforeseen by the original architects o f the organisation, especially in the campaign for 
rapid and across-the-board decolonisation and in legislative programmes aimed at the regulation 
o f  the liberal world economy. In all, a majority o f member-states sought to forge a United Nations 
that was concerned with challenging the settled status quo at the international level.112
111 The phrase ‘The Years o f Western Domination’ is the subtitle o f  Evan Luard’s first volume o f  A History 
o f  the United Nations.
112 Hedley Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the West’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.) The Expansion o f  
International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.227.
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Before the collapse o f the Second World, the UN essentially encountered two general challenges 
relating to how the ‘international’ should be organised and divided and which were centred on 
transforming what was in essence a US sponsored view of international organisations. First, as we 
have already briefly discussed, there was the competition among great-powers to institute their 
various visions o f world order in the organisation. In the UN this competition mainly took the 
form o f  European attempts during the early decades to hold on to empire blocks in the face o f an 
institution that was designed by the US Department o f State to universalise and regulate 
international political organisation around nation-states and hence open up new markets and 
regions to US public and private influence."3 Crucially, this campaign for the maintenance o f 
colonies was conducted in the institutional context o f new UN member-states that were 
determined to utilise the body to undo European dominion of African and Asian lands. Here, 
newly independent states made use o f the deliberative organs of the UN to pressure publicly and 
diplomatically European powers to become first, more responsive to international observation of 
their administration o f territories and second, to commit formally to some plan for ‘political 
development’ and eventual self-determination."4 As Evan Luard writes:
‘...Increasingly during this period the United Nations became an organisation that was 
concerned to bring about change, especially in colonial territories, and ceased therefore to 
be concerned to maintain peace at any price.’" 5
In some ways, as noted above, this was not necessarily a direct challenge to the institutional logic, 
or for that matter design, o f the United Nations Organisation. Chapter 1, Article 1, o f the United 
Nations Charter talks about the need to build international relations: ‘...on respect for the 
principle o f equal rights and self-determination.’ Chapter XI, the ‘Declaration Regarding Non- 
Self-Goveming Territories’, outlines the international obligations o f colonial powers towards the 
development o f self-government in territories that they administer, which should: ‘...take due 
account o f the political aspirations o f the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development o f their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances o f each
113 On this facet o f  US post-war planning and some o f  the internal debates among US policymakers on the 
merits o f  universalism versus regional spheres, see: Gowan, ‘US:UN’, pp. 11-15; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton 
Oaks, pp.64-65,71,167,248; Hull, The Memoirs o f  Cordon Hull, pp. 1651-1659; Kolko, The Politics o f  War, 
pp.460-463; and Schlesinger, Act o f  Creation, pp.33-45, pp. 175-193.
114 See for example, the seminal 1960 ‘Declaration on the Granting o f  Independence to Colonial Peoples’ 
discussed at length in: Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2, pp.l 80-ff.
1,5 Ibid. p . l l .
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territory and its peoples and their varying stages o f advancement.’116 There should be little doubt 
here that the UN had been planned as a universal organisation and as the primary international 
security body precisely in order to undercut a Soviet and European vision o f the world that 
prioritised ‘spheres o f influence’ and empires and this is partly reflected in the Charter. Certainly, 
as far as great-power relations were concerned the UN was in principle engineered by Department 
o f State policymakers to disentangle European control o f large swathes o f the globe and to allow 
for a greater official and institutional pretext for US world-order management.
Rather, what actually made the struggle for decolonisation so radical and counter-hegemonic in 
the UN was that in practice successive US administrations became less interested in such a 
general process once the UK and France opened up colonial economies to the US, and as East- 
West competition escalated. In the event, therefore, US Administrations played a rather 
ambiguous role in the process of decolonisation helping expedite the end o f empire in places such 
as Suez and the Dutch East Indies and entrenching it in others, such as in Lusophone A frica ."7 
This ambiguity coupled with racial segregation in the US created polarised conflict within UN 
bodies, especially during the 1960s, between those forces seen as white, racist, colonial and 
Western, and those progressively more numeric non-white nation-states."8 Among others this led 
to the creation o f treaties such as the ‘International Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination’ (1965) that created a direct equivalence between colonialism, racial 
segregation and apartheid."9 Conventions such as these were no simple or straightforward 
outcome to achieve because there was bitter and protracted opposition by European states, as well 
as by the US and o f course South Africa and Rhodesia, to these types o f declarations.120
As far as the UN as an institution was concerned, the upshot o f this process was that it helped 
produce a growing group o f disaffected and disenchanted states that increasingly saw their
116 The Charter o f  the United Nations and the Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice (New York: 
UNDPI, 1997).
117 US support for French colonialism in Indochina and the resultant Vietnam War is probably the most 
significant and obvious example o f  the US commitment to selectively defend, in places officials deemed 
necessary, the remnants o f  the old European order.
118 This equivalence was exploited by Soviet officials who talked about ‘two-camps’, with the US the 
leader o f  the ‘Imperialist and Anti-Democratic Camp’ and the Soviet Union at the head o f  the ‘Anti­
imperialist and Democratic Camp’. Cited in: Paul G. Lauren, Power and Prejudice (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1988), p.218.
119 A/2106 (XX), 21 December 1965 ‘International Convention on the Elimination o f  all Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination’; Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the West’, p.227.
120 During this time the UN General Assembly podium became a platform to denounce and censure 
European colonialism in particular, and Western racism and imperialism in general. On this struggle in the 
UN, see: Gordon, Power and Prejudice, pp. 197-232.
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numeric advantages in representative organs o f the UN as a potentially powerful method to 
democratise international affairs and challenge the international status-quo.121 This was a radical 
development because in the first decade o f the U N ’s existence the organisation remained in 
composition, structure and outlook a creature o f Western influence in general, and American 
foreign policy in particular.122
Above all, the extent o f UN connivance in US foreign policy during this period was seen in the 
manner in which the UN was harnessed to legitimate the 1950 US invasion o f Korea and in the 
support by UN officials for the establishment o f an F.B.l. ‘field branch’ in UN headquarters to 
monitor the activities o f US citizens, and citizens o f  other states for that matter, working for the 
world body.123 Certainly from a parliamentary perspective, during the early years the US could 
rally the General Assembly to any one o f a number o f proposals, such as the infamous ‘Uniting 
for Peace’ Resolution (1950), which allowed the Assembly to undertake decisions relating to 
peace and security if  the Security Council was immobilised as a result o f either a Soviet or, just as 
likely in the early years, a European veto. It should be recalled here that it was the Soviet absence 
from the Security Council as a protest against the blocking o f the People’s Republic o f China 
(PRC) from admission to the United Nations that initially allowed the US-Korean action to 
proceed under UN authority. The US then introduced the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution in 
November 1950 into the General Assembly in anticipation o f renewed Soviet activity in the 
Security Council. It stated that: ‘...if the Security Council because of lack o f unanimity o f the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance o f 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach 
o f  the peace, or act o f aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately.’124 But perhaps quite revealing here was that this ‘Uniting For Peace’ Resolution 
was first used in 1956 in order to circumvent UK and French, and not Soviet, vetoes; during its 
750th meeting (30 October 1956), Britain and France vetoed a Security Council resolution tabled 
on the Israeli invasion o f Egypt on 29 October 1956, which led the US to use the ‘Uniting For
121 Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the West’, pp.220-228. As Paul Gordon Lauren has written o f  this process, 
the: ‘...revolutionary emergence o f  independent states in Africa and Asia virtually transformed the 
composition, character, tone, language, and much o f  the agenda o f  the United Nations.’ Lauren, Power and  
Prejudice, p.232.
122 When the UN charter was signed there were 51 member-states. By 1975 the number o f  UN member- 
sates had risen to 144. Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p.82.
123 On the deployment o f  the F.B.l. agents in the UN, see: Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume
1, pp.353-357 and Hazzard, ‘Reflections. Breaking Faith - 1’, pp.63-72.
124 A/371  (V), 3 November 1950, cited in: Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws The Procedure o f  the UN Security
Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.229.
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Peace’ resolution to activate General Assembly consideration o f the matter.125 It is also worth 
recalling that the US also held, for all intents and purposes, the Chinese Security Council seat as 
it was denying the entry o f the PRC to the organisation and allowing the credentials o f the exiled- 
nationalist regime in charge in Taiwan to be considered the legitimate representatives o f the 
‘Republic o f  China.’ At the outset o f the negotiations on the UN in Dumbarton Oaks, Churchill 
had referred to this arrangement as the American ‘Faggot Vote’ designed to help open-up the 
British Empire.126 As all these matters reveal, therefore, it is hardly controversial to note that 
during the 1940s and 1950s both the United Nations General Assembly and the International 
Secretariat were direct instruments o f American foreign policy. As US Senator J. William 
Fulbright recalled o f  this period:
‘Having controlled the United Nations for many years as tightly and as easily as a big- 
city boss controls his party-machine, we had got used to the idea that the United Nations 
was a place where we could work our w ill.’127
The decolonisation process helped to end this complete domination o f the General Assembly and 
other organs by the US and helped foster a new political dynamic and voice in the world body.128 
This nascent opposition formed the basis o f what was during the 1970s to become the second, and 
perhaps here, far-more radical attempt to rewrite the regulation o f international life. Under the 
rubric o f the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group o f 77 (G-77), which incorporated 
African, Arab, Asian and Latin American Caucuses, a programme of action was proposed that 
sought to challenge the veiy conception o f  discrete international organisations engineered to 
manage separately various facets o f a liberal international order. With the force o f  numbers, these 
states sought to overthrow this division o f labour and move towards the political management o f 
international economic affairs by drawing-in the General Assembly into overseeing corporate 
economic activity. More than any other legislative programme, this New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) as it became known reflected the most profound attempt to redesign the
125 Ibid. p.233; Luard, A History o f  the United Nations. Volume 2, p.32.
126 Churchill cited in Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, p.59. See too, Gowan, ‘U S:U N \ p. 12. The PRC was 
eventually admitted to the UN in October 1971.
127 Senator J. William Fulbright cited in: Hazard, ‘Reflections. Breaking Faith - 1’, p.76.
128 From the perspective o f  a South African diplomat at the UN this change was clear: ‘The complexion o f  
the United Nations has changed from white to black.’ Cited in: Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p.233.
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international peace settlement that the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman Administration’s had 
forged in the middle part o f the 1940s.129
The New International Economic Order and counter-hegemony in the UN
One o f the distinct features of the 1945 post-World War II settlement was the unique way in 
which the international sphere was to be administrated. As we have already seen, this ‘settlement’ 
sought to supplant the imperial model o f world organisation, with a public-political structure o f 
‘modest’ nation-states and a universal private-economic realm o f the ‘free-market’. In this liberal 
social order, the UN was created to manage the political, and public, side o f international affairs 
and, despite the articles o f the Charter pointing towards historic Keynesian compromises such as 
achieving ‘full employment’, other international organisations (IMF, World Bank) were designed 
as discrete quasi-private institutions created to help realise the free-market side o f this 
structure.130 It was o f  course the case that the economic side o f this order, otherwise know as the 
Bretton Woods regime, was itself a very specific, and brief, inter-state capitalist arrangement—  
forged to facilitate a stable free-trade regime in a framework that would allow for national 
planning in domestic economies (primarily in order to allow governments to pursue ‘full- 
employment’ policies).131 In practice this entailed creating a global monetary regime that could 
manage matters o f international currency-exchange without necessarily forcing governments to 
devalue their currencies, or curb domestic demand. Hence the role o f  the IMF as the ‘lender-of- 
last-resort’ to member-states that faced acute balance of payment deficits in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The other differentiating factor o f this particular liberal order was that it allowed for national
129 NIEO and its wider roots are only touched upon here. For comprehensive accounts o f  this period— the 
NIEO and the progress o f  conflict between the Third World and the US— see: Enrico Augelli and Craig 
Murphy, America's Quest fo r  Supremacy and the Third World (London: Pinter Publishing, 1988); Stephen 
D. Krasner, Structural Conflict—The Third World Against Global Liberalism  (Berkeley, California: 
University o f  California Press, 1985); Robert W. Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic 
Order: reflections on some recent literature’, International Organization, vol.33, issue 2 (Spring 1979), 
pp.257-301.
130 ‘Keynesian’ compromises in the UN Charter appear under Chapter IX: ‘International Economic and 
Social Co-operation’ Articles 55-60, which include the aim o f  promoting: ‘...higher standards o f  living, 
full employment, and conditions o f  economic and social progress and development.’ The Charter o f  the 
United Nations and the Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice, Chapter IX, Article 55.
131 For a useful review o f  the process that led to this particular economic order including a discussion o f  the 
various battles between the US Treasury and State departments and their UK counterparts, as well as the 
role o f  new economic policy-making elites centred around John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White 
in the formation o f  a consensus on the issues, see: G. John Ikenberry, ‘Creating Yesterday’s New World 
Order’ in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, 
and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.57-81. See also: Andrew Walter, 
World Power and World Money (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 150-157.
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controls to be placed on the free and unhindered movement o f private capital across interstate 
borders— an arrangement labelled as ‘...financial repression on an international scale’ by Peter 
Gowan.132 But despite this early ‘embedded liberalism’ o f  the Bretton Woods Institutions, they 
were still fundamentally part o f a nascent universal liberal capitalist political economy because o f 
their compartmentalised economic roles, which were screened off from the political and public 
world system.133
Moreover, not only did these new world bodies represent the formal institutional cornerstones o f 
this new kind o f social organisation but they themselves came to mirror, especially in terms o f 
their constitutions, this type o f order; the UN was partially public and theoretically democratic in 
certain organs, while the IMF and World Bank operated as fundamentally private corporations. 
Indeed, even though the World Bank and IMF are formally part o f the United Nations System, 
they operate in complete independence o f the organisation. Their organisational structures and 
decision-making processes also differ greatly from UN political organs. In the IMF, voting power 
is determined by a country’s subscription, which is in turn determined by the country’s quota. 
The quota is arrived at on the basis o f the size o f the country’s economy and, periodically, by 
political negotiations and readjustments. As a result, decision-making remains largely in the 
hands o f G-7 states. Still, the only state to retain the right to veto IMF loans remains the US. The 
World Bank operates a similar system— weighted voting according to subscriptions that has 
historically favoured the US and latterly other G-7 states— but it is also a significant actor in 
‘security markets’. It is from these international capital markets that the World Bank attains a 
large proportion o f its funds for ‘policy-based’ loans.134
During the first decade or so this discrete division o f international life was relatively easy for the 
US to enforce within the UN given its ability to corral the small number of member states in the 
General Assembly and its financial and military hold over Western Europe; even the protracted 
struggle for decolonisation that followed in the late 1950s and 1960s would further reinforce, in
132 Gowan, The G lobal Gamble, p. 17; Eric Helleiner, ‘From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: a world 
turned upside down’ in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 163-165.
133 The phrase ‘Embedded liberalism’ was coined by John Ruggie to describe the unique Keynesian 
compromises o f  the post-1945 liberal economic order. Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money, 
p. 155.
134 On the origins and development o f  these institutions, see: Paul Mosely, Jane Harrigan and John Toye, 
(eds.) A id and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, Vols 1 and 2 (London: Routledge, 
1991); Cheryl Payer, The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); 
Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (London: Penguin Books, 2002).
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principle, such a social system despite the acrimony and animosity that it engendered among the 
Western alliance. But as argued above the process o f decolonisation, along with other 
international developments, helped generate a ‘new majority’ in the deliberative organs o f  the UN 
that were officially ‘non-aligned’ and that were increasingly hostile to US foreign and economic 
policies.135
In the area o f economic development in particular there was an increasing resistance among 
Southern elites to the prescriptions o f Western dominated international economic institutions, 
which had posited a nearly exclusive focus on endogenous economic reforms.136 New 
international bodies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) became countervailing diplomatic and 
intellectual forces that provided an alternative discourse on the nature o f economic development 
and the sources o f underdevelopment in the periphery that focused primarily on the international 
terms o f  trade and trans-national corporations.137
The key point here is that such a view o f the international political economy that gained a hold 
within UNCTAD and other forums invariably led to a course of action that necessitated the 
political management o f market-forces in universal bodies such as the United Nations. 
Accordingly, the G-77 utilised the UN General Assembly in an attempt to legislate economic 
relations, most prominently through the ‘Declaration o f the New International Economic Order’ 
(A/3201 and A/3202, Special Session VI, 1974) and the ‘Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties 
of States’ (A/3281, 1974). For instance in the above Charter, member-states resolved to establish 
new ‘...norm s to govern international economic relations’, which included among many other 
provisions, the ‘right’ o f every state: to ‘...regulate and supervise the activities o f transnational 
corporations’; to ‘...nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership o f foreign property’; and to
135 O f particular concern to Third World states was US covert or outright intervention, as experienced in 
among many others: Vietnam (1952-1973), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959-ff), Brazil (1964), 
Indonesia (1965), Chile (1973), Congo (1960-1965), Angola (1976-1992) and Nicaragua (1978-1990).
136 Former secretary-general o f  UNCTAD, Kenneth Dadzie, has noted that the first decades o f  international 
development activities were largely formed out the Arthur Lewis’s ‘The Theory o f  Economic Growth’, 
which focused on reform o f  the domestic economy. Kenneth Dadzie, ‘The Problem o f  Economic 
Development’, in Adam Roberts and Ben Kingsbury (eds.) United Nations, D ivided World: the U N ’s Role 
in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.299.
137 During the 1960s, UNCTAD became a major conduit for debating North-South economic issues, largely 
in terms o f  centre-periphery paradigms. In this respect its first secretary-general, Raul Prebisch, was a 
central figure in the dissemination o f  an alternative theory o f  development and underdevelopment. Dadzie, 
‘The Problem o f  Economic Development’, p.301; Marianne H. Marchand, ‘North-South Relations’, in 
Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.290-293.
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maintain its ‘...full permanent sovereignty...over all its wealth, natural resources and economic 
activities.’138 These ‘rights’ were also situated in a general international context that should seek: 
‘The achievement o f more rational and equitable international economic relations and the 
encouragement o f structural changes in the world economy.’139
Despite the controversy o f such Articles these were serious Third World concerns— especially at 
what was perceived as the rise o f Western neo-colonialism and imperialism from the 1950s. For 
instance, there was much concern in the Middle East following the British and American 
sponsored coup against Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953 after he nationalised the Anglo- 
American Oil Company as well as, for that matter, after the British, French and Israeli invasion o f 
Egypt after Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Elsewhere there was the 
example o f the toppling o f Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, and his murder later that same 
year, as well as the well-documented involvement of the CIA in the coup that brought down the 
popular nationalist-socialist leader Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973. Such actions 
were invariably reflected in the Charter, such as in Chapter II, Article 1:
‘Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well 
as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will o f its people, 
without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.’140
Hence it would be inaccurate to consider these proposals as simply economic. On the most basic 
level they include direct references to other international issues, such as the environment (Art.30), 
disarmament (Art. 15), colonialism (Art. 16), and the pursuit o f international peace and security 
(Chapter I). More significantly, however, taken as whole they put forward a counter-veiling 
vision for how international affairs and international organisations should operate. Here, they did 
not refute the United Nations Organisation or its Charter, quite the contrary. These proposals 
actually reaffirmed: ‘ ...the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, in particular the 
maintenance o f international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among 
nations and the achievement o f international co-operation in solving international problems in the 
economic and social fields.’141 Rather, what resolutions and programmes o f action such as the
138 General Assembly Resolution, A/3281, 12 December 1974: ‘Charter o f  Economic Rights and Duties o f  
States.’
139 ‘Charter on Economic Rights’, Chapter II, Article 10.
140 Ibid. Chapter II, Article 1.
141 Ibid. Preamble.
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Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties o f States actually sought to achieve was the re-definition 
and re-articulation o f the remit o f the UN.142 That the General Assembly was the appropriate 
forum— among others— for the discussion o f these issues, and that all policies regarding ‘...w orld 
economic, financial, monetary problems’ should be mediated equitably (Art. 10). In short, it was a 
call for the democratisation among nation-states o f the international political economy. Or, as 
Houari Boumedienne, President o f Algeria noted in his opening address as President o f  the 
Special Session o f the General Assembly in April 1974, the aim was to discuss the NIEO: 
‘...w ith a view to establishing a new system o f relations based on equality and the common 
interests o f all states.’143
In the event much o f NIEO and its attendant programmes remained a dead letter. They contained 
many contradictory proposals and were plagued by differences within the G-77, which were made 
significantly worse by the real-politick o f US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.144 Later in the 
decade, the NIEO was finally killed-off by the US Department o f Treasury’s interest rate policies 
and the denouement o f the 1980s Debt Crisis. Nonetheless at the time, NIEO and the 1970s more 
generally, represented a period in which an alternative non-Western agenda took hold o f  the 
organisation. Furthermore, for the first time in the post-1945 period, this was an agenda that 
challenged, if  only in spirit, the nature and conduct o f international organisations.
Still, part o f this alternative Non-Aligned agenda for the conduct o f international relations was 
not entirely rhetorical for it did have some practical and significant import for the activities and 
organisation o f UN organs. For example, against the will o f Western states, the General 
Assembly established the Centre Against Apartheid in the International Secretariat in 1976, 
which became a vocal and active part o f the anti-apartheid movement.145 Now disbanded, in the
142 There has been much debate as to the nature o f  the NIEO, which is far too extensive to detail in full 
here. Suffice to note that much discussion revolves around the nature o f  the constituencies that the G-77 
represented. Many conclude that NIEO was a statist movement— it sought the strengthening o f  the state 
vis-a-vis the market— which ultimately represented the interests o f  embedded Southern elites. See 
especially Cox, ideologies and the New International Economic Order: reflections on some recent 
literature’, pp.257-301.
143 Houari Boumedienne cited in: Kurt Waldheim, In the Eye o f  the Storm: the Memoirs o f  Kurt Waldheim 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), p.l 15.
144 In Department o f  State preparations for the 1974 UN General Assembly Special Session, Secretary o f  
State Kissinger made divide-and-rule a central pillar o f  US negotiating tactics. This was partly carried-out 
by the US seeking to create disagreements within the Group o f  77, for example between OPEC and non- 
OPEC members o f  this Third World caucus. Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p. 120.
145 The director o f  the Centre, E.S. Reddy, became a prominent anti-apartheid spokesperson. For a brief 
history o f  the UN and Apartheid, see <www.undp.org.za/docs/apartheid/un-chron.htmI>. For a more
56
1970s and 1980s it helped organise numerous conferences and events and was an important 
disseminator o f  knowledge and public information on the issue contributing significantly to the 
international sanctions campaign. There was also the Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) 
established in 1975 to help facilitate the work o f the Committee on the Exercise o f the Inalienable 
Rights o f the Palestinian People, which still includes consulting and liaising with NGOs, 
organising international conferences, producing studies and publications on the issue, and 
organising the ‘International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People’.146 As far as the 
international political economy and NIEO was concerned, by far the most significant 
organisational creation in the Secretariat during this period was the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) (1974-1993), which was established to investigate and partly regulate the 
practices o f these economic actors. Here, the centre was authorised to: conduct studies into the 
economic, political, social, and legal affects o f transnational corporations (TNC) on developing 
countries; ‘secure’ agreements which eradicate the negative consequences o f TNCs, and 
strengthen the positive facets o f their work; and, perhaps most divisively, it was charged with 
‘... strengthening the negotiating capacity o f host countries, in particular developing countries in 
their dealing with TNCs.’147 As we will see in the next chapter, this centre was one o f the first 
programmes to be dismantled in the comprehensive reorganisation o f the International Secretariat 
around peace operations that occurred in the early 1990s under Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
Taken together, however, these three Secretariat programmes reflected the shifting agenda o f  the 
organisation and its role, albeit temporary, as a vehicle for the political and economic 
transformation o f international relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They certainly showed 
how the UN could be harnessed as a counter-hegemonic force in international affairs, and 
demonstrated that the work o f the organisation could be defined in a number o f equally legitimate 
ways.
comprehensive account, see the UN Blue Book Series: United Nations, The United Nations and Apartheid\ 
1948-1994 (New York: UNDPI, 1996).
146 Despite the constant diplomatic efforts o f  the US and UK to close the division down, the DPR continues 
to retain the support o f  the majority o f  the General Assembly members necessary to protect its beleaguered 
presence in the Secretariat. On the work o f  the Division for Palestinian Rights, and access to the complete 
text o f  more or less every official document o f  the UN system relating to the ‘Question o f  Palestine’, see: 
<www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/dpr.htm>.
147 Cited from: <http://www.benchpost.com/unctc/>. This website has been created by ex-members o f  
UNCTC to provide an institutional history o f  the Centre and an archive o f  its publications.
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‘A W orld R estored’
As to be expected, such an agenda for international organisations encapsulated in the NIEO, and 
others on Palestine, South Africa and the like, came-up against the sustained and acrimonious 
opposition o f Western states and pressure groups.148 For commentators in the US in particular this 
was UN ‘Silly Season’, which had seen the organisation increasingly held hostage by the 
‘automatic majority’ o f the Third W orld.149 Along with other General Assembly actions, in 
particular the ‘Zionism-Equals-Racism’ resolution (1975), the UN was increasingly seen as a 
hostile and ‘politicized’ institution that had no place in the foreign policy o f the US.150 John Scali, 
US Permanent Representative to the UN, famously put the matter this way in 1974:
‘When the rule o f the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will 
cease to respect or obey it.’151
Diatribes against the UN such as these in the US were commonplace during the 1970s and early 
1980s.152 O f course from the start, the US has had at times an ambivalent, and occasionally rocky, 
relationship with the UN. From the McCarthy period o f investigations o f Secretariat staff in the 
1950s through to the John Birch Society, who’s catch-phrase was ‘Get the US out o f the UN, and 
the UN out o f the US!’, to Bob Doyle’s taunting o f Boutros-Ghali as ‘America’s Commander-in- 
C h ie f, anti-UN feeling has been particularly strong among republicans and conservative 
associations and media. It should also be noted that the Democrats and the ‘liberal press’ have 
carried out their fair share o f what is called in Turtle Bay as ‘UN Bashing’ (for example media 
reporting o f  the Zionism-Equals-Racism resolution and the vitriolic campaign carried out by 
James Rubin against Boutros-Ghali during his bid for a second-term as secretary-general in 
1996). But in the 1970s the extent o f US hostility to the UN was particularly shrill and protracted, 
reflecting the temporary collapse of Washington’s ability to shape the tone and tenor o f General
148 ‘The world restored’ is the title o f  Kissinger’s study on European real-politick: The World Restored: 
Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem o f  Peace, 1812-22 (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1957).
149 David Reiff, ‘Up the Organisation: The Successful Failures o f  Kofi Annan’, The New Republic, vol.220, 
issue 5 (1 February 1999), p.22.
150 US objection to the direction o f  certain programmes led to their withdrawal from some UN agencies, 
such as UNESCO in 1984. The term ‘politicization’ became one o f  derision used by US administration 
officials to describe a whole host o f  UN activities that they disagreed with. For instance as used ad  
infinitum by former US Ambassador Daniel Moynihan. Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p.96.
151 Ambassador John Scali cited in: Mark D. Alleyne, Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN and World Order 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p.90.
152 John Birch phrase cited in: Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN 
(New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996), p. 15.
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Assembly output. It was also part-and-parcel o f a larger crisis in America hegemony that 
manifested itself in the Vietnam quagmire, Watergate, the OPEC crisis and an unprecedented US 
balance o f payments deficit that led to the Nixon Administration’s calculated repudiation o f the 
dollar-gold standard.153 Certainly the systematic defeats o f the US in the General Assembly, from 
the admission of the People’s Republic o f China to the UN to the ‘Zionism-Equals-Racism’ 
resolution, marked the nadir o f US influence in the UN and seemed to portend the decline o f 
American power and prestige, and the rise o f  a seemingly multipolar and interdependent world.154 
In this regard, Robert W. Cox’s comments concerning the relationship between world order and 
modem international institutions are worth recalling at length:
‘...International organisations can be redefined as the process o f institutionalisation o f 
hegemony. International institutions universalise the norms proper to a structure o f world 
power, and that structure o f power maintains itself through support o f these institutions. 
In that sense, institutions are a ballast to the status-quo. But international institutions may 
also become vehicles for the articulation o f a coherent counter-hegemonic set o f values. 
In this sense they may become mediators between one world order and another.’ 155
Writing in 1980, what Robert Cox failed to anticipate was how fragile these ‘counter-hegemonic 
set o f values’ actually turned out to be in practice. Certainly, the usurpation o f the United 
Nation’s agenda o f work by the South was a temporary affair— broken by the revitalisation and 
reorientation o f  the liberal world economy from the 1970s onwards. In the broadest sense this was 
due to the methodical dismantling in the ‘Grand Area’ o f the US world system o f the Bretton 
Woods regime, and its replacement with a nascent neo-liberal alternative.156 Here the Nixon 
Administration’s unilateral suspension o f Gold-Dollar convertibility in August 1971 brought the 
whole edifice o f managed post-World War II international currency-exchange relations to an
153 It may be noted here that some commentators attribute the 1973 OPEC oil price hike directly to US 
statecraft— designed in part to discipline oil-dependent allies in Western Europe and East Asia. Gowan, 
The Global Gamble, pp. 19-25.
154 The PRC was finally admitted to the UN in a historic General Assembly vote on 25 October 1971— a 
victory apparently marked by the Tanzanian Ambassador and later secretary-general o f  the OAU (1989- 
2001), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, performing a victory dance in the Assembly aisles. Bailey and Daws, The 
Procedure o f  the UN Security Council, pp. 183-185 and p.642. Much more generally the idea o f  a decline in 
US hegemony was a particular strong discourse in IPE. For a robust rebuttal o f  this common line o f  
reasoning, see: Susan Strange, ‘The Persistent Myth o f  Lost Hegemony’, International Organization, 
vol.41, no.4 (1987), pp.551-74.
155 Cox, ‘The Crisis o f  World Order’, p.377.
156 The ‘Grand Area’ was a term coined by the US Council on Foreign Relations in the 1940s to denote, in 
Ikenberry’s words ‘ ...the core regions o f  the world that the United States depended upon for its economic 
viability.’ Ikenberry, ‘Creating Yesterday’s New World Order’, p.63.
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unceremonious end.157 Even before this event, however, the Bretton Woods regime was being 
eroded by the decision o f the UK and US in the 1960s to foster the development o f unregulated 
‘offshore’ capital-markets (‘Euro-markets’ in the City o f London).158 Later, in the mid-1970s, a 
further fatal blow was delivered to the post-1945 principle o f global ‘financial repression’ by the 
removal o f capital controls.159 The new financial order that arose, with freely-fluctuating 
exchange-rates and the world’s leading private financial corporations engaging in relatively 
unhindered global usury, had the practical effect o f forging a neo-classical international political 
economy. And given the fact that all this occurred during a time when the world was awash with 
OPEC Petrodollars, as Gowan has shown, very conveniently channelled through US private 
banks to non-oil producing Southern states desperate for balance-of-payments relief, meant that 
the US gained a powerful new private source o f leverage over international affairs.160 Indeed, 
when the ‘Debt Crisis’ ensued in the 1980s as a result o f interest-rate rises, the World Bank was 
empowered to reschedule Southern debt and provide loans to shore-up balance o f payments 
problems on the condition that subject states carry out a whole raft o f  economic reforms designed 
to deregulate their domestic economies.161
Much more specifically, however, the NIEO challenge to US hegemony in the UN system was 
met by material power. As Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger warned in a speech to the 
University o f Wisconsin in 1974: ‘ ...The support o f the American people, which has been the 
lifeblood o f the organisation, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the 
numerical majority respects the views o f the minority.’ 162 In the UN itself, the US threatened and 
cajoled member-states into moderating their actions partly through the financial crisis that it 
precipitated in the organisation: 1985 was the high-point o f US disciplinary action against the 
organisation with fifty-percent o f US contributions to the regular budget cut by the US Senate
157 A decision brought-on by severe balance o f  payments problems that the US was facing as a result o f  the 
Vietnam War, other US global security commitments, and the legacy o f  President Lyndon Johnson’s Great 
Society programme. Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy ‘Gramsci and International Relations: a general 
perspective and example from recent US policy toward the Third World’, in Stephan Gill (ed.) Gramsci, 
Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 133.
158 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 17, pp.19-25, pp.39-43; and Helleiner, ‘From Bretton Woods to Global 
Finance’, pp. 168-170.
159 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp.21-22.
160 Gowan argues further that the 1973 OPEC oil rise was itself a product o f  US statecraft— not only 
designed to discipline insubordinate and industrially strengthening Western allies but also, crucially, 
pursued precisely because o f  the anticipated benefit for US private financial organisations and in-tum US 
state power over the international political economy (hence the removal o f  US capital controls in 1974 to 
lubricate the process). Gowan labels this new international monetary order the Dollar-W all Street Regime 
(DWSR). Ibid. pp. 19-3 8.
161 Ibid. pp.41-42.
162 Henry Kissinger cited in: Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, p. 123.
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unilaterally. Included here were: the Kassebaum Amendment (August 1985), the Sundquist 
Amendment (October 1985) and, indirectly relating to the UN but significant nonetheless, the 
Gramm-Rudman Act (December 1985).163 But in large measure the Western conception o f 
discrete international organisations dealing separately with various facets o f a liberal order was 
restored by the new lease o f  life that the IMF and World Bank were given in the wake o f the debt 
crisis. This was because their increased prominence in the management of the international 
economy not only undercut the so-called ‘politicisation’ o f the General Assembly and its attempts 
to legislate for economic matters, but also because it began a course o f action that saw the 
systematic restructuring o f numerous G-77 states and societies along neo-classical political 
economy principles.
Briefly, during the debt crisis the World Bank moved away from project based lending and into 
balance-of-payments financing for Southern states that had become heavily indebted.164 Such 
relief was predicated on the reordering o f the domestic social sphere along specific neo-liberal 
lines: the privatisation o f state-run industries and utilities; the reduction even eradication o f state 
subsides in the spheres o f health and education; the general dismantling o f protectionist trade and 
finance regimes and the promotion o f export-orientated economies. These ‘structural adjustment’ 
programmes also included measures for the creation of favourable legal and regulatory 
environments for foreign capital. In the wake o f many G-77 countries participating in World 
Bank structural adjustment programmes, therefore, the ‘neo-statist’ agenda o f the NIEO became 
simply redundant.
Not only then were many Southern states forced to abandon any form o f interventionary role in 
their economies by conditional loans to help straighten out balance of payment problems, but the 
very fact that the crisis o f liquidity faced by a great deal o f  Southern states was being managed 
and regulated discretely and privately by the World Bank meant that the default liberal division o f 
labour between international institutions had been successfully restored. This ‘division o f  labour’ 
was effectively reinforced during the 1980s with the gradual reinvigoration o f the security and
163 For facts and figures on US cuts to its UN contributions see: Maurice Bertrand, ‘Development o f  Efforts 
to Reform the UN’, in Adam Roberts and Ben Kingsbury (eds.) United Nations, D ivided World: the U N ’s 
Role in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.426.
164 Also known as ‘policy-based lending’, these type o f  conditional loans were first deployed in the early 
1980s (although they had been discussed openly for some time in policy circles). One o f  the first and most 
significant structural adjustment loan was the one signed by the Philippines in September 1980. On the 
modalities and significance o f  this conditional loan to the Filipino government, see: Robin Broad, Unequal 
Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines (Berkeley, CA: 
University o f  California Press, 1988), p. 11.
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peace roles o f the United Nations, especially the reanimation o f the Security Council itself. Here 
a superpower rapprochement saw a Security Council resolution passed on the Iran-lraq War in 
June 1987 (S/RES/598), which called for a ceasefire and the establishment o f the UN Iran-lraq 
Observer Group (UNIIMOG).165 While for US Secretary of State Shultz ‘...nothing like this 
unanimous vote on an issue o f real importance and difficulty had ever happened before in the 
history o f the United Nations,’ for Javier Perez de Cueller ‘The adoption o f  this resolution 
marked the beginning o f the disintegration o f  the stultifying shroud o f the Cold War that had so 
long enveloped the Security Council’.166 In all, this resolution— along with later agreement on a 
Namibian peace operation—reflected a significant ‘thaw’ in Security Council practice and the 
emergence o f an assured activism in UN peacemaking enterprises within Southern states.167
The preceding two-chapters have sought to provide a certain context for the rise and rise o f peace 
operations in the United Nations. It has argued against the common mode o f understanding such 
peace operations as a normal and natural set o f activities for the UN to be preoccupied with. 
Rather, it has been suggested that these activities are best understood as essentially political 
practices that have their historical roots in a very specific international social order. In this regard, 
these practices have historically functioned to uphold in the periphery a world o f new ‘modest’ 
nations-states and to help bring about, in places, a transition from the ‘colonial’ to the 
‘sovereign’. The specificity o f such peace operations is further revealed if it is acknowledged that 
such activities are not necessarily the innate or intrinsic set o f functions around which the UN 
should be organised. As the brief outline above o f some o f the battles to determine the U N ’s 
programme o f work has sought to make plain, the agenda and organisation o f the UN has been 
empirically defined and constituted in a number o f ways. And of course, each particular 
programme o f work is politically contingent, reflective o f various competing visions for how we 
shou d manage international life. As we will now go on to see, the collapse o f  G-77 resistance to 
the peace and security agenda o f the US-led Western world has had direct import for the United 
Nations, which has seen its International Secretariat stripped o f political economy functions and 
reorganised around peace operations, and its diplomatic functions and autonomy within Southern 
states extended considerably.
165 Gculding, Peacemonger, pp. 123-138.
166 US Secretary o f  State, George Shultz cited in: Javier Perez de Cueller, Pilgrimage fo r  Peace 
(Basiigstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 159.
167 Btiley and Daws, The Procedure o f  the UN Security Council, p.49.
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C h ap ter 3
R eorienting the United Nations in a Post Second W orld Context: 
The advance of peace operations
63
‘Its time to recognise that the UN must direct its limited resources to the world’s highest 
priorities, focusing on the tasks that it performs best. The UN’s bureaucracy should be 
smaller, with a clear organisational structure and sharp lines o f responsibility. Each 
programme must be held to a simple standard -  that is, it must make a tangible contribution 
to freedom, security, and well-being o f real people in the real world.’ Remarks by US 
Secretary o f State Warren Christopher to the 50th Session o f the General Assembly, 25 
September 1995.
‘...Future success demands that the UN focus, within its overall Charter mission, on those 
activities, or on those aspects o f activities, that it does better than others.’ Secretary-general 
Kofi Annan (A /51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 21).
The UN in a uni-polar world
Both UN secretary-generals o f the 1990s began their terms in office by responding to the 
concerns o f  powerful states, such as the one outlined by Warren Christopher above, by carrying- 
out comprehensive programmes o f reform in the arena of the U N ’s agenda o f work. The content 
and progress o f these reforms can tell us a great deal about the political underpinnings o f  the 
renewed activism o f the UN in world affairs that has followed in the wake o f the collapse o f  the 
Second World, particularly in the field o f peace operations. Not only does such an approach 
highlight the contingent nature o f these transformations but it also sheds light on the general 
object o f  intervention that these renewed practices are designed to address. The primary purpose 
o f this chapter therefore is to detail the extensive programme o f reform that the UN has been 
subjected to throughout the 1990s as a precursor to the subsequent discussion o f UN experiences 
in the African context.
It argues that since the collapse o f the Second World and the Soviet Union, the United Nations 
has undergone a significant reorganisation and restructuring around peace operations that 
promote formal pluralism and liberal human rights within Southern states. This reform process 
has taken place in response to intensive pressure from Western private and public actors, 
particularly in the US, which have stressed the need to ‘streamline’ the UN Secretariat, close 
down ‘outdated’ and ‘duplicative’ units and programmes, and concentrate on those activities that
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the organisation apparently does ‘best’. '68 Invariably, the burden o f such a purge o f programmes 
has fallen on those units and committees associated with political economy research and 
advocacy and that were seen to impinge on the dominion o f international economic institutions 
and their particular economic orthodoxy. In ‘revitalising’ the United Nations then, a new 
specialised focus was anticipated for the organisation that precluded activities revolving around 
the international political economy (reserved in these cases for the Bretton Woods Institutions) 
and that, in its stead, concentrated on promoting liberal peace settlements within conflict-ridden 
Southern states.169
In some respects this body of UN reform has occurred in the context o f two inter-related 
possibilities for the organisation’s future prospects: if  the UN stripped itself o f ‘inefficient’ and 
‘duplicative’ programmes and paid greater emphasis on its peacemaking within states, then the 
organisation could assure itself o f some fiscal security and a renewed place in managing world 
(political) affairs; but if  the UN resisted the trend towards a revised division o f labour at the 
international level that focused on managing separately the various facets o f restructuring 
Southern states, and persisted in maintaining units with hostile political economy agendas, then 
the UN could face the real possibility o f financial insolvency and potentially become sidelined 
from new forms o f global governance.170 O f course, to a large extent this has been a non-choice 
for the UN, and does not necessarily reflect the dynamics o f change and power that the institution
168 This discourse o f  organisational reform has been levelled at a variety o f  international institutions that 
have been traditionally seen as outside the orbit o f  complete Western control. Intense pressure to reform 
was exerted especially on UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UN Regional Commissions, and the UN 
Secretariat.
169 The G-7 Political Communique o f  July 1991 was a typical example o f  Western statements-of-intent with 
relation to global governance: ‘We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfil 
completely the promise and the vision o f  its founders. A revitalised United Nations will have a central role 
in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more efficient in 
order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression. We will make 
preventative diplomacy a top priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential aggressors 
the consequences o f  their actions. The UN’s role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared 
to support this strongly.’ G-7, ‘Political Declaration: Strengthening the International Order’, London, 16 
July 1991. Available from: <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.
170 The threat o f  ‘irrelevance’ has been one that has hung over the United Nations throughout the 
organisation’s existence. The non-payment o f  arrears, primarily by the U.S. Congress, has been used 
regularly to force through programme reform. One o f  the most recent, and explicit, threats was made by 
President George W. Bush to the General Assembly in September 2002 when he warned delegates that if  
action was not taken on Iraq the UN faced becoming peripheral to world affairs: ‘The conduct o f  the Iraqi 
regime is a threat to the authority o f  the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade 
o f  U.N. demands with a decade o f  defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a 
difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honoured and enforced, or cast aside 
without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose o f  its founding, or will it be irrelevant?’ 
‘Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly’, September 12, 2002. 
USUN Press Release # 131 (02).
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is subject to: the inter-governmental machinery o f the UN, largely unchanged since 1945, 
underwent an internal transformation in its distribution o f forces during the 1990s that helped 
ensure that the organisation responded positively to the reform agenda of Western states. This is 
not only seen in the changed internal make-up o f the General Assembly, which saw the admission 
o f new states largely aligned to the US, but also a shift in power from the General Assembly to 
the Security Council that invariably followed the end o f Soviet opposition, and its attendant veto, 
in the Council chamber.171 Just as importantly, G-77 states have had little option but to accept this 
process o f reform, partly for the reasons stated immediately above, but also because o f  the 
denouement o f organised resistance o f Southern states that both the Debt Crisis and the collapse 
o f the Second World entailed. Finally, o f course, UN reform has transpired as an actual and ad- 
hoc outcome o f the sustained and protracted material pressure o f Western institutions on the U N ’s 
finances, notably in this case by the US Congress.
Still, there is some merit in viewing the reform process that the UN, and for that matter other 
international bodies, have undergone in the light o f this general predicament that the UN has had 
to face-up to in a post-Second World context. This is not only because it highlights the wider 
logic o f  reconstitution that the UN has been subjected to but, perhaps more importantly for this 
investigation, because it also illustrates the specific political underpinnings o f so-called ‘second- 
generation’ UN peace operations. In the latter regard, peace operations during the 1990s were not 
an unproblematic or uncontested set o f activities (no matter how feeble resistance may have 
been). Apart from anything else they have been deployed as part o f a political project that has 
seen the mechanisms o f internal governance within post-colonial states come under intense
171 The rise o f  Security Council activism is underlined by the use— or non-use— o f  the veto in a post-1989 
context, and by the deployment o f  peace operations. Between 1946-2005 there have been 212 public vetoes 
cast in the Security Council. Only 23 o f  these were cast between 1 January 1989 and September 2005 
(mostly by the USA in order to block resolutions critical o f  Israel and its continued occupation o f  
Palestinian Arab Territories). See Appendix One. Between 1948-1989, a total o f  15 peacekeeping missions 
were deployed by the Security Council; in the period 1989 and September 2005, there has been a marked 
increase in activism, with 45 peacekeeping operations deployed. The majority o f  these have been deployed 
within states and largely in the Southern hemisphere (the exceptions here relate to the former Yugoslavia, 
Central America and Haiti, and in couple o f  Central Asian contexts). See Appendix Two. Changes in 
General Assembly make-up is reflected by the entrance o f  new members to the UN. In 2002 there were 191 
UN member-states. Between 1990-1993 there was a ‘second wave’ o f  new members. In 1990: Namibia and 
Liechtenstein. In 1991: North Korea, South Korea, Micronesia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Marshall 
Islands. In 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993: Andorra, Czech 
Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovak Republic, and FYR Macedonia. See: <www.un.org/english>.
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Western scrutiny, and invariably, increased technocratic regulation and private corporate 
infiltration.172
It is important to note at the outset, however, that this reconstitution o f the UN is not necessarily 
far removed from the original functions and actions o f the organisation in the post-1945 period. 
As we have already seen, the UN was fundamentally caught-up in providing the institutional 
prerequisites for a world o f non-white nation-states in places such as West Irian, and policing 
post-colonial relationships in instances such as Suez. The UN also had a nascent set o f political 
and civilian functionaries who helped facilitate these ‘prerequisites’ and that were profoundly 
embedded in the political and socio-economic milieu from which they originated. Rather, the 
argument o f  this chapter is that the above dimension o f the U N ’s work has been fundamentally 
expanded, regularised and consolidated in a Department for Political Affairs, and that this has 
been carried out in order to concentrate the UN’s attention on its new specialised niche market: 
focusing its resources on the ‘...needs o f good internal governance’ within the Southern 
hemisphere.173 There is therefore both some continuity and some change in the U N ’s expanded 
peace roles in world order management. Not simply helping to provide for the structural division 
o f the international sphere into a world o f nation-states in the South separate from a private world 
economy, the UN is now deeply implicated in reorganising state-society relations and in 
advocating particular forms o f ‘...good internal governance’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these forms 
o f ‘good internal governance’ are imitable to the models promoted by private and public 
complexes emanating from the Western hemisphere.
Just as significantly this interventionaiy set o f activities has had the practical effect o f forging 
post-colonial states that are deeply amenable to international governance, and to the associated 
needs and wants o f global capital. But before going on to look at these new roles and functions in 
the Sub-Saharan African context, it is necessary to examine in more detail the process o f reform 
that the UN has been subjected to during the 1990s.
172Augelli and Murphy, ‘Gramsci and International Relations’, pp. 134-137.
173 This is a phrase that secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Ghali used in the 1992 An Agenda fo r  Peace, the 
report that symbolised a renewed UN activism in peace operations in the Southern hemisphere. Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fo r  Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping  (New  
York: DPI, 1992), paragraph 17.
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The reorientation and restructuring of the United Nations System
The conception o f reform that has been promoted and instituted in the UN during the 1990s has 
been a narrow and largely Western one. This is because reform has not focused on transforming 
the intergovernmental machinery o f the UN itself but rather on transforming the programmatic, 
administrative and managerial facets o f the organisation’s life. Granted, there has been serious 
discussion o f expanding the Security Council to include Germany and Japan but, by and large, 
this would not mark a change in the underlying structural principles that govern the Security 
Council and that are so central to the dynamics o f power within the UN as a whole. In this 
respect, changes have been instituted under the title ‘revitalisation’, as opposed to ‘reform ’, and 
reflect a political agenda that is designed to reorient the U N ’s functions in world order 
management without having to forfeit the advantages o f control that mechanisms such as a veto 
yield. In this respect, the discourse of ‘revitalisation’ has become an important and useful 
alternative to attempts to provide for a far more fundamental overhaul o f the UN system, and its 
machinery o f control, that Southern states have naturally advocated.'74
But within the parameters o f ‘revitalisation’, the UN has undergone momentous changes in its 
focus, and in its relationship with other international institutions. Most prominently, and relevant 
to this study, has been the way in which peace operations within Southern societies have come to 
dominate the U N ’s resources and persona.175 In the organisational context, this has involved a 
dual process o f reconstitution: on the one hand the enhancing o f units involved around peace 
operations from electoral and human rights functions to humanitarian programmes and general 
political affairs; and on the other hand, the ‘reallocation’ and ‘elimination’ o f UN units and 
committees that attend to the so-called hard economic issues o f international terms of trade and 
commodity prices, the flow o f global capital, technology transfer, industrialisation, and o f  course 
the regulation o f transnational corporations. The logic o f such a dual process relates to the 
pervasive discourse o f ‘efficiency’, ‘specialisation’, and ‘division o f labour’ that has pervaded US
174 For a perspective from the South on UN reform, see: South Centre, For a Strong and Democratic United 
Nations: A South Perspective on Reform (London: Zed Books & South Centre, 1997).
175 The UN’s prioritisation o f  peace operations has been explicitly alluded to in the introduction o f  the 
August 2000 Report o f  the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: ‘The United Nations was founded, 
in the words o f  its Charter, in order to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge o f  war.’ Meeting this 
challenge is the most important function o f the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick 
by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve.’ A /55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000: ‘The Report 
o f  the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, paragraph 1. Henceforth, the Brahimi Report.
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private and public policy pronouncements on UN reform since the early 1980s.176 Gradually, such 
a discourse has been thoroughly internalised within the UN, in particular by the Chief 
Administrative Officer—that is, the secretary-general— who have been nominated and elected 
partly on their reform credentials, and who have had to negotiate the continued fiscal solvency o f 
the organisation with powerful governmental bodies such as the US Congress.177 In the words o f  
former Chairman o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, the UN must simply 
‘Reform or D ie’.178
The discourse o f reform promoted by the likes o f Senator Helms, and subsequently internalised 
by both Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, has largely hinged on the principle o f an efficient 
division o f labour across the whole spectrum o f global affairs between various international 
organisations so as to avoid duplication and so as to concentrate and consolidate resources on 
various organisational priorities.179 The misleading notion here is that all international 
organisations have an internal governance structure and outward orientation that are both 
analogous and free o f particular political predispositions. As we have already noted in the 
previous chapter this is not the case with the World Bank and IMF, which are largely constructed 
internally as private corporations.180 Even the United Nations and WTO, formally democratic in 
many regards, are in essence institutions created to promote a very specific international social 
sphere.181 At the very least, shifting and juggling the agenda of the UN and distributing certain 
functions to other institutions is a process that has considerable political import for the character 
o f these activities. Moving, for instance, macroeconomic research and advocacy from the UN
176 For a critique o f  this largely G-7 reform discourse, see: ‘Reforming the United Nations: A View From 
the South’, The South Centre (Geneva), March 1995.
177 For example, Princeton Lyman, US Acting Assistant Secretaiy o f  State for International Organizations 
in 1996, noted that the UN reform process had been driven: ‘Largely through the blunt instrument o f  [US] 
budget restrictions and budget caps.’ He also stressed that Annan had been supported by the US because o f  
his reform credentials. Princeton Lyman (Acting Assistant Secretary o f  State for International 
Organizations), ‘News Conference on International Organization Affairs, DOS’, Washington D.C., 17 
December 1996 (FDCH Political Transcripts).
178 Jesse Helms, ‘Saving the UN; A Challenge to the Next secretary-general’, Foreign Affairs, vol.75, no.5 
(September/October 1996), p.7.
179 Kofi Annan ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’, paragraphs 27-34 and A/48/428, 
29 September 1993: ‘Review o f the efficiency o f  the administrative and financial functioning o f  the United 
Nations: Restructuring o f  the Secretariat o f  the Organization: Report o f  the secretary-general’, paragraphs 
115-120.
180 On the internal governance structures o f  the IMF and World Bank see Chapter Two, pp.52-53.
181 As discussed in Chapter One, the United Nations was created to help construct a division o f  the 
international social sphere into nation-states separated from a private world economy. This was largely 
anticipated by US post-war planners to help open-up colonial and third world markets and resources to US 
private and public power. This order was in direct competition with the colonial and Second World model 
o f  world order.
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Secretariat to more ‘appropriate’ institutions such as UNCTAD, the WTO or the IMF has the 
effect o f transforming the very meaning and orientation o f this research and work. As we will 
come on to see, this was a process that effectively happened to the UN’s Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (CTC), which after being moved out o f the UN Secretariat and into a thoroughly 
restructured UNCTAD, was stripped o f its advocacy role for Southern states.
O f course this kind o f radical reconstitution has occurred in the wider context o f  the collapse o f 
Command Economies and the profound dependence o f many Southern regimes on international 
financial institutions. Furthermore, it has taken place against the backdrop o f  powerful new 
economic orthodoxies that have undercut the fundamental premises o f units like the UNCTC and 
Conferences such as UNCTAD. While the rise o f neo-liberalism in the World Bank and IMF is 
regularly cited here, it was perhaps the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and Agenda 21 that finally broke 
the taboo o f the UN engaging with private enterprises. The least that can be said here is that the 
chimera o f sustainable development, enshrined in Agenda 21, has conferred the UN with an 
explicit free market-friendly outlook, and bestowed ‘Big Business’ with much needed legitimacy 
at the international level.182 Furthermore, the discourse o f sustainable development has in recent 
times allowed secretary-general Annan to launch several private-public initiatives, such as the 
much-vaunted ‘Global Compact.’183
The other side o f the equation has been the concentration and monopolisation o f  peace activities 
directed exclusively on the Southern hemisphere within the UN, namely what is termed in the 
conflict-resolution business as preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.184 As we 
will examine in detail, this was a process that was initiated early in 1992 and that has continued 
through to the ‘Brahimi Report’ o f August 2000. The foreground to these changes has been the 
on-going evolution o f liberal forms o f intervention in the South that culminates, at its apogee,
182 For a robust critique o f  sustainable development see: Timothy Doyle, ‘Sustainable Development and 
Agenda 21: the secular bible o f  global free markets and plural democracy’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, 
no.4 (1998), pp.771-786.
183 Annan’s first UN-private initiative was the ‘Business Humanitarian Forum’ January (1999), which was 
suspended after it was revealed that the eleven transnational corporations involved had donated $50,000 
each to UNDP; Global Compact, the most recent and prominent UN-private enterprise initiative, is open to 
TNCs that make voluntary pledges on labour and environmental standards. For a brief review see: George 
Monbiot, ‘Comment & Analysis: Getting into bed with big business: the UN is no longer just a joke’, The 
Guardian (London), 31 August 2000.
184 In recent years there has been some tentative moves towards utilising NATO as a ‘military-arm’ o f  
peace operations. This was first seen in Kosovo in 1999 and most recently in Afghanistan following 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in 2001. So far moves to deploy NATO in Iraq have been resisted by some 
European states— even though it has been agreed that NATO will train a new Iraqi army.
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with ‘humanitarian’ military intervention. In general, this has not only seen an increased activism 
in the realms o f micro-managing political transitions in the periphery o f the world-system, but 
also a thorough redefinition, among other things, o f state sovereignty, the appropriate forms o f 
public governance and, crucial for the new ideology of interventionism, regional and international 
security.185 As far as the United Nations is concerned a symbolic marker here was the publication 
o f  secretary-general Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda fo r  Peace, which provided a speculative outline 
the organisation’s new focus and prerogatives. Written in response to a request o f the Security 
Council Summit in January 1992, which sought to cement and bolster UN peace activities, the 
report stressed the role o f democracy and human rights within states as a prerequisite for peace 
and development and outlined a revised rationale for international intervention:
‘The time o f absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed...It is the task o f 
leaders o f States to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good 
internal governance and the requirements o f an ever more interdependent world.’186
With regard to ‘good internal governance’, the secretary-general noted that: ‘There is an obvious 
connection between democratic practices— such as the rule o f law and transparency in decision­
making— and the achievement o f true peace and security in any new and stable political order.’187 
This clear normative statement in favour o f particular forms o f governance is one that underlines 
the intent o f the UN to follow the general trend o f international institutions towards managing and 
engineering social change within the boundaries of Southern states. This has ultimately been 
justified by the rise o f liberal human rights discourse and related ‘human security’ paradigms that, 
among others, Kofi Annan has sort to advance:
‘...Surely no legal principle— not even sovereignty— can ever shield crimes against 
humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been 
exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf o f the international 
community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing
185 On the rise o f  liberal-humanitarian intervention during the 1990s, see: Duffield, G lobal Governance and  
the New Wars and De Waal, Famine Crimes.
186 An Agenda fo r  Peace, paragraph 17.
187 Ibid. paragraph 59.
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nothing when we can. Armed intervention must always remain the option o f last resort, 
but in the face o f mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished.’ 188
But as a first step, the authority to promote and prescribe certain forms o f ‘good internal 
governance’ was deemed defensible in terms o f a post-Cold War transformation o f international 
politics that posed new threats o f disintegrating states, ethnic cleansing, and destabilising 
humanitarian crises. That is, because major threats to international peace and security were 
situated in the essentially liberal discourse o f globalisation and fragmentation, it was now a 
central concern o f the world community to address internal governance, lest they lead to regional 
or international conflagrations.189 In such a context, Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda fo r  Peace 
reminded the membership o f Article 43 o f the UN Charter, the use o f military force to restore 
international peace and security, and encouraged its reactivation. It was coyly added, to assure 
any concerns that Western states may have, that:
‘Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well equipped to deal 
with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be 
useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force o f  a lesser order.’ 190
Setting aside the lack o f reticence in such remarks, An Agenda fo r  Peace underlines the 
emergence o f a new complex of post-colonial relationships, in which the UN sought to emerge as 
a central arbiter. The internal reforms of the UN during this period, in both the political and 
economic spheres, reflect this endeavour. Indeed, as we will now see, the practical
188 A/54/2000, April 3, 2000: ‘We the Peoples: The Role o f  the United Nations in the 21st Century, Report 
by the secretary-general Kofi Annan’, p.48. Henceforth the Millennium Report. This type o f  reasoning has 
been endorsed by the Security Council (S/RES/1296) and the 2000 UN Brahimi Report: ‘The targeting o f  
civilians in armed conflict and the denial o f  humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war 
may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security 
Council action’. The Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 50.
189 For the typical 1990s account o f  globalisation and fragmentation, and the rise o f  so-called ‘new wars’, 
see: Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). Kaldor suggests that ‘new wars’ 
(such as Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s) are novel in that they are driven by elites who utilise 
particularistic identities to remain in power, violence is decentralised around militias and is often targeted 
at civilians, and that a globalised war economy has developed. Much o f  this argument has been 
successfully rebutted as a simple ideological defence o f  Western military intervention; at the very least 
Kaldor’s ‘new’ war argument implies, as Paul Hirst has written, ‘ ...picking those who are the bearers o f  
‘civility’ and favouring them politically and economically, backing this up with external force.’ Paul Hirst, 
War and Power in the 2 Is1 Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.86. For a wide ranging critique o f  
new wars, see also: Stathis N. Kalyvas “N ew ’ Wars and ‘Old’ Wars: A Valid Distinction?’ World Politics, 
vol.54, no.l (2001), pp.99-118.
190 An Agenda fo r  Peace, paragraph 43.
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implementation o f this dual process o f reconstitution has been— admittedly with some setbacks 
and inconsistencies— a determined process o f  remaking the UN in the image o f a specialised 
agency promoting Western liberal modernity in the very periphery of the world state-system.
T he shift tow ards peace operations
Within two months o f taking office in January 1992, and barely one month after the Security 
Council declared the need to reform UN peace activities, secretary-general Boutros-Ghali 
unilaterally unveiled the first o f a two stage restructuring o f the International Secretariat.191 The 
primary intention o f this ‘first stage’ o f reform was to enhance the capacity o f the UN in the field 
o f  preventative diplomacy, peace making and peacekeeping.192 To this end, Boutros-Ghali 
announced the creation of three-new departments broadly dealing with peace activities: the 
Department o f Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Department o f Political Affairs (DPA); and 
the Department o f Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Simultaneously, every single unit or department 
concerned with economic, social and developmental issues was to be merged into one 
Department o f Economic and Social Development (DESD).193 This was held out to be the first 
stage o f the reform o f economic programmes with, as we will see in the following section, much 
more significant alterations carried out during the ‘second stage’ in December 1992.194
As for the general onus o f the February 1992 reform, it was explicitly calculated to increase UN 
resources on peace operations, and to shift the emphasis o f these activities.195 Crucially, the
191 Secretary-general Boutros-Ghali assumes office on 1 January 1992; Security Council Summit is held on 
31 January 1992; Boutros-Ghali announces internal secretariat reform on 21 February 1992; this ‘first 
stage’ o f  reform takes affect in March 1992. For a review: A /48/428,29 September 1993, paragraphs 1-23.
192 A/46/882, 21 February 1992: ‘Review o f  the efficiency o f  the administrative and financial functioning 
o f  the United Nations: Restructuring o f  the Secretariat o f  the Organization: Note by the secretary-general’. 
The report utilises the Security Council Summit as a mandate for this restructuring: ‘As was evident during 
the recent Summit Meeting o f  the Security Council, and as may be seen from the Presidential statement 
issued on that occasion (S/23500), the Membership expects the Organization to develop an enhanced 
capacity for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping...in response to these concerns, I 
have decided to establish a Department o f  Political Affairs’, paragraphs 5-6.
193 Ibid. paragraphs 8-10.
194 Ibid. paragraph 9 and A/47/753, 3 December 1992: ‘Restructuring and revitalization o f  the United 
Nations in the economic, social and related field: Programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993: Note by 
the secretary-general’, paragraphs 1-5.
195 Occasionally, the objective o f  prioritising peace activities has been explicitly acknowledged by UN 
officials, although the Secretariat must be careful not to understate the economic, social and developmental 
role o f  the UN: ‘ ...The pooling and shifting o f  resources that this restructuring [February 1992] has 
generated has made it possible to create new units, through the redeployment o f  staff, to meet new priority 
mandates o f  the Organization. Prominent among the new priority mandates are...the provision o f  electoral 
assistance to facilitate the democratisation process’ A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 70-72. In
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reform process initiated in 1992 sought to create a functional division of labour between the UN’s 
various peace activities. With some important exceptions, the structural departmental reforms 
announced in 1992 remain in place today.196 This is particularly pertinent with relation to the 
DPKO and DPA, which were created to enhance certain political aspects o f the UN’s activities.197 
While DPKO, formed out o f the Office o f Special Political Affairs (OSPA) and later 
incorporating the Field Operations Division (FOD), was intended to focus on planning, deploying 
and implementing peacekeeping operations broadly conceived, the DPA assumed authority for 
the supervision o f several new activities that the UN began to perform regularly in the early 
1990s.198 Central here were: the supervision, validation and, occasionally, organisation o f 
electoral processes that were repeatedly part o f comprehensive domestic peace settlements; the 
political negotiations and diplomacy o f UN special representatives with ‘contracting parties’ and 
the international donor community; the pursuit o f any human rights provisions that a mandate 
may include; and, generally, political relations with the Security Council.199 The DPA was also to
general, the same report noted that: ‘During the coming period, high priority will continue to be given to 
the strengthening o f  the Organization’s ability to deal with the increased demands for peace making, peace 
keeping.’ Ibid. paragraph 120.
196 While the remit o f  both the DPA and DPKO may have changed over the years the structure remains: 
even the Report o f  the Panel on Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), which had been given a wide remit 
to recommend any change, had been informally requested by Kofi Annan to leave DPA and DPKO as 
departments untouched. Confidential interview with senior UN DPA official, New York, 18 September 
2000.
197 ST/SGB/Organization Section DPA, 15 February 1996: ‘Organisation Manual: A Description o f  the 
functions and organisation o f  the Department o f  Political Affairs.’
198 The DPKO was initially formed out o f  the ‘Office for Special Political Affairs’ (OSPA), which had up 
until this point had the primary role o f  managing political negotiations and running all dimensions o f  peace 
operations, most notoriously in the Congo during the 1960s (as it will be recalled OSPA was run by Ralph 
Bunche until his death in the early 1970s and then by Sir Brian Urquhart until 1986). In the past, the OSPA 
had retained a certain ambiguity and seclusion, operating in the shadows and behind-the-scenes on political 
assignments delegated by the secretary-general. But when the UN ventured on occasion into far more 
prominent peace roles, especially those transition operations discussed previously, the OSPA was usually at 
its helm. This was initially because the OSPA operated as a vehicle to enable the secretary-general to 
engage UN ‘trouble-shooter’ Ralph Bunche in particularly sensitive tasks. Indeed, it should be recalled that 
Dag Hammarskjold moved Bunche from Under Secretary-General for Trusteeship Affairs to a newly 
created Under Secretary-General for ‘Special Political Affairs’ in the early 1950s precisely for this purpose 
(USG for ‘Special Political Affairs’ was the forerunner to OSPA; in turn, USG for ‘Special Political 
Affairs’ was a title that replaced ‘Under Secretary-General Without Portfolio’, which had been a title that 
had caused some concern among the membership). Even though the post had been set up, according to 
Hammarskjold, to deal with issues o f  an ‘inter-departmental character’, it became quickly associated and 
preoccupied with UN peace activities from Palestine, Congo, Cyrus and Kashmir to Lebanon and Bahrain. 
On OSPA, its origins and Ralph Bunche’s development within it, see: Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, pp.243-247 
and Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp.79-85. Within a couple o f  years o f  its establishment, the DPKO 
incorporated the Field Operations Division in September 1993 and was reorganised internally by Kofi 
Annan (then USG for DPKO) to create a military logistics and permanent planning unit and a 24 hour 
situation room. A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 73-75.
199 ST/SGB/1998/14, 20 August 1998: ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Organization o f  the Department o f  
Political Affairs’, Section 2, Section 4, Section 6, Section 7.
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focus a significant amount o f resources on a new G-7 priority o f ‘preventative diplomacy’.200 
What is noticeable in the above division o f tasks is the attempt to centralise political activities 
within one ‘mega-department’, the DPA, and the introduction into the programmatic agenda o f 
the UN a considerable emphasis on features o f peace operations that deal directly with domestic 
governance: elections, human rights, institutional capacity-building, and preventative diplomacy.
The introduction and evolution o f preventative diplomacy as a UN priority area is fairly 
indicative o f this transformation. Even though the DPA included the regular administrative and 
‘servicing’ roles o f the Secretariat for major UN organs— for example, incorporating the 
Department o f Political and Security Council Affairs (DPSCA) and the Office for Political and 
General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services (OPGAASS)— right from the start the 
department was to be the UN ‘focal point’ for preventative diplomacy. Indeed the official and 
formal rationale for the establishment o f the DPA in 1992 was that the Security Council had 
expected increased emphasis on this area.201 To this end the DPA incorporated divisions that were 
split according to geographical regions (Africa I, Africa II, Americas and Europe, and Asia and 
the Pacific) and whose main terms o f reference was to: ‘To monitor, analyse and assess political 
developments throughout the world’. Accordingly: ‘...D esk officers o f the four DPA 
geographical divisions develop country profiles on their respective countries and then monitor 
developments over tim e.’202 As a result, it was expected that the DPA would be able to: 
‘...assist... in the alerting o f relevant organs about impending crises or emergencies.’203
On the surface, the logic o f such a focus related initially to a simple cost-efficiency calculation; 
Security Council members emphasised in January 1992 their preference for preventative action 
that would initiate appropriate domestic settlements without the necessity o f costly peacekeeping 
and post-conflict operations.204 Latterly, a far more powerful rationale for these activities 
developed in the wake o f the explosion in social violence that states such as Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Congo, and Burundi underwent during the 1990s. Seen in terms o f  massive human rights abuses, 
or ‘crimes against humanity’, African, Asian and increasingly former Soviet satellites have 
become the object o f officially sanctioned UN Secretariat surveillance, and in a number o f cases,
200 In the early 1990s, G-7 and P-5 states began to emphasise preventative diplomacy as a new part o f  
global governance. For example: G-7 ‘Political Communique’, 16 July 1991.
201 A/46/882, 21 February 1992, paragraph 5-6; A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraph 68; and S/23500, 
31 January 1992: ‘Note by the President o f  the Security Council.’
202 ST/SGB/Organization Section DPA, 15 February 1996, p.l and p.5.
203 A/46/882, 21 February 1992, paragraph 5.
204 S/23500, 31 January 1992 and the Brahimi Report (A /55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 29.
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subject to the diplomatic and political intercession o f UN representatives.205 Either way, the 
departmental focus on preventative diplomacy has allowed for an increased inspection and 
observation o f domestic order in Southern states. Needless to say, this new institutional activity 
and programme o f work is one that would have been previously inconceivable for the UN to 
undertake (considering the sanctity o f sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the UN 
Charter) and which has met with the widespread suspicion o f  a number o f G-77 states.206
And yet this attempt to institutionalise UN surveillance o f certain less-privileged member-states 
has been fairly inconsequential when compared to the way in which this concept has served to 
pre-emptively encourage democratisation and liberalisation in the domestic context.207 Key in this 
regard has been the rise o f special representatives and political missions, under the DPA rather 
than DPKO, which have become routinely deployed in the last few decades.208 Here, for instance, 
out o f  forty-four special representatives deployed by the UN at the end o f 1994, sixteen were 
providing ‘good-office’ functions.209 Their roles, while varied, are in the first instance to forestall 
the outbreak o f organised conflict and to shore-up any political settlements between local 
groups.210 In the second instance however, special representatives perform peacemaking roles that 
seek to bring domestic groups to negotiated agreements and that are broadly in accordance with 
international standards and expectations. While this has entailed some reliance on power-sharing 
models o f conflict resolution, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, agreements have
205 The use o f  human rights discourse as a rationalisation for preventative diplomacy has been particularly 
noticeable during Kofi Annan’s tenure. For the justification for these types o f  UN activities, see Kofi 
Annan: ‘Millennium Report’, A/54/2000, pp.47-49.
206 Confidential interview with senior UN official, New York, 1 December 2000, and confidential interview 
with senior UN DPA official, New York, 18 September 2000.
207 Country-Desk Officers have a paucity o f  information sources at their disposal and usually cover more 
than one state, often entire regions. This has led to the complaint by special representatives, who often 
require background information, that this facet o f  the DPA’s work is as o f  yet little value. Confidential 
telephone interview with former UN special representative, 21 September 2001 and confidential interview 
with former UN special representative, New York, 25 October 2000. Nonetheless, this dimension o f  work 
has recently been upgraded, following the Brahimi Report, and remains a controversial Secretariat 
structure.
208 There are three categories o f  Special Representatives: those heading peacekeeping or observer missions; 
those appointed by the secretary-general directly for the purposes o f ‘good-offices’; and those appointed to 
help the secretary-general in the ‘discharge o f  certain aspects o f  his responsibilities.’ A/C.5/48/26, 15 
November 1993: ‘Administrative and Budgetary Aspects o f  the Financing o f  the United Nations Peace- 
Keeping Operations: Financing o f  the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Special Representatives, 
Envoys, and Related Positions’, pp.2-3.
209 A/C.5/49/50, 8 December 1994: ‘Administrative and Budgetary Aspects o f  the Financing o f  the United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Financing o f  the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Special 
Representatives, Envoys, and Related Positions’, paragraph 10-11.
2,0 Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 21 September 2001 and 
A/C.5/48/26, 15 November 1993, paragraph 8.
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invariably included, at the very least, a commitment to carry out some form o f democratic 
elections in the future, and provisions to respect human rights and govern according to certain 
standards o f transparency and accountability. 211 In fact, more often than not, preventative 
diplomacy on the ground  has aspired to liberalising structures and cultures o f governance. As 
Kofi Annan asserts in his Millennium Report, in the long-term preventative diplomacy must 
ultimately be designed to:
’...Prom ote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in
which all groups are represented.’212
Undoubtedly, as we will see in the African context, special representatives— both those 
concerned with preventive diplomacy and those heading peacekeeping missions— now have an 
absolutely central role in ensuring the smooth transfer in state-society relations that UN peace 
activities are structured to advance. Like some o f their forerunners in Jerusalem, the Congo and 
West Irian, these UN officials have a decisive role in ‘holding-the-ring’ between competing 
national elites, and are a considerable object o f influence within these societies.
The establishment o f the DPA in 1992 has, therefore, been relatively indicative o f the changing 
roles and functions o f the UN in the Southern hemisphere, as well as the reorientation o f  the UN 
itself. Its creation certainly underlines the wider peace activities that the UN undertakes and the 
expansion o f  functions that focus on governance within Southern states. This has been a work-in- 
progress throughout the 1990s and 2000s in that the DPA has progressively expanded and 
deepened its sphere o f influence with regard to promoting ‘...good internal governance.’ On one 
level, this is because the division o f labour between the DPA and DPKO has been a matter o f 
change and dispute throughout the 1990s, with the remit o f the DPA in particular constantly 
shifting.213 While DPKO has always retained the authority for the management o f  peacekeeping 
operations— be they limited classical peacekeeping or extensive transitional ones— the DPA has 
at various times been allowed to encroach on the political management o f these operations.214 For
211 Ibid. paragraph 5. As o f  2005, there were 84 Special representatives and Envoys employed by the UN. 
For current figures see: <www.un.org/english>.
212 ‘Millennium Report’ (A/54/2000), p.45.
213 The internal structure o f  the DPA has changed regularly. Initially, for example, DPA was headed by two 
under-secretaries, whose responsibilities were largely divided along geographic lines. A/46/882, 21 
February 1992, paragraph 6.
214 DPKO was supposed to be in charge o f  operational, and the DPA in control o f  the political, facets o f  
peace operations. Goulding, Peacemonger, pp.333-43.
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example: reports o f the secretary-general to the Security Council regarding operations are vetted 
by DPA; special representatives, who often simultaneously act as head o f peacekeeping 
operations, are answerable to the DPA with regard to issues within its remit such as electoral 
affairs, political negotiations, and Security Council relations; and the recent upsurge in 
transitional authorities and the resultant emphasis on long-term peace-building through civil 
society programmes, human rights advocacy and capacity-building has given the DPA a greater 
responsibility for implementing peace settlements.
On another level, however, the DPA’s focus on governance within states has been deepened and 
extended in unison with liberal theories o f conflict and conflict-resolution, and as a result o f 
‘failed’ experiences in the field. This has been most noticeable with the concept o f ‘post-conflict 
peace-building’ that has recently been introduced into the lexicon o f UN peace discourse, and 
translated as a principal UN peace practice under the aegis o f the DPA.215 This new category of 
peace operation has developed against the backdrop o f a growing realisation among practitioner- 
academics in the conflict resolution milieu that previous attempts at promoting democratisation 
and liberalisation may have proved superficial and unsustainable in the long-term.216 In the realm 
o f formal pluralism, for example, the Brahimi Report informs us that:
‘. . . ‘free and fair’ elections should be viewed as part o f broader efforts to strengthen 
governance institutions...elections need the support o f a broader process of 
democratisation and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and 
a culture o f respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny o f the 
majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.’217
This type o f logic has also been applied to law and order, human rights, and preventative 
diplomacy, and should therefore be seen as part o f an attempt to deepen the process o f state- 
society restructuring that UN peace operations enact.218 Transitional Authorities in both East
215 DPA becomes the ‘focal point’ for ‘post-conflict peace-building’ in 1997, during Kofi Annan’s tenure. 
A/51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 121 action 5.
216 For a candid example o f  this self-reflection in conflict resolution literature, see: Paris, ‘International 
peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice” .
217 The Brahimi Report (A /55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 38.
2,8 The Brahimi Report argues that a whole set o f  UN peace activities need to be deepened. For example, 
with relation to UN civilian police monitors it suggests that police officers must move beyond the simple 
‘...attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour o f  local police 
officers.’ Rather they should ‘...be tasked to reform, train, and restructure local police forces according to 
international standards for democratic policing and human rights...’ Ibid. paragraph 39.
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Timor and Kosovo can certainly be seen as part o f this trend, and commitment, to implement a far 
more thorough restructuring o f the domestic social ‘space’ in the Southern hemisphere. The 
introduction o f ‘post-conflict peace building’, and its ‘focal point’ in the DPA, has therefore had 
significant import for the UN’s remit in the realms o f observing and reforming the internal 
governance regimes o f  Southern states and societies.
Despite these new UN roles, however, the general practitioner-academic account o f peace 
reforms during the 1990s somehow focuses on the entirely functional need o f the Secretariat to 
update its capacities in the wake o f the rapid increase in peacekeeping operations that followed 
the end o f the Cold War, and tends to stress the lack o f adequate wherewithal to deal with such a 
transformation.219 Indeed, if anything, commentators stress the paucity o f resources at the 
disposal o f the UN when it comes to peacekeeping, the cautious progress o f peace and security 
sector reform, and the diminutive commitment o f some permanent Security Council members 
towards these activities.220 Time and again, we are told that peacekeeping is carried out on a 
‘shoestring’ and, contrary to this account, that the UN serves as an ideal ‘dumping-ground’ for 
international crises that powerful states have no intention o f solving.221 The UN is not so much an 
agency involved in restructuring the South, as an ideal scapegoat for reticent self-interested 
industrialised states. For most commentators, reform of the Secretariat’s agenda o f work has in 
fact not gone far enough.
In some ways it is understandable that commentators have come to these kinds o f conclusions. 
After all, most have been deeply involved in one way or another in the implementation o f these 
activities and are acutely aware o f the deficiencies in strategy as well as the fluctuating attitudes 
in Western societies towards peace roles and ‘nation building’.222 But the tendency in the conflict- 
resolution field to look at these roles in terms o f their adequate application as opposed to their 
political and socio-economic specificity is ultimately a narrow and partisan one. Because the 
parameters o f these activities are widely considered as neutral, normal and generally desirable,
219 Prominent examples o f  such a view would include: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 1999), pp.83-84, Goulding, Peacemonger, pp.341-342, and Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War,
pp.220-21.
Most recently put forward by: Linda Poleman, We d id  nothing: why the truth doesn't always come out 
when the UN goes in (London: Penguin Books, 2003); and Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f  US 
Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend? (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
22' Such as by Sir Brian Urquhart: Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War and Brian Urquhart, ‘Selecting the 
World’s CEO: Remembering the Secretaries-General’, Foreign Affairs, vol.74, no.3 (May/June 1995),
pp.21-26.
222 ‘Rich and Afraid o f  Peacekeeping’ Ramesh Thakur and David Malone, International Herald Tribune, 
25 October 2000.
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the issue is automatically one o f appraising the appropriate progress o f peace operations as 
opposed to probing their social implications or politically contingent nature. On the political 
level, the problem with this narrative is that it ignores the wider reform o f international 
organisations during the 1990s— most importantly, a renewed division o f labour at the level o f 
the international and the refocused agenda o f work within most o f these organisations towards 
issues o f internal governance, be it political, social, or economic. Taken as whole this 
reconstitution among and within international organisations belies the narrative o f  a necessary but 
insufficient process o f UN peace and security sector reform. The organisation’s peace activities 
may, perhaps, be defective and deficient, even superficial, but they are still an intrinsic part o f  a 
larger political project o f recalibrating the international management o f post-colonial 
relationships. As we have already seen, the net-effect o f UN ‘revitalisation’ in the sphere o f peace 
and security has been to shift the focus o f the UN’s peace functions from the inter-state regulation 
o f post-colonial relationships to the domestic supervision and minute restructuring o f Southern 
states. The least that can be said is that from the vista o f institutional reform— where the extent o f 
the UN’s shift towards peace activities becomes fully apparent— it is clear that previously 
unthinkable areas o f  domestic political and social surveillance have been tentatively established 
in the U N ’s programme o f work.
Overall, then, what is striking when examining the restructuring o f peace activities in the UN 
during the 1990s, starting with the establishment o f DPA and DPKO in 1992 and continuing 
through to the high-profile UN Brahimi Report in 2000, has been the way in which the orientation 
o f UN Secretariat activity has progressively become geared towards the sphere o f internal 
political governance. The establishment and development o f the DPA has perhaps been the most 
conspicuous facet o f this reorientation because o f its predominant focus on the political and social 
surveillance and reform o f Southern societies, which are invariably part-and-parcel o f the ever 
expansive practices o f ‘preventative diplomacy’ and ‘post-conflict peace-building’. But this 
process o f  expanding the UN’s role in the internal affairs o f states through the reform o f peace 
activities has only been one side of this reorientation. Indeed, as we will now go on to see, the 
other side o f the process o f UN reconstitution has been the extraction from the UN’s programme 
of work, all units, divisions, and committees that performed international political economy 
advocacy or research.
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T he pu rge  of political economy research and advocacy
The 1990s have seen the economic and social dimensions o f the UN’s work face a ruthless 
reconstitution. This has largely consisted o f a process o f eliminating UN activities that have 
historically had an ambiguous and antagonistic attitude to ffee-market orthodoxy, and their 
replacement with programmes o f work that are attuned to the broad endorsement, through 
sustainable development, o f neo-liberal practices. In the latter regard, this new political economy 
orientation can be seen to be akin to the transformation o f the UN’s peace and security roles 
outlined above— the rise o f preventative diplomacy and ‘post-conflict peace-building’ in the 
DPA— in that the organisation’s programme o f work has come to be broadly dominated by the 
promotion o f very specific regimes o f  good governance within Southern states.
In the U N ’s economic sphere, this outcome has been realised by an internal discourse o f  reform 
that pivots on issues o f the efficient allocation o f organisational resources within and across the 
UN system.223 Simply put, the UN must focus its limited and strained resources on ‘new ’ global 
priorities (failed and collapsed states, humanitarian emergencies, environmental issues, terrorism, 
drugs) and simultaneously reduce the wasteful duplication o f activities at the intergovernmental 
level (allowing the World Bank, IMF and WTO to specialise on their macro-economic and micro- 
economic ‘comparative advantages’).224 At the same time, a new neo-liberal dispensation within 
the UN has been made possible by the ideology of sustainable development, which has undercut 
calls to actively regulate international economic processes and actors in favour o f endorsing 
current global capitalist practices as the basis o f both economic development and a sound 
environmental future.225 As global capitalism is now seen as the singular fulcrum to realise these 
aspirations, as opposed to a major source o f North-South economic dependence and global 
environmental degradation, the UN has over time been able to legitimately internalise and 
promote such a view. This has o f course been a protracted, uneven, and in some respects, an 
incomplete process: state and non-state opposition has from time to time appeared; reforms have 
gone unimplemented; and there have been unexpected reversals in this largely Western agenda.
223 For a rationalisation o f  reform: A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993: ‘Review o f  the efficiency o f  the 
administrative and financial functioning o f  the United Nations: Programme budget for the biennium 1992- 
1993: revised estimates as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 47/212: Report o f  the 
secretary-general’, paragraphs 7, 19, 22, 50, 53, and 55.
224 A/C.5/47/SR.14, 26 October 1992: ‘Summary Record o f  the 14th Meeting o f  the Fifth Committee o f  the
General Assembly, Monday, 26 October 1992, 3 p.m. Agenda Item 103, 104, and 105’, paragraph 27, 28
and 34. A /48/428 ,29 September 1993, paragraphs 22, 26, 27, and 29.
225 On Agenda 21, see: Doyle, ‘Sustainable Development and Agenda 21.’
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But, by and large, the direction and dispensation o f institutional reform is clear—the UN has been 
redirected towards the promotion o f structures and cultures of internal governance that are 
imitable to current forms o f global capitalism.
But an initial prerequisite for this new orientation has involved the purge o f those programmes 
that were, for one reason or other, hostile to free-market orthodoxy. Here, it was argued in 
Chapter Two that even though the United Nations was primarily designed and developed to help 
promote a new form o f global order based upon the modest nation-state, and a private world 
economy, in certain spheres the organisation briefly and temporarily began to challenge this 
particular international social order. During the 1970s, the NIEO and the Charter on the 
Economic Rights and Duties o f States were formative aspects o f this challenge, one that not only 
had ideological significance but one that also had practical implications for the content o f the 
UN’s programme o f work.226 Indeed, we saw that committees such as that on Transnational 
Corporations (CTC), and conferences such as UNCTAD, were primarily deployed to challenge 
the discreet conception o f international social order that the UN had originally been established to 
advance. It was also noted that the design o f the UN featured a historic ‘Keynesian compromise’ 
in that it sanctioned a small measure o f formal international regulation o f the private economy in 
order to address problems of unemployment, and domestic social issues more generally. Chapter 
IX o f the UN Charter, entitled ‘International Economic and Social Co-operation’, fundamentally 
reflected this subsidiary UN concern.
Historically, these types o f social provisions and political economy outlooks have been the object 
o f bitter antagonism between G-77 states and industrialised states, in particular by the US. O f 
course, even within the heartlands o f advanced industrialised capitalism there has been a 
protracted and complex battle along these lines, culminating dramatically with the rise o f  the New 
Right in the US and UK in the 1980s and the systematic policy o f state reconfiguration that was 
thereafter instituted. Within the UN this process was instigated in February 1992 with the 
amalgamation of all economic and social units and divisions within one secretariat department 
(Department o f Economic and Social Development, DESD). This initial— ‘first’— stage o f reform 
was later followed by the creation o f three-new departments and the reallocation o f  some key 
tasks across the UN System in December 1992.227 It was this ‘second stage’ o f reform that finally 
expunged hostile political economy advocacy from the Secretariat and introduced new UN
226 On NIEO and Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties o f  States see Chapter Two.
227 A/47/753, 3 December 1992, paragraphs 7, 8, 13, and 14.
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priority programmes such as the implementation of Agenda 21. This was a fairly controversial set 
o f reforms: in the Fifth Committee o f the General Assembly in particular, objections were 
consistently raised by various G-77 states who generally felt that this Secretariat reorganisation 
reflected Western concerns and represented a diminution o f the economic role o f the UN.228 In 
this, there was ample justification— barely two months previously, for example, US Ambassador 
Perkins had informed the Fifth Committee that several functions o f the newly established DESD 
were ‘duplicative’, ‘not useful’, and should be ‘reassigned or eliminated.’ Perkins continued that 
it was now an opportune time to:
‘...Elim inate marginally useful units and activities, in order to release the resources 
required for priority areas, such as human rights and urgent new operations.’ 229
It is perhaps unsurprising that the UN secretary-general responded positively and quickly to these 
types o f managerial arguments. After all, Boutros-Ghali faced severe US material pressure to 
‘reform or die’ and probably understood that this was a necessary price to pay for a revitalised 
peace and security role for the UN in a post-Second World context.230 Either way, restructuring 
proposals advocated by G-7 states throughout the 1990s have been acted on swiftly by the 
Secretariat.231 This was certainly the case in the ‘second stage’ o f Secretariat reform announced 
by Boutros-Ghali in December 1992, which responded to calls for reprioritising and reallocating 
specific economic and social units.
228 For an example o f  G-77 concerns see the summary records o f  Fifth Committee meetings in late 1992 
and 1993. A/C.5/48/SR.18, 18 January 1994: ‘Summary Record o f  the 18th Meeting ofth e  Fifth Committee 
o f  the General Assembly, Tuesday, 16 November 1993, 10 a.m. Agenda Item 128, 129, and 125’, 
paragraphs 25-36 (Mr Marker, Pakistan) and paragraphs 50-53 (Mr Owade, Kenya). A/C.5/48/SR.14, 9 
December 1993: ‘Summary Record o f  the 14th Meeting o f  the Fifth Committee o f  the General Assembly, 
Wednesday, 10 November 1993, 10 a.m. Agenda Item 121,128, and 129’, paragraphs 13-15 (Mr Ju Kuilin, 
China) and paragraphs 47-53 (Mr Khan, Bangladesh).
229 A/C.5/47/SR. 14, 26 October 1992, paragraph 34.
230 Boutros-Ghali told the German paper, Die Zeit, in March 1992: ‘To make it absolutely clear to the 
Western public: I am not all that concerned about financial or technical assistance to the Third World. Your 
citizens in any case are sick and tired o f  being constantly asked to donate food or money.’ Cited in: Hussein 
Solomon, ‘Democratising the United Nations: A View From the South’, Politeia: Journal fo r  the Political 
Sciences (Pretoria: UNISA), vol. 15 no.l (1996), p.6.
231 This is especially noticeable with Kofi Annan’s reforms, which read as a near literal and verbatim set o f  
G-7 recommendations. For a comparative example, see the G-7 ‘Economic Communique: making a success 
o f  globalisation for the benefit o f  all’, Lyon, G-7 Summit, June 28, 1996 (available from 
<www.g8.utoronto.ca>) with the reforms subsequently proposed by Kofi Annan in ‘Renewing the United 
Nations: A Programme for Reform’, A/51/950, 14 July 1997.
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Top o f  the list for ‘elimination’, perhaps, was the U N ’s Centre on Transnational Corporations 
(CTC), which was finally reallocated in a neutralised form to UNCTAD in 1993.232 Here, from 
the beginning o f  Boutros-Ghali’s term as secretaiy-general, the centre faced a gradual diminution 
o f its roles and functions. During the first stage o f reform in February 1992, for example, CTC 
lost a significant degree o f autonomy when its status as an independent centre was ended.233 Its 
most controversial project, the non-binding ‘Code o f Conduct’ for corporations that the centre’s 
staff had been negotiating for over a decade was gradually sidelined throughout this period o f 
Secretariat transition, due in a large part to the opposition o f G-7 states and business interests.234 
Even though the centre had been instructed by the General Assembly to present a set o f 
recommendations on transnational corporations to be considered for negotiation in the final text 
o f  the Rio Earth Summit (Agenda 21), its advocacy was consistently marginalised.235 In part the 
CTC was outmanoeuvred by private corporations under the Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (BCSD), which played a large role in the Summit’s preparatory work, financing, 
and conduct both within and outside the UN.236 While CTC recommendations were to become 
tangential to the Summit, the BCSD circulated widely their own suggestions for self-regulation at 
Rio.237 With Agenda 21 and its conspicuous lack o f reference to multinational corporations, and 
its consequent internalisation in the UN’s programme o f work through the newly created 
‘Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development’ (DPCSD), there was little 
place for the kinds o f activity that the CTC had originally provided. Its transfer to UNCTAD 
reflected this changed reality and provided for an opportunity to refocus the centre’s axis.238 Its 
research and technical assistance was now to be re-centred on the ‘...contribution o f TNCs to
232 One former CTC employee expressed the opinion that Boutros-Ghali had been placed under 
considerable pressure to dissolve the Centre by the US Department o f  State and by powerful lobby groups 
such as the Heritage Foundation. Confidential email communication with former senior UN CTC official, 1 
June 2004.
233 The CTC became the ‘Division on Transnational Corporations and Management’ when it was merged 
into the newly created DESD in March 1992.
234 Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, The Earth Brokers (New York: Routledge, 1994).
235 See Chapter 2 in Joshua Karliner, The Corporate Planet: ecology and politics in the age o f  globalisation  
(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997); and George Monbiot, ‘Getting into bed with big business’, The 
Guardian (London), 31 August 2000.
236 It should also be noted that UNCED was headed at the time by Canadian businessman, Maurice Strong. 
It is widely accepted that Strong had a pivotal role, along with the Swiss philanthropist Schmidheiny o f  the 
BCSD, in fostering a pro-business environment. Strong has since played an important role in Annan’s 
reform process and in his several UN-private initiatives.
237 Chatteijee and Finger, The Earth Brokers, p.121.
238 Confidential email communication with former senior UN CTC official, 2 June 2004.
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developing countries’ and ‘...facilitating flows o f foreign direct investment’.239 It is probably 
worth recalling here its ‘terms o f reference’ as the Division on Transnational Corporations and 
Investment in UNCTAD:
‘Reviewing and providing guidance to the secretariat on technical assistance to 
Governments interested in developing investment regimes and enabling environments so 
as to attract more foreign investment and support for enterprise developments, thereby 
contributing to economic growth and development o f host countries.’240
It should also be noted that UNCTAD had itself faced a rapid process o f reconstitution— for some 
reflecting a ‘Houdini-like ability to survive’— from Cartagena in 1992 through to Midrand in 
1996.241 This saw UNCTAD secretary-general cut staff by 10 percent, narrow organisational 
activities, and refocus on free-market orientated technical assistance.242 In Lyon, G-7 states hailed 
UNCTAD’s ‘...thorough reform’ as a ‘...point o f reference’ for future UN economic and social 
sector restructuring:
‘We particularly appreciate the outcome o f the 9th Session o f  UNCTAD at Midrand 
w here...w e succeeded in reforming UNCTAD’s inter-governmental machinery and in 
refocusing its work on a small number o f priorities to promote development through trade 
and investment.’243
Such commendations reflected a complete turnaround in G-7 attitudes towards UNCTAD and 
underlined the new orientation o f this international body.244 This was also marked by UNCTAD’s 
1995 World Investment Report, where the change in tone towards a liberal political economy was 
palpable: transnational corporations, for example, now contributed to growth and development in
239 A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993: ‘Review o f  the efficiency o f  the administrative and financial functioning o f  
the United Nations: Programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993: revised estimates as requested by the 
General Assembly in resolution 47/212: Report o f  the secretary-general’, paragraph 54.
240 ‘Terms o f  Reference for UNCTAD’s Commission on International Investment and Transnational 
Corporations’, 31 March 1995. Available on-line from <www.unctad.org>.
241 Mark Tran, ‘UNCTAD changes its corporate tune’, The Guardian (London), 20 May 1996.
242 ‘UNCTAD receives ‘new lease o f  life” , Africa Recovery, vol. 10, no.l, May 1996.
243 G-7, ‘Economic Communique: making a success o f  globalisation for the benefit o f  all’, Lyon, G-7 
Summit, 28 June 1996. Available from <www.g8.utoronto.ca> .
244 Barely a year before, in the ‘Halifax communique’, the G-7 warned UNCTAD that its usefulness was 
dependent on eliminating ‘...overlaps with new organisations’, a reference o f  course to the establishment o f  
the WTO. ‘G-7 Halifax Communique’, Available from: <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.
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the South by providing capital, employment, technology and ‘efficient management 
techniques.’245
The orientation o f economic and social departments within the UN Secretariat faced a similar 
transformation to that o f UNCTAD, albeit a more subtle and at times ambiguous one. The 
second-stage o f  reform in 1992, for example, contained many details other than those involving 
the CTC that diminished UN international political economy advocacy. The short-lived 
Department o f Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (DESIP) was defined to 
shift the focus o f secretariat research and analysis from international political economy processes 
to the domestic policy-making sphere. Indeed one o f its pressing tasks was: ‘The monitoring and 
assessment from a global perspective o f economic and social policies and trends, including  
an a lysis  o f  efficient dom estic  m acroecon om ic m anagem ent an d  re levan t m icroecon om ic  issues' 
(emphasis added).246 Needless to say this was a function that caused much consternation in Fifth 
Committee and General Assembly discussions.247 The simultaneous creation o f the ‘Department 
for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development’ (DPCSD) was not only intended to 
provide secretariat services to the deliberative organs regarding economic and social issues, but 
was also established to monitor and evaluate the implementation o f Agenda 21, the ‘...secular 
bible o f global ffee-markets and pluralist democracy’.248 Even though this is not the place to 
detail the historical and conceptual intricacies that have marked the rise o f this new 
environmental and developmental orthodoxy, it cannot be overemphasised how decisive this new 
international priority has proved to be in transforming the UN’s relationship with big business. 
Suffice to note that through the Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) and the 
International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC), multinational firms have actually advanced their 
formal and informal roles in international governance and have further fashioned their image as 
positive and responsible agents o f social and economic transformation in the South. For the UN 
the internalisation o f Agenda 21, with its embedded corporate management philosophy, has 
firmly legitimated free-market friendly approaches to economic and social problems.
245 Mark Tran, ‘UNCTAD changes it’s corporate tune’, The Guardian (London), 20 May 1996.
246 A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993, paragraph 35 (C).
247 ‘United Nations: Secretariat reform must respect programme mandates’ Chakravarthi Raghavan, SUN5 -  
South-North Development Monitor (Geneva), 31 March 1993. Available on-line: 
<www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/develope/03311193.htm>. See also: A/RES/212, 6 April 1993: ‘Review  
o f  the efficiency o f  the administrative and financial functioning o f  the United Nations and programme 
budget for the biennium 1992-1993’.
248 A phrase used by Timothy Doyle in his critique o f Agenda 21: ‘Sustainable Development and Agenda 
21 ’, p.771.
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This development has been particularly noticeable throughout Kofi Annan’s tenure, during which 
several UN-private enterprise initiatives have been launched.249 Here, links have been enhanced 
with the ICC and established with the World Economic Forum in Davos (to which Annan is a 
regular participant), and business leaders are now frequently part o f wider civil society 
consultations.250 The UN’s current Global Compact is a case-in-point. Launched in July 2000, 
this ‘compact’ aimed at encouraging corporate responsibility through the commitment of CEOs 
and boards o f directors to: ‘...core values o f the UN in the area o f human rights, labour standards 
and the environment.’251 Annan warned that this was necessaiy because globalisation was far 
more fragile than realised and that there was a real prospect o f ‘...local or national communities’ 
reacting to the ‘...challenges and shortcomings o f globalisation by repeating the mistakes o f 
history, and turning in on themselves.’252 The solution, Annan has regularly noted, includes 
private enterprise taking-up their responsibilities as ‘global citizens’ and helping the ‘...w orld’s 
people share the benefits o f globalisation.’ 253 Fortunately enough for private enterprises:
‘Open markets offer the only realistic hope of pulling billions o f people in developing 
countries out o f abject poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialised world.’254
Much o f Annan’s efforts at reforming the UN’s economic and social programme o f work have 
implicitly internalised and reflected such a view.255 This not only holds for the formalisation o f 
links with the private sector but also for the way in which policy coordination and cooperation
249 For the full range o f  UN activities with private enterprise see: <www.un.org/partners/index.html>.
250 Yves Beigbeder, ‘The United Nation Secretariat: Reform in Progress’, in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, 
(eds.) The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs (London: Continuum, 2000), p .218. 
The ICC has had a formal relationship with the UN since 1946 when it was given consultative status by 
ECOSOC. As noted on its own website, however, the relationship was often ‘marred by...antagonism’. 
Happily the ICC notes that since the 1990s the UN now prefers to work with private enterprise. For further 
information see: <www.iccwbo.org/>.
251 UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2000. Available from <www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm>.
252 SG/SM/7495, 26 July 2000: ‘secretary-general welcomes international corporate leaders to global 
compact meeting.’
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 William I. Robinson has argued in a recent monograph that the UN under Annan has forged a much 
closer relationship to transnational capital. He cites Annan: ‘A strong United Nations is good for business.’ 
William I. Robinson, A Theory o f  Global Capitalism: production, class, and state in a transnational world  
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp.115-116. On Annan’s reforms in general, see: 
‘Reform o f  the United Nations by secretary-general Kofi Annan, A Chronology’ (available from 
<www.un.org/reform/chron.htm>) and ‘UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2000’ (available from:
<www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm>).
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with Bretton Woods Institutions has taken root.256 In this regard, Annan has sought to clarify the 
various roles o f each institution and has, as a part o f this process, explicitly accepted the flight o f 
macro-economic policy making to the IMF and WTO. Inversely, Annan has sought to solidify the 
UN’s monopolisation o f peace operations and humanitarian functions— activities that the UN 
apparently does ‘best’.257 Though, having said this, the UN’s relationship with the World Bank 
has in practice been far more complex and blurred because o f their similar focus on endogenous 
restructuring in Southern states (for example the World Bank has a Post-Conflict Unit and 
regularly produces new treatise on the ‘roots’ o f conflict in the South).258 But for Annan, this is 
all the more reason to consolidate and specialise the work o f international agencies. Indeed, for 
the secretary-general it: ‘ ...brings added urgency to the task o f ensuring an appropriate 
distribution o f responsibilities between the World Bank Group and the United Nations for the 
benefit o f  programme countries. This should take the form o f a functional rationalisation in a 
complementary and cooperative manner between the work o f the United Nations and World 
Bank.’ 259
United Nations ‘revitalisation’, the 1990s and beyond
The above discussion o f Secretariat restructuring has sought to provide a general picture o f the 
process o f  reorientation that the United Nations has been subjected to during the 1990s. The aim 
has been not so much to provide for an exhaustive list and definitive account o f each and every 
UN reform, or to discuss the wider international power-political dynamics that have informed 
such change. Rather, the objective has been to show how reform— broken down into the 
economic and political— can be viewed as a coherent project o f reinstating a division o f  labour 
among international organisations and refocusing activities, across-the-board, towards the 
monitoring and reforming o f state-society structures within post-colonial territories. Indeed the 
emphasis o f the argument has been to imply that the axis o f UN activity has faced a double
256 Other reforms included the merging o f  the three economic and social affairs departments established in 
1992 under one department (Economic and Social Affairs) in March 1997— a suggestion originally made 
by the G-7 in Lyon in July 1996.
257 As Annan notes in ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’: ‘The major source o f  
institutional weakness in the United Nations is the fact that over the course o f  the past half century certain 
o f  its organisational features tended to become fragmented, duplicative, rigid, in some cases ineffective, in 
others superfluous...Future success demands that the UN focus, within its overall Charter mission, on those 
activities, or on those aspects o f  activities, that it does better than others...[and] requires that the United 
National devise effective means by which to collaborate with other international organisations and 
institutions o f  civil society’ A /51/950, paragraph 11 and 21.
258 For details: <www.worldbank.org>.
259 A/51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 163.
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transformation: a shift towards peace activities and away from political economy advocacy, and a 
general transformation of these roles from an exogenous to an endogenous focus.
In the wider context, these changes are perhaps to be expected. After all, the collapse o f 
Command Economies as a rival socio-economic model, and the disintegration o f the Second 
World as a force in world politics, have inevitably opened-up an irresistible opportunity to 
reconstitute international organisations. Global geo-political victories are typically followed by 
the imposition o f new orders or the expansion o f prevailing social systems. In this case, as Danilo 
Zolo has pointed out, there was little need to create new institutions or regimes from scratch. 
Rather, with the structures in place they simply required recalibrating and expanding.260 The 
symbolic marker here in world affairs was undoubtedly the First G ulf War (1991), which 
signified the emergence o f a universal liberal-capitalist order and an expanded political role for 
the UN within it. But internally, the process had been in motion for some time: US pressure on 
UN finances was explicit throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s; engineering control 
within the General Assembly became again a real and tantalising possibility with the entrance o f 
friendly new and reconstituted states; and Soviet ‘new thinking’ left many former post-colonial 
regimes with little option but to cooperate with the US both within and outside o f international 
organisations. The repeal o f the Zionism Equals Racism resolution in the General Assembly in 
1991 was an important milestone here.261 As important, Soviet retreat in the Third-World and the 
resultant rise o f ‘regional conflict-resolution’ allowed the Security Council to refocus its own 
efforts to managing post-colonial relationships free from the fetters o f East-West rhetoric.262 The 
resultant rise o f peacekeeping operations deployed during this period has been staggering (45 
missions between 1989 and 2005) and has left the UN, as an intergovernmental body, with little 
option but to follow the Security Council’s lead.263
260 Danilo Zolo writes: ‘The task facing the victors this time has therefore been one o f  reinterpreting the 
role o f  the United Nations and other international organisations in the light o f  the post-war situation.’ Zolo, 
Cosmopolis, p .21.
261 In 1991, the US managed to repeal the Zionism-Equals-Racism resolution through the force o f  numbers 
it corralled in the General Assembly. At the time, this was a rather remarkable feat considering the 
caucuses that backed the initial resolution, and the general difficulty that the US faces during every attempt 
to block the passing o f  General Assembly resolutions it considers hostile to Israel. Paul Lewis, ‘U.N. 
Repeals its ’75 Resolution Equating Zionism with Racism’, New York Times, 17 December 1991 and
A/RES/46/86, 16 December 1991: ‘Elimination o f  racism and racial discrimination.’
262 On the reasoning behind Soviet ‘New Thinking’ in the Third World, see: Mikhail Gorbachev,
Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the Wor\d (London: Fontana, 1988).
263 See Appendix Two for details o f  UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post-1989 period.
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Certainly it took the end o f East-West confrontation to allow for the UN to assume its full role in 
world affairs as envisaged by its US post-Second World War planners. The UN could manage the 
political side o f a world o f nation-states and other international financial institutions could help 
provide for a universal private world economy. But this time, the substance o f each programme 
o f work is basically different. The UN no longer primarily secures a world o f modest-nation 
states by policing inter-state borders and the like, although this is occasionally still important. The 
UN, as with other international institutions, is now involved in the delicate and often messy 
business o f  restructuring state-society relations along neo-liberal lines in some o f  the most 
peripheral post-colonial territories. Managing transitions, between political and socio-economic 
systems and the elites that sustain them, is the UN’s new strategic business. And as we will now 
move on to see in the African context, even though the UN has to date had fluctuating fortunes in 
this field o f activity, it still remains absolutely central to the process o f managing change in 
borderland states and crucial to the project o f promoting a universal liberal social order.
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C hap ter 4
United Nations M isadventures in Somalia: 
M ilitarised liberal internationalism  in the early  1990s
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‘Somalia was a laboratory for all types o f peacekeeping.’ UNOSOM II official cited in 
Thomas G. Weiss (‘Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention’, 1997).
‘Dear Mr. President... I share your satisfaction at the adoption o f Security Council 
resolution 794. It underlines the grave concern felt by the international community at the 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. It also marks a significant step forward in the evolution o f 
the United Nations’ role in the post-Cold War era and will, I believe, strengthen the 
Organisation’s ability to intervene to maintain peace and security.’ Letter from the 
secretary-general o f the UN to President George H. Bush discussing the activities o f 
UNITAF, 8 December 1992.
Forging new UN peace roles in the South
The record o f the UN in Somalia is one of ambitious projects and fateful blunders, in large part 
symptomatic o f a variety of transformations that the world body has undergone at various 
moments. Perhaps the most significant and widely discussed o f these projects was the 
experimental form o f humanitarian military intervention that the UN embarked on from 
December 1992, first to ensure the secure delivery o f aid to regions affected by famine 
(UNITAF— under US command and control) and then, later, to pursue comprehensive 
disarmament, security and centralised rule from Mogadishu (UNOSOM II— ostensibly with UN 
‘executive authority’).264 These were significant moments in the early 1990s, not least because 
they indicated a post-Cold War structural shift o f UN peace activities into the domain o f direct 
military coercion. Needless to say at the time this was a radical and controversial departure from 
the traditional format o f UN peace operations in that the organisation was more accustomed to 
deploying indirect forms o f policing Southern societies— through consent, impartiality and 
adjudication— be they within or between states. But perhaps the more enduring controversy was 
the actual application o f this form o f militarised liberal internationalism, especially the disastrous 
consequences o f the imperious way in which UN officials sought to impose their dominion on the 
country from May 1993. Certainly, what remains the lasting image of this episode, at least in the 
Anglo-American world, was the war that was waged against the Somali General Muhammad 
Aideed in the summer o f 1993.
264 UNITAF (United Task Force, December 1992 to March 1993) and UNOSOM II (United Nations 
Operation in Somalia, March 1993 to March 1995).
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This chapter explores the origins, progress and consequences o f this misadventure in militarised 
liberal internationalism. It begins by suggesting that the civil war and famine that were 
precipitated by the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in parts o f Somalia in 1991 and 1992 
provided a timely opportunity for the UN to expand, develop and consolidate its repertoire o f 
peace practices. This was seen to be a necessary auxiliary to the reorganisation o f the UN around 
peace operations that began in 1992, and especially as an adjunct to the conceptual re-articulation 
o f these activities by the UN secretary-general in An Agenda fo r  Peace. Indeed at the time it was 
felt by UN officials that forceful intervention in Somalia would help set the precedent, or 
exemplar, o f what was termed a ‘peace enforcement’ operation. What this type o f  operation 
envisaged in the Somali context was a sort o f ideal in ‘international trusteeship’, in which the UN 
would assume temporary executive authority in a ‘collapsed state’ in order to reconstruct 
acceptable forms o f state-society relations.265 In the Somali situation this would entail the 
disarmament o f the population, the creation o f instruments and institutions o f state control (such 
as a police force), and centralised rule from the capital. Strangely enough, this was not the first 
time that the UN felt it necessary to impose a unique regime o f trusteeship on the territory; in the 
1950s Somalia was subjected, against the explicit wishes o f the population, to a re-imposition o f 
Italian rule under the UN trusteeship system. This trusteeship was unique— considered at the time 
a pioneering form o f international administration— imposing a strict timetable for ‘progressing’ 
the country towards liberal civilisation and establishing a set o f mechanisms for the surveillance 
by the UN o f such advancement.266
But besides the intriguing parallels o f such experimental forms of UN administration, what 
remains particularly distinctive about UNOSOM II was the seminal role o f UN officials in both 
constructing the ideological rationale and diplomatic framework for such intrusive intervention, 
and their subsequent ‘executive authority’ in carrying-out this operation. Indeed, it is the central 
contention o f this chapter that the essence o f the UN-Somalia adventure pivots around the rapid
265 Even though there was some loose-talk o f  a formal ‘trusteeship’ o f  Somalia, and a revival o f  the 
Trusteeship Council, among Western academics (I.M. Lewis one o f  them) and UN officials (Boutros-Ghali 
also raised the matter), the term is used here solely to denote an extensive regime o f  international 
administration. For the debate on a revival o f  the Trusteeship Council, from a sympathetic advocate, see: 
Peter Lyon, ‘The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival o f  International Trusteeship’ Journal o f  
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.xxxi, no. 1-3 (1993), pp.96-110.
266 On UN Trusteeship in Somalia, see: Alphonso Castagno, Somalia, (New York: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1959), Mark Karp, The Economics o f Trusteeship in Somalia, (Boston, MA: Boston 
University Press, 1960), Sylvia Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland, (London: Watts and Co, 1951) and 
Benjamin Rivlin, The United Nations and Italian Colonies, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1950).
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shift o f  emphasis in UN peace and security functions that followed the collapse o f the Soviet 
Union, especially the large but as o f yet undefined role assigned to UN officials in managing 
these revised practices. In the Somali context, UN officials found themselves in unchartered 
waters— first successfully probing for a militarised peace operation within an already independent 
sovereign territory and later, and notably with much less success, seeking to aggressively pacify 
the population in order to reconstitute the central state. It is only through the prism o f UN 
officials searching-out an active post-Cold War role in policing the Southern hemisphere that the 
nature o f the Somali misadventure can be fully appreciated.
This is not to imply that the UN, much less UN officials, were the singular variables in explaining 
intervention in Somalia. Clearly other factors were central in creating the environment and 
momentum for action, from forces with humanitarian agendas such as USAID, CARE, HRW and 
prominent ‘Africanists’ and ‘humanitarians’ within the US Congress, to the eventual concurrence 
o f the US Chief o f Staffs’ and Executive.267 These were all important factors in the decision o f 
the US to use its armed forces and to support— some may claim promote— an active and forceful 
UN response.268 But inevitably, accounts with these foci miss something about this UN adventure 
that relates to the laborious internal changes that the organisation was undergoing and the struggle 
among top-Secretariat managers to redefine their roles in shifting UN peace practices as far as 
possible. The least that can be said here is that the secretary-general for whatever reason took an 
extremely proactive position in advancing the military option. And on this score the literature that 
looks at the UN peacekeeping facet o f the intervention retains a certain distance from discussing 
the politics o f transformation that the UN was itself subject. To be sure, most o f  these 
commentators cursorily situate intervention in the context o f the end o f the Cold War and the
267 For an authoritative account o f  the US decision to intervene in Somalia, see: Jon Western, ‘Sources o f  
Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and 
Bosnia’, International Security, vol.26, no.4 (2002), pp.l 12-142.
268 One common explanation for the military intervention in Somalia revolves around the so-called ‘CNN- 
Effect’— the claim that through the explicit coverage o f  starvation and internecine violence, Western and 
especially US media organisations helped to put pressure on national governments (the US) and 
international organisations for intervention. While, o f  course, the media and its reporting in the Third 
World (especially during civil wars and famines) has recently helped mobilise public opinion, in the Somali 
case it has been shown that coverage actually followed (and did not lead) US and UN humanitarian 
initiatives. In fact it has been argued by Piers Robinson that the US government harnessed the media— and 
not the other way round— to provide positive initial reports o f  the military action. Piers Robinson, ‘The 
CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?’ Review o f  International Studies 25 (2), 1999, 
pp.301-309. See too: Western, ‘Sources o f  Humanitarian Intervention’, p.l 14. It is much more the case, in 
Somalia at least, that the ‘CNN-effect’ was a significant cause o f  the precipitous withdrawal o f  US troops 
from Somalia following the brutal death (captured on TV) o f  US Army Rangers at the hands o f  Somali 
militiamen in 1993.
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project o f a ‘New World Order’.269 But, by and large, the focus is the efficacy o f various 
peacekeeping tools and the ‘lessons’ for future missions.270 Having said this, however, there is a 
disparate set o f academics and researchers who have partially concluded— largely through an 
analysis o f large-scale famine that UN officials portrayed in the country—that the role o f the UN 
was less than benign or neutral.271 These authors have questioned the discourse o f famine and 
anarchy that the Secretariat used to justify action, especially the manipulation o f data to 
strengthen and bolster their policy-positions. But useful as this literature is in mapping the 
inconsistencies in the representation o f the humanitarian crisis by the UN and others, and in 
detailing the imperious nature o f UNOSOM II in particular, there remains the question o f 
understanding the rationale and logic o f such action. It is only through an analysis that situates the 
UN-Somali misadventure in the context o f ongoing external and internal efforts to shape the 
UN’s programme o f work that this question can be adequately addressed.
It is argued here that from the veiy outset o f UN engagement in the Somali crisis, officials 
gradually deployed a variety of arguments that sought to legitimise and justify an international 
take-over o f the country. On the one hand, like the parallel advocacy of certain elements within 
Western state bureaucracies and the independent efforts o f a host o f private voluntary 
organisations based largely in the US, this was simply a matter o f talking-up the humanitarian 
crisis and the deterioration o f the security situation in Somalia. But for the UN in particular it was 
much more than this; in order to legitimise and promote forceful action within a sovereign state 
the UN necessarily deployed a liberal humanitarian set o f arguments that were in the ascendancy 
both within and outside the organisation. This focused on a discourse— available in part from An  
Agenda fo r  Peace— that saw new threats to international peace and security arising from so- 
called globalisation. Disintegrating states, internecine violence and resource wars were the new 
hazards o f the twentieth-first century that would necessitate UN attention and merit forceful 
action. There was also a moral imperative for the UN to act in these types o f arguments that 
stressed the intrinsic rights o f the individual above and beyond those o f  subject states. 
Sovereignty was conditional on the establishment o f very specific forms o f  ‘good governance’. 
As will be outlined later, such a view o f conflict and conflict resolution infused the arguments put 
forward by the UN establishment for changing the basis for intervention in Somalia from one
269 James Mayall, The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experiences in Cambodia, Former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Cedric Thomberry, The 
Development o f  International Peacekeeping, (London: LSE Books, 1995).
270 Among many others: Weiss, ‘Rekindling Hope’.
271 De Waal, Famine Crimes, Debrix, Re-Envisaging Peacekeeping, and John Drysdale, Whatever 
Happened to Somalia? A Tale o f  Tragic Blunders, (London: Haan, 1994).
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based upon traditional peacekeeping values to one o f armed intercession and international 
administration.
Once in Somalia, UN officials utilised an extraordinarily wide enforcement mandate to subdue 
armed elements within the state and impose their own vision o f national reconciliation on the 
country. The UN was clearly in unchartered territory here in that hitherto the organisation had not 
conducted a peace operation within an already sovereign state, authorised under Chapter VII o f 
the UN charter, and under ostensibly UN ‘command and control’. This was an ambitious project; 
it was no less than the forced imposition o f UN rule over one of its member states. And combined 
with the scale o f the operation (28,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilian staff) and the 
resources available (such as the US Quick Reaction Force and US Army Rangers), UN officials 
found themselves in an immensely powerful but unfamiliar position.272 The conduct o f UN 
officials and military personnel within the country essentially reflected this predicament: in 
Mogadishu and New York, UN representatives sought to impose law and order, at each moment 
ratcheting up the level o f violence and coercion at their disposal. This not only led to the 
‘random ’ and ‘isolated’ abuse of Somalis often accused of petty offences by UN peacekeepers, 
but also to the wholesale and protracted military attempt to decapitate the political leadership o f 
the United Somali Congress (USC).273 Possibly as remarkable was the vitriolic rhetoric o f UN 
officials that accompanied this course of events: a massacre in a conference hall full o f Somali 
political leaders was ‘surgical’; while crowds mowed down by UN troops were ‘combatants’ who 
used women and children as ‘human shields’.274 Perhaps with no direct or recent experience o f 
such a situation to draw-on, the UN leadership simply evoked the operating procedures and 
behavioural characteristics o f its most powerful liberal states when dealing with ‘small wars’ in 
the periphery. And o f course, for a great many Somalis this was just another form o f foreign 
occupation and domination— or ‘gumeysi’.275
272 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.722.
273 For an interesting account the use of violence in Somalia by UN peacekeepers, see: Sherene H. Razack, 
Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somali Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism , (Toronto: 
UTP, 2004).
274‘Manhunt’ The Economist (London), vol.328, issue 7829, 18 September 1993, p.26, ‘Bloody Sunday in 
Somalia’ The New York Times (NYC), 15 June 1993, and ‘Somalia: Hope Denied’ Africa Confidential, 
vol.34, no.14, 16 July 1993. For a catalogue of abuses committed by UNOSOM II, see: African Rights, 
Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces, (London: African Rights, July 1993).
275 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? p.67.
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The upshot o f this experience for the UN is well known.276 But while many commentators have 
focused on the immediate effects o f the death o f 18 US Army Rangers in October 1993, tracking 
the resultant retreat o f Clinton’s policy o f ‘assertive multilateralism’, three other consequences 
are stressed in this account. First, it was recognised by (most) UN conflict-resolution practitioners 
that waging-war for humanitarian ends may be desirable but was not, under current institutional 
arrangements, possible. Here, it was considered that it was far better to ‘subcontract’ such action 
to major Western powers or even regional organisations.277 The UN, it was felt, retained its 
comparative advantage in its original format for peacekeeping in the South, with its principles o f 
‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’. Second, if military coercion was ruled-out as a principal UN peace 
activity in the South this did not mean that some form o f UN temporary trusteeship premised on 
consent and neutrality could not be developed and utilised by the UN in so-called ‘post-conflict 
peace-building’. Quite the contrary; the UN would now see this type o f operation as a central 
pillar o f any future expansion o f peace activities. Finally, while debates raged about the utility o f 
various forms of peace operation that the UN should undertake, the liberal-humanitarian 
discourse that was first used to justify armed action in Somalia emerged relatively unscathed—  
being utilised as an ideological template for intervention elsewhere in the South.
Experiments in the international regulation of Somalia in context
Peace enforcement in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 was not the first occasion in which the UN had 
developed experimental forms of international regulation in Somalia. Among other things, this 
was particularly relevant to the way in which the management o f  social change in Somalia has 
often been ‘internationalised’. In fact during an earlier transition in social and political life among 
the Somali, the UN was given a special responsibility for overseeing the population’s 
development towards sovereign independence under Italian Trusteeship. What was remarkable 
here was not that Italian rule was re-imposed upon the territory against the wishes o f a great deal 
o f  the inhabitants, or even because o f the record o f  Italy as an ‘Axis-Power’— it was maintained 
by the UN that because Italy had colonised the country before the spectre o f Fascism its 
‘belligerent’ status was not an issue in discussions regarding its return to the Horn.278 But it was 
perhaps because o f these exigencies, as well as wider geopolitical ones relating to the future o f
276 See the volume edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst Learning From Somalia: The Lessons o f  
Arm ed Humanitarian Intervention, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
277 Giandomenico Picco, ‘The U.N. and the Use o f  Force’ Foreign Affairs, vol.73, issue 5 (Sept/Oct 1994), 
pp. 14-18.
278 Rivlin, The United Nations and Italian Colonies, p.l 8.
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other ex-Italian colonies (Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania), that a relatively unique model o f 
trusteeship was developed that conferred the UN with a significant role in the territory.279 
Important here, were a variety o f surveillance mechanisms and guarantees, such as an Advisory 
Council stationed in Mogadishu to advise and oversee the local Italian Administrator, the 
constitutional rights accorded to the ‘Somali’, the direct oversight o f the UN General Assembly, 
and the relatively short time-limit set for a transition to independence.280
The Advisory Council was possibly the most important innovation. It established a three-person 
commission in Mogadishu (representatives from Egypt, Colombia, and the Philippines), which 
had some leverage over local forces. Article One o f the Draft Trusteeship Agreement set the 
scene by stating that the Italian Authorities ‘...shall be aided and advised by an Advisory 
Council’ who in Article Eight ‘...shall be fully informed...on all matters relating to the political, 
economic, social and educational advancement o f the inhabitants o f  the territo ry ...’281 Moreover, 
the Administrative Authority was to ‘...seek the advice o f the Advisory Council on all measures 
envisaged for the inauguration, development and subsequent establishment o f self-government 
for the Territory’.282 This was specified to include: the development o f organs o f self- 
government; economic and financial development; and labour, social and educational 
advancement.283 The Council even had some say over the establishment o f military installations: 
‘The Administrating Authority, after consultation with the Advisory Council, may establish 
installations... for the defence of the territory.’284 As can be seen by these articles, a distinguishing 
feature o f this Trusteeship was the role and position of international representatives in guiding 
and verifying the transition to sovereignty. But this did not singularly relate to the role and status 
o f the Advisory Council; the Trusteeship Agreement also sought to open-up the territory further 
by stipulating the ‘equal treatment’ o f all foreign nationals in the country including the right to
279 The negotiations relating to the dispensation o f  Italian colonies was a complex and protracted affair. As 
far as can be discerned, it seems that Italy (with the help o f  Latin American states) was able to secure a 
return to the Horn in exchange for giving-up a return to Libya. Trusteeship was seen to be important for 
Italian foreign policy because o f  its priority o f  being admitted to the United Nations and reintegrated into 
international society after World War II. Castagno, Somalia, p.399. Ben Rivlin surmised the matter this 
way: ‘The anti-colonial bloc, which brought about the rejection o f  the plans to re-install Italy in 
Tripolitania, conceded Italian Trusteeship over Somaliland, but not without saddling Italy with a Advisory 
Council and making the ten-year limit unequivocal.’ Rivlin, The United Nations and Italian Colonies, p.62.
280 This was the first occasion the UN Trusteeship Council imposed a finite time limit (10 years) on the 
administration o f  a territory by a European power.
281 T/456, 31 January 1950, Draft Trusteeship Agreement For the Territory o f  Somaliland Under Italian 
Administration  (As adopted by the Trusteeship Council at the eighth meeting on 27 Januaiy 1950).
282 T/456, Article 8.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid. Article 6.
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trade, acquire property and so forth.285 This was particularly noticeable with relation to business, 
which posited that no discrimination should occur in ‘...m atters relating to the grant o f 
concessions for the development o f natural resources.’286
More generally, the Trusteeship Agreement laid down an extensive list o f benchmarks for the 
Administrating Authority to carry out in order to progress the advancement o f  the inhabitants 
towards liberal modernity. All areas of social and political life were covered from proscribing 
slavery, child and forced labour to controlling the trade in opium, ‘dangerous drugs’ and 
‘spirituous liquors’.287 Special areas in need o f advancement were signalled out for particular 
attention— like establishing a modem system o f public education ‘...as  rapidly as possible... so as 
to ensure that sufficient qualified personnel will be available when the territory becomes a 
sovereign independent State’.288 In sum a modem nation-state with ‘free political institutions’ was 
outlined as the core objective o f Italian Trusteeship and UN oversight.
As it turned out, this experiment in nation-building and promoting constitutional democracy in 
the Somali context proved ephemeral— even though they did have a transformative impact on 
social relations.289 Here, as Ahmad Samatar has been at pains to point-out, along with the 
integration o f Somali territory into the world economy (largely the export o f cattle) and the 
related creation o f  various nascent merchant and bureaucratic classes orientated towards new 
external patrons, the colonial and later post-colonial state project had a corrosive effect on 
traditional kingship norms and values (such as reer and xeer)?90 One o f the most significant 
‘transformations’ relates to the fashioning of clan conflict and competition as an elementary part
285 Ibid. Article 15.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid. Article 3.
288 Ibid. Article 4.
289 While the state temporarily survived until 1991, formal pluralism did not endure long after 
independence with a militaiy coup that established a ‘Supreme Revolutionary Council’ led by General 
Siyad Barre in October 1969. On Siyad Barre’s rule, see Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric 
and Reality, (London: Zed Books, 1988).
290 This is an argument put forward by Ahmed Samatar in reaction to what he considers the ‘axiomatic’ 
tendency in Somali-studies (following the influential British anthropologist I.M. Lewis) to consider the 
traditional pastoral clan structure as a primary and unchanged source o f  social power. Ahmed I. Samatar, 
‘Somalia: Statelessness As Homelessness’, in Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar (eds.) The African 
State: Reconsiderations. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), p.228. According to Samatar, the old 
pastoral Somali traditions o f  kingship (now long transformed) consisted o f  reer and xeer. Reer, the 
household, refers to important social networks (based upon male lineage); while xeer refers to ‘ ...a  code o f  
conduct that sets specific guidelines for intra-and inter-kin transactions.’ Ibid. p.227.
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o f the Somali state and society.291 Specifically, the implementation o f the colonial state saw the 
systematic utilisation by the authorities o f a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach towards Somali clans as 
one means o f  securing native subordination— the other main strategy o f course remaining the 
frequent deployment o f colonial force and violence.292 The consequence o f this tactic in the 
Somali context in particular has been far-reaching, with the example being repeated and 
institutionalised during the latter years o f General Siyad Barre’s rule in the 1980s when his 
authority and reach were under serious contention, and during the 1990s (when at various points 
international and regional patrons have played one clan off against another during the civil war). 
So even though the post-colonial state disintegrated with the final collapse o f  the Siyad Barre’s 
regime in January 1991 (after a sustained military confrontation with USC) one o f its lasting 
legacies was that it left various elements o f the old regime, mainly bureaucrats and army officers, 
to lead their respective clans and sub-clans in their newly institutionalised struggle with each 
other.293
But another more immediately obvious legacy o f the last years o f the Barre regime, one that drew 
the attention o f Western aid agencies and media organisations, was the famine that engulfed parts 
o f  the country in 1992. Here, it was the last year or so of fighting between the USC and the 
remnants o f  the Barre regime in the inter-riverine area o f Southern Somalia in particular (the 
fertile areas around the Jubba and Shebelle rivers), which went a long way to create the 
conditions for the famine that gripped parts o f the country.294 With food production effectively 
halted in the ‘bread-basket’ o f Somalia, and the continued closure o f Mogadishu and Kismayo 
ports due to fighting, severe food scarcity led to widespread famine in these areas in the first few 
months o f 1992.295 Although statistics relating to the crisis vary considerably— and as we will 
later see, were manipulated for political ends— it seems worth stating for the sake o f depicting the 
scale o f the crisis some cautious figures: one million refugees and four-and-half million suffering 
severe malnutrition by the middle o f 1992, and up to half-a-million deaths in the Bay region o f 
the country by the end o f the same year.296 It was this crisis, along with a further civil war that
291 Martin Doombos and John Markakis ‘State and Society in Crisis: What went Wrong in Somalia?’ in 
Mohamed Salih and Lennart Wohlgemuth (eds.) Crisis Management and the Politics o f  Reconciliation in 
Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17— 19 January 1994, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
1994), p. 16.
292 Samatar, ‘Somalia: statelessness as homelessness’, p.229.
293 Ibid. p.231 and Doombos and Markakis ‘State and Society in Crisis’, p. 17.
294 John Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ Foreign Policy, issue 91 (summer 1993), pp. 138-148.
295 The grain stocks o f  the southern regions o f  Somalia were wiped out during the occupation o f  these areas 
by Siyad Barre’s forces between September 1991 and April 1992. De Waal, Famine Crimes, p. 163.
296 John Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ pp. 138-148.
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erupted within the USC in Mogadishu in particular—between the Somali National Alliance 
(SNA) led by General Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi— that 
activated international attention and eventually provided the pretext for military intervention in 
December 1992.
Faustian bargains in a post-Cold War Somalia: from UN engagement to the international 
military takeover
The expansive parameters o f UNOSOM II, deployed with a wide mandate to secure the country 
and reconstruct the central state, was achieved partly as a result o f the advocacy o f UN managers. 
Throughout the preceding years, the UN had begun loyally stripping-back ‘outdated’ and 
‘surplus’ UN activities and began implementing a far-reaching programme o f organisational 
reform at the behest o f G-7 states. Relevant UN officials were keen to press-forward with this 
transformation and fulfil their new specialists roles in peacemaking in the South. In large part, 
Somalia provided an ideal ‘testing ground’ for some o f these functions— especially as it related to 
the changing basis for UN engagement in an essentially civil conflict and to the potential 
authority o f the UN to coercively enforce local compliance. But as we will now go on to see, this 
enthusiasm to translate institutional reform into actual practice by UN managers was at first not 
reciprocated by some Security Council members; early in 1992, European states in particular 
were more concerned with the potential threat to their continental liberal political and economic 
order from the descent into conflict in the former Yugoslavia and this, temporarily, dampened any 
desire to activate new expansive operations at the borderlands o f international capitalism. With 
some temerity, and the parallel advocacy o f humanitarian forces in the US, UN officials led by 
Boutros-Ghali attempted to cement the revitalised UN mandate for managing the incorporation o f 
‘orphan’ Southern societies ‘forgotten’ after the Cold War back into the liberal international 
system.297 This largely entailed various forms of public and private advocacy, which centred on 
the construction o f the ideological case for engagement and then armed intervention in Somalia.
The UN’s engagement with the civil war in Somali occurred during a radical shake-up o f the 
U N ’s programme of work and a concurrent functional reorganisation o f the International 
Secretariat in 1992 around peace operations and away from issues concerning the international 
political economy. As we have already seen in Chapter Three, the new secretary-general, Dr. 
Boutros-Ghali, was quick to press forward with this conception o f ‘reform’ advocated by the US,
297 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p.53, p.55.
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UK and others— announcing barely a month into his term the first o f  a two-part restructuring o f 
UN departments and divisions.298 Later the same year, in July, the secretary-general published An  
Agenda fo r  Peace, a report requested by the Security Council, which sought to outline the future 
o f  UN peace activities.299 What both An Agenda fo r  Peace and the practical reforms underlined 
was a striking trend towards focusing UN activities on issues o f ‘good governance’ within 
Southern states— especially those members whose empirical sovereignty were in question as a 
result o f armed violence. Among other controversial features of these reforms, the perceived 
downgrading o f the conditions under which the UN has the authority to intercede in civil 
conflicts, and the implicit suggestion that ‘peace enforcement units’ may be needed to compel 
belligerents to abide by agreements, were particularly noticeable. An Agenda fo r  Peace suggested 
that:
‘Peace-keeping is the deployment o f a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with 
the consent o f all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military 
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.’300 (Emphasis added)
The clear implication o f this definition was that future peacekeeping operations might be 
deployed without the prior consent o f local groups. Further to this caveat was the suggestion that 
the UN should enforce ceasefire agreements:
‘Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has 
sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This 
task can on occasion exceed the mission o f peace-keeping forces and the expectations o f 
peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilisation 
o f peace-enforcement units under clearly defined circumstances and with terms o f 
reference specified in advance....Deployment and operation o f such forces would be 
under the authorisation o f the Security Council and would, as in the case o f peace­
keeping forces, be under the command of the secretary-general.’301
298 Boutros-Ghali assumes office on 1 January 1992; Security Council Summit is held on 31 January 1992; 
Boutros-Ghali announces ‘first-stage’ o f  reform (relating to peace operations) on 21 February 1992. 
A/48/428, 21 February 1992 (See Chapter Three).
299 It will be recalled that the Security Council Summit held in January 1992 requested the new secretary- 
general to produce a report on UN peace and security activities.
300 An Agenda fo r  Peace, paragraph 20.
301 Ibid. paragraph 44.
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It is in this changing institutional context that the UN’s advocacy for a military-option in Somalia 
becomes most interesting. Until this time, Somalia was hardly on the UN radar: while UNDP, 
UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR had all suspended operations in January 1991 due to the ‘security 
situation’, the UN Secretariat had largely failed to involve itself in any o f the conflict resolution 
activities that had been initiated regionally.302 Between January and December 1991, Javier Perez 
de Cuellar issued only one report and one routine letter relating to Somalia.303 But from the 
beginning o f Boutros-Ghali’s term, the UN began to pay much more attention to the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation: a UN envoy, James Jonah, was dispatched in January 1992 to Mogadishu 
to assess the potential for a rapprochement between the two USC belligerents, ‘Interim President’ 
Ali Mahdi and General Muhammad Aideed, and returned in March to witness a vague cease-fire 
agreement verified by some ‘...m eans o f a United Nations monitoring mechanism.’304 This paved 
the way for a Security Council resolution (S/RES/751, 1992) authorising the immediate 
deployment o f UN observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and later a ‘security force’ to 
protect relief supplies at Mogadishu port and its delivery to distribution centres in Mogadishu 
‘...and its environs.’305 The secretary-general appointed a veteran Algerian diplomat, Muhammad 
Sahnoun, as special representative to oversee the implementation o f resolution 751.
The problem for the UN was that despite the authorisation o f a small peacekeeping operation, G-7 
states were consumed with a bitter war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and were keen to focus Security 
Council attention on European efforts to resolve the crisis as opposed to any increase in activism 
in Somalia. In response, UN officials along with a variety o f other (humanitarian) forces began to 
step-up the public profile o f the Somali crisis. Sahnoun was a vital early contributor to this effort, 
making regular emotive statements on the issue o f a Somali relief effort to Western donors and 
media outlets. In one early instance Sahnoun rhetorically asked journalists: ‘Why can’t we have 
the United Nations airlift operations the way they do in Sarajevo to avoid kids dying?’306 But in 
terms o f diplomacy, the secretary-general’s contrived conflict with the Security Council in July 
1992 over the U N ’s endorsement o f the London Plan for the cantonment o f heavy weapons in
302 Sahnoun cites three ‘missed opportunities’ for UN engagement with conflict resolution efforts in 
Somalia, the most important o f  which was the 1991 Djibouti Conference. Mohammad Sahnoun, Somalia: 
The M issed Opportunities, (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1994).
303 A/46/483, 19 September 1991.
304 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, (New York: United Nations 
Department o f  Public Information, 1996), p. 18.
305 S/23829, 21 April 1992, paragraph 27.
306 ‘U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somali R elief The New York Times (NYC), 25 July 1992; 
‘The Squeezing o f  Sahnoun’ The Economist (London), 7 November 1992, p.50.
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Bosnia was the most significant.307 Dubbed by the French ‘la petite guerre’, Boutros-Ghali used 
this issue to imply that the Council were Eurocentric, interested only in strategic geopolitical 
conflicts.308 In an open letter to the Security Council on 22 July 1992, the secretary-general 
stated:
‘My concern is that if  the Security Council continues to concentrate its attention and 
resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at the expense o f the 
organisation’s ability to help resolve equally cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, for 
example in Som alia/309
This confrontation escalated into a full-scale public clash between British and UN managers, 
fought out largely in the Trans-Atlantic press. British leaks talked about Boutros-Ghali as an 
‘unhumble servant’ with an ‘imperious style’, who would need to watch his future conduct lest he 
is put out to an early retirement.310 The UN retorted with accusations o f  institutionalised British 
racism; or, as Boutros-Ghali controversially put it, ‘Maybe its because I’m a W .O.G.’311 
Hyperbole aside, however, this was in many respects just a familial quarrel; the point surely was 
that Boutros-Ghali had been given a mandate by G-7 states to conduct sweeping changes within 
the organisation and its focus o f work.312 This included a relatively wide remit to review the 
conceptual parameters o f the UN’s peace and security activities, hence An Agenda fo r  Peace. But 
when Boutros-Ghali readily carried-out these responsibilities and sought to translate some o f 
them into practice he appeared to be letdown by the derisory commitment o f G-7 states to 
actually follow through with these plans. It was not that UN managers were standing-up to 
Western powers; if it was it certainly was not on behalf o f G-77 states, which saw the new UN 
administration executing an across-the-board set o f US defined ‘reform’ proposals.313 Rather it
307 ‘The Security Council’s Unhumble Servant’ The Economist (London), 8 August 1992.
308 ‘Boo Boo Plots Path to Disunity’ The Sunday Times (London), 9 August 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 
Unvanquished, p.54.
309 Boutros-Ghali cited in ‘Blunder by UN Chief Marks Him for Failure’ The Times (London), 28 July
1992.
3.0 ‘The Security Council’s Unhumble Servant’ The Economist (London), 28 July 1992.
3.1 ‘UN C h iefs ‘WOG’ Outburst Over Bosnia Policy’ The Times (London), 4 August 1992.
312 G-7 Political Communique: ‘Strengthening the International Order’, London, 16 July 1991.
313 Indeed, one fundamental misconception o f  this period in the Western press was that somehow Boutros- 
Ghali was defending Third World interests in this episode o f  confrontation with the Security Council. 
Southern orientated commentators had no such illusions. In general refer to: The South Centre, For a 
Strong and Democratic United Nations, pp.201-219.
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was a plea to let the UN fulfil its promised role in policing the Southern hemisphere that had been 
temptingly held-out as an incentive to reorient around more ‘contemporary’ concerns.314
In any event, the secretary-general’s public outburst seemed to have concentrated-minds: only a 
few days later the Security Council endorsed an expansive vision of international involvement in 
the country set-out in the secretary-general’s first report on UNOSOM I.315 This report was 
significant because it was through the description o f the situation in Somalia and the adequate 
international responses to it, that the UN moves toward an explicit liberal-humanitarian reading o f 
the issues, such as those general ones put forward in An Agenda fo r  Peace. Indeed, it is from this 
period that we begin to see emerge a discourse that generalised the humanitarian crisis and 
lawlessness o f the country— the ‘collapsed state’ and ‘primordial anarchy’ theses— and implied 
that alternative strategies may be necessary to bring about an effective ceasefire. It claimed in the 
report for example that:
‘Somalia is today a country without central, regional, or local administration, and without 
services: no electricity, no communications, no transport, no schools and no health 
services. Throughout the country, there are incredible scenes o f hunger, disease and 
dying children.’316
But this picture o f events was contentious. This especially related to the portrayal o f anarchy and 
indiscriminate famine that was relayed. In the first instance, the collapse o f centralised structures 
o f rule from Mogadishu did not in the Somali context translate into an absence o f  other forms o f 
governance; Somaliland developed a ‘relatively high degree o f order and internal cohesion in the 
northern regions o f the territoiy throughout this period and, to a lesser extent, the Somali clan 
system provided an alternative form o f decentralised governance elsewhere.317 It was largely in
3,4 For one example, see: US Secretary o f  State Warren Christopher’s Address to the Fiftieth Session o f  the 
General Assembly, 25 September 1995 (Cited in Chapter Three).
315 S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992. It is interesting to note in this context Conor Cruise O’Brien’s 
suggestion that the diplomatic decision o f  the US to become more active in Somalia (i.e. with the offer o f  
an airlift in August) was partly predicated on a fear that Boutros-Ghali may resign over ‘la petite guerre.’ 
‘Servant o f  too many masters’ The Times (London), 18 August 1992.
316 S/24343, 22 July 1992, paragraph 24.
317 The debate in the literature about the nature o f  Somali society, particularly the question o f  the continued 
pervasiveness o f  pastoral traditions and structures, continues to divide scholars. On the one hand there are 
those, such as I.M. Lewis, who continue to stress the relatively unchanged nature o f  these pre-colonial 
traditions o f  governance and their salience for Somalia society. On the other hand, there are scholars who 
argue that the Somali clan social structure was radically transformed with the onset o f  colonialism, the 
intrusion o f  capitalism and, later, the imposition o f  a modem centralised state. See the following
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Mogadishu, and some Southern regions, that life could have been considered ‘anarchic’, and only 
then because o f  the absence o f centralised rule. In the second instance, the reach of the famine 
was highly differential and selective— it was largely concentrated on the Southern portions o f the 
territory.318 In relation to what was required as an appropriate response to this picture o f the 
conflict, the secretary-general observed that: ‘The UN must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its 
efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the 
coun try ...’ concluding that ‘...The desperate and complex situation in Somalia will require 
energetic and sustained efforts on the part o f the international community to break the cycle o f 
violence.’319 To some extent then, these comments reflect a shift in thinking within the UN about 
the type o f approach necessary to promote relief efforts and put an end to the civil war in the 
country. It intimated that neutral, non-conffontational, efforts may be inadequate to resolve the 
‘cycle o f violence’ and lawlessness ‘throughout’ the country.
Despite these remarks, and the quantitative shift in UN engagement that this report and the 
subsequent authorising resolution enacted (S/RES/767, 1992), the official basis o f UN 
involvement remained centred on the customary approach to peacekeeping. The UN was an 
impartial and neutral observer involved at the invitation o f the relevant parties— no matter how 
dubious the authority of Interim-President Mahdi’s UN representative was to issue such an 
invitation in the first place.320 Mediation efforts by Sahnoun, therefore, continued to centre on 
engaging and negotiating with various clans, as the major and legitimate parties to the conflict in 
the country, the deployment o f the peacekeeping force and an effective cease-fire to facilitate 
such an operation. Yet while Sahnoun implemented this approach on the ground, in New York 
there was growing impatience with faction leaders— especially with General Aideed— over the 
timely negotiation o f  outstanding deployment issues. This was crucially reflected in the way in 
which UN officials in New York increasingly sought to politically isolate the major faction 
leaders from August 1992 onwards and the way in which, as part o f this process, Sahnoun was 
marginalised from the operation.
exchanges: I.M. Lewis ‘Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman’ Cultural 
Anthropology, vol.13, no.l (1998), pp. 100-109; Catherine Besteman, ‘Representing Violence and 
“Othering” Somalia’ Cultural Anthropology, vol.11, no.l (1996), pp. 120-133; and Catherine Besteman 
‘Primordialist Blinders: A Reply to I.M Lewis’ Cultural Anthropology, vo l.13, no.l (1998), pp. 109-121.
318 De Waal, Famine Crimes, p. 161.
319 S /24343 ,22 July 1992, paragraph 70.
320 As Ali Mahdi controlled Somalia’s government ministries, including the diplomatic service, UN 
involvement in the country tenuously relied on accepting the legitimacy and legality o f  Omar Ghalib’s 
(Somali ‘Prime Minister’) invitation to include Somalia on the Agenda o f  the Security Council, and his 
request for the world body to undertake effective ‘ ...action to end the fighting.’ S/23455, 20 January 1992.
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However, this process has in part been shielded by a variety o f recriminations surrounding 
Sahnoun’s eventual resignation in October 1992, which has focused on his activities and the 
general approach that he adopted. Most misleading here is the presumption among many 
commentators and practitioners (taking on a legendary status in some quarters) that Sahnoun was 
somehow engaged in unconventional forms o f conflict resolution that centred on ‘bottom-up’ 
peacemaking.321 And to be sure, Sahnoun did incorporate elements o f such an agenda: he adopted 
an open-door policy with relation to many Somali figures and groups and organised, along with 
the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, several conferences to bring together academics and tribal 
elders.322 But, as noted above, Mohammad Sahnoun’s priority for the majority o f this period 
centred on negotiating with Somali factions (SNA and SSA) the deployment o f a small UN 
observer force based upon the normal prerequisites for UN operations— namely the consent and 
cooperation o f the parties and an effective cease-fire in which to deploy limited forces.323 So 
despite the much heralded policy o f civil society outreach in the conflict resolution process that 
many commentators have ascribed to Sahnoun’s tenure as special representative his mediating 
activities remained rather routine and conventional as far as UN practice was concerned; after all, 
at the time the UN was happily doing business with UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in 
Mozambique.
As a result, the general assumption that Sahnoun was sidelined because o f his civil society 
‘outreach’ approach to Somali reconciliation is misplaced.324 Undoubtedly, the pretext for his 
dismissal revolved around accusations that he travelled too frequently outside o f Somalia and that 
a conference in which he had been participating, with a range o f Somali academics in the
321 This view is implicit in much academic work on the subject. For instance: De Waal, Famine Crimes, 
pp. 176-178. It is also a view cultivated by Sahnoun himself in his brief memoir o f  his experiences 
(Somalia: The M issed Opportunities), and by the Life and Peace Institute’s Horn o f  Africa Centre, which 
sought the adoption by UNOSOM I o f  a ‘ ...bottom-up method for peace.’ This consisted of: pursuing 
peace from the district level upward; the direct ownership o f  the process by Somalis; the extensive 
involvement o f  civil society figures; and a process with no time frames. Sture Normark, ‘The Life and 
Peace Institute in Cooperation with UNOSOM Political Division’ in Mohamed Salih and Lennart 
Wohlgemuth (eds.) Crisis Management and the Politics o f  Reconstruction in Somalia: Statements from  the 
Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), p.43.
322 Ibid.
323 S/24343, 22 July 1992. As special representative, Sahnoun’s role also consisted o f  co-ordinating and 
advancing humanitarian operations, which largely entailed lobbying for greater funds from various donors 
and negotiating the provision and movement o f  aid into the country.
324 For examples o f  this common view Normark ‘The Life and Peace Institute’, and in the media, ‘Aides 
Departure Another Blow to U.N. in Somalia’ The New York Times (NYC), 31 October 1992.
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Seychelles, was unnecessarily expensive.325 There was also dismay at his high profile criticism o f 
UN bureaucracy, especially for its absence from the Somali crisis throughout 1991.326 But placed 
in context, Sahnoun’s time outside o f Somalia was not excessive, at least compared to the week 
or so that James Jonah had spent in the countiy during his time as UN envoy.327 And the 
conference in the Seychelles had been partially organised by the Life and Peace Institute and, in 
any event, remained rather standard in terms o f the meetings that the UN is accustomed to.
Rather, the major grounds for sidelining Sahnoun was the basic approach to conflict management 
that he was mandated to carry out, one that remained the standard practice utilised by the UN in 
various other contexts. In particular UN officials did not approve o f the laborious process o f 
negotiating and incessant shuttle diplomacy that Sahnoun adopted to secure agreement from 
General Aideed for the deployment o f five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers.328 For the secretary- 
general, such an approach conferred unnecessary legitimacy and bargaining power on Aideed. As 
Boutros-Ghali admits in his recent UN memoirs:
‘I was worried by his efforts to ‘understand’ the militia leaders, Aideed and Mahdi, and 
establish ‘warm relations’ with them. This...perpetuated the criminal establishment that 
had taken over the country, and lengthy negotiations between the warlords had to be
325 ‘Somalia: Should Sahnoun Return?’ Indian Ocean Newsletter, no.550, 14 November. 1992, Sahnoun, 
Somalia, p.40 and Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p.57.
326 Sahnoun’s comments became widely cited in the press at the time. One o f his most cited related to the 
U N ’s absence from Somalia: ‘A whole year slipped by whilst the UN and the international community, 
save for ICRC and a handful o f  NGOs, watched Somalia descend into this hell.’ ‘Aides Departure Another 
Blow to U.N. in Somalia’ The New York Times (NYC), 31 October 1992. But Sahnoun’s most high profile 
criticism o f  the UN came in a CBS ‘60 minutes programme’ aired in October. There was also a suggestion 
o f  personal animosities with some highly placed UN officials in New York, especially James Jonah. On all 
these issues, see: ‘U.N. Envoy to Somalia Says his Ouster is Official’ The New York Times (NYC), 30 
October 1992, ‘Somalia: Should Sahnoun Return?’ Indian Ocean Newsletter, no.550, 14 November 1992, 
‘The Squeezing o f  Sahnoun’ The Economist (London), 7 November 1992, and ‘Somalia: the UN Under 
Fire’ Africa Confidential, vol.34, no. 15, 30 July 1993.
327 On Jonah’s activities see: S/23693, 11 March 1992, and Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ pp. 139-142.
328 A li Mahdi, always seeking to bolster his position through international intervention, had accepted the 
deployment o f  observers on the first day o f  Sahnoun’s arrival in the country (4 May 1992). Initially it had 
taken Sahnoun two months to secure the agreement o f  General Aideed to deploy the observers (9 M ay-15 
July). S/24343. His task was made difficult by the justifiable perception that the UN was biased towards his 
rival Mahdi— as shown by the UN’s implicit acceptance o f  the legitimacy o f  Mahdi’s government and 
invitation to involve the organisation in the country (see footnote 320). Other incidents also reinforced this 
perception-such as the use o f  an Iluyshin aircraft contracted to a private firm but bearing UN insignia to 
deliver arms and currency to Mahdi, and the previous close association o f  Boutros-Ghali (as a former 
Egyptian diplomat) with the Barre regime. All this led to a general suspicion o f  many Somalis to the UN. 
‘Profile: Mohammad Sahnoun: A Diplomat Matches Wits With Chaos in Somalia’ The New York Times 
(NYC), 20 September 1992.
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carried out before food could be distributed within the various fiefdoms under their 
control.’329
This impatience at UN headquarters with Sahnoun’s protracted negotiations and the desire to 
expedite UN operations in the country is also reflected in the precipitous announcement from 
New York to enlarge UNOSOM I from five-hundred to three-thousand five-hundred security 
personnel in late August 1992.330 Here, the ‘Report o f the secretary-general on the situation in 
Somalia, proposing the deployment o f four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in 
Bossasso, Berbera, Kismayo and the southwest’ was released without the knowledge o f Sahnoun 
and without any consultation with the SNA— both became aware o f the proposal via the BBC 
World Service.331 Considering the fact that Sahnoun had only just managed to secure agreement 
from General Aideed for the deployment o f five-hundred UN troops (a protracted set o f 
negotiations that took over two-months), this announcement clearly signalled the determination o f 
the UN to side-step Sahnoun’s ongoing dialogue with the factions and, perhaps much more 
significantly, marked a UN move towards imposing peacekeeping deployments without the prior 
consent o f  local groups— as was proposed in An Agenda fo r  Peace. Indeed, this was exactly the 
type o f outcome that could be logically inferred from the slight but significant redefinition of 
peacekeeping that Agenda fo r  Peace put-forward: ‘ ...the deployment... hitherto with the consent 
o f  all parties concerned.’332
This type o f policy was confirmed in the months following Sahnoun’s departure from UNOSOM 
by a hardening of attitudes towards the ‘militia leaders’ by the UN. Here, Sahnoun’s replacement, 
Ismit Kittani, abandoned the practice o f shuttling between clan leaders, officially meeting Aideed 
and Mahdi only twice during his tenure, and toughened the content and tone o f  UN 
pronouncements towards these leaders.333 For many Somalis this new attitude was signalled 
before Kittani’s arrival in October, with his authorisation of the deployment o f Pakistani 
peacekeepers at Mogadishu airport— again, a move that was co-ordinated without the consent o f
329 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p.56.
330 S /24480 ,24 August 1992.
331 Sahnoun, Somalia, p.38; ‘Somalia: Regrets and Rancour for Sahnoun’ Indian Ocean Newsletter, no.552, 
28 November 1992, p.2; Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ p. 142.
332 An Agenda fo r  Peace, paragraph 20.
333 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? p.80, and De Waal, Famine Crimes, p. 181. Kittani (an Iraqi 
Kurd) had held several high-level posts in the UN Secretariat, interspersed with stints in the Iraqi Ministry 
o f  Foreign Affairs, including ‘Chef de Cabinet’ for U Thant and Kurt Waldheim. He served as President o f  
the General Assembly in 1981 and was Baghdad’s representative to the UN in New York between 1985-89. 
‘An Old UN Hand is New Envoy to Somalia’ The New York Times (NYC), 1 November 1993 and 
Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p.222, p.330.
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Aideed and one that caused a considerable degree of animosity and hostility among the SNA.334 
Yet Aideed and Mahdi were not the only Somali leaders to be singled out by ‘Governor Kittani’, 
as the residents o f Mogadishu curtly referred to him.335 During his only visit to the break-away 
republic o f  Somaliland, lasting two-hours, he threatened to halt food-aid to the area if UN 
documents relating to the deployment o f an Egyptian battalion in Berbera were not immediately 
signed on first inspection; and, shortly after this visit, ordered the closure o f UNOSOM offices in 
the nascent republic.336
This new approach to dealing with Somalis— one that placed little emphasis on consensus 
building within the territory— needs to be viewed as part-and-parcel o f a wider drive by the UN 
and some private and public humanitarian forces for a military intervention under UN auspices 
that had begun to gather momentum from October 1992.337 Indeed, from Kittani’s appointment 
onwards, it was not only clear from UNOSOM policy that the customary methods for dealing 
with ‘locals’ were being summarily dismissed but that in New York the UN was preparing a case 
for intervention that was based upon a very partisan view of the situation.338 Perhaps most 
striking in this regard was a letter from the secretary-general to the Security Council on 
November 24, in which it was contended that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated to such an 
extent that the ‘...basic premises and principles’ o f UNOSOM I would require revision.339 
Through the focus on a number o f ‘disturbing developments’— the shelling o f a World Food
334 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p.28. The UN had secured agreement o f  the Hawadle sub-clan and not 
the USC for the deployment o f  UN troops at the airport.
335 ‘Somalia: Beyond the Pax Americana’ Africa Confidential, vol.33, no.25, 18 December 1992, p.2.
336 The UN has always been dismissive o f  Somaliland and its claims to independence. Here, Sahnoun was 
equally brisk in his dealings with the territory. ‘Somalia: Beyond the Pax Americana’ Africa Confidential, 
vol.33, no.25, 18 December 1992, p.2. More generally, see: John Drysdale, Somaliland: Anatomy o f  
Succession, (London: Haan, 1992).
337 In the US, the drumbeat for intervention had begun to gather momentum in August 1992. The US 
Congress for example called for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Somalia in a resolution on 10 August 1992 
(Resolution 132). There were also calls from private voluntary organisations (CARE— USA), and in the 
editorials o f  major US broadsheets, for intervention. For two examples, one from the beginning and one 
from the height o f  this process, see: ‘The Hell Called Somalia’ The New York Times (NYC), Editorial, 23 
July 1992 and ‘Shoot to Feed’ The New York Times (NYC), Leslie H. Gelb, Editorial, 19 November 1992. 
The extent o f  the influence o f  these factors— the media and humanitarian forces— is usually taken to be 
central for the build-up to war. However, Robinson argues that media attention actually proceeded US 
government debate as to the efficacy o f  action in the country, and was to an extent a result o f  growing US 
governmental interest in intervention. Robinson ‘The CNN Effect’, p301-5. And Western, ‘Sources o f  
Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 144.
338 As African Rights stated: ‘...the situation in Somalia on the eve o f  the intervention was portrayed in 
unrealistically pessimistic colours. At the time, this served to justify the intervention; now, it serves to 
exaggerate the improvements that have occurred since.’ Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary 
Assessment, May 1993, p.5.
339 S/24859, 24 November 1992.
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Programme ship and the closure of Mogadishu port—the secretary-general made the malevolent 
character o f the factions the major concern.340 These events were then generalised to construct an 
inflated picture o f conflict and violence in the country. One o f the most contentious claims here 
was the U N ’s declaration that: ‘...humanitarian assistance that reaches its intended beneficiaries 
is often barely more than a trickle.’ This view reflected the diplomatic position o f the UN 
Secretariat, one that officials put forward in a briefing to an Informal Consultation o f the Security 
Council on November 25 that between seventy-to-eighty percent o f all international relief was 
being looted.341 This figure represented the absolute extreme o f all estimates relating to the 
plunder o f aid, and did not reflect the disparity o f relief lost over time, region and organisation. 
For some organisations and independent researchers, for example ICRC and Save the Children 
Fund, the contention was that no more than five-to-ten percent o f aid was diverted.342 The 
implication o f  such an extreme view o f the situation that UN officials presented was that the 
delivery o f aid was the prima facie issue that needed to be addressed by the Security Council. In 
this respect, the logical inference o f the UN was that: ‘...the cycle o f extortion and blackmail 
described above must be broken and security conditions established that will permit the 
distribution o f relief supplies.’343
This letter was crucial in opening-up the diplomatic space for an enforcement operation. By 
giving ‘urgent consideration to this state o f affairs’ and suggesting that it ‘ ...m ay be necessary to 
review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia’, the secretary- 
general was setting the scene for a radical revision o f UNOSOM. Indeed only a few days later, 
after negotiations with the US over a possible military intervention, Boutros-Ghali distributed a 
further letter presenting the Council with five possible options for the UN in Somalia.344 These 
options were unequivocally designed to promote various military operations in that the report
340S/24859, 24 November 1992. According to African Rights, Mogadishu port may have been closed to the 
UN during November but it was open to ICRC, which had unloaded 2,000 tonnes o f  aid between 3 and 10 
o f  November. Somalia Operation Restore Hope, p.4.
341 S/24859, 24 November 1992. President o f  the Security Council, Hungarian Ambassador Erdos, released 
a statement after the consultation on behalf o f  the Council that 70-80% o f  aid was diverted. ‘Bush Ready to 
Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food’ The New York Times (NYC), 26 November 1992. According to 
African Rights, Kittani was the source o f  this extraordinary claim. African Rights, Somalia Operation 
Restore Hope, p.2.
342 ‘The Protest o f  Rakiya Omaar’ The Nation (NYC), vol.255, issue 21,21 December 1992, p.762.
343 S/24859, 24 November 1992.
344 S/24868, 29 November 1992. The US offer to lead a humanitarian intervention had been widely trailed 
in the US media before the options letter was publicly taken to the Council: ‘Bush Ready to Send Troops to 
Protect Somalia Food’ The New York Times (NYC), 26 November 1992. The US had its own rationale for 
intervention. Particularly pertinent it would seem was inter-department debate within the Administration 
that eventually endorsed a US intervention in Somalia as a way sidestepping pressure for US troops in 
Bosnia. Western, ‘Sources o f  Humanitarian Intervention’, p.l 18.
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dismisses at the outset a continuation of existing peacekeeping efforts (option one), or withdrawal 
altogether (option two).345 Rather, it was declared that given the humanitarian situation presented 
in the previous letter: ‘...The Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to adopt more 
forceful measures to secure humanitarian operations.’346 With relation to more forceful measures, 
the option o f staging a ‘show o f force’ in Mogadishu was ruled out (option three) in favour o f a 
country-wide enforcement operation carried out by either a UN member-state under UN auspices 
(option four), or by the UN itself (option five). While Boutros-Ghali stated his preference for 
option-five he noted an offer by the US Secretaiy o f State for US armed forces to lead a UN 
mandated intervention (i.e. option four).347
What this b rief review o f the origins o f UN engagement with Somalia, from UNOSOM I to a US 
led military intervention (UNITAF), has sought to relay are some o f the institutional 
circumstances for such action. In the first place it is difficult to understand the evolution o f 
UNOSOM from a conventional peacekeeping operation to a more coercive one if institutional 
and doctrinal changes that UN managers were underwriting at the time are ignored. It is only by 
recognising the attempt to operationalise a changing conceptual emphasis in the principles o f 
peace operations— occasioned by An Agenda fo r  Peace and certain changes in the UN’s 
programme o f work— that the policy shifts o f UNOSOM from August 1992 onwards make sense. 
There was a cogent direction to these shifts, and this was towards de-legitimising local actors as 
the authoritative source o f consent and approval for UN deployment as well as a simultaneous 
move towards the view that ‘more forceful measures’ were a proportional international response 
to this type o f humanitarian crisis (no matter how exaggerated this tumed-out to be). The 
inference was that if  local parties were unable to agree and consent to keep the peace in such a 
crisis, the UN had an obligation to ‘enforce’ a ceasefire—just as advocated in Agenda fo r  Peace.
UNITAF was the first peace operation justified by the UN around these types o f  arguments. And 
in no small part the UN was vital in putting Somalia on the ‘international agenda’ and in 
constructing the ideological and diplomatic case for armed intervention. Certainly without the 
embellished and selective picture of events that UN mangers offered the international community, 
and the breakdown in UN-Somali cooperation that followed the institutionalisation o f a more 
confrontational approach to the major factions by UNOSOM I from September 1992, US military
345 S/24868, 29 November 1992.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
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intervention could have been neither rationalised or defended. The role o f the UN official here 
was crucial, and continued to be so. Indeed, after the authorisation o f UNITAF, the UN fought for 
a more expansive definition of UNITAF’s remit, with some successes and some disappointments. 
But in lieu o f a wholesale US take-over o f Somalia, the UN managed to negotiate the deployment 
o f a UN ‘enforcement’ operation under UN command and control to replace UNITAF and carry 
out functions that the US had been reluctant to conduct. In fact, UNOSOM II reads like a wish list 
o f Boutros-Ghali’s demands for a internationalised take-over of Somalia— encompassing all the 
elements o f peace-enforcement in Somalia that the UN had initially envisaged and providing that 
first, much longed for test case for the UN’s new role in policing the borderlands o f international 
capitalism. It is to this unique UN experiment in post-Cold War nation building and its fall from 
grace that our attention now turns.
UNOSOM II and the spectre of a UN leviathan
The creation o f UNOSOM II represented a remarkable accomplishment for UN managers. This 
was in part because o f the successful diplomatic manoeuvring of UN officials, who were able to 
negotiate with the US support for an extensive Chapter VII operation under UN control to replace 
UNITAF. This was not a trouble-free or simple process: the secretary-general engaged in 
extensive bargaining with the Bush and Clinton Administrations over the tasks o f  UNITAF, 
which centred on the refusal o f UN officials to discuss a transfer o f responsibilities from the US 
to a ‘norm al’ peace-keeping operation until the UN was satisfied that some degree o f 
disarmament had been carried-out.348 This dialogue began more or less immediately after the
348 There were several provisions in the resolution (S/RES/794) that authorised UNITAF, which frustrated, 
even limited, the UN’s vision o f  peace enforcement in the country. The resolution was designed by the US 
to provide some leeway in the interpretation o f  provisions relating to the disarmament o f  the factions and to 
de-limit US engagement in Somalia. Furthermore, once deployed in Somalia the Pentagon employed a 
limited reading o f  the resolution: US troops avoided any form o f  disarmament, from small arms to heavy 
weapons, and ignored arms caches when stumbled upon; and the deployment o f  troops was restricted to the 
southern portion o f  the territory. As important the Bush Administration dispatched Ambassador Robert 
Oakley— a diplomat with extensive experience in Somalia—to smooth the deployment and exit o f  US 
troops. In practical terms this meant negotiating, to the annoyance o f  Boutros-Ghali, with General Aideed. 
The problem for the US, however, was that Boutros-Ghali was unwilling to ‘sign -off UNITAF as a 
success in achieving ‘a secure environment’ in Somalia (a necessary precondition for the transfer to a 
traditional UN peacekeeping operation) until the US had ‘neutralised’ Somali factions. In other words the 
UN would not sanction— at first even discuss— a withdrawal o f US troops until some attempts at 
disarmament had been conducted. Boutros-Ghali in a report on UNITAF to the Security Council: ‘I and my 
representatives...have taken the line that it would be difficult to move from the discussion o f  concepts to 
the formulation o f  concrete plans until more is known about the success o f UNITAF in establishing a 
secure environment which would permit the transition to take place.’ S/24992, 19 December 1992. See
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adoption o f resolution 794 (1992) authorising UNITAF, with Boutros-Ghali disclosing in public a 
set o f ‘discreet’ understandings that had been reached with the US over the disarmament o f 
Somali factions.349 And even though the Bush Administration (and later the Clinton 
Administration) remained steadfast in its narrow interpretation o f UNITAF, in its eagerness to 
plan for an exit strategy it softened its public stance by carrying out some largely symbolic 
disarmament operations and, more importantly, consenting to UN requests for a countrywide UN 
run enforcement operation that would conduct tasks that the US were reluctant to perform.350
But from the perspective o f this study, the creation of UNOSOM II was also an achievement in 
that it marked an extraordinary upgrading o f the UN’s peace roles in the South. UNOSOM II was, 
hitherto, the largest and most expensive operation that the UN deployed with 28,000 troops and 
2,800 civilian staff at an annual cost o f $1.5 billion.351 Its remit was qualitatively distinct as well: 
UNOSOM II was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce a secure 
environment throughout Somalia and to pursue comprehensive disarmament. Indeed, 
UNOSOM ’s focus was not so much designed to create ‘...a  secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations’, as UNITAF was authorised in resolution 794, as it was to ‘...assum e 
responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance o f a secure environment 
throughout Somalia.’352 The shift was significant in that it reflected the creation o f an operation 
that had as its raison d ’etre the monopolisation o f the means o f legitimate coercion in the
also: ‘U.N Wants Somalia Disarmed Before U.S. Leaves’ The New York Times (NYC), 11 December 1992; 
‘Disarming Somalis Gains Priority’ The New York Times (NYC), 28 December 1992.
349 Apart from the procedural attempt by the UN to enlarge the scope o f  UNITAF actions, as outline in 
previous footnote, Boutros-Ghali also engaged in public diplomacy designed to show that the US had 
committed to disarmament. He told The New York Times for example that Bush had ‘discreetly promised’ 
to disarm Somali groups. And to back-up the claim, Boutros-Ghali threatened to publish these 
understandings— partly followed through by their selective reproduction in a UN report to the Council on 
18 December 1992— which explicitly linked the disarmament o f ‘lawless gangs’ to the establishment o f  a 
secure environment and, consequently, the transfer to a conventional peacekeeping operation. ‘U.N. Chief 
Says Letter to Bush Outlines U.S. Commitment to Disarm Somali Gangs’, The New York Times (NYC), 13 
December 1992; Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the secretary-general to the President o f  the United 
States discussing the establishment o f  a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuous 
consultations’; and S/24992, 19 December 1992.
350 The US shifted its policy on disarmament towards the end o f December: US patrols moved into North 
Mogadishu; private voluntary organisations were ordered to end their use o f  local armed groups for safe 
passage through Somalia; and heavy weapons would be destroyed when they were stumbled upon. 
‘Disarming Somalis Gains Priority’ The New York Times (NYC), 28 December 1992. This shift was 
indirectly recorded in a letter from the US to the UN Security Council in January: S/25126, 19 January
1993. The idea o f  a peace enforcement operation under UN command and control is officially raised for the 
first time by the secretary-general in S /24992 ,19 December 1992. In private US officials discussed the idea 
o f  a UN peace-enforcement operation to replace UNITAF on 18 December 1992. Boutros-Ghali, The 
United Nations and Somalia, p.42.
351 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.722.
352 S/RES/814, 26 March 1993.
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territory. This was not simply a way o f facilitating the admission o f a UN operation in lieu o f 
local consent— even though this may have been one initial aspect o f its utility. As was stipulated 
in the report proposing UNOSOM II: ‘The deployment will be at the discretion o f the secretary- 
general...and not subject to the agreement o f any local faction leaders.’353 But it was also, 
crucially, a matter o f  casting UN authority in the country in direct opposition to other armed 
elements and antagonistic political forces in Somali society. Indeed, considering the necessary 
abrogation o f all local and national legal codes and practices implied by resolution 814 (1992), 
every Somali was now theoretically at the mercy o f UN forces: arbitrary arrest, detention without 
trial, and uninvestigated deaths at the hands o f UN troops could all be legitimately condoned—  
and in no small measure they were.354
This ‘take-over’ o f Somalia reflected a changed emphasis in the structural objectives o f UN 
involvement. As already implied, the coercive dimension o f UNOSOM II indicated a shift from a 
formal focus on the secure delivery of emergency aid to one of establishing general law and 
order. This new objective— dominating the ‘security environment’ and rolling-back armed 
elements—was seen to be the single most important prerequisite for reconstituting the central 
state.355 Indeed, the wider agenda animated by resolution 814 authorising UNOSOM II was one 
that tasked the UN with reconstituting the instruments and institutions of centralised rule from 
Mogadishu; the coercive side o f this was simply the most innovative, prominent and ‘urgent’ 
aspect o f this ambitious project.356 It was envisaged that security would be proceeded, with the 
assistance o f the UN, with the establishment o f a police force as well as other ‘...national and 
regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country.’357
The implications o f such a revised UN agenda in Somalia was that the ostensible purpose was no 
longer to ‘...shoot-to-feed’, as an American advocate o f such a policy labelled it, but one that was 
now directly designed to reincorporate the ‘anarchic’ and ‘lawless’ territory back into the liberal 
world order.358 O f course this was exactly what UN officials had been arguing for in the summer 
o f 1992 when they spoke o f Somalia as an ‘orphan’ conflict that had been ‘forgotten’ in favour o f 
a ‘rich man’s w ar’ in Bosnia, near the heartlands o f Western liberalism.359 In March 1993, with
353 S/25354, 3 March 1993. paragraph 97.
354 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? p.xviii.
355 S/25354, 3 March 1993. paragraph 100.
356 Ibid.
357 S/RES/814, 26 March 1993.
358 ‘Shoot to Feed’ The New York Times (NYC), 19 November 1992.
359 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, pp.53-5.
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the creation o f  UNOSOM II, the UN finally had the opportunity to make good its promise o f  
returning the territory and its inhabitants back into the liberal fold. Here Madeline Albright’s 
words to The New York Times in August 1993 rang true for many in the UN when she said:
‘The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back 
into the abyss or stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category 
o f failed state into that o f an emerging democracy. For Somalia’s sake, and for ours, we 
must persevere.’360
The creation o f  UNOSOM II was, therefore, a significant moment for the UN. It presented the 
UN with its first opportunity to put into practice an expansive vision o f UN peace practices that 
had been tentatively put forward, with Security Council encouragement, by UN managers. 
UNOSOM II would be an ideal test-case for such new lines o f activities; very possibly it would 
be another ‘ ...significant step forward in the evolution o f the United Nations role in the post-Cold 
W ar era.’361 But these were a heady set o f activities for UN officials to be tasked with. Arguably, 
not since the Congo in the 1960s had the UN been bestowed with such material power to 
determine the future o f the inhabitants o f a post-colonial society. And by all accounts the UN 
utilised to the limit these instruments o f coercion at its disposal to compel elements to submit to 
the central state.
UN misadventures in Somalia
The UNOSOM II encounter was a violent and bitter affair, reflective perhaps o f the intrinsic 
functions that the operation was charged with as well as the zealous determination o f officials to 
carry these through. Indeed from the very beginning o f the operation, UNOSOM managers 
adopted a stringent approach towards the enforcement provisions o f the mandate, especially those 
that related to the disarmament of the local population. This attitude helped ferment a military 
confrontation with the SNA in which the UN— UNOSOM II, the secretary-general, and the 
Security Council— branded Aideed a ‘war criminal’ and ‘outlaw’ and authorised an extraordinary 
set o f  coercive activities designed to dismember the infrastructure of the faction and bring its 
leadership to international ‘justice.’
360 Boutros-Ghali cites extensively Albright’s New York Times letter. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, p.96.
361 ‘Letter from the secretary-general o f  the UN to President George H. Bush discussing the activities o f  
UNITAF, 8 December 1992.’
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The specificity o f UNOSOM’s constitution— that is, its particular makeup— goes some way to 
explain the zeal with which this type o f strategy was adopted. What is routinely noted in this 
regard is that even though the UN was officially in control of the operation, it was the US that 
really ‘called-the-shots’. And in fact to a significant degree the operation was permeated by the 
US military in a variety o f ways. Three aspects would seem to be important here. First, the Quick 
Reaction Force retained their own independent chain o f command. Strikes by these units were 
occasionally carried-out without the prior knowledge of UN headquarters.362 Second, the Deputy 
Force Commander o f UNOSOM II, Major-General Thomas Montgomery, was considered by 
many to be the real person in charge o f UN militaiy activities.363 Finally, the special 
representative o f UNOSOM II— the UN official responsible for the overall running o f the 
operation— was a retired American serviceman who had been nominated by the Clinton 
Administration. Other Western liberal states involved— France and Italy in particular—were 
locked out o f the key strategic positions o f the operation and hence felt that they were unable to 
influence the direction o f policy.364 On this account they occasionally pursued independent 
negotiations with local factions without UNOSOM II authorisation, much to the annoyance o f 
DPKO in New York, who sort to cast-aside these ‘rogue elements’.365 Some commentators 
suggest that had Italy— or France for that matter— been more central in the formulation o f 
UNOSOM II policy a more consensual and tolerant approach may have emerged. Presumably this 
was because o f their colonial encounters in the Horn of Africa and their ‘special’ understanding 
o f Somali history and culture.
While this view may certainly be accurate, the problem with this line o f  argument is that it 
obscures from sight the UN agenda in creating and fostering the UNOSOM II project in the first
362 Boutros-Ghali states that he had no foreknowledge o f  the disastrous October 3 attack by the US Delta 
Force on a house in Mogadishu in which 18 Rangers and around a thousand Somalis were killed. 
Unvanquished, p. 103.
363 ‘Somalia: The UN Under Fire’ Africa Confidential, vol.34, no. 15, 30 July 1993.
364 ‘Somalia: In the Wake o f  UN Raids’ The Indian Ocean Newsletter, no.581, 26 June 1993; ‘Italian 
General Who Refused Order In Somalia is Removed’ The New York Times (NYC), 15 July 1993.
365 There was much consternation, for example, when an Italian contingent pursued negotiations with the 
SNA to retake the ‘Pasta Factory’ in Mogadishu. In response, Kofi Annan, without prior consultation with 
the Italian Authorities, announced the repatriation o f  General Loi (in charge o f  the Italian contingent) on 14 
July 1993. The diplomatic spate that followed saw Italy threaten to withdraw its troops. A solution was 
found whereby Loi would carry on in his role (temporarily) and Italian troops moved to less ‘sensitive’ 
areas. Boutros-Ghali put the matter this way: ‘Owing perhaps, to the particularly complex and dangerous 
conditions under which UNOSOM found itself operating, the actions o f  some contingent commanders had 
the effect o f  weakening the integrity o f  UNOSOM’S command structure. Following clarification at both the 
political and operational levels, these difficulties were settled.’ S/26317, 17 August, paragraph 76. On the 
incident more generally: ‘In Somalia, Machiavelli VS. Rambo’, The New York Times (NYC), 22 July 1993.
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place. It may be the case that the US had some special interest in UNOSOM II, and that this led to 
a much more belligerent approach than it may otherwise have been. But, having said this, there 
would have been no UNOSOM II— with its wide coercive elements and nation-building 
functions— had it not been for the specific UN and US endeavour to make an example out o f  the 
Somali crisis. The issue is clearly one o f the intrinsic functions o f UNOSOM II combined with 
the determination of UN officials to carry these through to their logical conclusions. In this 
regard, the role and position o f the new UN special representative to Somalia is illustrative.
Special representative Admiral Jonathon Howe was arguably a driving force in the type o f 
belligerent strategy that UNOSOM II adopted on the ground in Somalia. Here, Admiral Howe 
was prominent in the push to capture Aideed— at one point putting a price o f  $25,000 for his 
arrest— and was quick to cast aside personnel who opposed his strategy.366 And perhaps more 
tellingly, at least from the Somali perspective, ‘Admiral Howe’ became mockingly known as 
‘Animal Howe’ on the streets in Mogadishu on account o f his penchant for the use o f military 
force and rhetoric.367 But while the ‘hunt’ for Aideed resembled an earlier episode in Howe’s 
military career (Howe was involved with the snatching of Genera Noriega from Panama in 1991) 
it cannot be said, Born-Again Christian eccentricities apart, that Howe was diverging from known 
UN views on how to apply UNOSOM’s mandate.368 They may have diverged from the views of 
other Western liberal states, but they certainly did not digress from the views o f top-ranking UN 
managers prominent in the oversight o f the operation. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan (at 
this time Under-Secretaiy o f DPKO) were clear in their preferences for these types o f  coercive 
actions and in their disdain for faction leaders, most notably General Aideed. In a specific 
response to criticism o f the strategy that UNOSOM II had adopted, for example, the secretary- 
general reaffirmed the importance o f operation’s military functions:
‘I am conscious o f the feeling in some quarters that UNOSOM is deviating from its
primary task...and is concentrating disproportionate efforts and resources in military
366 Howe declared the reward for Aideed, accompanied by ‘Wanted Posters’, on 17 June 1993. S/26022, 1 
July 1993.
367 Mohamad Diriye Abdullahi, Fiasco in Somalia: US-UN Intervention, (Pretoria: Africa Institute o f  South 
Africa, 1995), p.22.
368 Howe was an assistant to Admiral William Crowe, Chairman o f  the Joint Chief o f  Staffs during the 
Panama invasion, and was extensively involved in the hunt for Noriega. He was later Deputy National 
Security Advisor for President George H. Bush. As far as Bom Again Christian influences on Howe are 
concerned, it has been widely noted by UN staff that he opened morning meetings with prayers, and that 
his public and private statements were infused with religious undertones. Michael Maren, ‘Cleaning Up 
From the Cold War in Somalia’ Somalia News Update, vol.2, no .25,20 September 1993.
118
operations...However, the international community has known from the beginning that 
effective disarmament o f all factions and warlords is conditio sine qua non for other 
aspects o f UNOSOM’s m andate...the fact remains that the country will not enjoy 
stability unless and until the criminal elements have been apprehended and brought to 
justice as demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 837 (1993).’369
And one could well have seen ‘Governor Kittani’ apply such an approach had he been given the 
hallowed opportunity to lead US and UN forces. In fact, in terms o f style, it could be argued that 
Howe actually applied certain trade-marks o f Kittani’s period as special representative, rarely 
leaving the UN compound in which he was based (otherwise known as the ‘Camp o f Murderers’ 
among Mogadishu residents), or talking to relevant forces in Somali society. It should be 
remembered that it was during Kittani’s tenure that the institutionalisation o f  a more belligerent 
approach towards local groups was first developed and fostered. The difference surely was that 
Howe, unlike Kittani, had the material capacity and mandate to carry through the policy of 
dismembering local groups. This capacity, and mandate, was precisely the type o f operation that 
the UN had been arguing for since Kittani’s and Boutros-Ghali’s report outlining ‘Five Options’ 
in November 1992; the ‘preferred’ option it will be recalled was to replace the conventional 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia with a peace enforcement one under UN command throughout 
the country.370
What all this should reaffirm is that the peace operation that was consistently held out by UN 
managers— from October 1992 to July 1993— was one that would compel local forces to submit 
to the central state. Boutros Boutros-Ghali again: ‘If certain factions refuse to disarm voluntarily, 
UNOSOM is left with no choice but to disarm them through com pulsion/371 And once UNOSOM 
ground and air operations were underway, from June to September 1993, no effort was spared in 
reiterating the importance o f such action and the malevolence of General Aideed, who was the 
primary ‘...m enace to public safety.’372
The military operations against various factions— particularly against the SNA— began after 
UNOSOM II had conducted an inspection o f an authorised heavy weapons storage facility that 
was located in the grounds of Radio Mogadishu on 5 June 1993. The inspection turned into a rout
369 S/26317, 17 August 1993. paragraph 73.
370 S/24859, 24 November 1992.
371 S/26317, 17 August 1993. paragraph 15.
372 S/26022, 1 July 1993. paragraph 32.
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for UNOSOM forces, who were ambushed by local ‘militia’ which (quite reasonably) interpreted 
the act as an attempt to take-over the radio station. Twenty-six Pakistani peacekeepers and an 
unknown number o f Somalis died in the incident, which led to a hasty Security Council resolution 
that reaffirmed the secretary-general’s authority in carrying out such operations, and authorised 
him to ‘ ...take all measures against all those responsible.’373 Interestingly enough, the resolution 
seems to confirm Somali suspicions about UN intentions with regard to the radio station when it 
expressly reaffirmed ‘...the crucial importance o f neutralising radio broadcasting systems that 
contribute to the violence and attacks directed against the Operation.’374 This would not have 
surprised John Drysdale, a former advisor to UNOSOM II, who has suggested that UN officials 
developed a certain preoccupation with Radio Mogadishu and pushed for its removal from 
Aideed’s control in the immediate run-up to the June incident.375
From this point on, UNOSOM conducted an extensive set o f ground and air operations against 
General Aideed. This focused on all elements o f his power base; in terms o f armaments, what is 
interesting is that the UN not only focused on striking ‘clandestine’ munitions sites but 
‘authorised’ storage facilities as well— underlying the end o f a regime o f voluntary disarmament 
and the onset o f one o f compulsion by the UN. But action was not now officially limited to 
disarmament: Radio Mogadishu was taken out by air strikes on 12 June, and Aideed’s 
‘headquarters’ were destroyed on 17 June.376 Various other ground and air strikes targeted the 
leaders o f the SNA, including a combined assault on a conference centre hosting a meeting o f 
A ideed’s Habir Gadir sub-clan in which 73 prominent Somalis lost their lives.377 The UN 
maintained throughout these military operations that their actions were ‘surgical’ and ‘precise’, 
conducted ‘valiantly’ and with ‘great courage’ by UN troops in order to avoid ‘collateral 
damage’.378 Whereas for Admiral Howe the Somalis who attacked UN troops were ‘terrorists’
373 S/RES/837, 6 June 1993.
374 Ibid.
375 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? pp.8-9. In particular, Drysdale suggests that April Glaspie (a 
US State Department diplomat seconded to UNOSOM II as a ‘political advisor’ to Howe) was responsible 
for the strategy o f  demonising Aideed and focusing UNOSOM II attention on Radio Mogadishu. It may be 
recalled that Glaspie had previously been caught-up in a previous diplomatic controversy when as US 
Ambassador to Iraq just prior to its invasion o f  Kuwait she had apparently suggested to Saddam Hussein on 
25 July 1990 that the US had no opinion in the event o f  conflict between the two Arab countries.
376 Boutros-Ghali released the following statement: ‘Today’s action was also taken to facilitate the 
restoration o f  law and order by neutralising a radio broadcasting system that has contributed to violence in 
Mogadishu.’ SG/SM/5009, 12 June 1993.
377 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? pp.202-204; ‘Manhunt’ The Economist (London), vol.328, 
issue 7829, p.26; ‘Somalia: Hope Denied’ Africa Confidential, vol.34, no. 14, 16 July 1993.
378 S/26022, 1 July 1993. paragraph 26.
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and ‘cowards’ who placed ‘...women and children in front o f armed men.’379 But the legality o f 
UNOSOM action was eventually brought into question by the U N ’s own legal affairs advisers 
who demurred at such activities. UN lawyer, Ann Wright, wrote in an internal report o f 
‘Operation M ichigan’:
‘The issue boils down to whether the Security Council’s directive authorising UNOSOM 
to ‘take all necessary measures’ against those responsible for attacks against UNOSOM 
forces meant for UNOSOM to use lethal force against all persons without possibility of 
surrender in any building suspected or known to be SNA/Aidid facilities; or did the 
Security Council allow that persons suspected to be responsible for attacks against 
UNOSOM forces would have an opportunity to be detained by UNOSOM forces and 
explain their presence in an SNA/Aidid facility and then be judged in a neutral court o f 
law ...’380
W hat this demonstrates is the extent to which UN officials went to carry out the enforcement 
provisions o f  UNOSOM II— particularly those that required the UN to suppress and roll-back 
local armed elements within the state. Conscious perhaps o f the leviathan role that had for the 
first time been entrusted to its officials, the UN pursued these responsibilities with real zeal. For 
some this zeal went above and beyond the legal and ethical parameters that the UN was entitled 
to— behaving more like an occupying power o f the Anglo-American variety. But the ease with 
which the UN slipped into the typical operating procedures, both military tactics and ideological 
rationalisations, o f certain Western liberal states in their interventions in the South should not be 
surprising given the make-up o f the forces and the historical functions o f the UN in policing post­
colonial states. And yet it cannot be said that this was simply a US mission disguised as a UN 
one; the intrinsic functions o f UNOSOM II, the rationalisation of UNOSOM II’s militant 
liberalism, and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, the very bearing o f the operation’s tactics were 
all fundamentally shaped by the secretary-general and several o f his top-lieutenants eager to push 
the boundaries o f UN peace practices to their logical limits.
379 ‘UNOSOM II Takes ‘Decisive Action’ To Restore Peace’, UN Chronicle (New York), vol.30 issue 3, 
September 1993, p.4.
380 Ann Wright cited in: Michael Maren, ‘Cleaning Up From the Cold War in Somalia’ Somalia News 
Update, vol.2, no.25, 20 September 1993.
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The UN peace-enforcement experiment
The above discussion has sought to provide an account o f the UN’s post-Cold War engagement 
with Somalia that is sensitive to the wider transformations that the organisation was undergoing. 
Here it has been argued that the origins and development o f the UN ‘peace enforcement’ 
operation in Somalia is best understood in the context o f an attempt by UN managers to put into 
practice new peace roles assigned to the world body in the wake o f a resurgent post-Second 
World Security Council. These ‘new roles’ tentatively sought to rework the parameters o f 
conventional UN peace activities, especially the necessity o f local consent as a basis for 
engagement and the related possibility that in future the UN may enforce cease-fires. In key 
respects, Somalia was used as a testing ground for these revised practices. Initially, this related to 
the way in which local consent was gradually phased-out o f the process o f  UN intervention in the 
country; as we have seen, in a crucial step before the onset o f the US military operation, in late 
August 1992, the SNA was simply not told o f a significant increase in UN peacekeeping troops 
that had been discussed and then authorised by the Security Council.381 But the apex o f the UN 
experiment in Somalia was undisputedly UNOSOM II, which incorporated the full spectrum o f 
functions and authorisations that UN managers had been arguing for from autumn 1992. A 
countrywide operation with enforcement provisions under UN command and control, UNOSOM 
II was a pioneering attempt to move the organisation into the realms o f policing Southern 
societies through coercion. Here, the specific rationale of the operation was to compel the local 
inhabitants to submit to the instruments and institutions of a central state. It represented, in short, 
an ambitious bid to craft the UN as an agency with a wider remit for managing the 
reincorporation o f ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed states’ back into the liberal world order.
But as we have seen, from engagement to enforcement, the whole process was one that was 
fraught with difficulties and beset with problems. At first, UN managers were even forced to 
argue for the opportunity to utilise these new practices, not least because o f what was seen by 
Western European states as the more pressing issue o f the fragmentation o f the state-system at 
their borders, in Yugoslavia. Boutros-Ghali reflected on the experience in this way:
‘Deaths in Africa are no less significant than deaths in Europe. I tried to goad the
Security Council into a sense o f urgency. I contrasted their indifference to the horrors o f
the Horn o f Africa with their preoccupation with the ‘rich m an’s w ar’ in the former
381 S /24480 ,24 August 1992.
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Yugoslavia, where the horrors o f what was called ‘ethnic cleansing’ were taking place. I 
said that this double standard must stop.’382
Once the UN had been provided with this opportunity to forcibly reincorporate the territory o f 
Somalia back into the liberal fold, the essential problem became one o f UN legitimacy and 
authenticity. As a coercive apparatus explicitly functioning like a Western liberal state, the UN’s 
most central utility in policing the South— the imprimatur o f international society— was severely 
undermined. It was simply the case that through its zealous deployment o f force the UN alienated 
public opinion both within the territory and in the international community more generally.
To a large extent, therefore, the peace enforcement experiment in Somalia was widely seen as a 
failure. In the UN milieu, enforcement was now perceived as a ‘double-edged sword’ by officials 
and practitioners who felt that, in future, the UN should sub-contract police action to major 
powers and leave the UN to concentrate on those peace activities which it did best.383 On one 
level, this would allow for a fruitful division of labour between UN officials and the Security 
Council— with, as one highly placed commentator put it, the secretary-general playing ‘ ...good 
cop negotiator, warning from time to time o f what the bad cop Security Council might do if 
negotiations failed.’384 And to some extent this type o f relationship was pursued in places such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia. But on another level, this also meant that the UN would return to 
trusted templates for managing change in the South; namely interceding at the formal request o f 
local elites as an ostensibly impartial umpire tasked with micro-managing the implementation o f 
peace accords between two or more local groups. And o f course, these two levels were not 
mutually exclusive. Rather in certain extreme circumstances Western states, or other security 
groupings, could conduct the military side o f operations and then leave the UN to get on with the 
longer-term project o f reconstituting acceptable state-society relations through essentially civilian 
and technocratic roles.
But despite the clear realisation among UN officials that peace operations are best conducted 
under the rubric o f consent and impartiality, the discourse o f conflict and conflict resolution 
deployed in Somalia to justify intervention has remained remarkably resilient. Indeed, a more 
nuanced view o f local forces has now been developed by UN commentators and practitioners
382 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, pp.54-55.
383 Boutros-Ghali in: United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.6. The Brahimi Report also explicitly recognises 
this division o f  tasks. A/55/305-S/2000/809, paragraph 53.
384 Picco, ‘The U.N. and the Use o f  Force’, p. 17.
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who generally agree that while the format o f UN peace practices must for practical purposes rest 
largely on the consent o f local groups, these forces must also be managed far more effectively by 
relevant international officials.385 Because the UN now views conflict in the South— as it did in 
Somalia— through the prism o f predatory elites seeking to entrench their systems o f resource 
extraction through particularistic politics and generalised violence, international officials are now 
trained to retain a certain wariness and scepticism o f local factions. In short, UN officials now 
understand these groups as potential ‘spoilers’ who may for a variety o f political and economic 
reasons obstruct the successful implementation of an operation.386 The UN has therefore moved 
towards developing a more robust strategy o f  engagement with ‘locals’, in which parties to a 
conflict are not necessarily treated as ‘moral equivalents’ and peacekeeping officials have 
credible means to promote certain ‘international standards’.387 So while as a result o f Somalia the 
UN returned to the familiar template for conducting peace operations by placing at the heart o f its 
doctrine the full formal consent o f subject societies, this has been tempered by a far more 
methodical and instrumental approach to managing factions and elites.
385 O f course, many commentators demur at this type o f  political compromise. See Mary Kaldor and 
Michael Ignatieff for two prominent Western examples o f  commentators who advocate forceful 
‘cosmopolitan’ action against local militias and so forth.
386 A/55/305-S/2000/809, paragraph 22.
387 Ibid. paragraph 50.
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Chapter 5
Post-Colonial Rw anda and United Nations Conveyance O perations: 
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‘Banyarwanda: This appeal is addressed to you by the United Nations Visiting Mission. 
We have come here in order to help Mwami, the Belgian Administration and the political 
parties to come to an understanding, restore calm in the hearts o f all Banyarwanda and 
ensure happiness and peace in Ruanda. We urgently request you to remain perfectly 
calm. Do not believe false rumours. Do not assemble in crowds. The Mission is anxious 
to hear all those who desire a hearing, wherever they may be. But do not come in 
excessively large groups. Send us your representatives who you trust in groups o f ten or 
so. We will listen to them with the closest attention. Help the mission. Remain calm. 
Avoid incidents.’ United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, 
(T/1538, 8 March 1960).
‘The Council is following with great concern the situation as described by the Secretariat 
in its oral report. There has been considerable loss o f lives, including the deaths o f 
Government leaders, many civilians and at least ten Belgian peacekeepers...The Council 
strongly condemns these horrific attacks and their perpetrators, who must be held 
responsible...It further demands that all measures be taken to provide security throughout 
the country and particularly in Kigali and the demilitarised zone (DM Z)...The Council 
appeals to all Rwandese and to all parties and factions to desist from any further acts or 
threats o f violence and to maintain the positions they held before the incident.’ Statement 
by the President o f the Security Council (S/PRST/16, 7 April 1994).
M anaging social change in Rwanda
The United Nations has had a long and intimate association with the territory o f Rwanda. Before 
Rwanda attained formal independence from Belgium in 1962, the UN was involved in steering 
and interceding in the complex politics o f the kingdom in order to assist in a sequenced and 
legitimated transition to sovereignty. Fifty years later the UN was again involved in trying to 
manage change in Rwanda, only this time it was in the form o f a ‘peace operation’, which was far 
more active and intrusive, designed to preside over a transition in political systems and state 
structures. What should be immediately striking about these encounters— from the perspective o f 
this study at least— is that they were both structurally designed to manage a transition from one 
social and political order to another: in the 1950s from indirect colonial rule to political pluralism
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and formal sovereignty; and in the early 1990s from a one-party state to multiparty market 
democracy and ‘open’ civil society.
Understandably, perhaps, these facets o f UN intervention have been overshadowed by the second 
salient feature o f  these experiences— which is that they both dramatically failed, ultimately with 
horrific human consequences. By the time o f formal independence in 1962, Rwanda was a one- 
party regime based upon an inverted racial colonial ideology, which led to the systematic 
victimisation o f one, previously privileged, sector o f  society (the Hamitic ‘hypothesis’ that cast 
the Tutsi as a  racial foreigner). This ‘social revolution’ o f 1959 was the first to occur under the 
distant gaze o f  the UN Trusteeship system. In 1994, the transition to market democracy that the 
UN was theoretically deployed to oversee as a result o f the Arusha Accords was halted in its 
tracks by a wave o f genocidal killings and a resumption o f the civil war that left anywhere 
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans dead.388
The concern o f  this chapter is not to account for how and why UN transition operations failed in 
the Rwandan context: there is already an over abundance o f  material (largely alike) that explicitly 
apportion blame to this or that international actor, and that have been tailored or commissioned to 
learning institutional ‘lessons’.389 Produced exclusively in a post-1994 context, this material is a 
microcosm o f  UN peace operation and conflict-resolution material more generally. Designed to 
be policy-relevant, the literature is mainly limited to detailing the diplomatic story o f the UN in 
Rwanda during the 1990s and is concerned with critiquing the lack o f international action in the 
immediate run-up to, and during, the bloody events o f  1994. While this focus may be legitimate,
388 The question as to the origins o f  the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is the subject o f  much academic 
literature. Here a rather rigid discourse relating to the exclusivity o f  the genocide o f  the Rwandan Tutsi in 
the 1990s has emerged that has narrowed the issue to one o f  the role o f  the Hutu Power elite and media 
manipulation in planning and executing ethnic violence in the country. There are, however, dissenting 
voices who have broadened the question to include the longer history o f  genocidal violence in the region—  
in Eastern Congo, Burundi and Rwanda— carried out by various groups at various times. For example: 
Rene Lemarchand, ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?’ African Studies 
Review , vol.41, no.l (1998), pp.3-16.
389 For literature on the international facets o f  the Rwandan genocide see, among many others: Michael N. 
Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2002); Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, The Path o f  a Genocide: the Rwanda crisis from  Uganda to 
Zaire (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The international dimension o f  
genocide in Rwanda (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda crisis: history o f  a  
genocide (London: Hurst & Co, 1998); Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics o f  failure 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Peter Uvin, Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda (West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998); Romeo A. Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake hands with the devil: the 
failure o f  humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); Shaharyar M. Khan, The shallow  
graves o f  Rwanda (London: l.B. Tauris, 2000); and Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: the Role o f  the 
West in R w anda’s  Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000).
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and wholly reasonable given the scale o f the violence, it is an approach that fails to appreciate the 
wider post-colonial relationships in which Rwanda and the UN are a part. Indeed what is 
noticeable in the standard Anglo-American rendition o f the crisis is the narrow definition o f 
intervention applied, the constricted period o f time under investigation, and the general lack o f 
critical discussion relating to the genealogy o f UN peace interventions.390
Most concerning has been the manner in which a rigid story o f the Rwandan crisis has been 
adopted by outside scholars with hitherto no knowledge or interest in Central African affairs and 
the way in which debate or dissent on the subject has been displaced.391 With relation to the UN, 
a salutary fable o f great power and bureaucratic ‘indifference’ has been established that casts 
various actors in positive or negative terms.392 For example in many accounts there is the good 
liberal humanitarianism o f the Force Commander o f UNAMIR, Major-General Romdo Dallaire, 
willing to break the rules and halt internecine violence only to be blocked by bureaucrat-soldiers 
in New York (in this case Canadian colleague Maurice Bari!) concerned to tow-the-line no matter 
what the (human) cost may be. Samantha Power’s description of Dallaire is emblematic:
‘If  there was a peacekeeper who believed wholeheartedly in the promise o f humanitarian 
action, it was the forty-seven-year-old major general who commanded UN peacekeepers in 
Rwanda. A broad-shouldered French Canadian with deep-set, sky blue eyes, Dallaire has the 
thick, callused hands o f one brought up in a culture that prizes soldiering, service, and 
sacrifice. He saw the United Nations as the embodiment o f all three.’393
390 Nonetheless, a few excellent accounts o f  Rwanda have been produced in the post-1994 context, namely: 
Mahmood Mamdani, When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival 
and disinformation in the late twentieth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In terms 
o f  literature produced pre-1994, the seminal accounts o f  Rwanda and the region include: Catharine 
Newbury, The cohesion o f  oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988); and Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).
391 For the manner in which the international community— particularly in the Anglo-American media— has 
‘imagined’ Rwanda and Central Africa in the 1990s, the recent monograph by Pottier is instructive: Re- 
imagining Rwanda.
392 For one example o f  a commentator who has created a good/bad dichotomy with relation to the story o f  
humanitarianism in Rwanda, see: David Reiff, A B edfor the Night (New York: Vintage, 2002), pp. 155-62.
393 Samantha Power, A Problem from  Hell: America and the Age o f  Genocide (New York: Flamingo,
2003), p.335. Winner o f  the Pulitzer Prize in 2003, Power’s investigative journalism has been seminal in 
establishing in the US a general perception o f  Western non-intervention in the South.
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For David R eiff such a culture meant that despite the efforts o f Maurice Baril to ‘...se t him 
straight’ on matters relating to his mission, Dallaire was ‘...not content to stand by and watch the 
heavens darken while consoling himself that his mandate precluded doing what he could to stop 
the catastrophe.’394 In other words, Rwanda has come to serve as an ideological affirmation o f 
Iiberal-intemationalism, proof that the West must intervene more rather than less in Africa.395 The 
consequence o f this has been a thoroughly political shift towards developing regimes o f domestic 
surveillance o f societies such as Rwanda— as embodied, as we saw briefly in Chapter Three, in 
the ‘early warnings’ and ‘preventative diplomacy’ that is the preserve o f the UN’s Department o f 
Political Affairs.
In contrast to this view, this account o f the United Nations and Rwanda seeks to stress the depth 
and breadth o f the organisation’s involvement in the territory from its time as a Belgian 
trusteeship to current conflagrations in Eastern Congo. It suggests that it is more meaningful to 
view the relationship between Rwanda and the UN as closely connected from the start: after all, 
the organisation played the role o f guardian during Rwanda’s journey to independence, and since, 
has sought to protect and buffer the sanctity o f this nation-state through the care o f various waves 
o f refugees in the region and the monitoring o f its borders. Later, when the country was ushered 
down the path o f neo-liberal state-society transformation and regime change, the UN was on 
hand, again, to help the territory through its labour pains. As a result, the structural roles o f the 
UN in managing various changes in Rwanda can be seen as consistent with the UN’s wider 
functions in post-1945 world order management in the periphery. Rwanda is in many ways a 
typical example of the range o f associations that many post-colonial states have had with the UN.
But above all else perhaps, the stoiy o f United Nations intercession in Rwanda reflects the degree 
to which UN officials have replaced their erstwhile colonial colleagues as the arbiter o f the 
‘native question’. From sitting as evaluator o f progress towards self-rule and ultimately 
independence at a distance in New York, or even on annual ‘Visiting Missions’, to the gritty task 
o f holding-the-ring between competing local elites seeking to take charge o f a society in neo­
394 Reiff, A Bed fo r  the Night, pp. 158-9. The OAU’s report into the Rwandan genocide contends that Baril 
wanted to keep Dallaire— the ‘cowboy’— on a ‘tight leash’. OAU, International Panel o f  Eminent 
Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (Addis Ababa: 
OAU, 2000), Chapter 13, paragraph 38.
395 As Dallaire concludes: ‘As soldiers we have been used to moving mountains to protect our own 
sovereignty...In the future we must be prepared to move beyond national self-interest to spend our blood 
for humanity...No matter how idealistic the aim sounds, this new century must become the Century o f  
Humanity...Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.’ Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p.522.
129
liberal transition, Rwanda underlines clearly the advance o f an international regime o f  indirect 
governance to which some less fortunate societies have become subject. Peacekeeping operations 
during the 1990s in Rwanda and elsewhere— with doctrines o f consent, impartiality and 
neutrality— have been a central if often a gravely unsuccessful facet o f this regime.
UN T rusteesh ip  and the emergence of the H utu power republic
It is rarely recalled other than in passing that the United Nations has had a long and tenuous 
relationship with the territory of Rwanda dating back to its period as a UN Trust Territory. This is 
surprising considering not only the functional objectives o f the UN trusteeship o f Ruanda-Urundi, 
but also the way in which, in practice, this affiliation inadvertently helped foster an environment 
o f intense violence and conflict in the former kingdom that was part and parcel o f the social 
‘revolution’ o f 1959 and beyond. Here the UN not only played the preliminary role o f  catalyst for 
social and political modernisation in the territory but also became deeply involved in the complex 
and contested politics o f this particularly troubled transition to independence. Put more generally, 
what this episode ultimately underlines is the deep historical association o f the UN with nation- 
building and social transformation in Rwanda and the way in which these intercessions have 
turned on occasion horribly askew.
Initially, the United Nations played an important role in seeking to transform the organisation o f 
social life in the kingdom. This primarily entailed the attempt by the Trusteeship Council—  
through triennial Visiting Missions, petitions, resolutions and general discussion— to push the 
Administrating Authority (Belgium) down the path o f liberalising political, social and economic 
life.396 This was promoted under the generic trusteeship banner o f the ‘advancement’ o f 
indigenous populations to a certain standard that would enable eventual self-governance.397 In 
Rwanda the nature o f this programme is brought into sharp relief because o f  the extreme form o f 
social organisation that existed in the kingdom and relied upon by the colonial powers for indirect 
rule. Here the feudal relationship that existed between Tutsi and Hutu— in which the minority 
Tutsi aristocracy governed the majority o f the mainly Hutu peasant population through cattle
396 There were five UN Visiting Missions to Ruanda-Urundi: 1948; 1951; 1954; 1957; and 1960. This does 
not include a number o f  special ‘commissions’ established by the General Assembly in various resolutions 
to carry out tasks such as monitor events in Ruanda-Urundi and supervise elections in September 1961.
397 The term ‘advancement’ was used to structure the progress reports o f  visiting missions: i.e. after an 
outline o f  a missions itinerary, reports then typically divided into: ‘Political Advancement’, ‘Economic 
Advancement’, ‘Social Advancement’, ‘Educational Advancement’, and then finally, ‘Dissemination o f  
Information About the UN’.
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(Ubuhake) and labour (Ubureetwa) clientship— was an early and obvious target for modernisation 
by United Nation’s Visiting Missions in 1948 and 1954.398 These feudal institutions were rightly 
seen as fundamentally contrary to the organisational principles and values of a post-1945 world, 
in which a world o f modest nation-states simply provided the regulatory framework for private 
wage-labour market economies.399 The UN preference then, was for the modernisation o f  social 
life in the kingdom by removing the extra-economic instruments from subsistence production and 
exchange.
To a large extent, this was achieved fairly quickly: the Ubuhake was formally eradicated in a 
series o f  decrees and announcements by the Belgian authorities and Tutsi king (Mwami) between 
1951 to 1954 in anticipation of, and in response to, UN Visiting Mission exposure o f the issue.400 
For example, the UN’s 1954 Visiting Mission to Rwanda was the occasion for a declaration by 
the Mwami and Conseil Superieur (High Council) o f the ‘...progressive suppression o f the 
ubuhake contracts’.401 In fact the UN representatives were guests o f  the Mwami during this 
‘historic meeting’, o f which they noted in their Trusteeship Report— perhaps a bit too keenly—  
that:
‘The whole matter had been discussed with seriousness and civic responsibility, and the 
decision was taken by a body mainly composed o f shebuja [patrons], who by their own 
action undermined the essential basis o f their dominant social position.’402
398 Simply put Ubuhake, cattle clientship, involved the lease o f a cow from a patron to a client. The client 
would gain the milk o f  the cow (and any off-spring) and in return would provide a host o f  services to the 
patron. In practice, o f  course, this was a far more nuanced and complex process with a whole range o f  
social implications— for example, for the few wealthy Hutu’s with their own cattle the issue o f  Ubuhake 
was an absolutely vital one for if  they did not engage a patron then their own cattle remained unprotected. 
Conversely, though, by accepting a cow from a patron a client was putting any cattle owned by him self into 
the hands o f  the patron. Ubureetwa, on the other hand, was a form o f  clientship that was far less complex, 
and reciprocal, in that it simply compelled Hutu men to perform menial tasks for local chiefs. During the 
colonial period these practices seemed to become much more fixed by Belgian legislation, and by some 
accounts, much harsher. Newbury, Cohesion o f  Oppression, pp. 134-141. On these forms o f  clientship as a 
target o f  modernisation by UN Visiting Missions see, again, Newbury. Ibid. p. 145.
399 See especially the questionnaire (reproduced in Lemarchand’s Rwanda and Burundi) that was put to 
local Hutu peasants by a Visiting Mission delegate in which issues o f wage-labour versus forced labour are 
raised. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 123.
400 Newbury, Cohesion o f  Oppression, p. 145.
401 T/1168: United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954: Report on 
Ruanda-Urundi, paragraph 69.
402 Ibid. paragraph 72.
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In practice o f course, Ubuhake continued up until the social revolution o f 1959 because o f the 
loopholes in the decree, and due to the simple fact that the vast majority o f (Hutu) peasants relied 
upon access to their patrons land for pasture.403 Besides, as Catharine Newbury has pointed out, 
Tutsi rule was cemented through a variety o f other processes that became salient during the 
colonial period such as privileged access to secondary education.404
Nonetheless, these ‘reforms’— including the official abolishment o f forced labour clientship, the 
Ubureetwa, in 1949— were primarily a result o f growing UN criticism o f the Administrating 
Authorities and its failure to ‘advance’ the social position o f the indigenous population o f the 
territory.405 This was also the case with relation to the territories ‘political advancement’, which 
was a constant source o f UN condemnation. Here, UN Visiting Missions habitually reminded the 
Belgian authorities o f their responsibilities vis-a-vis political development. The 1954 UN report 
contained many statements to this effect:
‘The mission considers that urgent and serious attention should...be given to speeding up 
the political education o f the people by granting them increasing doses o f political power 
and responsibility and by other positive measures such as adult education, 
democratisation of the indigenous authorities, adult suffrage, education for direct 
elections etc.’406
The fact that this had been a ‘...regrettably low priority’ for the Belgian Administrators led the 
UN Visiting Mission to suggest and the General Assembly to eventually endorse a call on 
Belgium to set a ‘timetable’ and ‘targets’ for the attainment o f independence.407 General 
Assembly Resolution 1413 (XIV) adopted on 5 December 1959 included the. following operative 
paragraph:
‘2.Invites the Administrating Authorities to formulate...early successive immediate 
targets and dates in the fields o f political, economic, social and educational development
403 Newbury, Cohesion o f  Oppression, p. 146; and Mamdani, When victims become killers, p .l 14.
404 Newbury, Cohesion o f  Oppression, p. 146.
405 Ibid. p. 145; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p.79; Mamdani, When victims become killers, p .l 15.
406 UN Visiting Mission, 1954, Report on Ruanda-Urundi, paragraph 131.
407 Ibid. paragraph 129 and 133.
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so as to create, as soon as possible, favourable conditions for the attainment o f self- 
government or independence.’408
Interestingly, the view o f such a timetable as held by the 1954 Visiting Mission was quite 
expansive— all agreeing that while ‘three to four decades’ o f ‘tutelage’ was unnecessary it was 
‘within the bounds o f possibility’ that Rwandese may be capable o f self-rule in ‘...twenty to 
twenty-five years’.409 What this attests to— apart from the vagaries o f human foresight o f 
course— is the store that UN officials placed upon the prerequisites for a transition to modem 
nation-states. This was clearly much more than a matter o f setting-up the structures o f a state— a 
police force, army, diplomatic corps, legislator— it was also a matter o f modernising African 
societies. Crucially in the Rwandan context, this entailed the dismantling o f  feudalism and 
‘backwardness’, and its replacements with a political and economic system that allowed for the 
full development o f the ‘ ...composite personality o f the African’ necessary for ‘democratic way 
o f life’.410 As some UN conflict resolution specialists are beginning to rearticulate in our current 
global governance context, UN officials then believed earnestly that the implantation o f 
democracy in African societies would be a protracted process o f advancement and education by 
enlightened and benevolent authorities.411
As it turned out, such an idealised largely Western vision o f societal transformation in the 
territory was derailed by political developments on the ground that saw the UN’s involvement in 
the territory turned essentially upside down. In fact it would seem that the very zeal with which 
the UN approached the issue o f advancement in the territory helped foster a sense o f militancy 
and urgency in Hutu political groups fearful that change would largely entail the end of 
colonialism but not the end of Tutsi over-lordship.412 At first o f course, UN Visiting Missions 
gave Hutu political parties the opportunity to rally support and increase pressure for democratic 
change. The official reports o f these Visiting Missions are full o f descriptions o f  crowds o f Hutu 
peasants lining the roads o f their routes with placards and banners such as: ‘Abas le colonalism
408 UN General Assembly Resolution 1413(XIV), 5 December 1959.
409 UN Visiting Mission, 1954, Report on Ruanda-Urundi, paragraph 133.
410 Ibid. paragraph 130. Hence the importance attached to education by the UN Trusteeship reports and 
discussions.
411 See, for a recent example o f  conflict resolution specialists beginning to advocate far more thorough 
forms o f ‘advancement’, Paris, At War's End, pp. 179-212.
412 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 190.
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Tutsi. Democratic D ’abord Independence’.413 And, as is well known, the Bahutu Manifesto 
(‘Notes on the social aspects o f the racial native problem in Rwanda’) was produced precisely to 
help influence the 1957 Visiting Mission towards recognising the internal ‘...political monopoly 
which is held by one race, the T utsi...’414 But as change proceeded under the encouragement o f 
the UN, the m ajor political group o f the Mwami and the Tutsi (UNAR) began to push for 
immediate independence from Belgium essentially to forestall further indigenous social or 
political reform.415 This was clearly confirmed— to the Administrating powers as well as the Hutu 
majority— during a UNAR rally in September 1959 in which one o f the major speakers, Rukeba, 
stated:
‘The whole o f Africa is struggling against colonialism, the same colonialism which has 
exploited our ancestral customs in order to impose alien ones upon us. The goal o f our 
party is to restore these customs, to shake off the yoke o f Belgian colonialism, to 
reconquer Rwanda’s independence. To remake our country we need a single party, like 
UNAR, based upon tradition and no other ideology.’416
The consequences o f such a position adopted by the leading Tutsi political group was immense. 
After all, until this time, the local colonial powers had instituted their indirect rule in the colony 
through support o f  a Tutsi aristocracy and its racial feudal system. Indeed, the entire edifice o f 
this system o f  racial preference for the Tutsi had been put together and then internalised into the 
institutions o f  the state (such as in education, labour laws and state administration) by the Belgian 
authorities and the Catholic church.417 By declaring outright opposition to Belgian rule, UNAR 
provided the backdrop for local colonial authorities reversing their original ‘native’ policy o f 
ruling through the feudal system o f Tutsi privilege, and placing their support for the republican 
aspirations o f  Hutu parties.418 This was dramatically demonstrated during the disturbances o f  
November 1959— which saw Belgium commit itself to revamping political structures— and 
ultimately in January 1961, when Belgium discreetly helped facilitate the PARMEHUTU coup
413 UN Visiting Mission, 1960, Report on Ruanda-Urundi, paragraph 14; see also some interesting 
photographs o f  Hutu protest during Visiting Missions reproduced in Newbury, Cohesion o f  Oppression.
414 Mamdani, When victims become killers, p.l 16.
415 UNAR: union nationale rwandaise.
416 Rukeba cited in: Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p.l 59.
417 Mamdani, When victims become killers, p.88
418 O f course, Belgian authorities were also cognisant o f  the growing tide o f  popular (Hutu) resistance to 
the feudal system that they had constructed. By switching sides to the PARMEHUTU, the Belgian 
Authorities hoped to sacrifice its Tutsi proxies (the monarchy) in return for retaining influence in the 
country in a post-independence era.
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d’etat in Gitarama, where a declaration o f a republic and provisional government was 
announced.419
The upshot then of early efforts by the UN to provide for some accelerated transmission o f liberal 
modernity to Rwanda was the creation o f a radically transformed balance of forces within the 
territory. The former guardians o f colonial rule, the Tutsi monarchy and aristocracy, which had 
come under sustained attack by the forces o f modernisation in the form o f the UN, turned on 
Belgian colonialism as a way o f protecting their privileged order. The Hutu now became aligned 
to the Administrative Authorities and together they pressed— contrary to both their previous 
positions— for accelerated independence. In such a situation, the UN held fast to the modernising 
principles that it had consistently pressed for. And once again this involved the doctrine o f 
gradualism and consensual politics. So after the disturbances of November 1959— when a great 
deal o f  Tutsi chiefs were replaced by the Belgian Special Resident with Hutu ones and the first 
wave o f political (Tutsi) refugees had fled the country— the UN took the view that this was 
contrary to the spirit o f  liberalisation that was supposed to be under way. Here the UN demanded 
an ordered and sequenced process o f liberalisation, now including the repatriation o f political 
refugees, prisoner amnesty, and freedom o f political association (all by now largely Tutsi). This 
was shown principally in UN General Assembly 1579 (XV) on 20 December 1960, which sought 
to set out the necessary conditions before national elections were conducted (crucially urging 
their delay from January 1961 to later that year).420 Apart from suggesting that a national 
reconciliation conference be held before these elections (quickly arranged between 7-12 January 
1961 in Ostend) the resolution set-up a three man commission to oversee and supervise the 
conduct o f the elections, attend the ‘national’ conference, and monitor general developments in 
the territory.421 Ultimately it was this resolution that gave the impetus to instigators o f 
PARM EHUTU’s January 1961 coup d ’6tat in Gitarama, who were by now deeply suspicious o f 
the intentions of such a delay, o f a national conference, and o f generally increased outside 
interference by the UN.422
Even after the coup, the first to occur in a Trust Territory, the UN persisted in demanding a 
formal, organised and legitimated transition to independence. Indeed, General Assembly 
Resolution 1579 (XV) was followed by Resolution 1605 (XV) in April 1961, which castigated
419 PARMEHUTU: parti du mouvement de 1’emancipation hutu.
420 UN General Assembly Resolution 1579 (XV), 20 December 1960.
421 UN Year Book 1960 (New York: UNDPI), p.457.
422 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 190.
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the authorities for not providing for the ‘...necessary conditions and atmosphere for the conduct 
o f  the national elections’ and especially its ‘...de facto recognition...of governmental bodies 
which were established by unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative 
o f all segments o f the population in the absence of free and fair election on the basis o f direct 
universal adult suffrage.’423 These points, among others, were clear references to the Belgian 
support o f the PARMEHUTU coup and its continued suppression o f other political tendencies.424 
The resolution even went as far as demanding the return of the Mwami and the conduct o f a 
referendum on the future o f the monarchy to be held alongside legislative elections in September 
1961.
The Belgian government in Brussels acceded to some o f these demands for reasons relating 
essentially to its continued diplomatic clash with the UN membership and establishment over the 
secession o f  Katanga in the Congo.425 As the General Assembly demanded, legislative elections 
and a referendum on the monarchy were finally held in September 1961 under UN supervision. 
The results were o f no surprise with PARMEHUTU returning 77% o f the vote in the legislative 
elections, and 80% o f the electorate voting for the abolition of the monarchy in the referendum.426 
While the UN commission monitoring these elections noted that they were generally free, they 
concluded that the pre-election environment was seriously prejudicial to free political 
expression.427 Most observers would agree with Rend Lemarchand’s conclusion:
‘Given the circumstances, the outcome o f the UN-supervised legislative elections o f  
September 1961 was a forgone conclusion. They merely confirmed the de facto 
supremacy o f PARMEHUTU, while the referendum on the question o f the mwami 
officially abolished a regime that had already been overthrown.’428
W hat this necessarily brief and general overview o f UN trusteeship has sought to highlight is just 
how involved the UN has been from the outset in the transmission o f liberal modernity to 
Rwanda. The organisation— contrary to common wisdom—was absolutely central in Rwanda’s 
journey to formal sovereign independence, consistently playing advocate for social and political 
modernisation and ‘advancement’. This entailed much more than simply providing for the formal
423 UN General Assembly Resolution 1605 (XV), 21 April 1961.
424 UN Year Book 1960, p.461.
425 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 191.
426 UN Year Book 1961, p.486.
427 Ibid.
428 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p.l 96.
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institutions and symbols o f the state and liberal democracy; it included, rather unremarkably for 
the time, a project for advancing the indigenous population beyond the feudal system o f which 
they were part. This was the real and emphatic ‘civilising mission’ that colonial authorities had 
often hollowly declared. Admittedly, the UN did not achieve its objectives in many important 
respects: social and political reforms, when carried out, were typically superficial; an ordered 
transition to independence was precipitously interrupted by a revolution and then a coup; and 
elections, when finally conducted, seemed to simply ratify a new racial dictatorship. And this is to 
say nothing o f the redundant but persistent attempts o f the UN to force political union between 
the administrative units o f  Ruanda-Urundi.429
And yet most o f these ‘failings’ simply underline further the importance o f the nascent UN 
regime in the story o f social transition for post-colonial territories. Indeed the other equally 
salient aspect o f  this episode, one that the UN is perhaps anxious to set aside, was the way in 
which UN intercession in the territory helped transform the political dynamics o f the kingdom to 
such an extent that it set in motion the events that led to both the 1959 ‘revolution’ and the 1961 
PARMEHUTU coup d ’&at. This is mostly because it waded into the politics o f the kingdom and 
provided fodder for the emerging Hutu elite seeking justice and equality with the Tutsi— here as 
we have seen the UN transformed the comfortable world in which Tutsi rule had been secured, 
creating an imperative for the Mwami’s party (UNAR) to forge an anti-colonialist but 
traditionalist platform. It is precisely because o f the UN’s initial effectiveness in instigating social 
change that events began to unravel as and when they did. For better or worse, the UN was a 
force in Rwanda’s transition from a world o f empire to a world o f nation-states.
As we will now go on to see, half a century later the UN became once again deeply involved in 
the business o f managing social change in Rwanda. Only this time it was far more intrusive and 
micro-managed than in the 1950s and 1960s, overseeing the liberalisation o f  the polity. And 
remarkably enough, the very early success of this peculiarly contemporary form o f the 
‘advancement’ o f Southern societies was to unfold, yet again, into a high level o f violence and 
conflict.
429 The United Nations Trusteeship Council was o f  the opinion that Rwanda and Burundi should assimilate 
into one state after independence. After much pressure the UN managed to arrange a conference in Addis 
Ababa on the potential for unity between the two countries. But both Rwanda and Burundi were against 
such a union— a United States o f  Rwanda and Burundi as one proposal put it— even though they agreed to 
some form o f  monetary and customs union (which in the event tumed-out to be very short-lived). 
Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp.86-87.
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UN peacekeeping and R w anda’s transition  to m arket-dem ocracy
More than any other event in Tropical Africa, the Rwandan genocide and civil war o f 1994 has 
received the most ‘outside’ attention. Commentators and analysts from every conceivable comer 
o f human inquiry have turned en masse to describing and accounting for the violent events o f 
1994. The world o f conflict resolution and international studies has been particularly active in this 
regard with new articles, monographs and edited volumes produced regularly on every facet o f 
the crisis from the role o f the media to intelligence gathering in the United Nations.430 The 
common image o f UN peacekeeping in Rwanda in this literature is overwhelming one o f poorly 
armed and equipped ‘Blue Helmets’ who were unable and in some cases unwilling to help 
forestall the carefully calibrated plans for genocide in the country.431 It is regularly recalled here 
that apart from being instructed to help evacuate foreign nationals (largely European o f course), 
UN peacekeeping contingents became helpless and passive actors in the unfolding civil war and 
genocide.432 The charge is not only that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) was hopelessly understaffed and resourced for a rapid reaction to the violence, but 
that great-power and bureaucratic indifference to this Central African country led to a wholesale 
policy o f  delay and procrastination in the corridors of power and decision-making in Washington 
and New York that made an effective response all but impossible.433 Ultimately, the UN is seen to 
have abandoned Rwanda. As Dallaire laments in his very personal chronicle o f the encounter:
‘I know that I will never end my mourning for all those Rwandans who placed their faith 
in us, who thought that the UN peacekeeping force was there to stop extremism, to stop 
the killings and help them through the perilous journey to a lasting peace. That mission, 
UNAMIR, failed. I know intimately the cost in human lives of the inflexible Security 
Council mandate, the penny-pinching financial management of the mission, the UN red 
tape, the political manipulations and my own personal limitations. What 1 have come to 
realize as the root o f it all, however, is the fundamental indifference o f the world
430 Like conflict resolution literature more generally, a significant proportion o f  the material on the 
international dimensions o f  the Rwandan episode have been produced by some o f  the main UN participants 
in the crisis. For example, Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, Khan, The Shallow Graves o f  Rwanda, 
and Henry K. Anyidoho, Guns Over Kigali (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1999).
431 For example: Reiff, A B edfor the Night, pp. 155-62; and Power, A Problem From Hell, pp.329-45.
432 Lindsey Hilsum writes: ‘The UN’s main failure in Rwanda...may have been moral rather than military. 
Despite pleas from the heads o f  UN agencies in Kigali, UN secretary-general...refused to allow the 
evacuation o f  Rwandan staff working for UN agencies.’ Lindsey Hilsum, ‘Settling Scores’, Africa Report, 
vol.39, issue 3 (May/June 1994), p.l 3.
433 The most comprehensive and cogent account o f  UN ‘indifference’ is by Barnett, Eyewitness to a 
Genocide.
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community to the plight o f seven to eight million black Africans in a tiny country that 
had no strategic or resource value to any world power.’434
At first glance there is much logic to such a narrative. After all, if  the record o f the UN during the 
genocide is traced back to the immediate diplomatic context o f its deployment and subsequent 
operation then it appears clear that the UN had reached the ‘high-point’ o f its post-Cold W ar 
interventions in Mogadishu, and was now experiencing a rapid and US instigated era o f ‘roll­
back’ in its peace activities.435 From this perspective, an increasingly belligerent US approach to 
peacekeeping as a result o f the death o f 18 US Rangers in Somalia can be linked to the meagre 
resources and rigid Rules O f Engagement (ROE) applied to the Rwandan operation. If there was 
any doubt as to the veracity o f the new found US and UN temperance with relation to its peace 
operations, then the machinations o f the Security Council in the immediate days and weeks 
following the outbreak o f the violence on 7 April 1994 is taken by commentators as the final and 
damning proof o f the new illiberal climate sweeping the Western world.436
And yet there is something profoundly parochial— even ethnocentric— about this type o f  account. 
It is as if  there should be no questioning o f the specificity of UN activities in the country, or 
admission that the organisation (as we have seen in detail) has a long and ignominious pedigree 
o f  interceding in the politics o f Rwanda dating all the way back to the Trusteeship period. It is 
also as if  UN ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping operations such as UNAMIR were not in and o f 
themselves deeply invasive instruments o f international regulation. These silences o f mainstream 
Rwanda literature has helped foster a rather uncritical narrative o f the UN and Rwanda and 
helped downplay some simple but salient points. First, as we shall see, UNAMIR was in many 
regards a standard UN operation deployed to oversee a standard peace accord— deigned like 
many others o f the period to provide for a transition in state structures as well as possible regime 
change. Second, as opposed to nominally involved, the UN was in actuality an actor that was 
caught-up deeply with pushing and prodding the parties down the line o f liberalisation through a 
variety o f  diplomatic means. And as it happened this was a major contributory factor in the 
polarisation o f  Rwandan politics and society in late 1993 and early 1994. Finally, this 
involvement, as we discussed in Chapter Three, was part-and-parcel o f a transformation o f the
434 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p.6.
435 The policy o f ‘tough love’ instituted by the Clinton Administration is, again, most cogently expressed by 
Barnet, Eyewitness to a Genocide, pp.33-43.
436 For an extensive account o f  the unfolding o f  diplomatic events in the UN Security Council, see: 
Melvem, A People Betrayed, pp.l 11-114, pp. 152-167.
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United Nations itself towards peace operations, which were expanded and refocused around the 
promotion o f what was labelled ‘good internal governance’ within Southern societies. In this, the 
UN was rediscovering its ‘comparative advantage’ o f overseeing social change in periphery. But 
while in a colonial and feudal Rwanda this comprised of an attempt to modernise social life in the 
territory, in the 1990s this was crucially about redefining the polity through a process o f political 
liberalisation and a change in the incumbent regime o f President Juvenal Habyarimana and the 
Mouvement Revoltionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND).437
The transition to multiparty democracy and liberal market economy had begun in Rwanda 
following a combination o f exogenous pressures that included the collapse o f  the Second World, 
a shift in French foreign policy towards promoting democratisation in Africa, and the onset o f a 
guerrilla war that had been launched by second-generation Rwandan Tutsi exiles in Uganda (the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF).438 Initially, however, the pace o f liberalisation was set by 
economic reforms conducted under IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment loans in 1990 
and 1991, which saw aid tied to a typical package o f macroeconomic measures. These included, 
among others, fiscal stabilisation policies (reduction of government expenditure and subsides to 
state enterprises and coffee producers), tight monetary policies (interest-rate rises), removal o f 
price controls, privatisation of state enterprises, the lifting of trade tariffs and other protectionist 
measures, and the introduction of fees for public services such as health and education.439 They 
also included provisions more specific to the Rwandan context, for example promoting free 
‘internal’ labour migration.440
In line with a revised division of labour among multilateral organisations at the international 
level, these economic reforms were seen as the preserve of the Bretton Woods Institutions and 
were treated— for the most part anyway— as distinct from the liberalisation o f the political 
‘space’.441 Indeed, during the early 1990s Western development aid to Rwanda in general was
437 In 1991, this single party was re-named: Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratic et le 
Developpement (MRNDD).
438 For accounts o f  the origins and development o f  the RPF, see: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 
p p .l59-234; and Ogenga Otunna, ‘Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda’, in Howard Adelman 
and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path o f  a Genocide: the Rwanda crisis from  Uganda to Zaire, pp.3-29.
439 Andy Storey, ‘Economics and Ethnic Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda’, Development Policy 
Review, vol. 17, no.l (1999), pp.45-6.
440 Uvin, Aiding Violence, p.58.
441 Ibid. p.45. But as we will see, there was an important exception to this ‘separateness’ o f  economic and 
political liberalisation in July and August 1993.
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kept separate from issues o f political liberalisation and negotiations with the RPF.442 This 
‘separateness’, however, has in the post-1994 Rwandan genocide context come to be seen as a 
significant topic o f  concern for aid agencies not only because o f the way that economic aid and 
reforms served to exacerbate ethnic tensions in the country, but also because o f  the fact that aid 
was not utilised as a lever to reign in the Rwandan government and forestall the deteriorating 
political and security situation.443 To a large extent, it was recognised by practitioners that 
overseas development aid could and should be much more systematically coordinated and 
harnessed for helping progress political liberalisation— and not simply economic liberalisation—  
and for moderating the actions o f certain Southern elites.444 Indeed within the UN system, while 
the general division o f labour remains, there has developed much more synchronisation across 
various agencies in terms o f the release or withholding o f aid, and with the establishment in the 
World Bank o f a conflict resolution unit designed to assess the political impact o f its economic 
loans and projects.445
In so far as efforts to reform the political space, and to resolve a guerrilla conflict that was taking 
an increasing toll on the Rwandan economy and society were concerned, the pace o f negotiations 
and liberalisation was much more protracted than the economic sphere, with a complex interplay 
o f  domestic, regional and international political issues and actors.446 It is suffice to note here that 
with relation to the external environment the Habyarimana regime was put under immense 
pressure to negotiate with the RPF—through their intermittent military advances and the less than 
subtle nudges o f various patrons, especially France and the US, for Rwanda to enter such a 
process.447 These factors among others led the Habyarimana regime to engage in a protracted 
period o f negotiations with the RPF over a package o f protocols that dealt with: the rule o f law; 
the functioning and sequencing of a Broad-Based Transitional Government; the repatriation of 
refugees; the future o f the army, the gendarmerie and a call for a ‘Neutral International Force’ 
(NIF); and other ‘miscellaneous’ provisions including a timetable for implementation. These
442 Regine Andersen ‘How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda’ Third 
World Quarterly, vol.21, no.3 (2000), pp.441-2.
443 Uvin points out that development aid was only withheld, suspended or reduced on a couple o f  occasions 
by Western aid agencies. Uvin, Aiding Violence, p.90.
444 Andersen, ‘How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda’, p.453 and Uvin, 
Aiding Violence pp.236-8.
445 See: <www.worldbank.org>.
446 For a good account o f  this process, see: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp. 159-234.
447 On international pressure on the Government o f  Rwanda to negotiate with the RPF, see: Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Report no.2 1992: Rwanda, pp. 19-20; and Herman Cohen, Intervening in 
Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 170-2. On 
the RPF invasion o f  Rwanda, see: Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, pp.93-108, pp. 174-192.
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protocols concluded in August 1993— commonly known as the Arusha Accords— constituted a 
complete package o f political reforms that would see the one-party state transformed into 
multiparty democracy and plural society within a period o f 22 months.448 As Bruce Jones has 
innocuously put the matter:
‘The deal laid out, in rich and complete detail, the basis for a new order in Rwanda, one 
based on the rule o f law, on democratic processes, and on the rights o f refugees and
, 4 4 9
returnees/
In essence, the Accords were pushed upon Habyarimana and represented, politically, an 
overwhelming defeat for his regime.450 While this was a result o f a successful offensive launched 
by the RPF in Februaiy 1993, which threatened to bring about the immediate collapse o f the 
regime had it not been for French militaiy support, it was also because the ‘international 
community’ put pay to any final reticence o f Habyarimana to sign-up to the Arusha Accords by 
an extraordinary threat to cut off World Bank and Western funding if  there was no accord.451 In 
any case, the content o f the Arusha Protocols underscored the humiliating defeat o f the regime 
and held-out in its provisions the gradual transfer o f power from Habyarimana and the ruling 
MRNDD to ‘...o ther political forces in Rwanda’.452 It was, for some, ‘une paix militaire.’453 For a 
start, Habyarimana would remain in office with the establishment of the ‘broad-based transitional 
government’ until national elections but would have many o f his powers transferred to the Prime 
Minister.454 It is significant too that the RPF was able to force a power-sharing model on the 
transition period, which guaranteed the rebel movement and opposition parties portfolios in the 
Transitional Government and ‘Deputies’ in the Transitional National Assembly before any
448 The Arusha Protocols reproduced in: The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996 (New York: UN DPI), 
pp. 169-201.
449 Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p.92.
450 As Herman Cohen has put it: ‘As I left office in April 1993, my analysis o f  the Rwandan conundrum
was less concerned about possible extremist action by the Hutu-dominated regime than by a slow and
insidious return o f  minority Tutsi control, a throwback to preindependence days’. Cohen, Intervening in 
Africa, p. 176. On why Arusha was a defeat, see: Joint Evaluation o f  Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
(JEEAR) Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management (Steering Committee o f  the Joint Evaluation 
o f  Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), pp.26-28.
451 As reported in Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story (London: Human Rights Watch, 
1999), p. 124.
452 Article 2 (a), Annex VI: Protocol o f  Agreement on Power-sharing, The Arusha Protocols.
453 Cited in: JEEAR, Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.26.
454 On the exact provisions, see: Annex VI: Protocol o f  Agreement on Power-sharing, The Arusha Accords. 
See too, JEEAR, Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.25.
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elections that may well have favoured the incumbent party.455 Certainly, it was unlikely that the 
RPF would have gained such a strong representation in executive or legislative had any 
democratic elections actually taken place.456 Moreover, the portfolios allotted to the RPF were 
taken as a sign o f the balance o f power shifting in favour o f the exiled rebels— given Rwanda and 
Burundi’s history this was especially the case with relation to the Ministry o f Interior.457 But 
perhaps most humiliating from the perspective o f the establishment was the agreement on the 
integration o f  armed forces, which saw a 60:40 split in favour of the Forces Armdes Rwandaises 
(FAR) but a 50:50 split on all officer positions with the RPF.458
This then was the immediate context in which the negotiation, authorisation and deployment o f a 
UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda took place. While the UN was not directly responsible for 
the peace accords— as is occasionally the case— the organisation began to pay much more 
attention to the negotiations from early 1993 when the prospect o f a UN force was raised. In fact 
the UN was initially requested by the Ugandan and Rwandan governments in February 1993 to 
deploy an observer mission between their borders in order to monitor the ceasefire and verify that 
the RPF were not crossing freely from Uganda into Rwanda. This was finally authorised by the 
Security Council in May 1993 (S/RES/846) and formed the basis o f the United Nations Observer 
Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). It is from this period that the UN began to monopolise 
peace activities, with the OAU and its peacekeeping force gradually sidelined by Boutros-Ghali. 
Incidentally, this OAU force—the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)— which was 
deployed in 1992 in Rwanda to monitor a ‘buffer zone’ between the RPF and FAR was the first 
internal peacekeeping force that the regional organisation had deployed and represented an 
attempt by secretary-general Salim Salim to transform its priorities, in-line with global trends, 
towards issues of internal governance (formalised with the establishment o f the OAU Conflict 
Resolution Mechanism).459 In the Rwandan context it was an effort that was short-lived due to a 
lack o f resources and logistics, which were requested from Boutros-Ghali and the Security
455 On the division o f  posts and deputies see Arusha Protocols: Protocol o f  Agreement on Power-sharing 
(continuation o f  the Protocol o f  Agreement signed on 30th October 1992).
456 It should be recalled here that RPF was unpopular with a great deal o f  the Rwandan population. Indeed, 
every offensive that the RPF launched led to the systematic emptying out o f  those areas under its control. 
Commentators have attributed this to a variety o f  factors including: government and media propaganda; 
abuses perpetrated on occasion by the RPF; and a RPF military policy o f depopulating areas in order to put 
pressure on the GOR.
457 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p.210.
458 JEEAR, Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, pp.25-26; Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers, pp.210-12.
459 JEEAR, Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.24.
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Council in March 1993 but rejected on the grounds that operational ‘...com m and and control’ 
must lie with the UN.460
In any event, the UN DPA had an observer at Arusha from March 1993 onwards and contributed 
to several ‘technical’ discussions relating to the modalities o f the peace accords.461 And even 
though the UN had held out on a commitment to send a peacekeeping operation until September 
1993 when secretary-general Boutros-Ghali commended it to the Council, by the time the accords 
were signed it was clear that the UN would be called upon to provide a supervising role.462 
Indeed, the protocol on the integration o f armed forces signed on 3 August 1993 contained the 
main provisions relating to the possibility for a UN operation under the title ‘The Neutral 
International Force’ (Annex VI, paragraph 2 o f the Arusha Accords). This paragraph called for a r  
UN force to help ‘...assist in the implementation o f the Peace Agreement’ particularly as it related 
to the monitoring o f the cease-fire and the quartering, demobilisation and integration o f armed 
forces.463 It was anticipated that in due course the UN would supervise national elections at the 
end o f the transition period.464
The broad parameters of UN action therefore were focused on political and military issues. This f ' 
formally entailed helping provide for a transition in state structures— particularly the army and 
the gendarmerie— and monitoring the ceasefire. In terms o f specific tasks, there were, o f course, 
important nuances. Many accounts for example stress the difference between the request o f the 
Arusha Protocol for the UN to ‘...guarantee the overall security of the country’ and the final UN 
Security Council Resolution (S/RES/872, 1993) authorising UNAMIR, which limited this to: 
‘...contribute to the security o f the city o f Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons secure area 
established by the parties...’. While this was indeed an important distinction, it was quite normal 
for the UN to rework its own authorisation given that the mission was always going to be a 
standard Chapter VI operation (i.e. governed by consent and neutrality). Phrases such as 
‘...guarantee the overall security o f the country’ would imply and entail a Chapter VII 
enforcement operation. Much is also made of the delay in deployment that UNAMIR faced and
460 Ibid. p.27. At one point the OAU had optimistically envisaged filling the role o f  the NIF. Jones, 
Peacemaking in Rwanda, p. 104.
461 S/26350, 24 August 1993: ‘Further Report o f the secretary-general on Rwanda, concerning the Arusha 
Peace Agreement and the possible role o f  the United Nations in its implementation’; and Jones, 
Peacemaking in Rwanda, p.75.
462 JEEAR, Study 11: Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.28.
463 Annex VI, paragraph 2 o f  the Arusha Protocols.
464 Paris, At War's End, p.72.
144
the reduced number o f troops available for the operation. With relation to troops, it is regularly 
recalled that the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August 1993 scaled down its initial troop 
number assessment from 8,000 to 4,500 peacekeepers.465 Knowing that even this figure would be 
too much for some Security Council members to consider (namely the US), the Secretariat further 
reduced this number in its recommendations to 2,548.466 In the world o f conflict-resolution this 
process has been labelled ‘self-censorship’, a practice which has seen the Secretariat’s DPKO and 
Executive Office (EO) learn to tailor reports and requests to the Security Council according, in 
the language o f  that well-worn phrase, to ‘...w hat the traffic will bear’.467
But what needs to be stressed is that this was not unusual or out o f the ordinary. In fact this was a 
process that the UN was well used to from the Congo in the 1960s to Angola in 1992.468 It is 
rather the case that operations such as those in Somalia and South West Africa were the 
anomaly— extraordinarily well funded, equipped and staffed.469 The process o f  deployment too 
was not out-of-kilter with what was normally the case with standard UN peace operations. The 
Arusha Accords had initially called for the deployment o f UN troops within 37 days. This was an 
unrealistic request given the need to assess the situation (August 1993), obtain authorisation for 
the mission (5 October 1993), find willing troop contributors for the operation (August- 
November 1993), and finally deploy (October 1993-February 1994). In fact, if  the UN was far 
from efficient and judicious in UNAMIR’s deployment then it was at least relatively timely in 
this regard.
All o f this becomes even clearer if the UN’s involvement with Rwanda is compared with that o f 
its neighbour Burundi during the same period. Here, following the assassination o f Burundi’s first 
democratically elected President in October 1993, inter-communal violence erupted and was 
brutally put down by the army. With an estimated death toll o f between 50,000 and 100,000 
Burundians and the creation o f 800,000 Hutu refugees (mostly displaced to Southern Rwanda),
465 Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 131; Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p. 110; 
JEEAR, Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management, p.36.
466 S/26488, 24 September 1993: ‘Report o f  the secretary-general on Rwanda, requesting establishment o f  a 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration o f  UNOMUR into 
UNAMIR.’
467 The Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 59.
468 For example, as we will see in the next chapter, it is often suggested by commentators that during the 
Bicesse peace process in Angola (1991-92), the UN mission (UNAVEM II) was funded on a ‘shoe-string’.
469 The UN peace enforcement mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) was an experimental form o f  peace 
operation. And even though it had important implications with relation to the rise o f  liberal-humanitarian 
discourse, and for the rationalisation o f  concepts o f  conditional sovereignty in the South, the particular 
form that it took (Chapter VII enforcement) has yet to be repeated by the UN elsewhere.
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UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali dispatched a special representative to Burundi to head a 
small diplomatic mission.470 The Burundian mission was to help restore democracy, facilitate 
dialogue, and establish a commission o f inquiry into the October massacres.471 For these tasks a 
three-member team running on an operational budget o f $1,000 a day was considered an ample 
international response.472 The comparable figures for Rwanda in early 1994 was 320 civilian staff 
and 2,548 peacekeepers with a total operational budget o f $1.2 million per day.473 This is not to 
say that the Burundi operation is directly analogous with the one in Rwanda; on the most basic o f 
levels UNAM IR was a peacekeeping operation while Burundi was a new breed of ‘preventative 
m issions’ run by the DPA. But what even the briefest o f contrasts makes obvious is that the UN 
mission to Rwanda was a significant and weighty operation for the UN to undertake— whether in 
the ‘illiberal’ context o f October 1993 or more generally.474
W hat it also helps underline is the specificity o f the UN-Rwanda operation, designed and • 
deployed not to forestall violence per se  but to help micro-manage the transition in state 
structures and regime. UNAMIR was more about supervising the assembly o f a new political 
order than ‘good-offices’. Indeed, as we have already seen, the functional objectives o f the UN 
mission must be viewed in the context o f a peace accord that was primarily structured to initiate 
regime change. The UN’s role was to help guarantee and facilitate this change by supervising the 
integrity and implementation of the transition (especially the military and political side o f this 
process) between elites and political institutions. To a very large extent this is also borne out by 
the way in which the UN mission functioned in practice from its deployment in October 1993 
onwards. Here, UN activities and behaviour not only show that the world body was deeply as 
opposed to nominally involved in interceding in the politics o f the country but also that its 
representatives were principally concerned with pushing and prodding the regime at all costs
470 The experiences of these Hutu refugees—in fact, of the Burundian Hutu more generally—reinforced the 
perception of the Rwandan Hutu population of the insidious nature of Tutsi power in the region. After all, 
the democratic experiment in Burundi, in which decades of minority Tutsi dictatorship was finally 
supplemented by the inauguration of a democratically elected Hutu president, ended in a Tutsi coup and 
army pogrom against the population. This tended to reinforce the belief in Rwanda that the Arusha process 
was simply a victory for the RPF.
471 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Burundi on the Brink 1993-95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventative 
Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2000), p.38.
472 Ibid. pp.39-40.
473 Ibid. p.40. The cost of UNAMIR from 5 October to 4 April was $51,120,000 gross ($50,478,000 net). 
S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: ‘Second Progress Report of the secretary-general on UNAMIR for the period 
from 30 December 1993 to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six 
months, paragraph 44’.
474A point made to me by a former UN special representative. Confidential telephone interview with former 
UN special representative, 21 September 2001.
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down the path o f liberalisation. It is only once this has been discerned that it becomes possible to * 
identify the way in which UNAMIR, like its distant Visiting Mission ancestors, helped polarise 
an already volatile society to such an extent that the deployment o f violence became a logical 
strategy for a great number o f the Rwandan citizenry.
But at first glance it is easy to overlook the implicit bargain that an incumbent government enters 
into with the UN when a peacekeeping operation is agreed and then deployed. It is, for a subject • 
government, an acceptance o f the UN’s right to comment publicly on domestic developments, to 
enter into a wide variety o f dialogues with various forces in the polity and, perhaps most 
significantly, to submit the state to some form o f supervision and possible censor by the UN 
Security Council. It is in short an endeavour that transforms the subject government’s balance o f 
considerations significantly. In the Rwandan context, this is important to bear in mind when 
thinking about the nature o f UNAMIR and the behaviour o f UN officials because most accounts 
implicitly assume that these types o f operations are politically unproblematic and unobtrusive—  * 
that UN deployment had no inherent political import. In this regard it should be recalled that the 
regime o f Habyarimana accepted UN peacekeeping troops as a necessary alternative to defeat on 
the battlefield and increasing international isolation. The Arusha Protocols were a negotiated 
surrender for his regime and harbinger o f an impending transformation o f the polity. In its 
dealings with the regime, the UN as a whole was conscious o f this dynamic and adopted a logical 
approach o f tying a continuation o f the operation with attendant progress in the implementation o f 
transitional institutions. If the Habyarimana regime behaved appropriately, and earnestly 
implemented its political commitments, then the secretary-general and the Security Council 
would endorse further UN services in the country. If, however, the regime pursued an evasive 
strategy vis-a-vis the process o f liberalisation then the UN would consider constricting and 
reducing UN involvement. Hence, abandoning an increasingly isolated and beleaguered 
Government o f  Rwanda to its fate on the battlefield.
This was a logic that was applied fairly consistently by the UN throughout the deployment period 
in a variety o f  diplomatic contexts, with an especially active role assigned to UN officials on the 
ground charged with micro-managing the process. Here UN officials were not only supposed to 
authenticate the implementation of provisions but also, where need be, pressure parties down the 
path o f  liberalisation through threats o f withdrawal and the like.475 This became quite a desperate
475 This is why there is so much misunderstanding regarding the requisite role o f  UN officials in the 
country— especially as it relates to Romeo Dallaire and ‘early warnings’ o f  impending genocide in
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effort once the security situation began to deteriorate significantly in January 1994 with an array 
o f diplomatic initiatives and demarches presented to Habyarimana to expeditiously establish the 
transitional government. In fact, if  the secretary-general’s Reports to the Security Council on 
UNAMIR during this period are read closely— and for that matter other official UN documents—  
it becomes evident just how involved a process this actually was. This is especially the case 
following the failure o f Habyarimana to secure the establishment o f transitional institutions in 
December 1993, when incremental pressure from the UN system began to be put upon Rwanda. 
In January 1994, for example, the secretary-general wrote a letter to Habyarimana setting out, in 
characteristic fashion, the UN position:
‘As far as the commitments Rwanda has made to the international community are 
concerned, you are not unaware that the Security Council, in its resolution 893 (1994) o f 
6 January, strongly urged the parties to...com ply fully with the Arusha Peace 
Agreem ents...and in particular to establish a broad-based transitional government at the 
earliest opportunity in accordance with this agreement. Moreover, the Council stressed 
that continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt 
implementation by the parties o f the Arusha Peace Agreement.’476
Such a letter merely reflected the outward culmination of a variety o f diplomatic activities. In his 
report to the Security Council o f 30 March 1994, the secretary-general recounts an assortment o f 
initiatives undertaken by his representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, to secure the 
establishment o f transitional institutions from arranging all party-consultations to encouraging the 
president to comply with the Arusha provisions.477 During this time too, the Security Council
Rwanda. Here, Dallaire’s enthusiasm to proactively investigate reports o f  arms caches and disarm militias 
was seen by the UN establishment as far too brash (particularly as it relates to the January 1994 ‘genocide 
fax’ which is frequently taken as forewarning o f  the genocide). It is simply the case that Dallaire was seen 
as jeopardising the incremental diplomatic approach to pressuring the regime that was being pursued by 
UN Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, DPKO and the secretary-general. For example 
Dallaire asked DPKO for permission to carry-out arms retrieval operations and more resources on: 11 
January, 22 January, 2 February, 15 February (with SRSG Booh-Booh), 27 February, and 13 March. 
Human Rights Watch, Leave None to the Tell the Story, pp. 147-71.
476 ‘Letter dated 27 January 1994 from the secretary-general to the President o f  Rwanda expressing concern 
over delays in establishing a transitional Government and national assembly in Rwanda’ Reproduced in: 
The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, p.242.
477 Boutros-Ghali urges Habyarimana to establish a transitional government by telephone on 14 January, 24 
February and by letter on 27 January. Special Representative Booh-Booh convenes ‘all-party consultations’ 
for attempts to establish a BBTG on 7,10,13,25,26, and 27 February 1994. S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: 
paragraph 4-22.
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underlined the secretary-general’s position with, for example, a blunt statement demanding 
implementation in February 1994:
‘The Security Council, taking note of the fact that the President o f Rwanda has been 
sworn in as the interim Head o f  State, encourages him, in the context o f  that 
responsibility, to continue his efforts for the speedy installation o f the other transitional 
institution... the Security Council calls the attention o f the parties to the consequences for 
them o f non-compliance with that provision o f the Agreement. It notes that UNAMIR 
will be assured o f consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha peace 
Agreement fully and rapidly.’478
But after a protracted period o f attempting to increase the pressure on the regime to establish the 
transitional institutions, Habyarimana and other political forces within Rwanda continued to draw 
out the process in a variety of ways and for a variety o f reasons.479 Every gesture o f international 
pressure was met by provisional agreement by the President on the date for the establishment o f 
the institutions— on December 31, January 5, Februaiy 14, 22 and 23, and March 25.480 After 
these targets came and passed, it was left to the secretary-general to turn-up the pressure on the 
regime by noting in his March 30 report that:
‘My special representative and I have stressed to the Rwandese political leaders that, 
without the early establishment o f the broad-based transitional government and the 
Transitional National Assembly, it would be difficult to affirm sufficient progress has 
been made in the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement to warrant the continued 
support o f the international community.’481
In essence, the secretary-general was ratcheting-up the threat o f withdrawal by moving from 
simply recalling the conditions upon which the continuation o f operation was premised as seen by 
the Security Council, to suggesting explicitly that he might not be able to recommend the 
continuation o f the operation. In the event this remained just a threat with Boutros-Ghali
478 S/PRST/1994/8, 17 February 1994: ‘Statement by the President o f  the Security Council expressing 
concern over delays in establishing a transitional Government and the deteriorating security situation in 
Rwanda’.
479 On the domestic struggles that Habyarimana was facing during this period and partly as a result o f  
external pressure to liberalise, see: Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 127-206.
480 S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: paragraphs 4-22.
481 Ibid. paragraph 10.
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concluding that because the parties ‘...maintained the process o f dialogue’ he was willing on this 
occasion to recommend the extension o f UNAM IR’s mandate for a further six months.482 The 
Security Council however was much less sanguine— considering that practical pressure was now 
called for in their relations with Habyarimana. Indeed, in Resolution 909 (1994) o f 5 April 1994, 
the Security Council cast aside the secretary-general’s conclusion and authorised the continuation 
o f  the mission for a further period o f  only four months and then only if the secretary-general 
reported within six weeks that transitional institutions had been established and sufficient 
progress made.483 It was a calculated move designed to increase international pressure on 
Habyarimana and demonstrate that the Security Council was serious in its conditions for 
deployment. 484 In an informal Security Council meeting the day before the vote, the US in 
particular argued that UNAMIR should be shut-down if transitional institutions were not set-up—  
a threat that was finally carried out on 21 April 1994 when the Council voted in the midst o f  a 
vast amount o f organised bloodletting to reduce the mission, evacuate foreign nationals, and 
abandon the regime to the RPF.485
O f course this line of policy was perfectly consistent with past ultimatums and postures o f both 
the secretary-general and the Security Council. It was one that recognised the fragility o f the 
regim e’s existence and the wider power political transformations underfoot in the country. Here 
the policy o f pressure was one intended to ensure that Habyarimana live-up to his commitments 
to dismantle fully the one-party state, devolve real political authority to ‘representative 
institutions’ and allow an exiled guerrilla group a significant slice o f  power in the polity. It was 
one that saw the increased political and ethnic violence in the state, and felt that these were the 
last gasps o f a fading and anachronistic dictatorship.486 With the establishment o f an assembly 
and government, it was widely agreed within the UN in New York that the ‘security situation’ 
would improve and the ‘...provision o f more effective assistance to the population in need’
482 Ibid. paragraph 48.
483 S/RES/909 (1994), 5 April 1994.
484 Informal Security Council Meeting Minutes, UN Headquarters New York, 4 April 1994. Made available 
to me by Linda Melvem.
485 Informal Security Council Meeting Minutes, UN Headquarters New York, 4 April 1994.
486 Violence was becoming widespread and seemingly systematic from January 1994 onwards. The UN 
DPKO was made aware o f such a situation by Dallaire on: 6 January (Code Cable MIR 39) and 2 February 
(Code Cable MIR 267). But most infamously, Dallaire sent Code Cable 67 (11 January 1994), titled 
‘Request for Protection for Informant’, which has since been labelled by Phillip Gourevitch as the 
‘Genocide Fax’. Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our fam ilies 
(New York: Picador USA, 1998), p. 103.
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met.487 But by pushing and prodding the Habyarimana regime relentlessly down the path o f 
implementation, the Security Council and secretary-general played a central role in polarising 
social and political relations in the countiy— helping inspire perhaps the initial outbreak of 
violence on 7 April.488
W hatever the actual sequence o f events and consequences of particular UN actions, it seems 
broadly clear that the UN had an important impact on the way in which events unfolded in 
Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. Not only was the UN an actor tasked with micro-managing neo-liberal 
change in the country, but the organisation also had a particular position vis-a-vis the method for 
achieving such change. And perhaps fatefully, considering the impact o f past UN forays in the 
territory, such a task and position helped foster a climate of fear and violence in Rwanda that 
culminated in such large-scale death and destruction.
Post-colonial Rwanda and the United Nations: from trusteeship to neo-liberal
transformation
When looked at from the broader vista o f Rwanda’s post-colonial journey it is clear that the 
United Nations has been an important player at several critical junctures in the territory’s history. 
As we have seen, the UN was seminal in shaping two transitions in the territory— from 
colonialism to self-rule and ostensibly from a one-party state to multiparty polity. By way o f 
conclusion, therefore, it is seems worthwhile underlining some o f the more striking continuities 
and discontinuities o f these encounters.
For our purposes, there are perhaps two noteworthy symmetries with relation to the ‘transition’ 
operations examined above: the role o f transmitter o f Western liberal modernity that the UN 
assumed with relation to social developments in the kingdom and then in the Hutu Republic; and 
the position o f  indirect arbiter o f the ‘native question’ that the organisation—rather disastrously 
as it has turned out— has willingly and occasionally unwilling taken-up. In the first instance, the 
UN clearly and unambiguously set out in its relations with the Administrating Authorities during 
the 1940s and 1950s to promote and foster the general ‘development’ o f Rwandan society and the 
progressive liberalisation o f public life. The notions o f ‘advancement’ and ‘modernisation’ were
487 S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: paragraph 9. And S/PRST/1994/8, 17 February 1994. Except o f  course 
Dallaire, who felt that more active and forceful measures to guarantee the security situation were called for.
488 An opinion also tentatively expressed by: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, pp.213-14; and 
Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 114.
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the cornerstones o f this policy o f liberalisation, with UN Visiting Missions constantly evaluating 
‘progress’ in various spheres. While in the early 1950s it was economic life under the scrutiny o f 
Visiting Missions keen to erase all feudal, extra-economic, forces in society, in the late 1950s 
attention switched to ‘political development’ and educational opportunities in a bid to open-up 
the territory’s public life and help provide the prerequisites for eventual self-rule. And in the 
1990s, the UN again took up a liberalising mantle in Rwanda by agreeing to supervise a formal 
transition from a dictatorship to a liberal market democracy. To this end, the UN deployed a 
significant peacekeeping force and engaged in a variety o f diplomatic measures to earnestly 
promote an agenda o f democratisation that largely entailed pressuring the regime to establish 
representative transitional institutions.
To be sure there are many important and varied differences in this liberalisation venture. The least 
that can be said here is that while Visiting Missions took a broad and somewhat elastic view o f its 
‘advancement’ o f Rwandan society, from economic to educational, in the early 1990s the UN was 
solely concerned with liberalising the political kingdom along very specific lines. In this regard, 
the U N ’s activities in Rwanda were reflecting a revised and renewed division o f labour with 
relation to international organisations in the 1990s that saw various activities farmed-out to the 
‘relevant’ specialist institutions (even if this was not as clear and consistent in each and every 
case). While the IMF and World Bank were charged with transforming the economic regulatory 
framework o f  the Rwandan state, the UN was mandated to oversee the political transformation o f 
the country according to prevalent models o f formal liberal democracy.
The second notable symmetry between the two transitions is that they outline, in rough form, a 
type o f indirect international governance that borderland societies have occasionally been subject 
since their emergence from colonialism. This is to say that both the ‘trusteeship’ and 
‘multidimensional peacekeeping operations’ that Rwanda has been subject, represent complex 
forms o f external intervention and intercession. During trusteeship, the modest and largely distant 
surveillance o f Ruanda-Urundi by the UN meant that the organisation had a central— it could be 
argued divisive— role in the polity. This was clearly seen in the way the UN helped change (by 
design and indirect implication) the balance o f forces in the territory during the 1950s towards the 
Hutu peasant majority. When the Trusteeship Council tried to reverse some o f the more 
unpleasant and radical transformations that ensued (from the social revolution o f  November 1959 
to the PARMEHUTU coup in January 1961), the UN was far less successful. Nonetheless, events 
during this latter period can be read as a protracted struggle on the part o f PARMEHUTU to
152
extricate itself from the provisions and proclamations o f the UN in New York seeking to reverse 
the unauthorised abolition o f the monarchy and declaration o f a Hutu Republic. As noted earlier, 
the UN was seminal in Rwanda’s joum ey from a European colony and kingdom to a one-party 
republic. This influence can also be discerned in the 1990s, where the UN can be seen to have had 
a lethal impact on the calculations o f various domestic and regional political forces. This is not 
least because the peacekeeping force, and the scrutiny of the secretary-general and the Security 
Council, were all primed towards encouraging the Habyarimana regime to cede power through an 
organised and (theoretically) peaceful transition. Hence the obsessive preoccupation o f UN 
officials with the swift establishment o f a ‘broad-based transitional government’ and assembly.
In these encounters then, the UN was a principal— albeit deeply ineffectual— arbiter o f the native 
question. Here the organisation had some implicit position on the question o f who rules and under 
what conditions in Rwanda in both the 1950s and 1990s. These are reflected in the actions and 
deeds o f UN officials and remain consistent, for the most part anyway, with the wider structural 
role o f the UN in promoting liberal modernity in the periphery. And yet there is one noticeable 
and important distinction between these instances o f  managing post-colonial affairs in Rwanda, 
which relates to the scope and extent o f UN intercession. UN oversight in the 1950s was from a 
distance and limited to infrequent Visiting Missions, Trusteeship resolutions, and debate. While 
these activities had enormous import on political developments in the territory, they remained far 
less involved and intrusive than their 1990s peacekeeping relatives. Indeed, UNAMIR was an 
endeavour whose scale and ambition was way beyond its Visiting Mission precursors. It involved 
a great deal o f  technical capacity from organising quartering and demobilisation sites to helping 
train the gendarmerie. All at the same time as observing the integrity o f borders, buffer zones, 
weapons-ffee areas, and the ‘security situation.’ But more than anything else perhaps it entailed 
UN officials deployed permanently on the ground micromanaging the process and pushing the 
Rwandan parties towards implementation and liberalisation. It was, in many respects, much more 
‘hands-on’.
What all this goes to show is that it is practically meaningless to view UN intercession in 
Rwanda, and in the region more generally, as either nominal or neutral. Not only has the UN been 
involved in the Rwandan nation-building project from the late colonial era, but its 1994 
peacekeeping operation was particularly intrusive. And this is to say nothing o f the UN’s 
continued engagement in the region, with peacekeeping in the Congo, ‘preventative’ diplomacy 
in Burundi, and a UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda established— in Arusha o f all
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places— to put on trial the perpetrators o f the 1994 genocide. In these ways, it is hard to overlook 
the seminal role o f the UN in the political development of Rwanda through the decades, and now 
the sub-region, and avoid the conclusion that the territory has intermittently been part o f  the U N ’s 
shifting rem it for managing a post-colonial world.
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Chapter 6
Manufacturing Peace in Angola:
The Lusaka Protocol and the standard of UN peace operations
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‘W e’ve brought the horse to water, now it’s up to them to make it drink’ UN official on 
the wind down o f UNAVEM III (‘Angola: its not over yet’, Africa Confidential, vol.38, 
no.4, 14 February 1997).
‘The United Nations came to Angola at their explicit request and can be proud o f what it 
accomplished. It has brought four years o f relative peace, the longest such period Angola 
has ever enjoyed since its independence. However precarious and imperfect that peace 
may have been, UNAVEM III and MONUA provided to the Angolan parties ample 
political space in which to reach a peaceful solution and achieve national 
reconciliation...History of course, will pass judgement on the reasons for which this 
unique opportunity was missed. In the meantime, however, the parties and their leaders 
must assume full and direct responsibility for the suffering of their people.’ Kofi Annan 
(S/1999/49, 17 January 1999).
The functions o f UN peace operations in Southern Africa
For all practical purposes this statement by the UN secretary-general to the Security Council in 
early 1999 ended a decade o f troubled UN peacekeeping in Angola. In effect, a long and tenuous 
struggle to restore UN credibility in the face o f an earlier UN peacekeeping fiasco in Angola in 
1992 and elsewhere, in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia came to a bitter, albeit rather belated 
end in this low-key report o f the secretary-general.489 Resigned to monitor Angola from the 
sidelines, the UN’s misfortunes in the country were masked only by the near-universal belief that 
the war was impossible to resolve given the malevolence o f the Uniao Nacional para a 
Independecia Total de A ngola’s (UNITA) leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the availability o f valuable 
natural resources to sustain the conflict. No matter what the UN had done, most commentators 
agreed, UNITA was bent on the total capture o f the Angolan state:
489 UN exit from the country was belated because the Government o f  Angola had withdrawn its support for 
MONUA, and had formally requested its dissolution: S/1999/49, 17 January 1999.
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‘Savimbi is a...m an o f towering arrogance and o f uncontrollable rages... parliaments and 
power sharing are of no interest to him .’490
W hatever the veracity o f this common belief, it has nevertheless helped conceal the remarkable 
political story o f  the UN’s engagement in the country, and the region, and some o f the general 
dynamics exogenous to Angola that drove UN policies.491 The objective o f this chapter, in line 
with the previous two chapters on Somalia and Rwanda, is to provide a broader context and 
framework in which to situate and understand this particularly protracted and unhappy UN 
encounter with micro-managing post-colonial affairs in Southern Africa. In order to do this, the 
chapter begins by highlighting some o f the historical functions o f the UN’s operations in the 
country— especially how they fitted into wider projects o f  world-order management during the 
early 1990s— and then goes on to explain in detail how, in practice, these roles were interpreted 
and put into effect by the UN during the third and by far the largest o f the organisation’s peace 
operations in Angola, during the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) 
and the implementation o f the Lusaka Protocol.
In the first instance, it is argued that the UN’s engagement with Angola must be seen as part and 
parcel o f  a wider attempt to realign the political economy o f the entire region along liberal- 
capitalist lines. On the broadest level, this included a long-overdue transition to independence for 
the territory then known as South West Africa (a former UN Trust Territory), a transition from a 
minority white regime to a liberal market democracy in South Africa, and a managed end to war 
and insurgency and a transition from Affo-Marxism to free-market liberalism in the other 
Southern African Lusophone state, Mozambique. Here, the historical record makes plain the fact 
that the first national peace accords in Angola were imposed upon the parties by the US and 
represented only one element of a comprehensive effort to fully integrate the entire sub-region 
into the liberal capitalist system. From this perspective, therefore, the historic and structural role 
o f the UN has been to help manage aspects o f this transition in various ways, at various times,
490 David Birmingham, ‘Orphans o f  the Cold War: Angola’s People’, African Affairs, vol.96, no.384, p.443. 
This opinion has been reinforced since Savimbi’s death in 2002. See, for one example: ‘The Late Jonas 
Savimbi’, Jeremy Harding, The London Review o f  Books, vol.24, no.6, 21 March 2002.
491 For literature that examines UN peace operations from a technical and problem-solving perspective see: 
Vladimir Krska, ‘Peacekeeping in Angola (UNAVEM I and II)’ International Peacekeeping, vol.4. n o .l, 
(1997), pp.75-97; Assis Malaquias, ‘The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned’ International 
Peacekeeping, vol.3, no.2 (1996), pp.87-93; Norrie MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United 
Nations in Angola’, The Journal o f  Modern African Studies, vol.36, no.3 (1998), pp. 399-422; Anthony G. 
Pazzanita, ‘The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola’, The Journal o f  Modern African Studies, vol.29, 
no.l (1991), pp.83-114; Anthony W. Pereira, ‘The Neglected Tragedy: the Return to War in Angola, 1992- 
3 ’, The Journal o f  Modern African Studies, vol.32, no.l (1994), pp.1-28.
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and in various places. Indeed, among other things, the UN helped administer South West A frica’s 
transition to independence in 1990, presided over a large civilian and military peacekeeping 
operation between 1992 and 1994 that formally delivered Mozambique into the fold o f nascent 
liberal market democracies, and helped monitor national elections in South Africa in April 
1994.492 In Angola, where as we will see events went seriously askew, over a ten year period the 
UN made numerous attempts to entrench a liberal order.
The first UN engagement with Angola, however, began with the deployment o f  a small mission 
that was tasked with implementing a long standing US and apartheid South African foreign policy 
preoccupation o f  removing the sizable and militarily accomplished contingents of Cuban armed 
forces from Angola. Essentially, the UN accepted the linkage created by the US between South 
Africa’s handover o f South West Africa and Cuba’s withdrawal from sovereign Angola, and 
deployed a small mission o f military observers between 1989 and 1991 to oversee and verily the 
process o f Cuba’s retreat as part o f the general settlement leading to Namibian independence. 
After the successful implementation o f this relatively straight-forward and in some ways 
‘traditional’ military observer role, the UN was enlisted by the US, USSR and Portugal to 
maintain and then expand its presence in Angola and carry out different tasks that related to the 
implementation o f a negotiated settlement which had been brokered between the warring parties 
in the country by the above ‘troika’ in the Portuguese town o f Estoril in 1991 (commonly known 
as the Bicesse Accords). The role o f the UN was to verify the demobilisation o f fighters and their 
integration into a unified Angolan army and, crucial for the legitimacy o f this externally imposed 
peace process, validate a formal transition o f political systems and very possibly o f political elites 
by observing the ‘free and fair’ conduct o f national elections. Euphemistically termed by high 
officials at the UN as ‘...a  small and manageable operation’, UNAVEM II was primarily 
produced to provide legitimacy to a peace process sponsored, managed and imposed by outside 
powers, and was designed, through its oversight o f national elections, to provide a symbolic 
representation o f the Angolan state’s transition from Affo-Marxism to a liberal market
492 In South Africa the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOSA) played an important 
role in assessing the conduct o f  the electoral process. By 17 April 1994, for example, there were 2,120 UN 
observers in the country. United Nations, The United Nations and Apartheid, p. 118. In Mozambique, the 
UN was drafted in to play a significant role in the implementation o f  the Rome Accords (4 October 1992). 
Indeed, chastened by failure months earlier in Angola, the special representative and UN Operation in 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) were given central roles in the management o f  the process, which at its height 
saw the deployment o f  6,576 military staff and 1,087 civilian staff. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, 
p.323, p.725.
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democracy.493 But despite the limited, albeit highly symbolic, role that UNAVEM II actually 
played in this peace process, when it collapsed in October 1992 the organisation was saddled with 
much o f  the blame simply because o f its high profile and public association with the elections and 
demobilisation process.
It is in this context that the third and most significant UN operation (UNAVEM III) was deployed 
in Angola in order to put-back on track a settlement broadly conceived to shore-up and secure a 
client neo-liberal regime and its writ over the country. In this instance, unlike previous 
encounters, the major powers subcontracted to the UN the lead role and resources for delivering a 
settlement in Angola. Indeed, it could be said that with UNAVEM III the UN was finally given 
an opportunity to redeem itself as a competent and semi-autonomous agent o f world order 
management in the South after the peacekeeping and peace enforcement fiascos o f the early 
1990s. It is the UN’s management o f this important operation that the second part o f the chapter 
examines in detail. Here it is argued that the UN, desperate for a success in its peace operations 
and keen to re-establish its managerial capacity, especially in Africa, went to great lengths to 
ensure that the Lusaka Protocol, signed in late 1994, and its attendant peace operation, UNAVEM 
III, would not be derailed. This objective, it is suggested, was sometimes pursued at any cost. In 
particular: Security Council preconditions relating to the deployment o f  first, UN observers, and 
second, UN peacekeepers, were disregarded; infidelities relating to the quartering and 
demobilisation o f UNITA’s forces were constantly overlooked; and violations o f the ceasefire 
and in the trade o f arms by both sides were ignored. These features o f UN policy went hand-in- 
hand with a protracted period o f intense UN mediation with the parties that epitomised the whole 
o f the implementation process. Such intensive shuttle diplomacy, a policy as it will be recalled 
that UN managers explicitly objected to in Somalia, reflected a deep commitment to micro­
manage the political process and, in the end, manufacture progress at any cost. The chapter 
concludes by suggesting that this hands-on policy of stage-managing every facet o f the Angolan 
peace process reflected an attempt by the UN to forge an informal peace operations doctrine of 
coercive diplomacy— that is, one that respected the formal prerequisites o f  peacekeeping 
operations such as consent, neutrality and impartiality, but within these parameters, utilised to the
493 The term ‘...small and manageable operation’ was used consistently by senior UN officials in relation to 
UNAVEM II, and has since been made renowned by Dame Margaret Anstee and her use o f  the term to 
denote her experience as UN special representative to Angola during this period. Margaret Anstee, Orphan 
o f  the C old War: The Inside Story o f  the Collapse o f  the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996), p.32.
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maximum the various diplomatic and bureaucratic tools at its disposal to impose progress on local 
political elites and bind them into internationally constructed settlements.
In order to understand the nature of UN peacemaking in Angola it is necessary first to place these 
activities in the wider historical and regional context in which they were first developed. This is 
not least because UN activities in Angola in the 1990s were only one integral part o f a larger 
project o f  reordering the entire region along more conventional state-society lines. The UN’s role 
and function in this remarkable transition was largely— but not wholly— limited to formally 
validating and legitimising such change towards the end o f these externally imposed processes. 
That is, the UN was only inducted into the process o f managing change in Southern African states 
once agreed settlements had been achieved on various issues. Among other important roles, these 
included overseeing Namibia’s transition to independence in 1990, verifying a Cuban withdrawal 
from Angola by 1991, and validating a liberal peace settlement in Angola in 1992 and 
Mozambique in 1994.
M anaging transition  in a ‘bad neighbourhood’
In the post-W orld War II era, Southern Africa increasingly came to be seen as an abnormal region 
o f the Western world order. This world order, as already discussed, was one that was generally 
and loosely structured around the universalisation o f modem nation-states and a private liberal 
world economy. In Southern Africa, however, decolonisation was far more protracted than 
elsewhere— with Portugal seeking to keep hold o f its large settler colonies in Angola and 
Mozambique well into the 1970s— and the white-minority regimes o f  South Africa and Rhodesia 
refusing to define a majority o f their population as citizens or equal subjects. And while for some 
time these were not necessarily unfamiliar arrangements in other European empires, or indeed if 
compared to race and class relations in the US itself, from the late 1970s the issue became one of 
increasing political— and economic— urgency. This urgency was not simply a result o f the fact 
that the model o f  social organisation that white minority regimes represented was increasingly an 
anathema to the needs and wants of global capitalism and the sensitivities o f Western public 
opinion— although as time went on this was ever more important— but it was also because in 
Lusophone countries indigenous and external forces had eventually managed to bring down 
Portuguese rule and establish alternative socio-economic development programmes and political 
systems that were invariably defined against both Western liberal capitalism and white minority 
rule. There was also the matter o f the last outstanding colony o f  South West Africa on the
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continent— a Trust Territory assigned to South Africa after World War I by the League o f 
Nations that was eventually terminated by the UN in 1966 but which continued under de facto 
control from Pretoria. It was in this broad context that war and conflict in Southern Africa, 
between states and between various social and political forces within states, became such a 
troublesome and endemic feature o f the region and, as importantly, marked it out as a key global 
ideological and political battleground throughout the 1970s and 1980s.494
In all o f  this early period the UN endeavoured to act as a progressive agent for change in the 
region. Indeed when the UN was driven by radically alternative visions o f world order in the 
1960s and 1970s in particular, the organisation produced a steady stream o f resolutions and 
programmes designed to bolster the legitimacy and diplomatic capacity of indigenous resistance 
movements and frontline states in their struggle against apartheid.495 Here, the Special Committee 
Against Apartheid and the Centre Against Apartheid were established in 1963 and 1976 
respectively to contribute to these ends.496 Specialised agencies o f the UN system played their 
part too— with the ILO, UNESCO, and UNCTAD all contributing to the anti-apartheid 
campaign.497 More conventionally, and in-line with its original functions, the UN also engaged 
itself in a protracted legal struggle with South Africa over the future o f the ex-German colony o f 
South W est Africa. At first the General Assembly pushed to no avail for the territory to be 
formally placed under its supervision. Later the UN Security Council (especially under the 
influence o f  those Western states known as the ‘Contact Group’) established the parameters o f an 
eventual settlement for the territory and its transition under UN and South African supervision to 
independence in Resolution 435 (1978). This landmark document represented one part o f 
Western efforts to resolve several issues o f  the region throughout the 1980s and eventually 
resulted in the establishment o f the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which partially 
administered Namibia’s orderly move to independence in 1990.498 But beyond the resolutions and 
declarations o f  support o f a diminishing General Assembly and its related committees and
494 It is in this context that Dr. Chester Crocker, former US Assistant Secretary o f  State for African Affairs 
and architect o f  the highly activist regional strategy o f  ‘ .. .changing things’ that the US embarked upon in 
1981, euphemistically labelled the region a ‘bad’ and ‘rough neighborhood.’ Crocker, High Noon, p.456.
495 Among many others, see the following landmark UN General Assembly resolution on Apartheid: 
Resolution 2627 (XXV) passed on the twenty-fifth anniversary o f  the UN, which declared Apartheid a 
crime against humanity.
496 See Chapter Two.
497 For example ILO member-states voted to eject South Africa from the organisation in 1961— even 
though there was no procedure in the ILO statute that provided for such a measure. As a result, South 
Africa continued to send delegates to the ILO.
498 UNTAG would supervise the South African administration o f  the transition o f  Namibia to its 
independence. S/RES/435 (1978).
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programmes, the UN was locked out o f any meaningful dialogue or process o f instigating change 
in the region. O f course, the UN was seminal in the anti-apartheid and sanctions campaign, and 
its resolutions on Namibia provided the accepted international normative framework for any 
future settlement. But its ability to participate in any regional process was ultimately blocked by 
the US, which had its own specific vision for a satisfactory regional settlement that excluded the 
strident economic nationalism of the General Assembly’s pronouncements.499 It would not be 
until the UN was more disciplined and focused around its specialised tasks o f peace operations 
and supervised more closely by the Security Council— a process that as we have seen was 
initiated towards the end o f the 1980s—that the organisation would be entrusted with some 
perfunctory roles relating to the endorsement and legitimisation of US engineered settlements in 
the region.
In order to grasp this US vision for the region it is useful first to quickly review some o f the 
contradictions o f its Southern African policies that administration officials hoped to iron-out. 
Here, the least that can be said is that the standpoint o f the US during this period was a complex 
and nuanced one. On the one hand it supported Namibian independence but, on the other, only if 
it was not likely to be led by an Afro-Marxist regime.500 In South Africa, successive US 
administrations were appreciative o f Pretoria’s anti-communist actions in the region and within 
the country but, at the same time, were dismayed by the way in which the old guard refused to 
adapt to changing economic and political realities. And as far as Angola was concerned, the US 
was happy to diplomatically and materially sponsor conservative guerrilla forces within the state 
and endorse South African adventurism for as long as the incumbent regime remained formally 
outside the liberal world system, and Cuban troops continued to bolster the MPLA from its 
internal and external opponents. But simultaneously, private corporations in the US were quite 
content to purchase petroleum and do business with the regime, and diplomats at the US State 
Department were often shuttling in and out o f Luanda opportunistically seeking some form o f 
hasty exit for Cuban troops from the region without offering anything o f much consequence in 
return.
499 O f course South Africa was also steadfastly opposed to any UN role. As Crocker relates, but with 
absolutely no sense o f  irony or self-reflection: ‘A long history o f  pro-SWAPO pronouncements and 
activities (including the General Assembly’s 1977 endorsement o f  SWAPO as “sole and authentic 
representative o f  the Namibian people”) had severely compromised the United Nations’ standing as a 
decolonizing agent.’ Crocker, High Noon, p.39.
500 Forward by George P. Shultz, in Crocker, High Noon, p. 12.
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It is in this general environment then that the US embarked from the early 1980s on a strategy of 
what one prominent State Department diplomat intimately involved in the process, Dr Chester 
Crocker, considered as moving the ‘planets’ into ‘...perfect alignment’ for a set o f interlocking 
settlements in the region that would be more in-sync with US principles o f world order.501 The 
end product for US ‘grand strategy’, according to the same diplomat, was that this and other ‘bad 
neighbourhoods’ must be ‘...m ore effectively linked to the global system’.502 With South Africa a 
policy o f  ‘constructive engagement’ was developed that was apparently to encourage some form 
o f internal reform among ‘modernisers’ while essentially cashing-in on the rewards o f Pretoria’s 
activism in the region.503 Most strikingly with respect to the latter, the US developed a policy o f 
linking South Africa’s withdrawal from South West Africa with a Cuban exit from Angola. This 
policy o f  linkage had numerous advantages for the US and its allies. Not only would a successful 
linkage rid the region o f South Africa’s only serious conventional military adversary, it would 
also remove one critical source o f  support for the MPLA and certain factions within it.504 
Furthermore, the independence o f Namibia—conducted under US terms— would remove a 
significant irregularity from the organisation o f the Western world and deprive Washington’s 
enemies in the South and East o f one potent source o f ideological and political fodder.
But the process o f diplomacy and negotiations that eventually secured this linkage and agreement 
was protracted, in the end spanning most o f the 1980s. At first, the various parties still had a 
range o f diplomatic and military options open to them— while South Africa still hoped to 
indefinitely retain South West Africa and believed for some time that it could decapitate the 
Angolan regime, the MPLA still aspired for an outright military victory against UNITA and 
searched for the capacity to protect its sovereignty. It was only when the South African Defence 
Forces (SADF) began to suffer serious military setbacks in Southern Angola at the hands o f 
Cuban forces in the late 1980s and the Angolans and Cubans began to count the financial cost o f 
large-scale military deployments (combined o f course with the tantalising prospect o f securing 
once and for all UNITA’s southern heartlands when the SADF withdrew from first Angola and 
then South West Africa) that the various regional elements were in place for the US to secure the 
deal. Indeed, the US had precisely been working to manufacture this type o f  correlation o f
501 Crocker, High Noon, p. 18.
502 Ibid. pp.465-6.
503 Ibid. p.75.
504 Ibid. p.388.
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forces— for example ensuring that UNITA would not or could not be defeated by supplying the 
group with emergency arms if  and when it was in difficulty.505
Once reached, the settlement itself was relatively straightforward to implement: the Brazzaville 
Protocol signed in December 1988 provided for the withdrawal o f Cuban troops from Angola 
over a 27 month period and the transition to independence o f South West Africa a year after the 
process was formally initiated.506 But in order to ensure for the US and Apartheid South Africa 
the veracity and legitimacy o f the process o f Cuban withdrawal from the region, the UN was 
enlisted to deploy a small observer mission to monitor the incremental stages o f troop withdrawal 
from Angolan air and sea ports and their general movement towards the centre and north o f the 
country.507 For Crocker, the architect o f the entire process, UNAVEM I’s main utility was 
actually ensuring the legitimacy o f the linkage as opposed to its verification skills per se:
‘It was not the United Nation’s capacity to conduct verification that impressed Pretoria.
Rather, the proposal further legitimised Cuban withdrawal as an integral part o f the
settlement [on Namibia].’508
Following the successful and timely withdrawal o f Cuban troops from Angola, and Namibia’s 
transition to independence, there was a widespread belief among the international community, 
particularly in the US, that Angola’s internal situation could now be fully addressed. This feeling 
was a result o f  a variety o f factors that were serving to place extreme pressure on the Angolan 
regime to reform. In the first place, as far as war and insurgency in the country were concerned, 
the US refused to halt aid to UNITA or recognise the Angolan state, until the MPLA conducted 
and concluded negotiations with UNITA on equal terms.509 At first, the MPLA and Cuba had 
attempted to exchange an end o f US aid to UNITA in return for Cuban withdrawal but the US 
coyly declined to include this leverage until the issue o f Angola’s domestic settlement was on the 
agenda.510 In fact in the late 1980s a staged policy o f incremental normalisation o f relations with
505 Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p.99.
506 The Brazzaville accords incorporated two previously agreed documents: the New York Principles (July 
1988) and the Geneva Protocol (August 1988). Namibian independence was actually declared at midnight 
21 March 1990. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.203.
507 S/RES/626, 20 December 1988.
508 Crocker, High Noon, p.455.
509 Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p.88; Crocker, High Noon, p.462.
510 Crocker, High Noon, p.377. The Cubans and Angolans were dismissed outright on this account by US 
diplomats, who argued that this was an attempt to: ‘...sell the same horse twice— giving Cuban troop 
withdrawal to Pretoria for Resolution 435 and offering it to Washington for the termination o f  UNITA aid.’
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the MPLA was held-out by the US in return for a domestic peace settlement capped-off with 
democratic elections (in which it is was understood that UNITA may very plausibly win).5" 
Crucially, it was understood by the MPLA that in the context o f Soviet ‘new thinking’, a faltering 
economy, vastly increased domestic debt and continued South African aggression that the 
normalisation o f relations with the US and admission to international economic institutions was 
an absolute necessity for the regime’s continued survival.512 In fact with an international audience 
and domestic economic troubles in mind, the MPLA had begun moving down the path o f  reform 
for some time: in 1987, for example, President Dos Santos announced a package entitled 
Saneamento de Economica e Financeiro (SEF), which was supposed to initiate the process o f 
Angola’s transition to a market-economy;513 and in 1990, the MPLA renounced Marxism as 
official party doctrine, and enacted several laws that were intended to liberalise the political
514system.
But despite these piecemeal reforms indicating the MPLA’s commitment to a new social order, 
the US maintained that until or unless the regime negotiated with UNITA and submitted to the 
guerrilla group’s demand for internationally supervised and sanctioned elections, it would 
continue to aid UNITA and withhold much needed diplomatic recognition.515 In this context the 
MPLA moved slowly but surely towards the US position and signed an agreement with UNITA 
in May 1991 under Portuguese auspices. The agreement’s provisions included the establishment 
o f a cease-fire, the formation of a national army, and the conduct o f national elections at the end 
o f the process. To support this endgame, the UN Security Council established UNAVEM II 
whose m andate was to monitor and verify the cease-fire and the neutrality o f the police, and
This was o f  course a disingenuous argument: the US was clearly working as a matter o f  priority for a way 
o f  extracting Cuba from the region. US official, Larry Napper, cited in: Crocker, High Noon, p.378.
5,1 Ibid. p.456.
512 It must be said that the MPLA found itself in an increasingly difficult domestic and international 
environment as the 1980s wore on. In the first place the slump in world oil prices that hit Angola in the late 
1980s affected its export earnings considerably and pushed the country into severe debt with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union— a development that these external patrons were none too happy with. Domestically, the 
centrally planned economy had caused significant production and pricing problems, and had encouraged 
the meteoric rise o f  an alternative black market. And o f  course Soviet perestroika in the USSR, and 
retrenchment abroad, indicated to MPLA leaders that a realignment o f  their foreign policy would be an 
increasingly urgent priority. On Angola’s changing development strategy through the 1980s, see: Tom 
Young, ‘The Politics o f  Development in Angola and Mozambique’, African Affairs, vol.87, no. 188 (1988), 
pp.165-184. On the Angolan state and economy more generally see: Keith Somerville, Angola: politics, 
economic, society, (London: Pinter press, 1986).
513 Tony Hodges, Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-diamond Capitalism  (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 
p. 104.
5,4 Ibid. p.50.
515 Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p.96.
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supervise the free and fair conduct o f national elections. This set o f UN roles simply amounted to 
another validation operation in Angola— designed to legitimise a process that had in essence been 
outlined and then imposed on the Angolan regime by the US. Certainly, in this regard it is hardly 
surprising to note the Angolan President’s desire to discuss with Sir Marrack Goulding the fate 
and fortunes o f  the Sandinistas in Nicaragua—who had just been voted out o f  power in another 
internationally imposed settlement crowned with elections that were supervised by the UN.5'6
As it turned out, the peace process that followed the Estoril accords proved to be short-lived. 
Despite a year o f relative peace in the country in which some tentative progress had been made 
towards the implementation o f the accords, conflict broke out following UNITA’s surprise first 
round defeat in the presidential elections o f 1992.517 While UNITA was publicly blamed for 
returning the country to war in the wake o f its rejection of the election results, UNAVEM II with 
its highly visible association with the peace process and the elections came to be seen as an 
unmitigated failure.
UNAVEM  II and the validation of regime change in Angola
The shortcomings o f UNAVEM II have become infamous in the conflict resolution world. For 
many, UNAVEM II graphically illustrated the institutional weaknesses of UN operations and 
came to be held as proof of the manner in which the UN has been forced into carrying out 
inadequately financed and resourced peace operations:
‘I had been given a 747 Jumbo to fly but provided with fuel sufficient only for a DC-
^  ? 518
This commonly cited quote by Margaret Anstee on the challenge she faced in running UNAVEM 
II is one that sums-up the type o f explanation given at the time, and post-facto, for the failure of 
the operation in November 1992.519 Lack o f international ‘resolve’ and a ‘quick-fix’ approach to a
516 Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 186.
517 Presidential results: Dos Santos 49.7%; Savimbi 40.07%. Legislative results: MPLA 54.74%; UNITA 
34.1%. United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.244. Because Dos Santos received less than the required 50% 
for an outright victory, a run-off second round election was theoretically required.
518 Anstee, Orphan o f  the C old War, p.38.
519 See among many typical examples o f  this strand o f  argument, in the press in particular: ‘Raw deal for 
UN in Angola’ Karl Maier, The Independent on Sunday (London), 18 October 1992; ‘Angola teaches 
lesson to U N ’ Chris Mcgreal, The Guardian (London), 11 December 1992.
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peripheral Cold War conflict, so the common argument runs, resulted in a hasty UN operation 
that was ill-equipped to deal with the ferocious nature of Angola’s conflict. At first glance there 
would appear to be some merit in these claims: UNAVEM II was authorised to operate with only 
440 military and police observers and spent a total o f $175 million.520 Compared to other 
missions o f  the time— $368 million in Namibia, $1.6 billion in Cambodia— UNAVEM IPs 
resources were meagre.521 Combined with the rigid and rushed implementation timetable that the 
Bicesse Accords adopted, UNAVEM II seemed to reflect the peripheral importance placed upon 
Angola by the international community.522
In this context, it is accurate to note that at the time the Security Council was more concerned 
with the escalating costs o f  peacekeeping operations, and preoccupied by the intensification o f 
violence in the Balkans on the borders o f Western Europe rather than on conflict-resolution in 
Angola.523 But while the general design o f UNAVEM II and the Bicesse process can be faulted 
for a variety of technical problems this kind o f argument invariably tends to overlook the fact that 
the central international actors in the Bicesse process were the Troika, and not the UN Security 
Council. To the extent to which this is recognised, the salutary lesson taken away from the 
UNAVEM II debacle is that the UN should always seek to participate in the wider negotiations 
under which a UN operation is deployed.524
On a deeper level, however, the problem with these explanations is that they have disregarded the 
specific political functions of UNAVEM II and the wider relations o f power that brought about 
the Bicesse accords in the first place. In the first instance, special representative Anstee struggled 
assiduously to increase UNAVEM II resources to no avail because UN managers in New York 
understood very well that as a ‘small and manageable operation’, UNAVEM II only had a token 
role to play in the process. This role, defined by the Troika and agreed by the Security Council, 
was important in so far as it provided legitimacy for the peace agreement. Crucial for the success 
o f the Bicesse process was not money or troops but the validation process that UNAVEM II 
would provide. In the second instance, and related to the first, the Bicesse Accords were the result
520 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.240.
521 Ibid. p .711, p.741.
522 ‘Angola teaches lesson to UN’ Chris Mcgreal, The Guardian (London), 11 December 1992.
523 Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001; ‘U.N. Chief 
Focuses on Africa’s ‘Underdog Conflicts” Barbara Crossette, New York Times (NYC), 23 July 1995. 
‘Conflict in the Balkans; U.N. Chief keeps promise to visit war-torn Africa’ Barbara Crossette, New York 
Times (N YC), 15 July 1995.
524 Anstee, Orphan o f  the C old War, p.533; Hare, Angola's last best chance, p.l 34.
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o f a particular constellation o f regional and international interests, most important o f which was a 
general attempt by the US to transform its relations in Southern Africa from one based upon 
support for anti-communist regimes and movements, to one that sought to manufacture 
legitimately governed and functioning states that were compatible with US economic and 
political values. As we have already seen, from the 1980s the US was deeply involved in trying to 
integrate the sub-region into a coherent political economy unit; the transformation o f the People’s 
Republic o f  Angola from a centrally-planned economy and one-party state into an ostensibly free 
market economy and multi-party democracy was one important element o f this project. Again, 
this was a process that was a long-time in the making with the incumbent regime groping towards 
economic and political reform—as well as membership o f international liberal economic 
institutions— throughout the 1980s.525 In a sense then the Bicesse Accords were designed to 
resolve and finalise all the outstanding issues, such as which local elite and faction would preside 
over the new Angolan order. Indeed the Bicesse Accords provided the very real and tantalising 
possibility for the US and South Africa o f regime-change from the MPLA to UNITA.526 The UN 
was drafted in to validate and officiate over this formal transition— of the symbolic integration of 
an ex-Afro-Marxist state into the liberal capitalist system and, if need be, o f a legitimate and 
orderly transfer o f power from an incumbent regime to a guerrilla movement turned quasi­
political party with an old and long established relationship with the Western alliance.
Some o f  these key functions of UNAVEM II can be shown through a brief examination o f UN 
Secretariat-UNAVEM II relations. Throughout UNAVEM II’s duration, Margaret Anstee worked 
to implement her mandate and clashed constantly with UN headquarters. From the outset o f her 
appointment she argued with UN headquarters, in particular under secretary-general for political 
affairs, Marrack Goulding, for greater manpower and material resources.527 She also argued for a 
revised mandate. On more than one occasion the response from UN headquarters was 
dismissive— Anstee was reprimanded by Boutros-Ghali and told to discontinue her practice of 
lobbying UN managers and international diplomats.528 In addition, her reports from Angola, 
which noted resource problems and the precarious political situation in the country, were toned 
down before their inclusion in the secretary-general’s reports to the Security Council. It should
525 For example, the MPLA had sought membership o f  the IMF for some time prior to its admission in 
September 1989 (facilitated, finally, by the US).
526 The least that can be said is that the US supported and advanced the UNITA position in negotiations, 
which was essentially that negotiations on equal terms should be concluded with national elections taking 
place as quickly as possible after the signing o f  a peace accord.
Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001.
528 Ibid.
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also be noted that in contrast to normal practice with special representatives, Anstee was 
prevented from briefing the Security Council personally because of the fear within DPKO and 
DPA that her outspoken views may raise alarm among non-permanent members o f the Security 
Council.529 This process o f UN ‘self-censorship’ was designed to maintain a ‘small and 
manageable operation’ in Angola whose role was simply to verify the cease-fire and elections.
Indeed, the logic o f such a position held by UN managers in New York was that UNAVEM II 
was never designed or developed to be a comprehensive peace operation; UNAVEM II, it was 
recounted by UN officials, was an operation whose mandate was limited to verifying the cease­
fire and neutrality of the police and to certifying the conduct o f free and fair elections. Therefore, 
when compared to the precise roles that the UN has undertaken elsewhere, the resources allocated 
to UNAVEM II were proportionate to the role o f the operation.530 Nevertheless it could be 
argued, as Anstee did, that even if  this was the case the resources allocated to UNAVEM II were 
still insufficient: for example the September 1992 election was ‘monitored’ by 400 international 
observers split into pairs who were deployed in 200 o f the 5,800 polling stations set up in the 
country.531 Disregarding the problematic rationale o f (and motives for) implanting a Western 
European model o f elections on the country, this seemed like a rather token attempt at probing the 
fidelity o f  the election process.
This divergence o f opinion relates to a different conception o f what the process was about. For 
Anstee, the Bicesse process and UNAVEM II’s role within it was about engendering the political 
and military conditions necessary for an end to the conflict and about the earnest belief that the 
Angolan population alone should decide the question of ‘who rules’. Her resort to subterfuge to 
secure additional resources for the elections— such as procuring additional aircraft for electoral 
logistics— reflected this conviction.532 However, apart from a major preoccupation with not 
damaging UN Secretariat-Security Council relations by requesting additional resources and a 
revised mandate, UN officials in New York saw UNAVEM II exactly for what it was: an
530 Anstee, Orphan o f  the Cold War, p.40. In an angry response to claims o f  UN failure, Marrack Goulding 
replied in a New York Times ‘Letter to the Editor’ that: ‘Those who, like you, wish the United Nations to 
develop into a more effective instrument for establishing peace in the world, should not blame the United 
Nations for failing to perform tasks that it was neither mandated nor equipped nor financed to perform’. 
‘U.N. Can’t Force Peace On Parties In Angola’ Sir Marrack Goulding, Letter to the Editor New York Times 
(NYC), 16 February 1993.
531 United Nations, The Blue Helmets, p.244.
532 See Anstee’s account o f  acquiring the loan o f  US vehicles. Anstee, Orphan o f  the C old War, pp.l 11- 
117.
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appendage to a pre-packaged peace-settlement delivered by the Troika. For New York, 
UNAVEM II was designed to provide a legitimising function, to ‘rubber-stamp’ the negotiation 
and implementation o f the Bicesse Accords by the Troika, the MPLA and UNITA. It is precisely 
because the function o f UNAVEM II was simply to ‘rubber-stamp’ the agreement that the 
resources allocated to UNAVEM II for elections and other functions were so low. In many 
respects, the resources that the operation received were incidental so long as it could credibly 
judge the cease-fire and the outcome o f  the elections. Hence UN managers explicitly pursued the 
policy o f ‘a small and manageable operation’.
In the event, even these basic requirements could not be met: a bungled demobilisation process in 
which both UNITA and the MPLA had failed to frilly ‘quarter’ their troops, and in which they 
were both said to have retained ‘secret’ armies meant that an important precondition for the 
conduct o f elections had been sidestepped. The policy o f elections at any cost was sealed when a 
key requirement o f the Bicesse Accords, the formation o f integrated army (FAA), was 
superficially established just two days before the national ballot.533 These were serious 
indiscretions, which for one reason or another the UN implicitly sanctioned. Yet, despite New 
York’s clearly politicised approach to UNAVEM II, the primary responsibility for such 
impropriety lay with the Troika’s management o f the process.
In reality, the peace process that was secured in Estoril in Portugal in May 1991 was the outcome 
o f international dynamics that had served to place extraordinary pressure on the two main parties 
to the Angolan conflict. While domestic and regional factors were clearly important here, it was 
US and USSR collaboration on the Angolan issue that served to deliver the MPLA and UNITA to 
the negotiating table.534 Most importantly, the Angolan regime was driven to engage in direct 
talks with UNITA as the central condition for the incremental normalisation o f relations with the 
US— a tactic explicitly pursued by State Department officials. More generally, pressure was 
placed directly on the parties through diplomacy backed by the threat o f sanction, and on regional 
allies who were to curtail MPLA and UNITA’s political and military activities.535 Their drive to 
collaborate was motivated by a variety o f concerns. As the George H. Bush Administration saw
533 Unified Armed Forces (FAA) was established on the 27 September 1992 but only 10,000 troops had 
been integrated. Gregory B. Simpkins, Angola: A Chronology o f  Major Political Developments 
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Democratic Studies, 1996), p. 27.
534 It was apparently during a Baker-Shevardnadze foreign ministers meeting in Houston in December 1990 
that the US and USSR hammered out the parameters o f  a final peace agreement, which was to be forced on 
the parties. Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p. 105.
535 Ibid. pp.89-96.
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the matter: ‘We wanted peace in Angola and a dignified exit for ourselves, a view shared by the 
Soviets.’536 It was also motivated by a radically reshaped US foreign policy that sought to realign 
what were seen as redundant Cold War alliances. In this regard, Assistant-Secretary o f State for 
Africa at the time, Herman Cohen, relates instructions given to him by his superior, James Baker 
III:
‘You had better cut a deal on Angola fast...because time is running out on our ability to 
deliver assistance to UNITA. These Cold War programs are going out o f style.’537
Part o f the implication here is that some form o f settlement was required in order to transform US 
support o f  a guerrilla movement into US support for a legitimate political party and expectantly, 
government. Elections validated by the UN were seen to be the vehicle for such a 
transformation.538 In fact it can be further argued that the wider role o f UNAVEM II was to 
validate a peace settlement in Angola based upon mainly US foreign policy interests in the region 
by providing for elections that many, including the US, expected UNITA to win.539 Indeed it is no 
secret, however underreported it may have been, that up until the signing of the Bicesse accords 
the US was still providing arms to UNITA as a way o f ensuring that the MPLA could not win an 
outright military victory and until the incumbent regime submitted to a negotiated settlement with 
UNITA that incorporated democratic elections.540 Even during the implementation o f the 
Accords, the Bush Administration was providing private electoral advice to UNITA’s leaders.541
536 Ibid. p.90; Perez de Cueller, Pilgrimage fo r  peace, p.326.
537 James Baker III cited in: Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p. 102.
538 It could be legitimately noted here that during the early 1990s democratic elections o f  the Western 
variety were increasingly being used by the US, in an experimental fashion perhaps, as a vehicle for regime 
change in the South, such as in Nicaragua, South Africa and the Philippines. Indeed, promoting a certain 
type o f democracy— as William Robinson has so thoroughly demonstrated— has become a central foreign 
policy instrument for the US. On this, see: Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy.
539 The British Embassy in Luanda, for a long-time the conduit for US interests in the country, reported 
back to London days before the election that a victory for Dos Santos: ‘...now  appears a possibility that 
many would have viewed as unlikely three months ago.’ Indeed, the prospect o f  an MPLA victory was, 
among diplomatic circles, considered quite unlikely until the final days o f  the election campaign. British 
Embassy Luanda telegram 474 (18 September 1992). Confidential telephone interview with former UN 
special representative, 13 August 2001; Speech by senior Angolan minister at British Angola Forum (BAF) 
Chatham House (24 September 2001); Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p .U 2; ‘Winner does not take all’, 
Africa Confidential, vol.33, no.18, 11 September 1992; ‘Angola To Vote, Unsure About West’s 
Democracy’ Kenneth Noble, New York Times (NYC), 27 September 1992.
540 Crocker, High Noon, pp.462-3 and Cohen, Intervening in Africa, p.96.
541 Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001; Cohen, 
Intervening in Africa, p. 110, p. 112.
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As it turned out, and as a side point, the usefulness o f UNITA for the US in general and the Bush 
Administration in particular had evaporated with the organisation’s inability to transform itself 
into a semi-acceptable political movement— as was seen by US astonishment at UNITA’s 
execution o f two o f its top political figures, Tito Chingungi and Wilson dos Santos, and its 
repudiation o f the election results.542 To be sure, UNITA still had powerful friends in 
Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, that resulted in continued good-will towards the 
movement up until the collapse o f the Lusaka Protocol in 1998, but these events marked a general 
shift o f US support away from the movement and towards the recently brought-into-the-fold 
MPLA. As the top diplomat of the newly established US Embassy to the Republic o f Angola 
remarked: ‘The U.S. never owned Savimbi, we just rented him .’543
It should also be remembered that while there were important ideological allegiances between 
numerous US private and public institutions and UNITA, which had the historic effect o f the US 
generally favouring this rebel movement, it is also true that other alliances, between elements o f 
the MPLA and US institutions such as the State Department, were being forged for some time 
prior to the Bicesse Accords.544 Indeed, informal diplomatic contacts had been established 
throughout the 1980s between various US administration officials, private US business executives 
(generally in the petroleum industry), and certain pro-Westem factions within the ruling MPLA. 
Needless to say, the US sought to engage those figures within the MPLA that were sympathetic to 
the Western model o f social organisation and built, over time, durable working relationships with
545these partners.
In sum, UNAVEM II was an operation that was fraught with difficulties. These revolved around 
problems o f  limited resources and a limited mandate in a context that had been shaped by 
superpower interests and Portuguese influence. Given a symbolic role intended to shore-up 
international legitimacy of the peace accords, the U N ’s role was important, albeit legally and
542 ‘Prospects o f  Vengeance and Victory for UNITA’ Africa Confidential vol.33, no.13, 3 July 1992; 
‘Angola: Bullets threaten the ballots’ Africa Confidential vol.33, no.20, 9 October 1992.
543 Cited in: ‘N o War, No Peace, No Angolan Solution’ Mercedes Sayagues, Weekly Mail and Guardian 
(Johannesburg), 3-9 July 1998.
544 ‘Angola: Mobutu holds key to peace’ Africa Confidential vol.30, no.25, 15 December 1989.
545 For example: Pedro de Castro van Dunem, a former foreign minister and oil minister, had strong tries 
with the US oil industry and George H. Bush. This member o f  the van Dunem clan— like most others—  
were often looking for greater ties to the US from the early 1980s onwards; at the same time the State 
Department, in contrast to the Pentagon, saw Pedro as a member o f  small group o f  former Marxists within 
the MPLA centred around the President that were willing to move fully into the Western camp and sought 
to encourage these elements through admittance to the IMF and World Bank. ‘Angola: War and Peace in 
the MPLA’ Africa Confidential, vol.30, no. 16, 11 August 1989.
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politically narrow. The UN’s emblematic role in the process is reflected in its perfunctory 
approach to UNAVEM II’s responsibilities, and in its dismissive reactions to Margaret Anstee’s 
protestations. This was a perilous strategy; the original mistake that UN officials made was to 
assume that because it had not designed or supervised the implementation o f the Accords, the 
organisation would be free from blame in the event o f its collapse. Because o f this 
miscalculation, the UN stood by the policy o f  a ‘small and manageable operation’ in Angola, 
despite clear shortcomings, focusing its attention instead on managing its shifting relations with 
the Security Council and pursuing peacemaking opportunities elsewhere— in Bosnia and Somalia. 
With a highly visible return to war following the elections, this policy turned out to be a serious 
blunder: the UN’s reputation was badly tainted and its credibility as an effective peacemaking 
body, was under question.546 More assiduously, many UN officials felt that UNAVEM II had 
been used to shield relevant member-states from their oversights in Angola; in essence the UN 
had become a ‘scapegoat’ for the collapse o f a settlement in which they only played a token 
part.547
The management of the Lusaka Protocols
In contrast to the previous roles assigned to the UN in Angola, the deployment o f  UNAVEM III 
and its oversight o f the Lusaka accords marked a significant upgrading o f tasks assigned to the 
organisation in the country. It was not so much that the political functions o f a peace settlement in 
Angola fundamentally changed with the new UN mission and peace accords. Rather, it was the 
means to achieve such prefabricated ends— o f finalising and consolidating the question o f which 
local elite and faction would preside over the new and nascent social order in the country— that 
changed. Here, the UN was given the lead role, the requisite resources, and a degree o f relative 
autonomy for delivering this settlement in Angola. It is to the management o f this process, 
especially the way in which UN officials sought advance the progression o f the settlement that 
the chapter now turns.
546 In November 1992 the secretary-general acknowledged the difficulties the UN was having following its 
Angolan operation. The comment of one UN official was: ‘We’ve hit a sticky patch all right.’ Cited in: ‘No 
Peace For The U.N.’ Paul Lewis New York Times (NYC), 29 November 1992. Many other commentators 
linked the UN with failure in Angola. ‘Perils For The U. N.’ Paul Lewis, New York Times (NYC), 20 
December 1992; ‘The U.S. Can Learn From Angola’s Losers’ Bill Keller, New York Times (NYC), 17 
January 1993; ‘Angola teaches lesson to UN’ Chris Mcgreal, The Guardian (London), 11 December 1992. 
‘Raw deal for UN in Angola’ Karl Maier, The Independent on Sunday (London), 18 October 1992.
547 Confidential interview with senior UN official, New York, 1 December 2000; Confidential interview 
with senior UN official, New York, 24 November 2000; Confidential telephone interview with former UN 
special representative, 18 August 2001.
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There were high stakes involved for the UN at the outset o f the implementation o f the Lusaka 
Protocol in December 1994. Not only had the UN invested over 14 painstaking months 
negotiating the agreement with the MPLA and UNITA, but the organisation had also suffered a 
great loss in its prestige and credibility in the wake o f its previous foray in the country in 1992, as 
well as in Somalia in June 1993, and in Rwanda and Bosnia in 1994.548 Compounding this 
pressure was the sheer magnitude o f the post-Bicesse conflict, a scale o f violence not seen since 
the civil w ar o f  1975-1976. Dubbed the ‘war o f the cities’, it was estimated by UN agencies that 
1,000 Angolans a day were dying in the conflict and its related consequences in early 1993.549 For 
these reasons, the UN went to great lengths to ensure that previous shortcomings in the design o f 
UNAVEM II would not be repeated again in any further UN operation in the country.550 This, it 
should be noted, was done extremely thoroughly by UN officials involved in the design o f the 
Protocols and o f UNAVEM III: a power-sharing dynamic was adopted; full demobilisation o f 
UNITA was expected; a relatively realistic timeframe was set; the UN became the central 
negotiator and implementer o f the Protocols; and a significant amount o f human and material 
resources were allocated to UNAVEM III.551 However, the standards that the UN set out for itself 
were severely depreciated by how it came over time to define the successful implementation o f 
the various Protocols. In particular, during the major implementation period, December 1994 to 
December 1996, UN officials successively blurred various conditions o f the agreement, 
including: conditions relating to the deployment o f UN peacekeepers in the first place; the 
definition o f  quartering and disarmament; and the continued integrity o f the ceasefire and arms 
embargo on the parties.
The adoption o f these attitudes towards the implementation of key facets o f the Protocol by UN 
officials was the result o f three related factors. First, there was the normative belief o f some UN 
officials at the time— in this case the new special representative to Angola, Alioune Blondin 
Beye— that internal conflicts could only be resolved through a power-political approach to
548 ‘Sniping Is Growing At U.N. Over Weakness In Peacekeeping’ Richard Bernstein, New York Times 
(NYC), 21 June 1993.
549 This was a widely cited figure that originated from S/26434, 13 September 1993 paragraph 20. For 
example: ‘Angola’s Return To War Scars Its People And Now Its Cities’ Bill Keller, New York Times 
(NYC), 20 September 1993; ‘Over 1,000 a day die in Angola’ Michael Littlejohns, Financial Times 
(London), 15 September 1993.
550The N ew  York Times commented that: ‘This time the peace is taking place under the high-powered 
scrutiny o f  a United Nations chastened by earlier failure.’ ‘Angolan Foes Sign A Truce In Step Toward A 
Formal Peace’ Bill Keller, New York Times (NYC), 16 November 1994.
551 Lusaka Protocols (15 November 1994) available online: 
<www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/pa_angol.html>.
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mediation. Conflict-resolution was seen as a process of adjudicating between mutually exclusive 
armed actors and as being determined by their relative power. Private diplomacy and mediation 
were required to manage changes in this ‘balance’ and achieve peace. It has to be said that this 
was applied selectively in peace operations, as was seen in the case o f Somalia and the manner in 
which UN officials sought to ostracise the major warring-parties. It should also be noted that in 
the post-Rwanda milieu, this was an increasingly unfashionable and unpopular approach among 
international technocrats for managing crises in the periphery.
Possibly as significant in the Angolan case are a second-set o f related explanations that revolve 
around: the institutional concern o f UN officials to ensure success in the Angolan context; and the 
way in which UN officials came to rely (in the process o f ensuring such a success) on a dogged 
engagement with local elites as a method o f maintaining the U N ’s sway in the country. Firstly, 
the UN can be seen to have compelling reason to push through with the implementation of the 
Lusaka Protocol because o f way in which it was saddled with the blame for the failure o f the 
previous peace process in Angola in 1992 and because o f high-profile failures elsewhere in 
Africa. In this respect UNAVEM III— at the time the largest UN peacekeeping operation 
deployed— was seen as an important opportunity to reassert its capacity and revive its reputation 
for managing transitions in the periphery. In many ways, therefore, failure in Angola this time 
around was not an option for UN officials keen to retain their specialised peace functions in the 
South. It can be argued here that when it became clear that UNITA and MPLA non-compliance 
on various issues would be protracted, the definition o f successful implementation o f the 
protocols became rather fluid. In short, success could be defined in a variety o f ways. Finally, and 
in some ways with a slightly different accent to the rationale outlined above, the protracted and 
fluid interpretation o f  the implementation o f  the Lusaka Protocols by the UN can be read as a 
determined effort to stay-the-course in Angola by prodding and pushing the local elites down the 
path o f so-called reconciliation. Indeed on this more abstract level, UN actions in Angola during 
the Lusaka period can be seen to reflect the emergence a peace operations doctrine that 
emphasised micro-managing and stage-managing developments as a method o f cajoling 
uncooperative locals to accept by attrition— as opposed to overt coercion— internationally 
imposed settlements. By continually binding local groups in a web o f international diplomacy and 
conflict management, the UN perhaps hoped to remain a principal force in the country’s politics.
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The politics of implementation and the deployment of UNAVEM III
Central to the dynamics o f the UN’s policy towards the implementation o f the Lusaka Protocol 
was the way in which UN officials sought to protect the process’s continued survival by adopting 
an elastic and pragmatic approach to its provisions. This occurred in a variety of spheres and 
circumstances, sometimes as a reflex response to serious moments o f crisis, and sometimes as an 
underlying political strategy designed to stimulate and manufacture compliance to the 
agreements.
From the very outset o f the Lusaka Protocol, the UN disregarded its own preconditions for 
engagement. Important here were conditions relating to the effective cessation o f hostilities that 
were set by the secretary-general and endorsed by the Security Council before first, military 
observers and second, peacekeeping troops, were to be deployed in Angola. The secretary-general 
noted in his report to the Security Council in December 1994 that:
‘The Angolan parties must abide fully by the Protocol before the UN can consider 
committing major resources to a substantial expansion o f its operation. The Security 
Council has reiterated that the UN can assist only once the Angolans themselves have 
demonstrated the necessary political w ill.’552
As a first step, the secretary-general required the MPLA and UNITA to ‘...meticulously 
implement the cease-fire’ and to have this confirmed by his representative, Blondin Beye, before 
military observers be restored to their previous strength under UNAVEM II.553 Only four days 
later, and despite a precarious military standoff between the parties, Beye reported back to 
Boutros-Ghali that the ceasefire was ‘generally holding’ and that the MPLA and UNITA had 
requested ‘...the planned enlargement o f UNAVEM .’554 The upshot o f this letter was that the 
precondition for redeployment had been sidestepped: a ‘meticulously’ implemented cease-fire 
had been substituted for one that was ‘generally holding’, and the rationale for enlarging military 
observers was now based on its explicit request by the parties. There was, o f course, some logic 
to Beye’s recommendation; how could the UN verify the status o f the cease-fire without 
sufficient military observers on the ground? Nevertheless, the atmosphere in Angola that had
552 S/1994/1376,4 December 1994.
553 Ibid.
554 S/1994/1395, 8 December 1994.
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preceded and followed the signing o f the Lusaka accords was, to say the least, tense and 
belligerent.555 The initialling o f the Protocols on 17 October 1994 was followed by an extensive 
military offensive by government forces against Huambo, and the signing o f the Accords on 20 
November was followed by an offensive against UNITA in Uige and M ’banza Congo, in the 
north.556 Throughout December too there were reports o f MPLA military activities in northern 
provinces coupled with public and private pronouncements by UNITA that were manifestly 
hostile to the Lusaka Protocol and the UN.557 Such an atmosphere could hardly be demonstrative 
o f  ‘...the necessary political w ill’ that the secretary-general had insisted upon before UN re­
engagement.
The decision to redeploy military and police observers by UN officials was therefore a political 
one; a choice that was not based upon the fulfilment o f the conditions that the UN had set, but 
based upon on securing the continued viability o f  the Protocols. It reflected the U N ’s willingness 
to tailor provisions as and when it was necessary to keep the transition to a new social order on- 
track. This approach to the implementation o f the Lusaka Protocol became clearly defined in the 
episode that saw the eventual authorisation o f UNAVEM III and the deployment o f 4,000 UN 
peacekeeping troops. Like the decision to redeploy observers in Angola, the secretary-general in 
February 1995 outlined in detail several stipulations that should be met by the MPLA and UNITA 
before the deployment o f UN peacekeepers could take place. These included: an effective 
cessation o f hostilities, the full disengagement o f troops; the creation o f verification mechanisms; 
the establishment o f communications between the parties; the provision o f military data on both 
sides to UNAVEM; and the commencement o f de-mining.558 Despite these informal conditions, 
the secretary-general concluded in the ‘Observations’ section o f the report that:
‘Given the...respect for the cease-fire shown by the Government and UNITA, their
commitment to ensuring the safety and security o f the UN personnel and their
555 Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance fo r  Peace: An Insider’s Account o f  the Peace Process 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 1998), pp. 59-71.
556 ICRC, ICRC Activities in Angola: 1993-7 December 2000  (ICRC: Geneva, 2000), p.7; ‘Ceasefire in 
Angola fails to stop guns’ Karl Maier, The Independent (London), 28 November 1994. Simpkins, Angola: a  
chronology, p.32. See also Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/1994/63 in which concern is 
noted ‘...over the recent reports o f  the intensification o f  military operations in particular those towards 
Huambo.’
557 Hare, A ngola’s  last best chance, p.67. It has been widely recalled, for example, that Savimbi did not 
attend the signing o f  the Lusaka Protocol.
558 S/1995/97, 1 February 1995.
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commitment to the Lusaka process and national reconciliation, I recommend that a new 
UN operation in Angola, UNAVEM III, immediately take over from UNAVEM II.’559
With one important proviso, the Security Council accepted this recommendation. In Security 
Council Resolution 976 (8 February 1995) it was decided that UN infantry troops would only be 
deployed once the stipulations outlined by the secretary-general in the above report had been 
fulfilled.560 This proviso also placed the onus upon the secretaiy-general to establish exactly when 
these conditions had been met. In line with the U N ’s decision to redeploy military observers in 
December 1994, however, the detailed preconditions relating UNAVEM I ll’s deployment that 
had been set out in Boutros-Ghali’s February report were gradually but substantially diluted. At 
that time it could not possibly be argued that most o f the conditions could or would be realised.561 
There was still a high incidence o f what were deceptively termed ‘localised’ cease-fire violations 
that amounted to around 120 incidents a month in 1995, and UN personnel had come under attack 
on several occasions.562 Instead, UN officials presented a situation in Angola that was stable but 
still uncertain. The UN continued to stress that the cease-fire had been ‘generally holding’ and 
that the MPLA and UNITA had reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process.
But in order to justify the deployment o f UN peacekeepers, which was done in March 1995, UN 
managers necessarily went a step further in the rationalisation o f their decision. In fact, the 
conditions were effectively shelved altogether with a completely different set o f reasons given by 
the secretary-general for deployment. This was prompted by Ismit Kittani’s visit to assess the
559 Boutros-Ghali also noted that: ‘For the international community, there are obvious risks involved in 
investing in a new peacekeeping operation in Angola. If the above-mentioned political will is found to be 
lacking or if  the cooperation required from the parties is not forthcoming, 1 will not hesitate to invite the 
Security Council to reconsider its commitments in Angola.’ S /1995/97 ,1 February 1995.
560 The Security Council in its resolution: ‘Decides that the deployment o f  infantry units will take place on 
the basis o f  a report from the secretary-general to the Security Council that the conditions contained in 
paragraph 32 o f  the secretary-general’s report, inter alia , effective cessation o f  hostilities, provisions o f  all 
relevant military data, and the designation o f  all quartering areas, have been met, provided the Council does 
not decide otherwise.’ S/RES/976, 8 February 1995. Yet Chris Garuba, UN C hief Military Observer in 
Angola, believed in February 1995 that: ‘...under the current circumstances there is no way that the 
international community will allow peacekeeping troops to come into Angola because the process is being 
stalled.’ ‘Delays In Angolan Peace Process’ Inter Press Service International News, Monday 27 
February 1995.
561 This was a position that, as indicated above, Chris Garuba held. ‘UNAVEM man says Unita is stalling’ 
SouthScan, vol. 10, no.9, 3 March 1995.
562 There were on average 120 violations o f  the cease-fire a month in 1995. Human Rights Watch Arms 
Project and HRW Africa, Angola: Between War and Peace. Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since 
Lusaka Protocol vol. 8, no. 1 (A), February 1996, p. 10. See also: ‘Angola: Inside the tent’ Africa 
Confidential, vol.36, no. 14, 7 July 1995.
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situation in Angola in March 1995 on the secretary-general’s behest, in which he argued that the 
Lusaka process required a push-start:
‘...I t is clear that it is becoming increasingly necessary to assist the parties in overcoming 
their mutual mistrust and to create additional impetus to the peace process.’563
This represented a revised rationale for UN engagement, where UNAVEM was to be deployed as 
a way o f  stabilising the precarious ceasefire and peace process. Instead o f verifying the 
implementation o f  the provisions, UNAVEM was to help foster a constructive environment for its 
development. More telling was the inference that the peace process was not proceeding as 
anticipated. As the secretary-general explicitly conceded in the letter to the Security Council in 
late March 1995 authorising the planning stage o f  deployment:
‘...W ith a view to avoiding dangerous delays in the implementation o f the Lusaka 
Protocol which might destabilise conditions on the ground, I have decided that it would 
be in the best interest o f the peace process to proceed with the preparations for the 
deployment o f the UN infantry units to Angola. I fully realise that there are certain risks 
involved in the above decision.’564
In the end, therefore, the decision to prepare for deployment was based upon a completely 
different set o f criteria than had been originally agreed in Security Council Resolution 976 (8 
February 1995).565 This decision set the pattern o f UN policies towards the implementation of 
UNAVEM III, and sealed an approach to its provisions that was above all else politically 
pragmatic. The decision, like its antecedent in December 1994, was a direct response o f  the UN 
to the perilous state o f  the Lusaka accords. Because the process was so fragile, in moments o f 
crisis it required innovative and flexible approaches to its implementation. But this pattern of 
behaviour went further than simply a UN response to crisis points in the peace process. As we 
will now see, the evolution o f the UNITA ‘quartering process’ translated over time into a 
protracted period o f  horse-trading. This policy was so pronounced partly because o f an approach 
to conflict-resolution that UN officials held that privileged private diplomacy and power politics,
563 S /1995/230, 28 March 1995.
564 Ibid.
565 S/RES/976, 8 February.
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and partly because o f an increasingly desperate diplomatic attempt by these same UN officials to 
ensure that UNITA formally complied, no matter how superficially, with the Protocols.
The politics of definition and the quartering of UNITA’s army
In a statement broadcast on Angolan television on 14 December 1996, the secretary-general’s 
representative in Angola, Blondin Beye, officially confirmed that UNITA had fulfilled its 
obligations under the Lusaka Protocol relating to quartering its troops: ‘UNAVEM III declares 
that henceforth, as far as it is aware, despite some reservations, UNITA has carried out all its 
military tasks.’566 After two years o f protracted and, to say the least, belated steps taken by 
UNITA to surrender its armed forces, the statement represented a significant moment o f respite 
for UNAVEM I ll’s leadership.
Behind the facade o f this qualified success, however, there was considerable unease, both within 
the UN system and within the international community more generally, about the integrity o f the 
quartering, integration and demobilisation process and the veracity o f UNAVEM’s claims. 
Indeed, it was felt by UN officials deployed at quartering locations that the whole process had 
been politically manipulated by UNAVEM to such an extent that it had become practically 
meaningless.567 As will become clear, this was because in the absence o f satisfactory progress in 
the dismantlement o f UNITA’s military machine, UNAVEM III interpreted the process rather 
charitably: UNAVEM quartered a large percentage o f troops that were clearly civilians, 
occasionally government POWs; accepted UNITA disarmament that was all but superficially 
applied; and disregarded the continued existence o f significant UNITA forces posing as police, or 
personal protection units, for Jonas Savimbi.
The quartering of UNITA troops was a central component o f the Lusaka Protocol. It could be 
argued that after the establishment o f a ceasefire, it ranked along with the establishment o f a 
power-sharing formula as the most important principle o f the Lusaka Protocol to be implemented. 
Indeed, it was widely argued that the failure to carry this out during the Bicesse Accords was 
what had allowed UNITA to pursue the military option after its election defeat in September
566 BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 17 December 1996: UNAVEM statement read out by Blondin 
Beye on Televisao Popular de Angola, 14 December 1996.
567 Peter Simkin speech at SOAS 1997. ACTSA; CIIR; Christian Aid ‘Achieving Lasting Peace in Angola: 
the Unfinished Agenda. Report o f  conference held at SOAS, London, 4 September 1997’ (London SOAS), 
p.23; Office for the Coordination o f  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Complex Crisis Complex Peace: 
Humanitarian Coordination in Angola (New York, February 1998), 7.6.
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1992. The process agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocols was one that envisaged the quartering and 
disarmament o f all o f UNITA troops in designated UN areas throughout Angola followed by 
either their integration into the FAA, or their demobilisation and reintegration back into civilian 
life.568 The process was due to begin as soon as peacekeepers had been deployed and the UN and 
UNITA had built quartering areas. In the event, the quartering process did not start until 
November 1995 when the UN and the US began to exert significant diplomatic and material 
pressure on UNITA to comply with the military provisions o f the Lusaka Protocol.569
The declaration in December 1996 that UNITA had completed the quartering process was 
problematic for a variety o f reasons. For UN officials o f the Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Unit (UCAH) who were responsible, among other things, for planning and 
coordinating demobilisation and maintained for this purpose staff in all quartering areas, there 
were significant discrepancies in the process.570 Most staff noticed some general patterns in 
UNITA practise that were condoned by UNAVEM in order to facilitate the numeric targets being 
met.571 In the first place it was estimated that out o f the 41,796 UNITA troops demobilised, a 
significant proportion were civilians, underage conscripted soldiers (4,799), or disabled soldiers 
(10,728).572 As Peter Simkin, former Director o f UCAH explains:
‘Most o f  the UNITA soldiers, who were registered in the Quartering Areas as ex­
combatants, were raw recruits scooped up from the surrounding rural areas. In private 
registration interviews many expressed their desire to return home rather than be 
integrated into a combined army.’ 573
Perhaps even more troubling for those observing the process was UNAVEM’s cursory 
supervision o f UNITA’s disarmament. In one instalment o f 12,500 UNITA troops that were 
quartered on 12 February 1996, for example, only 1,200 unusable weapons were handed in.574 
The charade of this process was well known and commented on. While one official in a
568 The Lusaka Protocols, Annex 3 General Principles.
569 Madeline Albright’s visit to Angola in January 1996 was part o f  a campaign to exert pressure on the 
parties to implement the Protocols. On its details, see: Hare, A ngola’s last best chance, p.99.
570 OCHA, Complex crisis complex peace, 4.1.
571 Simpkins, Angola: a chronology, p.23.
572 Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall o f  the Lusaka Peace Process (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1999), p.32.
573 Simpkins, Angola: a chronology, p.23.
574 Ibid. p.36. The UN estimated that 30-40% o f  weapons handed in were not ‘serviceable’. S/1996/171, 6 
March 1996.
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quartering area noted to a human rights investigator that ‘Nobody believed UNITA was handling 
in their real weapons’, another observer stated that in one assembly area ‘...the weapons on 
display looked as if  they had last been fired in the Boer war.’575 But the meaning o f this practice 
went further than simply relating to disarming UNITA; quartering a UNITA soldier was officially 
preconditioned by a weapon being handed over. In essence, therefore, it was also an issue o f 
fulfilling ‘quartering targets’. And contrary to this protocol that all troops must hand in a weapon 
before registration, UCAH was pressed as a matter o f policy to ‘bend the rules’ in order to meet 
these ‘targets’.576 Again, as Peter Simkin relates:
‘The Joint Commission and the UN Special Representative o f  the secretary-general 
allowed the majority o f UNITA soldiers to register in the fifteen Quartering Areas 
without handing in their weapons.’577
In all o f these various patterns o f quartering discrepancies, the UN noted, albeit mutedly, some o f 
its shortcomings. Indeed throughout 1996, the secretary-general’s reports to the Security Council 
were lightly infused with references to the paucity of weapons surrendered, and the sheer extent 
o f UNITA’s so-called ‘police force’.578 Yet in many other important details, the reports gave a 
rather erroneous account o f the progress o f quartering. There is little mention o f underage soldiers 
or ‘raw ’ recruits, and there is no explanation given for why UNAVEM accepted the policy o f 
quartering 24,867 UNITA troops without their weapons.579 Most disingenuous, however, was 
Blondin Beye’s December 16 announcement in Luanda: how could it plausibly be stated by 
UNAVEM that ‘...as far as it is aware, despite some reservations, UNITA has carried out all its 
military tasks’?
The answer in part relates to the personal approach that Beye adopted to the implementation o f 
the Lusaka Protocol and to the general policy o f seeking to complete the protocols o f  the peace 
process at any cost. Indeed the ‘numbers game’, as Ambassador Paul Hare put it, reflected a 
policy o f  political pragmatism embraced by the UN that, in lieu o f  substantive progress in
575 Cited in: HRW, Angola unravels, p. 34; Hare, Angola's last best chance, p. 100.
576 ‘Angola: Slow, Painful’ Africa Confidential, vol.37, no. 12, 12 April 1996.
577 Simpkins, Angola: a chronology, p.23. 24, 867 UNITA troops were quartered without weapons up to the 
27 September 1996. S/1996/827, 4 October 1996.
578 S/1996/171; S/1996/328; S/1996/503; S/1996/827.
579 Underage troops and civilians forced into quartering areas by UNITA are mentioned in passing in 
S/1996/171, 6 March 1996.
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UNITA’s quartering, accepted any technique that would avoid scuttling the process.580 But in the 
broader context, it is also clear that the UN, the US and UNITA were all engaged in a diplomatic 
battle o f wills and wits in which the rebel group sought to delay and redefine the conditions o f its 
disbandment. After numerous diplomatic demarches, from the US, UN and others, UNITA 
belatedly began the process in a much diluted form, which was accepted as better than nothing by 
UN officials administering the process. It was simply the case that the UN made a political 
compromise as to the extent o f UNITA’s dismemberment in the process o f trying to impose this 
crucial protocol on the rebel group.
UN power politics during Lusaka
In a considerable broadside against this approach that Blondin Beye adopted towards the peace 
process in general and quartering process in particular, the UN Office for the Coordination o f 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted in a report assessing humanitarian activities in the country 
the overly pragmatic approach to Lusaka that the UN consistently took:
‘In highly politicised conflict or post-conflict periods, the UN mission, the warring 
parties, or the Observer Governments may make a political decision to misrepresent or 
not disclose known information. The decision to forego transparency and public 
accountability in favour o f private dialogue is a political decision which, with the benefit 
o f hindsight, may or may not be justified. In Angola, humanitarian organisations 
sometimes found that the Angolan situation presented by the SRSG [Blondin Beye] and 
the UNAVEM mission differed considerably* from their own experience and 
understanding.’581
It is implied here that, in some way or another, UNAVEM was adopting a real-politick approach 
to the conflict and that it did this because in its judgm ent this would be beneficial to the 
continuation o f  the peace process. As we have already seen, the UN applied a fluid diplomatic 
approach in relation to the deployment o f UN peacekeepers and to the verification o f UNITA’s 
quartering as a method o f coaxing the parties down the path o f implementation and binding them 
into the process. This general ‘high-diplomacy’ approach that Beye and other UN managers
580 Hare, A n gola’s last best chance, p. 100.
581 OCHA, Complex crisis complex peace, 7.6.
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adopted was also reflected in the way in which the UN constantly talked-down violations o f the 
cease-fire and the procurement of heavy arms by both the government and UNITA.
From the outset o f the Lusaka process, the military activities o f the government and UNITA 
threatened the survival o f the Lusaka accords because o f its consequences for the deployment o f 
UN peacekeepers and because various actions on the battlefield served to hinder the progress o f 
implementation. For example, cajoling UNITA to ‘quarter’ its troops became all the more 
difficult with tactical military forays by the government. Yet, it was obvious that at certain 
moments o f the process there was very little peace to keep; during 1995 there were 1,200 cease­
fire violations, 235 o f which took place during the month o f March when the secretary-general 
had decided to plan for UN deployment.582 Government operations against UNITA between the 
signing o f the accords and 1997 in particular were low-key but constant: a massive rearmament 
programme for the FAA was accompanied by tactical military movements and, sporadically, 
offensives in a variety o f provinces. Typical o f such an atmosphere, a UN officer commentated in 
July 1995 on tensions in the north, with troop movements and standoffs in M ’banza Congo, 
Zaire, Uige, and Lunda Norte:
‘Everyday we hear new reports o f troop movements, attacks on barracks and troops 
pillaging the local population in the interior... We see invasions o f buffer zones 
established in the major disengagement areas like in Uige, but these have never been 
respected by either side.’583
Yet, in general these incidents were dismissed as ‘technical’ and ‘low-level’ by Blondin Beye, 
and were reported as such in reports to the Security Council.584 In addition, it was felt by other 
UN officials working in Angola that Beye deliberately avoided highlighting government and 
UNITA violations. For one outspoken critic, Beye: ‘ ...shied from publicly assigning blame for 
violations. This seems to have been official UN policy.’585 As we have seen, this was initiated in
582 Ibid. 2.3.
583 Cited in: ‘Concern Over Tensions In Angola’ Reuters News Service, 21 July 1995. Available from: 
International Peacekeeping News <http://csf.Colorado.edu/defax/ipn>.
584 For one example: S/1995/177, 5 March 1995. Chris Garuba disagreed with Beye’s approach and 
maintained that skirmishes, troop movement, small and large-scale attacks were violations. As it was put in 
one analysis: ‘Garuba is forthright: Beye practices quiet diplomacy.’ Cited in: ‘Angola: Inside the tent’ 
Africa Confidential, vol.36, no. 14, 7 July 1995.
585 ‘No War No Peace No Angolan Solution’, Mercedes Sayagues. Weekly Mail and Guardian 3-9 July 
1998. Sayagues was a World Food Programme (WFP) information officer who became critical o f  
UNAVEM and Beye’s approach after she was banned from talking about the dire humanitarian situation
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December 1995, when Beye denied that any serious violations o f the ceasefire had occurred since 
its initiation, despite the FAA offensive against UNITA in Uige and M’banza Congo during 
November. Beye’s caveat was: ‘O f course that doesn’t mean to say there hasn’t been certain 
hostilities.’586
Apart from the reticence o f such UN public diplomacy what this goes to show is just how 
pragmatically minded UN managers were in their approach to the Lusaka Protocols. Most 
fundamentally, the entire progress o f the settlement depended upon the existence o f  a cease-fire—  
and the UN’s most basic task was to monitor this truce. Moreover, the very deployment o f UN 
peacekeepers and the continuation o f UNAVEM III were premised upon this formal and practical 
cessation o f hostilities. On one level, therefore, it can only be inferred that the UN made a 
political decision to overlook these widespread indiscretions as a necessary way o f  guaranteeing a 
UN presence in Angola and a continuation o f the process. On another level though, UN officials 
also understood— as in other peacekeeping contexts— the exigencies o f UN troops for the 
survival o f UNITA or the government at various times, and decided that it was vital to continue to 
fulfil this function. It would seem that as important as anything else in this context, UN officials 
knew that they could utilise this dependency in return for compliance on certain other issues. 
Indeed, even by brushing over cease-fire discrepancies— violations that the UN high-command in 
New York ritually stated would lead to the end o f UNAVEM III— UN officials were participating 
in a delicate but well-worn game o f engaging local elites and enveloping them further into the 
process. In the extreme, the UN and others could raise the explicit spectre o f troop withdrawal, 
which in due course they did as a way o f prodding the parties down the route o f an orderly 
submission.
In sum, it can be concluded that from the very outset o f the Lusaka Protocols, the UN sought to 
ensure that the process would not be derailed or sabotaged by the outright non-compliance o f 
local elites. Here, as we have seen, important prerequisites such as an effective cease-fire and a 
judicious demobilisation effort were resisted by the parties who were keen to avoid handing any 
type o f advantage to their local opponents and, perhaps just as importantly, to international forces 
like the UN operating extensively in the country. To a large extent the UN played along with this 
game; during endless rounds of shuttle diplomacy UN officials invariably accepted some degree
she had seen in Cuito as a result o f  a deal reached by UNAVEM and UNITA to allow the evacuation o f  
trapped UN personnel in the town. ‘Inter-Agency Differences Bedevil UN Aid Distribution in Angola’ 
Chris Mcgreal, The Guardian (London), 16 November 1993.
586Cited from: ANC daily news briefing, Friday 9 December 1994: <www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/>.
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o f  compromise and concession on the implementation of the accords to placate the parties and tie 
them into making some effort at carrying out their externally imposed obligations. The quartering 
o f  UNITA’s troops was perhaps most stark in this regard because the UN’s and US’s irritation at 
the group’s persistent delays, culminating in high-level demarches and threats, was matched by a 
sense o f relief when the process, hugely diluted, did eventually get underway. Walking UNITA 
down the path o f organised surrender in this area in particular was a turbulent one for UN 
officials to handle and resulted in their acceptance o f a far from perfect process.
The UN had relatively less trouble in its dealings with the regime— except on the issue o f human 
rights and cease-fire violations— largely because the immediate onus for implementation rested 
with UNITA. Nonetheless the MPLA’s limited freedom o f movement should not be 
underestimated: most importantly the regime had conceded a power-sharing agreement during 
Lusaka and surrendered a large role for the UN in the country’s affairs. In a very real sense the 
Angolan government was inviting the UN to extensively interfere in its politics and giving formal 
legitimacy, once again, to UNITA. This position not only reflected various changes in the 
military balance in the country between UNITA and the MPLA, or the region more generally, but 
also a continued campaign by the US to trade incremental diplomatic support for the regime with 
continued MPLA cooperation and general good behaviour. On the whole, therefore, it is fair to 
suggest that both UNITA and the MPLA found themselves in a web o f international diplomacy 
and peacemaking that sought through endless rounds of negotiations to lock them into an 
organised process o f political and military capitulation. In this respect, the management o f the 
Lusaka Protocols by the UN can be interpreted as a dogged and determined diplomatic effort to 
ensure that the two-factions kept to the script o f  the peace process— even if  its provisions were 
pragmatically tailored in the course o f events.
The anatomy of a manufactured peace and the standard of UN peace operations
A decade o f  troubled and often tragic UN peacemaking in Angola has had the unfortunate effect 
o f  reducing analysis o f this encounter to the functional facets o f the conflict, the personalities o f 
the major belligerents, and the technical capacities o f the so-called international peacemakers.587 
What has undoubtedly been set-aside and sacrificed in these narratives has been the historical and
587 See, Krska, ‘Peacekeeping in Angola’; Malaquias, ‘The UN in Mozambique and Angola’; MacQueen, 
‘Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola’; Pazzanita, ‘The Conflict Resolution Process in 
Angola’; Anthony W. Pereira, ‘The Neglected Tragedy: the Return to War in Angola, 1992-3.’
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political framework in which UN missions to Angola and the region have operated, and equally, 
the way in which when given the opportunity the UN has sought to act as a loyal and symbolic 
marker o f change to a liberal order for states and societies in the region. Indeed considering the 
empirical record it is quite reasonable to suggest that the major facet o f this UN encounter has 
been missed: that is, the historic and structural function of the UN in Southern Africa has been to 
legitimise, on essentially US terms, the final stages o f the region’s staged reintegration into the 
Western capitalist world-order.
In Angola, in particular, this has been the underlying basis o f  all the UN’s peace operations. At 
first, the UN was simply called in to legitimate and officiate over a withdrawal o f Cuban troops 
from country— a long-standing US policy goal that it was hoped would fatally undermine the 
incumbent regime or, at the very least, narrow its relative autonomy from international 
exigencies. When the regime then moved decisively down the road of US and UNITA defined 
national reconciliation— a risk that the MPLA considered necessary given its need to end its 
international isolation in the twilight o f the Second World— the UN was again enlisted to preside 
over a formal transition o f political systems, and possibly regimes. The UN role here was 
symbolic, heralding the endgame o f a long fought for reintegration o f the Angolan state back into 
the liberal world system.
Only allotted this token role to officiate over the process, it was other powers that played the role 
o f micro-managing the imposition o f the settlement and the contest for power between the two 
sets o f local elites. Indeed, as Dame Margaret Anstee has so poignantly reminded us, the UN high 
command always saw UNAVEM II as a ‘...a  small and manageable operation’ with only a 
symbolic role to play in the imposition o f the Bicesse Accords. This role, as we have seen, 
changed substantially after UNITA demurred at its unexpected electoral defeat and scuttled the 
whole process by returning to war. In fact, when UNITA was eventually hauled-back into direct 
talks with the MPLA by the imposition of UN sanctions and US pressure, the UN found itself at 
the helm o f negotiations and in a position to extract a large and powerful role for itself in any 
future settlement. In addition, when the Lusaka Protocols were finally signed in late-1994, the US 
and others were only too glad to sub-contract the responsibility for managing this intractable 
process to the UN.
The deployment o f UNAVEM III did therefore mark some sort o f departure for UN activities in 
the country. This was not so much in terms o f pursuing different ends, which remained largely if
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not wholly the same task of holding-the-ring between UNITA and the MPLA and managing an 
orderly transfer to a peaceful liberal social and political order. Rather it was the scope o f UN 
management, and the means harnessed, that marked a departure for the UN in the Angolan 
context. Indeed, the UN was given some latitude to pursue the objectives o f the settlement, which 
to a large extent was utilised by UN officials to drive the parties as far as possible down the path 
o f the process. As we have seen, at times this was a farcical and desperate spectacle, with the UN 
engaged in endless rounds o f high-level shuttle diplomacy to keep UNITA and the regime on­
board.
But looking beyond this spectacle, the UN was actually engaged in a serious process o f pragmatic 
politics and diplomacy, which was intended in one way or another to lock the parties into an 
inescapable web o f international regulation. And to some extent this worked; for at least three- 
years the UN managed to keep UNITA in the game and moving very slowly down the path 
allotted to it. The only way UNITA could disentangle itself from the UN and the process at large 
was to lurch into all out war—an option it did eventually take and one which cost the movement 
very dearly. Indeed, with this act UNITA lost all remaining support and became hostage to the 
military and political changes that Central Africa was undergoing as a whole.
It can be concluded more generally though that the UN management o f the Lusaka process 
underlines a certain generic standard o f UN behaviour in post-colonial societies. That is to say, to 
some extent UN actions in Angola faintly reveal the political strategy o f UN officials in their 
management o f Southern societies and in their dealings with local elites. In the Lusaka process 
we see UN officials who understand the value and utility o f discretion, compromise and 
pragmatism in embedding themselves into the politics o f a situation and for the furtherance o f the 
wider structural agenda underfoot. It is this art o f manoeuvring the UN into the position o f a 
powerful local patron that UN officials are so well versed— a skill it should be conceded that was 
forged during nascent UN transition operations in Jerusalem, West Irian and the Congo.
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C hapter 7
United Nations Peace O perations and  the M anagem ent o f the 
W orld Political O rd e r in the Periphery
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‘How can we forget the betrayal o f the hope that Patrice Lumumba placed in the United 
Nations? How can we forget the machinations and manoeuvres that followed in the wake 
o f the occupation o f that country by United Nations troops, under whose auspices the 
assassins o f this great African patriot acted with impunity?... Who can deny the sad role 
that the imperialist compelled the United Nations to play?’
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevera, Address to the United Nations 
General Assembly, 11 December 1964.
‘II faut faire de la politique!’
Mahmoud Khiary, UN official in the Congo, 1961 cited in Conor 
Cruise O ’Brien (To Katanga and Back, 1962).
The specificity of the UN and its peace operations
In the summer o f 2003, the UN special representative to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and twenty- 
two other UN officials were killed in a truck-bomb attack on the UN’s new headquarters in the 
troubled city o f Baghdad. Sergio de Mello had just been appointed to this controversial posting, 
apparently at the behest o f Washington because o f his experience in running large-scale 
transitional authorities in East Timor and Kosovo and because o f his notoriously tough-minded 
approach to local politics.588 The UN position in Iraq was o f course a very delicate and complex 
one following the failure o f the Anglo-American coalition to generate immediate backing and 
legitimacy for its invasion and subsequent occupation— and one o f Mello’s immediate tasks was 
to lubricate the return o f the international community to the country.589 Indeed the dispatch o f 
Mello in June 2003, following Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), marked a rapid 
attempt by secretary-general Annan to deploy the organisation in Iraq and re-involve itself in 
political, as well as humanitarian activities.590 Just over fifty years earlier and during what was 
essentially the very first political operation conducted by the UN in managing social change in 
the periphery, in Jerusalem in 1948, the UN ‘Chief Mediator’ and Swedish aristocrat and
588 Alexander Casella, ‘After the Bomb’ Prospect, September 2004, pp. 15-16.
589 ‘Handmaid in Babylon: Annan, Vieira de Mello and the UN’s Decline and Fall’, Alexander Cockbum, 
Counter Punch, 30 August 2003. Later, in March 2004, the UN sent another prominent member o f  the UN 
establishment, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help the head o f  the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer III, in the political and diplomatic task o f  suturing an acceptable interim sovereign Iraqi 
government. UN Press Release SC/8035 (24 March 2004). ‘Security Council 4930th Meeting (AM). 
Security Council in Presidential Statement Strongly Supports Decision to Dispatch UN Assistance Teams 
to Iraq ‘As Soon As Possible.”
590 S/RES/1483 (2003), operative paragraphs 8-9.
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philanthropist, Count Folke Bemadotte, was assassinated by a member o f the Stem Gang. The 
Count was shot at point blank range on his way back from Government Hill House in Jerusalem, 
which was then being considered as a possible UN headquarters, on 17 September 1948.591 Both 
events, standing half a century apart, serve to powerfully remind us o f the contested roles that the 
UN plays, especially in facilitating certain post-colonial settlements, and how locals and other 
actors can occasionally and violently object to this alien UN presence.592 O f course in between 
these two notorious events the UN has carried out numerous activities under the catch-all rubric 
o f ‘peace operations’ that have in one way or another sought to coax social and political change 
and, in the process o f such assistance, have interceded in the local politics o f these societies. 
Nearly every single one o f  these peace operations has been deployed in the Southern hemisphere, 
with the exception only o f those deployed in the Former Yugoslavia, divided Cyprus, parts o f the 
ex-Soviet Union and Central America.593 But in the course o f such a widespread utilisation of 
these practices, particularly following the collapse o f the Second World, they have come to be 
treated as a customary and perfectly acceptable set o f activities for an international organisation 
to conduct in non-Western societies. It would seem that in today’s world, UN peace operations 
have become an unquestioned facet o f global politics— unless o f course the onus of inquiry is to 
criticise the lack o f UN action, the sluggish response o f the Security Council or, more emotively, 
the ‘indifference’ o f UN peacekeepers to the South. The singular critique o f UN peacekeeping 
consequently remains a liberal one, which stresses that there is not nearly enough UN political 
intervention in the affairs o f subject African and Asian societies.594
591 Government Hill House remains UNTSO headquarters for the Middle East. On the Count and his 
activities refer to: David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, (London: Futura Publications, 1977).
592 There still remains some speculation regarding the death o f  Hammarskjold in an airplane crash in 
Central Africa in 1961. Some commentators have suggested that the DC-6B plane that he was travelling in 
was shot-down over Northern Rhodesia by European mercenaries incensed by the UN’s position regarding 
Katanga. David N. Gibbs, ‘Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis o f  1960-1’ 
Journal o f  Modern African Studies, vol.31, no.l (1993), p.163. There was also some loose speculation as to 
the causes o f  the crash o f  the light aircraft carrying UN special representative to Angola, Blondin Beye, in 
Cote d’Ivoire in June 1998 with some saying that it was UNITA initiated. More generally, the UN has often 
been the object o f  post-colonial violence: For instance, much is made in the Western world o f  the way local 
forces have targeted UN peacekeepers as a political strategy to precipitate early UN withdrawals, as in 
Somalia and Rwanda.
593 Strictly speaking, UN activities in Haiti and Central America are classified as being conducted in the 
Western hemisphere though they fit much more closely into the structure o f  the South. See Appendix Two.
594 This is not to say that other critiques o f  the UN do not exist, far from it. As recorded throughout this 
study there remain many individuals who have critically assessed various aspects o f  UN peace activities. 
Rather the point is simply that the mainstream account o f  UN peacekeeping is actually one that accepts 
uncritically the desirability and necessity o f  intervening in the South.
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This study has sought to reverse this basic liberal conception o f UN peace operations and provide 
in its place an alternative more critical account o f the history, functions and politics o f these 
practices. The objective of this final chapter is to bring together various elements o f this 
alternative account and make some observations about what this study can tell us about the much 
broader issue o f the management o f world order in the periphery and international politics. But 
before going on to discuss various themes o f  the study, and its conclusions for how we 
understand the UN and wider international politics, it seems worthwhile to quickly run through 
die major narrative o f the political and ideological specificity o f UN peace operations that has 
been put forward over the previous six-chapters.
In a sense the negative side of this account has simply been to demonstrate that it is practically 
worthless to view UN peace operations as a normal, natural or neutral set o f activities for the UN 
to conduct. The UN is an organisation that was clearly established to underpin a specific new type 
o f world order— and its activities in the periphery o f the world system during its early years, in 
Palestine, Suez and the Congo underline the retreat o f the European world o f empire blocks and 
the onset o f  the so-called ‘American Century’. But the UN’s ‘programme o f work’ developed in 
unexpected ways as soon as the internal balance of forces moved decisively away from the 
American camp and towards the non-aligned movement in the 1960s. Then the organisation 
became far more concerned with issues o f international economic equity and, in the light o f 
various forms o f covert and proxy great-power intervention, deeply worried about upholding the 
sovereignty o f its African, Asian and Latin American members. During this period the UN was an 
organisation that resisted—however meekly and inconstantly— the ‘big-boss’ tendencies o f the 
US in the General Assembly and was hostile to the prevailing liberal-capitalist orthodoxy. Later, 
when the collapse o f the Second World finally unravelled the last remnants o f organised 
resistance in the UN, the organisation was once again brought back into the Western fold and 
tasked with a new set o f activities in many Southern states that can only be described as about 
reconfiguring the political wiring o f these societies along neo-liberal lines. It may be added that 
simultaneously, the UN was unceremoniously stripped o f the world economy functions that it had 
accrued for itself during the heady days o f  the 1970s— and even those mostly Keynesian values 
that were built into the UN Charter at its inception— and left to develop its skills in the areas o f 
producing ‘good internal governance’ in non-Westem states.
If  we then consider the actual application o f  UN peace operations in the 1990s the myth o f 
neutrality and impartiality is exposed even further; for these operations, and most others, were
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deployed in circumstances in which there was a wider political and sometimes regional agenda 
underfoot and in a situation in which the UN was sub-contracted to micro-manage a transition in 
regimes and social order. Moreover, once fully deployed the UN collaborated and conflicted with 
other forces active in these situations— some o f  them external state actors— in order to push and 
promote its own particular agenda. It is hard to ignore some of the continuities in UN behaviour 
here: while between 1960 and 1962 the UN in the Congo served as a tentative proxy force for the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations and its entrance onto the stage o f Central African 
politics by serving (eventually) to put down the succession of Katanga against some European 
interests, more recently in Angola, Rwanda and Somalia the least that can be said is that the UN 
merged broadly with the US point o f view on the interpretation o f its mandates and in its dealings 
with local forces.595 After all, in Somalia the UN was severally at odds with the Italian and French 
‘approach’ to the local militias (i.e. with relation to General Aideed), and in Rwanda the UN was 
participating in a peace process that would lead to the near certain defeat o f the incumbent regime 
and the end o f a long era o f French domination o f  the entire Central African region.596 And this is 
to say nothing o f the way in which various local forces have been favoured or spumed by the UN 
and others, such as in the Congo where Patrice Lumumba was effectively decommissioned as a 
national force by the cabal o f American UN officials running the Congo operation, or in Somalia 
where General Aideed was from the start deliberately disadvantaged by UN diplomacy that 
favoured the businessman Ali Mahdi.597
Taken together then, one aspect o f the study has been to outline the political contingencies and 
specificities o f these fairly curious activities that are now so regularly deployed in the South. To 
simply show how, before they gained uncontested hegemony within the organisation’s 
programme o f  work, they were a controversial and contested set o f activities institutionally and, 
when applied, have often served the wider political and economic agendas o f Western states. The 
other, one might say, positive side o f this study has been to fashion an alternative account o f UN 
peace activities that focuses on analysing them in terms of their engagement with subject 
societies, including their wider political functions and the way in which they are calibrated to
595 For an account o f  how the UN served to promote the US position in the Congo (over Katanga) against 
the European position, see: Gibbs, ‘Hammarskjold’. For a detailed history o f  shifting US foreign relations 
with the Congo during this time, see: Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960- 
1964, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974).
596 In Angola, the UN was drafted in to validate potential regime change and, more widely, facilitate the 
reintegration o f  the entire sub-region into capitalist world system (with varying roles in South Africa, 
Namibia, Angola and Mozambique).
597 It is widely accepted by many directly concerned that UN Congo policy was run, apart from Dag 
Hammarskjold, by three US-UN officials: Bunche, Cordier, and Wieschhoff.
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engage in the local politics o f any given situation, and the narrower political and ideological 
battle within the UN to determine the direction and spirit o f the organisation. It is to various 
elements o f  this account and what it can tell us about international politics that the chapter now 
turns.
The long history of UN involvement in post-colonial affairs
One o f  the most under-explored and overlooked aspects o f UN peace operations has been their 
long history o f  involvement with many Southern societies, especially in the African milieu. This 
is surprising considering the striking continuities and discontinuities o f some o f these encounters, 
especially the way in which the UN has acted as a conduit for social change in these societies in 
the immediate post-World War II era and in a Post-Command Economy world, as well as the way 
the UN has interceded in the local politics o f these places. And in some ways it is difficult to get 
any sense o f  perspective about the nature o f current forms o f UN intervention and their recent 
applications, particularly in Africa, without looking at the broader contours o f this engagement. It 
certainly seems fanciful to stress the lack and paucity o f United Nations involvement in the 
Rwandan crisis o f 1993 and 1994, as is often the case for instance, if  it is acknowledged that the 
UN had been deeply involved in trying to modernise Rwandese social relations in the 1950s.
W hat is important to recognise here is that while the basis, extent, and occasionally orientation o f 
the U N ’s political engagement in post-colonial societies may have ebbed and flowed according to 
the rhythms o f international politics, transforming quite radically in some important respects, the 
UN has always been an important factor in the history o f many o f these places. Whether it has 
been the way in which the UN sought to push a particular colonial authority to expedite a 
transition to independence in the 1950s or 1960s, or has interceded in the form o f a peacekeeping 
operation to manage a transition in local elites in the 1990s or 2000s, the UN has often been an 
intrinsic part o f the post-colonial journey o f several societies.
To some extent, therefore, there must be something more general, even elementary, about the 
U N ’s functions in parts o f the Southern hemisphere that relates to the attempted management o f 
local politics and imposition o f order by external forces. On one level this o f course relates to the 
novel modalities of intercession and patronage that were needed for a world that is universally 
divided-up into theoretically and formally equal and sovereign nation-states in which there is 
supposedly no global hierarchy. The UN was useful insofar as it could legitimate and effectively
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govern aspects o f this new order. While, to be sure, the larger ‘concert-role’ that the US 
envisaged for the UN did not long survive the perceived exigencies for regional security alliances 
such as NATO, the UN did manage through the Trusteeship Council and ad-hoc peacekeeping 
measures to develop an approximate ability to crisis manage transition in the periphery and 
develop unobtrusive formats for managing the native question that appeared at once sensitive to 
the new modalities o f political organisation in the ex-colonies.598
Indeed from the very outset o f the organisation’s life some o f its activities were directed towards 
helping manage— fairly loosely it may be conceded—the transition o f social systems from 
European colonies to formally independent nation-states states. The UN Trusteeship machinery 
was the most prevalent factor in this regard, with many African societies placed under the loose 
surveillance o f  the Trusteeship Council and its ‘Visiting Missions’. But loose as this oversight 
may well have been, the UN Trusteeship system established the goal o f independence for subject 
colonies as a legitimate and attainable one, and provided some checks and balances on the 
exercise o f  European power in these societies. Most importantly, it provided a set o f timetables 
and functional checklists for the governing authorities to meet and attain in the ‘progression’ of 
these societies towards liberal and modem civilisation and, quite crucially, provided a source o f 
support for this or that local force in their efforts against the Trusteeship Authority. For example 
the way in which the UN helped shape the Ruanda-Urundi Trusteeship in favour o f  the local Hutu 
party in the early 1950s by pushing the Belgian authorities to modernise social relations, labour 
laws, and educational rights and by giving a platform for PARMEHUTU to express their 
grievances and mobilise their supporters.599 In Somalia too the UN imposed strict conditions upon 
a return o f  Italy to the Horn o f Africa, including timetables for certain progressive benchmarks to 
be met.
In a few other instances, the UN actually went beyond these official and relatively distant 
functions o f Trusteeship to pursue activities that were much more heavily involved in directing 
the course o f  post-colonial politics. Here, there was a small set o f actual peace operations that 
were deployed to directly manage social change— in Jerusalem, West Irian, and the Congo. What 
was important about these conveyance roles for the UN was that they moved the organisation into 
the arena o f micro-managing post-colonial affairs. In the Congo in 1961, for example, the UN
598 For a lucid review o f  the institutional design o f  the UN by US planners, and how it subsequently 
diverged from this plan in practice, see: Gowan ‘US:UN’, pp.5-26.
599 Recall that later the UN tried to reverse some o f  the more ‘illiberal’ changes that had occurred as a result 
o f  the rapid political rise o f  PARMEHUTU. For details, see Chapter Five.
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played a crucial role in delicately reconstructing the African face o f Congolese politics after 
helping to remove Patrice Lumumba quite literally from the national scene. Locked away in the 
grounds o f  the University o f Leopoldville, UN official Mahmoud Khiary and another colleague 
worked their magic among the assembled local forces to produce a government that’s core they 
had pre-fixed before (some o f those who were involved suggested this was achieved through 
outright bribery).600 This type o f hands-on activity is now a mainstay o f the UN’s management o f 
Southern polities— one need only recall the central role in manufacturing local settlements that 
the UN high-official, Lakhdar Brahimi, has played in recent years from fabricating a ‘Loya Jirga’ 
to seemingly ‘rule’ Afghanistan in 2002, to the negotiations that he conducted to bring-in an all 
Iraqi veneer (with Sunni Arab participation) and some semblance o f  international legitimacy to 
the Interim Iraqi Government and Anglo-American occupation.601
In some important ways therefore early UN conveyance operations remain important antecedents 
to current peace activities, and can illuminate various aspects o f the UN’s political and historic 
role in world order management. In fact they show how one very controversial aspect o f  the UN’s 
practices evolved to become the most significant contribution that the UN currently makes to 
maintaining political order, and its inherent hierarchy, in the periphery. This becomes all the more 
clear if  we consider and compare the fluctuating historical fortunes o f Trusteeship to these early 
peace operations. At first, however, peace operations were so tarnished with US seigniorage after 
the Congo episode that they became practically o f no use and were temporarily decommissioned. 
Here, the actions o f UN officials in Leopoldville during the crucial hours and days that led to 
Lumumba’s political immobilisation, and later physical elimination, stirred-up a great deal o f 
bitterness and enmity directed at the organisation in general and the secretary-general in 
particular.602 The episode clearly demonstrated to the UN the dangers, among many others, o f 
becoming too closely associated and identified with US interests.603 One manifestation o f this was 
that while at the beginning o f the operation it was seen as wholly unproblematic to have three 
prominent American citizens run virtually every aspect o f the UN operation in the Congo— Ralph 
Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinz Wieschhoff— by the end it was seen as politically expedient
600 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 189.
601 Loya Jirga is Pashto for ‘grand council’, where tribal elders meet to settle disputes. Brahimi was a key 
architect o f  the ‘Bonn Agreement’, which created the interim administration led by Karzai.
602 Recall the demand o f  the Soviet Union for Hammarskjold to resign and for a Troika o f  officials to 
replace the position o f  secretary-general. More generally, for Non-Aligned member-states, UN actions were 
seen as unashamedly driven by US interests.
603 A lesson the UN has had to relearn in the wake o f  the attack on the UN in Iraq, which killed de Mello in 
2003.
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to bring on board as an outer core some extra-American personalities.604 The temporary lull in the 
utilisation of these activities was also, o f  course, crucially related to the decline o f the US ability 
to corral various representative organs o f  the UN; while the Congo operation occurred at the very 
highpoint o f the US domination o f these various organs and offices o f the UN, the birth o f many 
new Afro-Asian states during this period marked the beginning o f organised NAM resistance 
towards the US-UN agenda. It was only with the collapse o f this resistance, in the late 1980s, and 
the shift in power back from the General Assembly to the Security Council, that UN conveyance 
operations became so widely and freely utilised.
In contrast, the machinery of Trusteeship was very active during the 1960s and 1970s, becoming 
an established feature o f the UN landscape. But by its very nature the Trusteeship system, defined 
to bring about only one type o f social transition in the periphery (from colonialism to 
independence), was a finite one. As formal colonies evaporated, the agenda o f the Council 
shortened and shortened until it no longer had any outstanding decolonisation issues to resolve, 
which happened on 1 October 1994 with the independence of Palau.605 Here the slow and 
inevitable death o f the Trusteeship system has meant that the highly specialised ‘peace operation’ 
has become the surviving UN mechanism for managing transition in the South. It is in this 
context that the debate about a ‘revitalisation’ o f  the Trusteeship Council around perhaps ‘failed’ 
or ‘collapsed states’ needs to be understood. The debate was about recalibrating the UN to 
formally and permanently manage the affairs o f its most troublesome African and Asian 
members— perhaps ‘overseeing’ the reconstruction o f a state by a supposedly ‘benevolent’ 
Western power or even exercising ‘executive authority’ o f the state itself. As Edward Mortimer, 
Director o f Communications in the Office o f the secretaiy-general has suggested, the 
international community could: ‘...revive and reform the Trusteeship Council, using it as a 
mechanism through which the community o f  nations could effectively exercise the tutelage and 
responsibility for the interests o f those unfortunate peoples who from time to time find 
themselves in need o f international protection’.606 While this prospect has for now been killed-off 
because o f its overtones o f paternalism and colonialism, in effect the UN is endorsing these 
practices and conducting these types o f protectorates under different institutional names and 
through ad hoc arrangements.607 Certainly, the UN has recently endorsed Western military
604 Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p.55.
605 After the independence o f  Palau, the Trusteeship Council was subsequently suspended.
606 Edward Mortimer, ‘International Administration o f  War-Torn Societies’, Global Governance, vol. 10, 
issue 1 (2004), p.5.
607 Ibid. p.2.
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occupation (Afghanistan) and actually taken over the executive roles o f  the state, as was the case 
with Sergio Vieiro de Mello in East Timor in 2000. More broadly, a great deal o f the UN’s peace 
activities feature important elements o f ‘international administration’— from Cambodia to 
Somalia— it is just that for political and ideological reasons the institutionalisation o f  these 
practices has become much more opaque and the phraseology toned-down to innocuous terms 
such as ‘Transitional Authority’ and ‘Transitional Administration’.608 Unsurprisingly, UN 
managers have quietly ignored the bold labels and names, such as ‘Guardianship’, that some 
liberal Western commentators have earnestly suggested for these practices.609
The simple overall point surely is that the UN has forged a role for itself—in different ways and 
at different times— in managing our unique world order of ‘independent’ nation states in the very 
periphery o f  the world system. These roles have evolved along their most extreme and 
controversial axis o f UN conveyance operations that micro-manage local elites and administer 
local affairs to become the specialised and privileged focus o f the organisation. Moving on to 
discuss the specific functions and practices o f current UN peace operations will help unpick this 
unique role in world affairs further.
The functions o f UN peace operations
From the perspective o f this study there should be little doubt that the functions o f UN peace 
operations are related in the broadest sense to managing transitions in social order in the 
periphery. From the controversial conveyance operations that were conducted in the UN’s early 
years to the widespread use o f peace operations within states in our current post-Cold War era, 
these activities all share the same function o f helping oversee various transformations o f social 
life. By now we also know that the essential difference between these two eras relates to the type 
o f transformation underway: in the early years the UN forged a role in helping manage the 
transition from colonialism to independence, whereas from the late 1980s the UN began to 
specialise in reforming state structures, managing political transformations and even handling 
regime change between local elites.
608 For example, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations 
Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), and the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
609 While Peter Lyon cautions against the use o f  the ‘old name’ o f  Trusteeship, he suggests the term 
‘Guardianship’: Lyon, ‘The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival o f  International Trusteeship’, p .108.
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What we can say about the current era of transformation that the UN is engaged in delivering in 
the periphery is that it dates back to the universalisation o f the liberal market-economy orientated 
state that followed the debt crisis and the collapse o f the Soviet Union. Indeed these moments 
allowed for the historic integration o f the ‘Second W orld’ and ‘Third W orld’ into the liberal- 
capitalist and US led ‘First World’.610 This has, to be sure, been a very problematic and difficult 
process. In the Second World o f Eastern Europe, subjected to a different intensity o f integration 
than the Third World, the coordinated Western policy o f ‘Shock Therapy’ has been an 
unremitting and brutal exercise in disciplining and rationalising the political economy o f the 
region.611 It has also been about breaking-up the area’s interdependencies in favour o f what Peter 
Gowan has suggested is a hub-and-spokes relationship with Western Europe and the US.612 This 
aspect would also seem to be a partial template utilised in the Third World context— especially as 
it relates to the politics o f debt and loan negotiations. By forcing each and every post-colonial 
state to negotiate separately with Western banks, aid agencies, and ministries o f finance, the 
collective ability o f these states to resist or rebel has been significantly reduced. Nevertheless, in 
general it is fair to suggest that the intensity o f integration into a universal liberal capitalist order 
has been different in the periphery than it has been in Central and Eastern Europe, near the 
heartlands o f global capitalism.
In the South, the Third World developmental state has been the prime object o f reform and 
remodelling, with international economic institutions playing a lead role in embedding the 
regulatory framework o f neo-liberalism through legislation protecting the sanctity o f private 
property, the freedom o f foreign capital, and the privatisation o f a whole host o f  public utilities 
and services.613 This has entailed much more than simply promoting technical economic reforms; 
it has been about carving-out working market-economies from the ashes o f command economies, 
or mixed systems, and helping to foster social forces that can nurture and then protect the new
610 The integration o f  the Second and Third World into one universal capitalist order was precisely what the 
Clinton Administration’s national security strategy o f  ‘engagement and enlargement’ was about—  
extending and deepening free markets and democracy. A National Security Strategy For A New Century 
(Washington D.C: the White House, October 1998). Still for a short time after the collapse o f  the Soviet 
Union this universal capitalist order retained a couple o f  significant exclusions, most important in terms o f  
the world market was China and to a lesser extent North Korea. For an interesting discussion o f  these 
issues, see: Cummings, ‘The Wicked Witch o f  the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch o f  the East’, 
and Gowan, ‘The American Campaign For Global Sovereignty’, pp.2-27.
611 For a detailed examination o f  the strategy o f  Shock Therapy in Eastern Europe, its theory, application 
and social consequences, see: Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 187-247.
612 Ibid. p. 190.
613 This is a process that Leo Panitch has generally called the process o f ‘Constitutionalising neo­
liberalism’ at the state and inter-state level. Panitch, Rethinking the Role o f  the State, p.96.
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capitalist order.614 For example, Western aid channelled to ‘civil society’ is often targeted to 
circumnavigate the apparatus o f the state and cultivate local forces such as the by now ubiquitous 
liberal orientated NGO— a development it may be added that has changed the whole character o f 
sovereignty in the periphery.615 As important as carving out an autonomous economic and civil 
sphere has been the drive to reconstruct the ‘political kingdom’ along formal liberal democratic 
lines.616 This has been as much about dislodging old elites and empowering new modem ones as 
it has been about creating a political infrastructure that is imitable to external public and private 
interests.617 One important facet o f this, as William Robinson has detailed, is political aid from G- 
7 and OECD public and private institutions to Western orientated local political parties that will 
guarantee the continuation and extension o f this new order.618 Another has been the way in which 
various Western institutions have sought to implant, nurture, and bolster potentially sympathetic 
and like-minded bureaucratic units and departments against others with embedded interests in the 
‘old order’— such as ministries o f  finance against ministries o f industry.619
The role o f the United Nations in this transformation has been focused on addressing the political 
side o f  this project in particularly troublesome African and Asian societies that have been racked 
with organised political violence. It would be foolish to argue here that this function was ever 
meant to be a total and thorough refashioning and reconstruction of the political fabric o f these 
places— certainly from what we have seen in a couple o f African contexts they were fairly hasty 
and often haphazard.620 And save for the total and long-term occupation o f a society by external 
forces, such as that which occurred in post-World War II Germany and Japan, the project o f 
completely embedding a liberal market democracy may never long survive the vicissitudes o f 
events.621 It would seem wise therefore to consider recent UN roles with some circumspection,
614 Margaret Hall and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence, (London: 
Hurst & Co, 1997), p.227.
6,5 Ibid. pp.217-234.
616 Young, You Europeans Are Just Like Fish! p. 123.
617 As Robinson explains the matter: ‘The purpose o f  ‘democracy promotion’ is not to suppress but to 
penetrate and conquer civil society in intervened countries, that is, the complex o f  ‘private’ organizations 
such as political parties, trade unions, the media, and so forth, and from  therein, integrate subordinate 
classes and national groups into a hegemonic social order.’ Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p.29.
6,8 Ibid. pp.73-116.
619 Broad, Unequal Alliance, pp. 12-19.
620 Again, the focus o f  much recent debate in the literature has been the necessary depth and longevity o f  
UN peace operations. See Paris’s concept o f  Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation in At W ar’s End, 
pp.l 79-211.
621 Germany and Japan were not only reconstructed along liberal political economy lines but they were also 
compelled to forgo many o f  their great power prerogatives. Deudney and Ikenberry refer to them as ‘semi­
sovereign’ or ‘partial great powers’, where they have in important respects been tied into a US global 
liberal order. Deudney and Ikenberry, ‘The nature and sources o f  liberal international order’, p. 188. For an
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especially in those instances in which the comprehensive transformation o f a society and success 
o f a peace operation has been hastily proclaimed by the UN after the completion o f  Westem-style 
presidential or parliamentary elections.622
But be this as it may, the UN has successfully forged a niche role for itself in the post-1989 
universal capitalist system that is trained on the ability o f the organisation and its officials to 
shepherd a change in political systems and to reorganise institutions o f law and order at the 
borderlands o f the international system. And the immediate effect o f these activities and their 
utility for world order management should not be downplayed— if only because the UN remains 
the only institution with the technical capacity, expertise and international authority to carry out 
these delicate and sensitive functions. As the George W. Bush Administration has discovered to 
its cost in Iraq, United Nations peace activities are useful not only because they intercede in local 
politics in seemingly unobtrusive ways, but also because they often have the competence to 
suture local elites into one political programme— as was shown by the momentary success o f 
Lakhdar Brahimi in forging a quasi-sovereign Interim Iraqi Government and National 
Independent Electoral Commission in June 2004.623
The straightforward role o f the UN in this particular post-1989 transformation o f problematic 
Southern societies, therefore, has been to perform certain political and institution-building tasks. 
The recasting o f national institutions to give some substance to the state has obviously been an 
important, largely technical, role here with the UN providing expertise and funding for training 
police forces, armies and the judiciary. While on one level this has simply been about ensuring 
the continued viability o f the state in peripheral lands (something we will come on to discuss 
shortly), it has also been about reformulating existing institutions to embody liberal values. For 
example, human rights components have now become a significant dimension o f  UN ‘institution 
building’, such as in police training programmes that the UN has conducted in East Timor and 
Kosovo.624 The capacity o f the UN to manage the political process too— the organisation, conduct
in depth discussion o f  Germany and Japan’s integration, see: John W. Dower, Embracing defeat: Japan in 
the aftermath o f  World War //(London: Allen Lane, 1999); Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. 
occupation policy and the German public, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); and John 
Montgomery, Forced to be Free: the Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1957).
622 A point made by Margaret Hall and Tom Young in: Confronting Leviathan, p.234.
623 UN Press Release SC/8113 (11 June 2004): ‘Security Council 4984th Meeting (PM). Lakhdar Brahimi 
Briefs Security Council on ‘complicated and delicate’ process leading to Iraq’s Interim Government, 
Electoral Commission.’
624 The Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 39.
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and independent verification o f an election for instance— has also been relied upon to plant the 
seeds o f formal pluralism and has been used as a symbolic marker o f change in these states and 
their wider integration into international society.
But in a sense the role o f UN peace operations that has just been outlined is only one albeit 
crucial side o f the story— the side that looks at the specific place o f the UN in integrating 
borderlands states into a universal international capitalist system after 1989. The other side o f 
story is the one o f the fungible nature o f these functions today and o f the fluctuating fortunes of 
the UN in trying to expand, consolidate and formalise these roles. Indeed, what is striking when 
we look at the spread o f peace operations that the UN has conducted in the 1990s and 2000s is the 
attempt o f the UN to market its prospective practices as actions designed to prohibit the 
disintegration o f the international system in the South. It has been portrayed as the UN seeking to 
rehabilitate ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states, where sovereignty has ‘lapsed’ and the integrity o f the 
international (capitalist) system is under threat.625 In Somalia these types o f arguments were 
successfully utilised by UN managers to buffer their case for a forceful UN take-over o f the 
country and as part o f an attempt to expand the organisation’s repertoire o f peace activities. Part 
o f the rationale here has been to suggest that the UN’s real utility is its ability to monitor the 
borderlands for disintegrating states and its capacity to resolve any such situation through the 
reconstruction o f the vital institutions o f the state and management, temporarily o f course, o f the 
local political process.
What it is absolutely crucial to recognise is that the UN is trying to transform what is potentially a 
transitory set o f functions in the South—post-1989— into a much more permanent set o f roles. 
Indeed, the emphasis o f UN discourse and behaviour is towards intimating that it could and 
should have a much more enduring and possibly formalised role in managing post-colonial 
politics; hence the debate about a revival and redefinition o f the Trusteeship Council that we have 
already discussed as well as the ongoing attempts o f UN managers to institutionalise its peace 
practices through such documents as the ‘Brahimi Report’.626 In addition, unlike the 
decolonisation process and the UN’s role within it, which was inevitably a finite one, the set o f 
tasks that the UN is conducting today are far more malleable to the needs and wants o f the global 
capitalist order. Not only can the UN move from one African state to another peddling its format
625 Mortimer, ‘International administration o f  war-torn societies’, p.2.
626 As detailed in Chapter Three, the ‘Brahimi Report’ (A /55/305-S/2000/809) is an important recent 
attempt by UN officials to institutionalise and expand the organisation’s peace practices.
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for liberal change but the very institutional reforms and political projects that the UN implements 
can be tuned according to the ever-shifting fashions o f  global governance. Liberal human rights 
for instance has become an ever-growing part o f UN peace operations throughout the 1990s; 
attempts too by the UN to break into the sphere o f  ‘civil society’ though various educational and 
‘outreach’ programmes have added an extra-dimension to peace operations. It is not then that the 
specific emphasis o f  UN conveyance functions have remained or will continue to be strictly 
fixed, as just stated they are always in flux, but that the UN is seeking to formalise its position as 
transmitter o f these evolving functions. One key aspect o f this generic role that can be identified 
in our current era is the UN’s position as a manager o f local politics and as an arbiter o f the 
‘native question’.
The UN’s engagement in the local politics of post-colonial states
When UN peace activities are viewed in their broad historic context, it is hard to ignore the fact 
that the organisation and its high-officials have played an important role in the local politics o f 
many Southern societies. In the post-1989 milieu the UN has dramatically expanded and, in some 
regards, deepened this role with at any one time dozens o f UN managers deployed ‘on-the- 
ground’ or in ‘the field’ to help direct and steer UN operations and carry out explicit and implicit 
diplomatic tasks. Various observations can be made about this engagement, which relate to the 
role o f the UN in transmitting a certain Western diplomatic agenda among local elites and in 
occasionally mediating inter-capitalist competition in the periphery. An important aspect o f this 
relationship is the way in which UN peace operations are sometimes developed to promote 
orderly and peaceful changes in local regimes: in both Angola and Rwanda the UN mission was 
structured to oversee a transfer in regimes though, in the event, they both unfolded in unexpected 
ways. But when it comes to the deployment and implementation o f a peace operation, the UN 
often shapes the local political scene according to the preferences o f one or another external 
power. Here the UN may not only play an important role in promoting Western interests in any 
given local context, but the UN many also work towards the agenda o f one major power in its 
competition with others in the Southern hemisphere.
This is not necessarily a new development; in the Congo in the 1960s, the UN through its 
representative in Leopoldville, Andrew Cordier, significantly helped shape the political battle that 
was developing between President Kasa Vubu and the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in favour 
o f the former. It is no secret here that a great deal o f  the Western world, and Cordier himself,
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considered the nationalist Prime Minister a serious threat to African order and were contriving in 
various ways to exclude him from the political scene.627 Indeed Cordier was well aware o f the 
President’s plan to dismiss Lumumba and his parliament in the September 1960 ‘Constitutional 
Crisis’ and was explicitly asked by Kasa Vubu to help him ensure the success o f such a 
manoeuvre by closing down the radio stations and grounding all air-traffic in the country—  
requests that Cordier in due course acceded to.628 Considering the fact that Lumumba’s 
powerbase was in the east o f the country in Stanleyville, 800 miles from the capital, and the fact 
that sympathetic forces across the river, in Congo-Brazzaville, had made their airwaves available 
to the pro-Western President, these were highly political decisions that helped tip the balance 
decisively in favour o f Kasa Vubu. On this occasion the UN’s choices chimed with the broader 
direction o f Western policy— from the UK, France and Belgium to the US— which sought to 
ensure that a decolonised Congo would not diverge too far from the path o f paternalism that 
Brussels had envisaged or threaten the social, economic or political status o f the continent in 
general. But later when this inter-state capitalist consensus was breaking down, essentially over 
issues regarding the territorial integrity o f the country and the privileged position o f Belgian 
companies in mineral-rich Katanga, the UN moved towards the US position and reading o f the 
situation. Here the UN eventually enforced the reintegration o f the renegade province o f  Katanga 
and deposed European and other white mercenaries that had propped up the Elizabethville 
regime, all against European public opinion.629 In the broadest sense, therefore, the direction o f 
the UN in Katanga was consistent with the way in which it was occasionally utilised to extricate 
European powers from certain post-colonial situations (recall Suez as the other obvious example) 
and the way it served as a mechanism to promote the US agenda above its European competitors. 
Certainly, from the perspective o f the Kennedy Administration, the UN in the Congo was seen as 
a useful surrogate for direct US intervention because it was helping to breakdown the monopoly
627 Even after Kasa Vubu launched his mini-coup (itself an idea pressed on him by various members o f  the 
Belgian community) the CIA were in the late stages o f  planning an assassination attempt, which had 
envisaged Lumumba being poisoned by a European mercenary. Allen Dulles, Director o f  the CIA, had sent 
‘The Firm’s’ Chief Scientist, Gottlieb, to Leopoldville in October 1960 to deliver the toxin to be used in the 
operation. De Witte, The Assassination o f  Lumumba, pp.46-51.
628 Very few commentators, including many o f  the personalities involved, deny the impact o f  the U N ’s 
actions on the course o f events during the 1960 ‘Constitutional Crisis’. What commentators disagree about 
is the legitimacy and legality o f  such action as well as the motives o f  Cordier and Hammarskjold. But given 
the release o f  recent documents in the UN and in Belgium, and the research o f  Ludo de Witte in this regard, 
it seems more than reasonable to suggest that the UN in general and the personalities in particular (Cordier 
and Hammarskjold) were happy to see the marginalisation o f  Lumumba and that they helped within their 
limited parameters to facilitate such an end. For the official version o f  these events, see: Urquhart, A Life in 
Peace and War; Urquhart, Hammarskjold; and General Carl von Horn, Soldiering fo r  Peace (New York: 
David McKay Company INC, 1966). For more critical points o f  view, see: O’Brien, To Katanga and Back, 
and de Witte, The Assassination o f  Lumumba.
629 O ’Brien, To Katanga and Back, pp. 195-247.
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o f European powers in Central Africa and transmitting the Administration’s shifting Africa 
agenda.630
Though perhaps not as patently transparent as the Congo episode, there remain some important 
continuities in this type o f relationship o f which the UN is a part with its major patrons. In 
Somalia, the UN diverged from the European position quite starkly, with a public row erupting 
between the Italian government and Kofi Annan over the political dialogue that the Italian 
peacekeeping contingents were pursuing with General Aideed and his sub-clan in 1993. This 
particular episode was merely the outward manifestation o f competing Western agendas in the 
Horn o f  Africa and their support for this or that local force.631 In Rwanda too, there was a general 
divergence between the UN and US support for the RPF, and the French backing o f the 
incumbent regime. In the first place the role o f the UN was to oversee a peace process whose 
major political import was to bring to power an exile rebel army, which had been reared in 
Uganda and its key officers trained in the US, and to end the rule o f a regime that had been a 
stalwart ally o f the French establishment in Central Africa. When this transition collapsed in 
April 1994, the UN made good on its previous diplomatic demarches to the regime and left it to 
be driven out o f the country and into Zaire by the advancing RPF.632
Whether the UN is tasked with administering a political transition or mediating inter-state 
capitalist conflict in post-colonial societies, one o f the distinctive aspects o f many peace 
operations over the years has been the way that UN officials have been intimately involved in 
these processes. From the Congo and Rwanda to Kosovo and East Timor, it has been high-UN 
officials deployed on the ground  or in the f ie ld  who have had to convert the various political 
agendas into a reality. This has become particularly noticeable in our current era, where over the 
last decade there has been a rapid increase in UN political officials and civil administrators, above
Gibbs, ‘Dag Hammarskjold’ pp. 170-171. For the extensive covert entanglement o f  the US in Central 
African politics, relating particularly to CIA engagement in underwriting counter-revolutionary operations 
in the Congo from the early 1960s onwards, see the recent historical work by Piero Gleijeses in: Conflicting 
Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press,
2002), pp.57-76, pp. 124-159.
631 Prunier, ‘The Experience o f  European Armies in Operation Restore Hope’, p. 145.
632 O f course, the UN Security Council did belatedly authorise— in the face o f  growing international media 
and public pressure— a military humanitarian operation led by France. One consequence o f  Operation 
Turquoise, as the intervention was labelled, was that it served to slow the unhindered advance o f  the RPF 
and its complete capture o f  territory— an outcome that reflected the French desire to forestall the total 
destruction o f  its ally.
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that o f  the traditional ‘Blue Helmet’, deployed in various peace roles.633 In many respects this rise 
would seem to herald the institutionalisation o f the UN’s political functions o f managing and 
mediating between various internal forces in the periphery and the partial shedding o f those 
excess military roles. In the first place this has something to do with the shifting division of 
labour that the UN is part o f in relation to international peacemaking. Here, as David Chandler 
has argued, there has been a farming-out o f potential military functions to organisations such as 
NATO that are better disposed to total Western public and private control and a concentration of 
the UN on the specialist tasks o f rebuilding institutions and administrating subject states.634 Both 
Kosovo and Afghanistan were important moments in the construction o f such a new global order. 
But it has also been a matter o f the UN seeking to consolidate and expand its political functions in 
the South by the creation o f whole new categories o f UN peace practices such as ‘preventative 
diplomacy’ and ‘post-conflict peace-building’. With relation to the first there has been the 
tentative establishment in the UN Secretariat o f a bureaucratic structure o f political surveillance 
o f  the South, no matter how rudimentary this may be, as well as a far more serious attempt to 
create a cadre o f UN envoys who are dispatched to the borderlands in order to suture local elites, 
or offset rebellion from below, through diplomacy.635 There are even ‘best practices’ and irregular 
seminars hosted for how these officials should go about achieving cooperation from local forces 
in the implementation of their mandates. For example in ‘Command From the Saddle’, the 
Recommendations Report o f the Forum on Special Representatives, much is made about the 
UN’s mutual synergies with Bretton Woods Institutions:
‘The SRSG and the senior representative o f the World Bank in the mission can be very 
helpful to one another...Establishing co-operative relations with the World Bank in particular 
can have a large positive impact on the degree o f  co-operation between the parties and the 
UN system.’636
In the case o f post-conflict peace-building, an activity formally introduced into the lexicon o f UN 
peace practices by An Agenda For Peace, the UN has effectively deepened its civilian and
633 There were 84 UN Special Representatives, Deputy Representatives and Envoys deployed in dozens o f  
countries, in a couple o f  regions and in various capacities as o f  October 2005. To browse through these 
titles— as well as the very prominent individuals who fill them— see: <www.un.org/news/ossg/srsg>.
634 Chandler, ‘International Justice’, pp.55-66.
635 Rudimentary because, as this author observed during 2000, the institutionalised surveillance aspect o f  
‘preventative diplomacy’ consisted o f  a dozen officers responsible for monitoring various regions and 
countries with little more than open media sources to guide them.
636 Recommendations Report o f  the Forum on Special Representatives, Command From the Saddle: 
Managing United Nations Peace-Building Missions, (Oslo: FAFO), p.23.
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political functions o f institution-building and, in some cases, carried out executive roles. This has 
been justified by UN mangers and sympathetic commentators with the argument that to 
rehabilitate a society you need to move beyond the facade o f signed peace accords or the conduct 
o f one democratic election and move into the reconstitution o f various elements o f the state and 
civil society.637 Based in the Department o f Political Affairs, as is ‘preventative diplomacy’, post­
conflict peace building reflects the shifting emphasis o f the UN’s programme o f work over the 
decades from the economic to the political and from the international to the domestic.638 Indeed, 
the creation and subsequent evolution o f  the Department o f Political Affairs in general indicates a 
bid to universalise and institutionalise the ad-hoc UN roles in overseeing and managing the local 
politics o f  Southern societies.
What we can conclude from the observations outlined above about the role o f the UN in the 
periphery is that the organisation has had a long history o f seeking to manage transformations in 
social life in the South and that, very recently, the UN has sought to institutionalise and formalise 
many o f these extreme and rather controversial ‘conveyance’ roles. This has especially been the 
case with the U N ’s political responsibility for managing local elites and for administrating the 
appropriate reconstruction o f various institutions o f law and order in the post-colonial state. This 
radically reshaped ‘work’ of the UN— its overbearing emphasis on the peace activities outlined 
above— ultimately reflects the shifting way in which world order in its widest sense is organised 
and managed, and the way the UN as an institution has functioned to historically promote or 
resist such orders depending on its internal correlation o f  forces. It is to these wider political 
processes that the chapter now turns.
The evolving organisation and management of world order in the periphery
It should by now be clear that the UN has played a significant role in the organisation and 
management o f  our contemporary world order in the periphery. What we can reasonably surmise 
here is that there are two-sides to this role: the historic one that has witnessed the UN tasked with 
trying to integrate peripheral states into a universal liberal capitalist order after the collapse o f the 
Soviet Union and other Command Economies; and an ongoing one that has seen UN managers 
and G-7 states seek to forge an organisation whose focus is set on a generalised surveillance of 
the borderlands and on conducting crisis diplomacy in the local politics o f these places. The
637 Brahimi Report (A /55/305-S/2000/809), paragraphs 38-39.
638 See Chapter Three for an examination o f  the institutional mechanics o f  this process.
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shifting internal organisation o f the UN’s departments and programmes over the 1990s and 2000s 
reflects the evolution o f these twin roles, with increasing emphasis being placed on 
institutionalising and broadening the political functions that the UN conducts within Southern 
states. Here, in lieu o f the formal revival o f the Trusteeship Council, the creation and subsequent 
expansion o f  the Department o f Political Affairs (DPA) has been fundamental to the project o f 
formalising the UN’s place in micro-managing local elites and temporarily administrating post­
conflict societies.639
We are now in a position to say that these evolving tasks in the periphery amount to a fairly 
intrusive regime o f supervision and political regulation by the UN over Southern societies and, as 
David Chandler has argued, mark a dramatic and general erosion o f the principle o f sovereign- 
equality for these particular states.640 It is not necessarily the case that these places have not 
experienced the interventionary practices o f the UN before. Far from it, there has often been a 
long history o f past UN involvement in many post-colonial contexts such as in the Congo, 
Rwanda, and Somalia. Nor is it the case that sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal 
affairs o f states clause o f the UN Charter (Article 2,7) was ever meaningfully respected by a 
whole range o f state and inter-state actors— who in any case necessarily and very deliberately 
developed alternative and fairly successful templates for influencing events and shaping various
639 The creation o f  a department for the U N ’s new institutionalised political roles in the periphery— the 
DPA— has been important in order to formalise and rationalise these roles. But a department in the UN 
Secretariat is no substitute for a revival and redefinition o f  one o f  the consultative organs, such as the 
Trusteeship Council, which would legitimate these pervasive peace practices as a formal UN activity. 
Having said this there is some not insignificant utility in keeping the situation as it is— without any 
additional oversight by potentially hostile, Third World, states. After all, peace operations are ultimately 
authorised and overseen by the Security Council.
640 The question o f  the retreat o f  formal sovereignty in the South in the 1990s as a result o f  the rise o f  peace 
operations is one that is persuasively tackled by David Chandler in: From Kosovo to Kabul and 
‘International Justice.’ This study o f  peace operations broadly agrees with Chandler’s formative arguments 
relating to the consequences o f  the new doctrines o f  intervention for sovereignty in the South. A question 
mark however remains as to the extent to which there has become an effective or generalised division o f  
labour between NATO and the UN, with the former now carrying out the military roles and the UN 
conducting the civilian ones. Clearly this has happened in some form or another in Afghanistan and Kosovo 
and it may translate in the future into other cases. But it remains to be seen whether this system can be 
stretched to incorporate the key objects o f  the U N ’s interventionary practices today, at the very borderlands 
o f  international politics and capitalism. Both Kosovo and Afghanistan, and Iraq if  NATO involves itself 
further in the country, have historically been the sites o f  various forms o f  great power conflict and inter­
capitalist competition. Furthermore, the extent to which Chandler suggests that there has existed in practice  
a ‘UN Charter System’ is open to some speculation: as we have seen, a world o f  equal nation-states also 
saw the development o f  different modalities o f  intervention, from UN peacekeeping and low-intensity 
conflict to ‘democracy promotion’ and outright great-power intercession. And, in any case, the U N ’s 
historical preoccupation with ‘sovereign-equality’ was in part a function o f  the very real concern o f  Non- 
Aligned states at what they considered the general and widespread interference in their societies by 
Western Europe and the US.
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dimensions o f  the post-colonial state.641 But rather, what marks this emerging regime out from 
what has gone before it is that the UN’s practices have moved from an informal and contested 
repertoire o f political activities in the South to a formal and institutionalised set o f  activities that 
are much more freely utilised and widely accepted as a device for world order management in the 
periphery. This has necessarily seen a subtle redefinition o f the organising principles o f the inter­
state system.
Perhaps most significantly the last couple o f decades have seen a gradual chipping-away o f the 
rhetorical facade o f sovereignty in the South by UN managers and G-7 leaders who have sought 
to put forward various doctrines for the international oversight and management o f peripheral 
lands. The seeds o f this were evident in the seminal Agenda fo r  Peace, which was written by UN 
managers seeking to crystallise a new order o f UN intervention in Africa and Asia, from 
suggesting the creation o f ‘peace enforcement units’ to the questioning o f the need for local 
‘consent’ before the deployment o f any peacekeeping operation.642 To a significant extent these 
new ideas were translated into practice by the UN in Somalia, where a discourse o f ‘collapsed- 
states’ was aggressively marketed to justify a forceful international take-over o f  the territory in 
1992 and 1993. Here, the UN and US argued that because the institutions o f the state had lapsed 
and the territory had descended into lawlessness and anarchy, the international community had an 
obligation to temporarily administer the country and return the land and its people back into the 
family o f nations.643 O f course, what is noteworthy here is that the notional legitimacy of 
universal sovereignty is not itself under attack— once fully rehabilitated countries like Somalia 
could once more be ‘sovereign’. Rather, what is being put forward is a criteria o f what Robert 
Jackson has called ‘empirical statehood’ for determining which states are subject to 
interventionary supervision and practices and which are not.644 This has, in effect, created
641 On a deeper level the UN itself was product o f  a specific attempt o f  US post-World War II planners to 
develop an extra-European and non-territorially based world order over which the US could indirectly 
preside. Later, UN peace operations were precisely seen as a useful template for managing post-colonial 
affairs because they would not violate the principles o f  sovereignty in the periphery.
642 Recall how Agenda fo r  Peace suggested ‘...Forces under Article 43’ would be useful ‘...in  meeting any 
threat posed by a military force o f  a lesser order’, and how the same document hinted that ‘...consent o f  all 
parties concerned’ may in future not be necessary. Agenda For Peace, paragraph 43.
643 Madeline Albright’s comments in August 1993 remain the most emblematic in this regard: ‘The 
decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or stay the 
course and help lift the country and its people from the category o f  failed state into that o f  an emerging 
democracy. For Somalia’s sake, and for ours, we must persevere.’ Albright cited in: Boutros-Ghali, 
Unvanquished, p.96.
644 Robert H. Jackson. Quasi-states, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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different classes o f states—with a bottom tier o f states unquestionably subjected to international 
regulation and general interference.645
But beyond the prevalence o f such a rationale to justify international intervention today in 
Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere, there has also developed a much more general discourse 
relating to the international oversight o f post-colonial states. This essentially relates to the 
doctrine o f ‘good internal governance’, which has been put forward as a set o f liberal political 
and economic standards that Southern states must adhere to if  they are to avoid international 
censure and discipline.646 That is to say, the rights and privileges o f states and their regimes have 
been increasingly made conditional on them meeting a whole host o f  standards, from some 
acceptable level o f formal pluralism and human rights to meeting the basic requirements o f a 
free-market economy.647 The UN has been at the forefront o f this campaign with an increasingly 
large institutional structure dedicated to monitoring and advancing various political and social 
dimensions o f this ‘good internal governance’ agenda. Perhaps one o f the most important 
organisational developments has been the creation of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 
which is calibrated to instil local institutions and societies with appropriate liberal values, 
including through democracy and human rights promotion.648 Indeed, an institutional system is 
being tentatively fashioned under the name o f ‘preventative diplomacy’ in the DPA to monitor 
and respond to the haemorrhaging of liberal values in any given Southern state.649 This concept, 
given its elastic and evolving nature, is even beginning to be used by the UN to justify pre­
emptively pushing liberal political change on trouble-ridden states.650 But in eveiy case, the basic 
outcome has been to allow the UN much more freedom to comment on, and interfere in, the
645 For an incisive critique o f  Robert Jackson’s taxonomy, see: Roxanne L. Doty, Imperial Encounters: the 
politics o f  representation in North-South Relations (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota 
Press, 1996), pp. 145-162.
646 The concept o f  good internal governance was also introduced into the lexicon o f  international diplomacy 
by An Agenda For Peace, which announced: ‘The time o f  absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has 
passed.. .it is the task o f  leaders o f  states to understand this and to find a balance between the needs o f  good 
internal governance and the requirements o f  an ever more interdependent world.’ An Agenda For Peace, 
paragraph 17.
647 For example as in: An Agenda For Peace, paragraphs 9-10, 17-19, 81-82.
648 A/59/2005 (21 March 2005). ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all, report o f  the secretary-general’, paragraphs 140-152.
649 The release o f  the Brahimi Report in September 2000 resulted in much bureaucratic manoeuvring in the 
UN International Secretariat. Considering the contents o f  the report and its emphasis on preventative 
diplomacy and post-conflict peace building, DPA officials were fairly satisfied with the report and began 
enthusiastically planning for the new and deepened focus on peace activities. This author participated in a 
couple o f  these preparations— one o f  which was a packed ‘confiict-prevention seminar’ held in the 
Secretariat in New York in November 2000 for UN officials to get-up to speed with the latest developments 
in ‘early warnings’ and ‘preventative diplomacy’.
650 As in the UN ‘Millennium Report’ (A/54/2000), p.45.
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internal politics o f  the weakest sets o f states in the international system. Needless to say this is a 
significant development for an organisation whose raison d ’etre was the theoretical sovereign- 
equality o f all its member-states, and whose documentary output has so studiously sought to 
buffer and uphold such a principle— as it was with the Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties o f 
States (CERDS) and other seminal General Assembly resolutions o f the 1960s and 1970s.
The emerging picture o f world order in the periphery we are left with then is one where the 
continued importance o f the sovereign state-system as an over-arching organising principle o f 
international politics has been tailored to legitimate the international intercession and oversight o f 
a certain bottom-rung o f member-states. With the creation o f different categories o f  states—  
encouraged by the various UN and G-7 doctrines o f ‘Failed States’, ‘Collapsed States’ and 
‘Rogue States’— the obstacle o f ‘sovereign-equality’ has been overcome and a general regime o f 
international surveillance and intercession institutionalised to selectively oversee or govern the 
lower tiers o f this new hierarchy. The UN’s emphasis o f work today is indeed towards 
monitoring, managing, and occasionally remaking the political side o f states that fall within this 
subordinate category o f the capitalist state-system.651
This type o f inter-state hierarchy has o f course been complimented by the reworking o f the 
political and economic wiring o f a great many Southern states that followed the end o f the Cold 
War and the expansion o f the global capitalist system. Most importantly this has seen the Third 
World state reconfigured to become much more susceptible to Western public and private 
influence— particularly to the influence o f various sides ‘global governance’. Here, while certain 
institutions o f the state have been strengthened and bolstered by international organisations and 
Western state aid— such as national armies, border police, judiciaries— other elements o f  the state 
have been deliberately weakened by such external intervention.652 Getting the state out o f the 
economy and out o f providing some ‘public goods’ such as utilities, healthcare and education are 
the most obvious and cited examples here. But it has also entailed, as implied above, creating 
political systems and regimes that are far more permeable to G-7 public and private interests and 
influences through, for instance, the creation o f social and political forces that share roughly the 
same neo-liberal values and ideologies. The UN is playing its part here too, with an increasing
651 Though o f  course the UN is also called-upon to involve itself, more irregularly, in situations which are 
important sites o f  inter-capitalist competition or o f  significant geo-political value— such as in Iraq, Kosovo, 
and Bosnia.
652 A point that has been made by Tom Young in: Readings in African Politics, (Oxford: James Currey, 
2003), p.4.
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emphasis o f its work and public pronouncements targeting various elements o f ‘civil society’ and 
focused on circumnavigating ‘the state’ so that it can deal directly with ‘the people.’653 Yet, 
having said all o f this about new elaborate forms o f intercession, good-old fashioned Western 
imperialism and proxy-rule cannot be discounted. For instance, in a case such as Afghanistan it is 
not at all clear what differentiates its current incarnation as a pro-Anglo-American ‘democratic’ 
regime led by Hamid Karzai from the barefaced installation o f proxy rulers in the past— whether 
it was by Moscow in Kabul in the 1980s and in Chechnya in the early 2000s or by Washington in 
countless other Third World contexts.654
These remarkable exceptions apart, however, the overall point that needs to be conveyed is that in 
general the nature o f  the state in the South has undergone significant transformations at the hands 
o f the UN and others and is, more than at any time since the colonial period, seen as the 
legitimate object o f intercession and direct intervention by these Western-orientated international 
entities. Here what appears to be emerging is a certain global hierarchy o f states, whose members 
are rated according to their level o f incorporation into the liberal capitalist system, with those 
most enlightened ones entitled to comment on and ‘progress’ those much further-down the ladder. 
The United Nations is at the forefront o f the institutionalisation o f this new inequality at the 
interstate level, with its programme o f work disproportionately trained on conducting political 
operations in the borderlands of international capitalism.
653 See ‘Millennium Report’ (A/54/2000) and the ‘Human-Centred Approach to security’ which it puts 
forward for a seminal UN attempt to put the ‘rights’ o f  individuals at least on the same par as the ‘rights’ o f  
states. Recently this type o f  balance has been put forward in the high-profile report by the secretary-general 
entitled: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights fo r  all, (A/59/2005, 31 March 
2005). O f course, this recent report, discussed during the 59th session o f  the General Assembly in New  
York in September 2005, is a broad ranging attempt by UN managers to regain the initiative in light o f  the 
shifts that international politics has been going through since 11 September 2001, including establishing 
terrorism and counter-terrorism on the U N ’s agenda o f  work, raising the profile o f  counter-proliferation, 
human rights and democracy promotion (all o f  which remain the essence o f  the G-8 agenda) and proposing 
a relatively large-scale reform programme o f  UN organs (the Security Council). The report also tries to 
draw a line under the arguments over the Iraq war that proved so divisive in 2002-2003 (paragraph 10).
654 Karzai’s regime is a barely concealed front for the Anglo-American alliance: the British and American 
Embassies in Kabul virtually direct executive policy in the country, such as it relates to tackling opium 
production for instance. As far as Chechnya is concerned, after a brutal war o f  independence between 
1994-1996, and the subsequent withdrawal o f  the Russian army from the territory, Moscow reinvaded in 
1999 and installed a local puppet administrator, Akhmad Kadyrov (later ‘elected’ president in October
2003). Kadyrov was subsequently assassinated in Groznyy in May 2004 by the Chechen resistance.
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IThe continued bu t contested A m erican hegemony of the United Nations
In the end, the unique role o f the UN in our current era needs to be understood in the context o f 
an evolving US led world-capitalist order. Not only is the UN itself a product o f the unique liberal 
peace that the US practically forged after 1945 but it has, to a large extent, recently been 
recalibrated to articulate contemporary US needs after its international social victory over the 
Second and Third World from the mid-1980s onwards. Indeed, after this ‘victory’ the UN’s 
programme o f work was refashioned to undertake a formal role in expanding and maintaining this 
international capitalist social system in the periphery o f the world system. It is simply the case 
that UN’s agenda o f  work— in this instance its overbearing emphasis on peace operations—  
cannot be understood outside o f this wider political context. Yet, the US hegemony o f the 
organisation that allows, in large part, for the evolution o f the UN’s specific political role is one 
that is never quite complete or total; rather it is one that is continually shifting and evolving. Most 
obviously in the 1970s, the UN was seen as a virtual pariah in the US for its radical ‘Third 
Worldism’ and, much more recently, seen as ‘irrelevant’ by the George W. Bush Administration 
because o f  its insubordinate refusal to endorse a pre-emptive war on Iraq. But it has to be said 
that in the midst o f another attempt to refashion the organisation to articulate emerging US 
concerns o f counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and democracy promotion, the UN’s strategic 
place in underpinning a specific US inspired inter-state capitalist order remains unchallenged.
In the first place our contemporary world order—with its entire global organisational 
infrastructure— remains rooted in a specific peace settlement that was designed by the US to 
replace or at least moderate a world dominated by Europe. It was in fact an idea that went back to 
the First World War and Woodrow Wilson’s vision o f a world social order that would see the end 
o f empires (in some places) and the gradual universalisation o f nation-states peacefully coexisting 
with a private world economy. This vision was one that sat comfortably with the rising economic 
and political power o f the US in the 1940s— which needed domestic and international markets for 
the products that its fast-growing industries were churning-out, primary resources to feed these 
Fordist industries and which yearned to compete without the general inequality o f empire trading 
blocks and monopolies.655 The US vision of world order then was one that was not only put 
forward as an alternative to the model that the Bolshevik Revolution held-out in 1917, but one 
that was also in direct opposition to other peer European competitors. As Neil Smith has put the 
matter in a recent study:
655 Deudney and Ikenberry, ‘The nature and sources o f  liberal international order’, p. 192.
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‘ ...A m erican globalism...represents a long-term strategic rebuttal o f  European 
colonialism and anticolonial movements alike. Simultaneously a precursor and a 
successor to Soviet socialism, American globalism also supersedes the two-hundred-year 
old nexus o f  world power connecting European states and their colonies.’656
The United Nations, no less than the Marshall Plan, NATO, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, were all structurally designed to underpin, promote and secure this ‘American 
globalism’, as Smith terms it. This is not to say that various facets o f these institutions did not 
contradict or undercut each other at one time or another; at the outset for instance, as Peter 
Gowan has delineated, there was a fundamental tension between the ideal o f a universal 
collective security mechanism o f the UN and the practical regional arrangements, such as NATO, 
that US military planners were far more comfortable relying on.657 And o f course the US did in 
the end depend on mechanisms such as NATO for protecting and corralling the capitalist core—  
or to paraphrase its first secretary-general Lord Ismay, to keep the Soviets ‘out’, the Americans 
‘in’ and the Germans ‘down’.658 But it is to insist that the inter-state infrastructure that was 
established after World War II— regional or international, political or economic— was meant to 
support a hidden and ‘spaceless’ geography o f US public and private power.659
The place o f the United Nations in this ‘American Century’ was to act as the political congress 
for a world increasingly made-up of independent and formally equal nation-states and 
decreasingly organised around empire blocks. While, as alluded to above, this vision was partially 
frustrated and replaced by other types o f US oversight such as NATO, the UN did manage to 
fashion a role outside the capitalist core and in the periphery. Indeed, in its early years the UN 
was explicitly and controversially used to help extradite European powers from its traditional 
spheres (Suez and West Irian), or at least replace them after their premature departure (as in 
Jerusalem and Congo). But these extreme conveyance roles that the UN performed in its early 
years were put on hold by the Cold War and the entrance o f radically aligned Third World states 
into the organisation who supposedly ‘hijacked’ its agenda. On the one hand, the Security
656 Smith, American Empire, p.2.
657 See Gowan’s U S iU N ’ article for his particular argument relating to the triumph o f the regional security 
protectorate system over the UN collective security system.
658 The purpose o f  NATO, according to Lord Ismay, was: ‘ ...to  keep the Russians out, Americans in, and 
Germans down.’ Cited in: Deudney and Ikenberry ‘The nature and sources o f  liberal international order’, 
p. 183.
659 Smith, American Empire, p. 17.
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Council became locked not by the French and British veto o f US inspired international censure, 
as was the case during the Suez crisis, but by the Soviet realisation that the forum could act as a 
mechanism for policing the capitalist ‘rimlands’— a lesson that the Soviet Union learnt after its 
unfortunately timed absence from the Security Council allowed the body to sanction US military 
action against North Korea in order to return the peninsula back into the nascent capitalist 
political economy that was being forged in the Far East at the time.660 One important consequence 
o f this stalemate in the Security Council was that it shifted the balance o f power towards the other 
consultative organs, especially towards the General Assembly whose output increased 
exponentially. And with the membership o f the Assembly growing at an unforeseen rate, and the 
political character o f these new members broadly hostile to what was seen as ‘Yankee 
Imperialism’, this output began to challenge the US vision of the United Nations. From the 
podium o f  the General Assembly, Third World leaders denounced every aspect o f  US foreign 
policy as well as continued European colonialism and racism. Che Guevara’s address to the 
Assembly in December 1964 is perhaps emblematic though rarely cited:
‘We would like to see this assembly shake itself out o f  complacency and move forward. 
We would like to see the committees begin their work and not stop at the first 
confrontation. Imperialism wants to turn this meeting into a pointless oratorical 
tournament, instead of solving the serious problems of the world. We must prevent it 
from doing so....W e feel we have the right and the obligation to do so, because our 
country is one o f the most constant points o f  friction. It is one of the places where the 
principles upholding the right o f small countries to sovereignty are put to the test day by 
day, minute by minute. At the same time our country is one o f the trenches o f  freedom in 
the world, situated a few steps from United States imperialism, showing by its actions, its 
daily example, that the present conditions o f humanity the peoples can liberate 
themselves and keep themselves free.’661
It was only with the end o f the Cold War and the collapse of the Third World development- 
orientated state in the late 1980s that the US was able, through its new ability to coral various 
organs o f  the UN, to refashion the organisation’s place in world order management. This was a 
sort o f  reversal o f the process that the UN underwent in the 1960s and 1970s: the end o f the
660 On the Korean War: Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f  the Korean War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981).
661 Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara Address to the 19th Session o f  the General Assembly o f  the United Nations, 11 
December 1964.
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Soviet veto in the late 1980s unlocked the stalemate o f the Security Council and resulted in a shift 
in power back from the General Assembly to this great-power forum; and the material and 
diplomatic disciplining o f  political regimes in the Third World, as a result o f the debt crisis and 
Soviet ‘New Thinking’, brought many non-aligned states back into the Western fold.662 These 
changed correlation o f forces within the UN has given rise to a specific and limited agenda of 
reform that has essentially focused on jettisoning those international economic roles that the UN 
picked-up in the 1970s and turning to those activities that it does ‘best’. As it turns out the types 
o f  activities that the UN does ‘best’ here are exactly those controversial and extreme political 
ones, within states, at the periphery o f the international system, designed to progress a place and 
its people into liberal civilisation, that the UN conducted when it was last an unremitting 
American proxy in the 1950s and 1960s. O f course we know by now how contemporary UN 
peace roles differ from these early formative ones; but the simple point to be made here is that 
there should be no surprise at the widespread incidents of these generic political activities when 
the organisation is dominated by the US. What perhaps is unique in our current period is the 
lacklustre opposition o f  subject states to these controversial political roles that the UN routinely 
conducts.663
But even when the US enjoys uncontested control o f the organisation, as it largely does today, 
there are parameters in which the US cannot diverge if  it wishes to maintain organisational 
backing. In one sense this clearly relates to key occurrences o f inter-state capitalist and geo­
political competition, for example, as happened with the refusal o f China and Russia to allow the 
UN to legitimise the NATO bombing o f Serbia in 1999. More recently it has also become 
patently clear in relation to the French, German, and Russian opposition— in the narrowest 
sense— to Anglo-American plans to manufacture UN support for the US-UK invasion o f Iraq in 
2003. This divergence o f interests was remarkable for its intensity, which included the utilisation 
o f  the full gamut o f  diplomatic tools available to these capitalist powers for pressuring countries 
in key non-permanent positions in the Security Council to line-up in their coalitions.664 This was
662 Recall too that previously the ‘Second World’ states o f Eastern Europe that had now become pro- 
Western helped shift the balance in the General Assembly back towards the US during this period.
663 Although impassioned denouncements o f  Western foreign policy occasionally reappear in the General 
Assembly (such as by Hugo Chavez), one can hardly imagine the type o f  robust and frequent rebuttal o f  
UN and US imperialism that radical Third World leaders, such as Che Guevara, espoused in the 1960s and 
1970s.
664 For example recall the degree o f  lobbying that the UK, Spain and US engaged in to persuade Chile, 
Angola, and Mexico (all holding non-permanent seats on the Security Council) to vote for a draft resolution 
giving Iraq an ultimatum to comply with certain demands in March 2003 (S/2003/215, 7 March 2005, 
Provisional) as well as the successful counter-lobbying by France and Russia.
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not o»f course a principled opposition: after all, the UN has sanctioned over a decade o f 
unrelenting air strikes and crippling sanctions against the country and has, post-facto, been quite 
happy to  quickly ‘move-on’ and legitimise the 2003 Anglo-American occupation. But what it 
does serve to show is the continued importance o f great power inter-state capitalist competition 
over Ikey geo-strategic regions o f the globe and the way in which this type o f conflict can serve to 
fracture what is ultimately a delicate US consensus in the world body.
A fter the refusal o f the UN to endorse the pre-emptive Iraq war, various parts o f the US 
establishm ent have sought to rebuild Washington’s hegemony along much firmer lines through 
the tried  and tested means o f politically and materially disciplining the organisation.665 One angle 
o f attack  has been an attempt to place pressure on Kofi Annan for his role in allowing for a 
fracture o f the organisation. Most important here has been the effort o f the US Senate’s 
‘Perm anent Subcommittee on Investigations’ to tar the secretary-general with the 
m ism anagem ent and abuse o f the UN’s Oil-For-Food programme in Iraq, claiming that his son 
K ojo Annan was able to use his family connections to secure lucrative contracts for his former 
em ployer, Cotecna, which were still paying him a monthly retainer. It was largely as a way o f 
regaining the initiative, or at least taking it out the hands o f hostile US Senators, that UN mangers 
com m issioned in 2004 Paul Volcker, a former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, to form a 
com m ittee to look into the matter o f the Oil-for-Food programme and Annan’s role in it. To no- 
one’s great surprise, Volcker has found in favour o f the secretary-general, suggesting that Kojo 
had deceived his unsuspecting and trusting father.666 Senator Nat Coleman, Chairman of the 
‘Perm anent Subcommittee on Investigations’, however, has remained unmoved:
‘Kofi Annan is responsible for the failed management that resulted in the fraud and abuse 
o f the Oil-for-Food Program. His lack o f leadership, combined with conflicts o f interest 
and lack responsibility and accounting point to one, and only one, outcome: His 
resignation.’667
665 In March 2003, Richard Perle was one o f  the first to attack the U N ’s betrayal with relation to Iraq. He 
told The Spectator: ‘Saddam Hussein’s reign o f  terror is about to end...H e will go quickly, but not alone: in 
a parting irony he will take the United Nations down with him.’ Perle cited in: ‘U.N. Still Battered By U.S. 
A ction On Iraq’, Barbara Crossette, Unwire (NYC), 1 July 2003. More recently, former US ambassador to 
the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, informed the US Congress in March 2005: ‘I think we either need 
to reform it or destroy it.’ ‘Annan has a plan to revitalise U .N .’, Maggie Farley, Los Angeles Times, 19 
March 2005.
666 On the Volcker Commission, its reports and findings, see the official website: <www.icc-offp.org>.
667 Senator Nat Coleman, 29 March 2005: ‘Statement regarding Second Volcker Report on UN Oil-For- 
Food Scandal.’ Available from: <http://coleman.senate.gov>.
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In any event, the pressure applied on the UN from different quarters within the US has seemed to 
pay off, with UN officials bending over themselves to prove their relevance and worth. While the 
Volcker Commission was about protecting and re-establishing the credibility o f the UN and its 
secretary-general in the US, the UN has also sought to stress to Washington its willingness to 
reform. Indeed the most important opening gambit in this regard has been the publication in 
March 2005 o f a wide-ranging report by the secretary-general outlining a new agenda for the 
organisation, under the title In Larger Freedom , which mimics aspects o f the foreign policy 
phraseology o f George W. Bush’s administration.668
This report and current efforts to reform the organisation must also be seen in the larger context 
o f the shifting emphasis o f  US foreign policy since 11 September 2001. Indeed, it can be fairly 
stated that as a result o f a much more activist ‘grand strategy’ that has been pursued by the US 
since the attacks on the ‘Twin-Towers’ and Pentagon, the UN has become the subject once again 
o f a significant bid to refashion its work. Here the UN is most definitely in another general phase 
o f  reconstitution— over its programme o f work and even its legislative structure— although the 
overall shape o f this is difficult to discern at this stage. What is apparent is that UN mangers have 
sought to regain the initiative by proposing a wholesale redefinition o f the UN’s place in 
international politics that retains its primary political roles of democracy and human rights 
promotion and institution-building in the peripheiy but includes a bigger place on its agenda for 
emerging G-8 and especially US concerns.669 It is clear here that terrorism and counter-terrorism, 
proliferation and non-proliferation, and a greater focus on democracy promotion are a series o f 
issues that are gradually being internalised into the UN’s agenda by a desire to placate the US 
establishment after the Iraq war and the ‘War on Terror’ in general. With relation to other G-8 
states, and emerging Asian and South American powers, it seems that proposals relating to the 
expansion o f  the Security Council were meant to assure concerns that the body no longer fitted
668 Though o f  course in the detail o f  the report, the phraseology does differ from the Bush position on many 
issues, especially those surrounding aid and development. It is much closer on the issues o f  UN reform, 
democracy, human rights and terrorism.
669 ‘Annan has a plan to revitalise U.N.: the world body is facing a crisis o f  confidence. The secretary- 
general will present a blueprint to make it more effective and accountable’, Maggie Farley, Los Angeles 
Times, 19 March 2005.
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with contemporary geo-political ‘realities’— though this tactic is already floundering on regional 
rivalries.670
It remains to be seen what will be the outcome o f this new process o f reconstitution that the UN is 
beginning to go through again at the hands o f the US. It is possible that a new regime o f 
surveillance o f Southern states designed to forestall revanchist competitors in key geo-strategic 
regions, otherwise known as ‘Rogue Regimes’, will emerge alongside all the other layers o f UN 
oversight o f the periphery. The Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism agendas in the UN 
are at least in part about institutionalising a material status quo globally. But two trends seem 
clear so long as the present correlation o f  forces in the UN remain broadly as they are: the UN 
will continue to underplay the sovereign-equality aspects o f its founding charter in favour o f a 
good governance agenda centred around democracy and human rights— the beneficial effect o f 
which for Western states and capital has been to slowly create various categories o f states. With 
the creation o f  these categories, the UN has helped fashion a lower-tier o f subordinate societies 
that are increasingly treated as the legitimate object o f  open international intercession and liberal 
‘advancement’. What is also not in doubt is that the UN will continue to play a major role in 
managing and administrating this ‘progress’ in the periphery o f the world-system until a far more 
fundamental political change in this system occurs. But perhaps if and when this happens, the 
UN ’s specificity in underpinning an American liberal capitalist order will become wholly 
apparent and the organisation will necessarily be cast-aside for some other regulatory mechanism. 
For the time being, however, the UN is evolving its doctrines and altering its outlook to be at the 
forefront o f the move to institutionalise a clear global hierarchy o f states and societies.
670 For example in relation to the creation o f  ‘new’ seats in the Security Council, Pakistan is lobbying 
against Indian membership, China against Japanese membership, and Argentina against Brazilian 
membership.
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Appendix 1
United Nations Security Council Vetoes 
Jan u a ry  1989 —  Decem ber 2005
Y ear D ate Subject M em ber S tate 
C asting Veto
2004 October 5 Israel -  demanding halt to 
military operations in 
Occupied Arab Territories
USA
2004 April 21 UNFICYP -  termination of 
mandate in Cyprus
RUSSIA
2004 March 25 Israel -  condemnation o f  the 
assassination o f Ahmed 
Yassin
USA
2003 October 14 Israel -  the construction of 
separation wall in the 
Occupied Arab Territories
USA
2003 September 16 Israel -  threat to ‘remove’ 
Yasser Arafat
USA
2002 December 16 Israel -  the killing o f UN 
employees
USA
2002 June 30 Bosnia and ICC -  renewal o f 
peacekeeping mandate and 
the immunity o f US troops 
from ICC prosecution
USA
2001 December 14 Israel -  withdrawal from 
Occupied Arab Territories
USA
2001 March 27 Israel -  the establishment of 
UN observer force in 
Occupied Arab Territories
USA
1999 February 25 UNPREDEP -  extension to 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
CHINA
1997 March 21 Israel -  halt o f settlement 
building in Jabal Abu 
Ghneim in Occupied East 
Jerusalem
USA
1997 March 7 Israel -  halting o f settlement 
building in Occupied East 
Jerusalem
USA
1997 January 10 Guatemala -  authorisation o f 
observers
CHINA
1995 May 17 Israel -  expropriation of 
Palestinian territories
USA
221
1994 December 2 Bosnia -  free access of 
humanitarian goods
RUSSIA
1993 May 11 Cyprus -  finances RUSSIA
1990 May 30 Israel -  establishment o f 
commission to examine 
conditions in the Occupied 
Arab Territories
USA
1990 January 17 Panama -  violation of 
diplomatic immunities
USA
1989 December 23 Panama -  invasion by USA FRANCE, UK, 
USA
1989 November 7 Israel -  situation in Occupied 
Arab Territories
USA
1989 June 9 Israel -  situation in Occupied 
Arab Territories
USA
1989 February 17 Israel -  situation in Occupied 
Arab Territories
USA
1989 January 11 Libya -  complaint against the 
shooting down o f aircraft by 
US
FRANCE, UK, 
USA
Sources: Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure o f  the UN Security Council, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.236-7 and Global Policy Forum 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto.htm
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Appendix 2
United N ations Peacekeeping O perations 
Ja n u a ry  1989 —  D ecem ber 2005
Region C ountry UN
PEA C EK EEPIN G
O PER A TIO N
Y ear
AFRICA :
Angola UNAVEM I 1989-91
UNAVEM II 1991-95
UNAVEM III 1995-97
MONUA 1997-99
Aouzou Strip UNASOG 1994-94
Burundi ONUB 2005-ff
Central African 
Republic
MINURCA 1998-2000
Democratic 
Republic O f 
Congo
MONUC 1999-ff
Ethiopia & 
Eritrea
UNMEE 2000-ff
Ivory Coast UNOCI 2004-ff
Liberia UNOMIL 1993-97
UNMIL 2003-ff
Mozambique ONUMOZ 1992-94
Namibia UNTAG 1989-90
Rwanda UN AMIR 1993-96
Sierra Leone UNOMSIL 1998-99
UNAMSIL 1999-2005
Somalia UNOSOM I 1992-93
UNOSOM II 1993-95
Sudan UNMIS 2005-ff
Uganda-Rwanda UNOMUR 1993-94
Western Sahara MINURSO 1991-ff
ASIA:
Cambodia UNAMIC 1991-92
UNTAC 1992-93
East Timor UNTAET 1999-2002
UNMISET 2002-ff
Georgia UNOMIG 1993-ff
Kuwait UNIKOM 1991-2003
Tajikistan UNMOT 1994-2000
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C EN TR A L 
A M ER IC A  & 
CARRIBEAN:
Central America ONUCA 1989-92
El Salvador ONUSAL 1991-95
Guatemala MINUGUA 1997
Haiti UNMIH 1993-96
UNSMIH 1996-98
UNTMIH 1997
MIPONUH 1997-2000
MINUSTAH 2004-ff
EX
YUGOSLAVIA:
Former Yugoslavia UNPROFOR 1992-95
Bosnia UNMIBH 1995-2002
Croatia UNCRO 1995-96
UNTAES 1996-98
UNMOP 1996-2002
UNPSG 1998-98
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia
UNPREDEP 1995-99
Kosovo UNMIK 1999-ff
Sources: United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review o f  United Nations Peace-keeping (New 
York: United Nations Department o f Information, 1996) and 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp
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